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HITSQUADS

TESTIMONY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY POLICEMAN:
THE FULL STORY

by

CAPTAIN DIRK COETZEE

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Preface

What my brother Dirk had to say could not be presented as a mere string of facts, one isolated incident after another. The facts form a web, which is the frightening and unassailable world of the South African security police, the country that it envelops and the lives that become entangled and destroyed in it.

Dirk had dared to challenge this power and fallen in disfavour. When ex colleague Nofomela on the eve of his execution revealed the existence of police hit squads to escape the noose, the writing was on the wall. Dirk would become a scapegoat and disappear into their huge grave yard of oblivion. My brother is a formidable fighter but in South Africa he stood no chance. He went into exile and found sanctuary with the African National Congress, who have for so many years attempted to break the grip that the security police, and the oppressive system it sustained, had on South Africa.

For months Dirk has been trying desperately to tell the world about the web but every time he opened his mouth a solid stream of unorganized facts poured forth. He has a vast store of information and he could bubble over endlessly with it but he became exasperated by his inability to let the world hear what he was really trying to say. A judicial commission of enquiry was appointed but the attorneys were dealing with his testimony as professionals who have to consider the mandate and the dictates of the Commission. This would also not tell the full story as Dirk saw it.

Dirk phoned me from exile one Sunday evening and shouted help! He knew what stood in his way and was tearing off the nice garments that were strapping him in. For two weeks he wanted nothing of mandates and legal technicalities. He had set about in his formidable manner to do things his way.

An impromptu flight to Lusaka ensued. I bungled through the unfamiliar environment of international departures with a small travel bag and a huge array of word processing excess luggage, scrounged from all and sundry. We sat isolated in a remote ANC sanctuary. The kind and human faces of our long exiled compatriots came and went around us. He talked and I typed and together we fought and organized and reorganized information until he was satisfied that what he wanted to say stood there clearly for anyone to read and understand.

For two weeks we had very little sleep. The computer often turned on us. We took time off only to eat, do washing and fight off lawyers that could not know what we were attempting. They had made commitments and were now becoming panicky about the too fast approaching commission date. The tension was tremendous but after a week we had a sample and the legal men seemed satisfied. The pressure was subsiding but at the end of a fortnight we had to interrupt the work to go to London, legal representatives and the commission.

Our document did not make it into the commission, but we found time to complete it in London. At the end of another week we had a book - this book - written by a man who wanted the truth out; with the help of his lay brother. The full story as he would have liked to tell it to the judge will out.

An incredibly checkered life of achievements and atrocities is before me. At the end of it his casual comment during this ordeal comes to mind: "I am like a racing July donkey. One clout on the side of the head and I am in the rough, uprooting trees. Another clout and I am back on the track, going for a certain win". May the world have mercy!

Ben Coetzee

21 April 1990

Several factors prevented my brother from producing a reasonably spell-checked document in Lusaka and London. Neither of us are good at spelling. We had precious little time, a temperamental computer and a primitive word processing package.

I have now converted the electronic text to a more modern word processing document. This enabled me to use a different font, a variety of letter sizes, bold face and paragraph justification. I also corrected the bulk of the numerous spelling errors but did not as much as touch the original grammar, idiom, choice of words or sentence construction for fear of changing the meaning in any way.

This is the precise original text, spell checked to some extent and with a different type face.

Ben Coetzee

1994
Roodepoort
South Africa

TESTIMONY

I, Dirk Johannes Coetzee, South African Police pensioner with the rank of Captain, Force Number W56470E and South African Identification Number 450415 5027 00 3, declare under oath the following:-

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 During the 5 years from January, 1977 to December, 1981 I served in the Security Branch of the South African Police. As members of this branch, my colleagues and I enjoyed a special protection that enabled us to perform various illegal operations within and outside the borders of the Republic of South Africa and in and outside of the course of duty.
- 1.2 This protection that enabled us to operate above the laws of the country and above the rules and regulations of the police, was not statutory and is hard to define. It is vested in a culture belonging to a clique that is more like a close-knit family. The culture is a syndrome of arrogant exclusiveness - of being above the law - of secrecy, necessity, loyalty to one another, mutual trust and mutual understanding; and of a very special relationship between superiors and subordinates. Aspects of this culture, such as the exclusiveness, secrecy and necessity are explicitly and implicitly respected by the rest of the police force and by the subservient community at large
- 1.3 This same protection, however, became a desperate liability once I fell in disfavour with the security clique. For a long time they have been out to destroy me with overt as well as covert incriminations and it is well nigh impossible to expose the truth.
- 1.4 Not only our culture, but also our dispositions, skills, methods and techniques had much in common with those of a close-knit gang of thugs. We differed from other thugs in that we form part of the broader police community appointed to bring such thuggery to justice. We also differed from other thugs in that our dispositions and skills were employed "constructively", in terms of the government aims and policies that were being furthered by our operations.
- 1.5 The security culture was not formally taught. We grew into it, with our progress depending on our attitudes towards the ANC and our personalities and our skills. Our progress in turn determined our acceptability and direction of

specialization. The contrast in my behaviour between the uniform and security branches illustrates the changed working culture that I grew into, while my single authentic personality is clearly discernable in both environments as well as in earlier and childhood years.

- 1.6 Our operations often spanned more than one country, with illegalities on one or both sides of the border. The illegalities included various more or less related crimes, including murder, attempted murder, victimization, assault, theft, border violations and others. Illegalities in the course of duty often gave rise to illegalities outside the call of duty; and illegalities outside the call of duty, as well as by criminals outside the police force, were condoned to serve the ends of Security Police operations. We were, as part of the culture, quite unconcerned with bringing a car thief to justice if such a thief can serve our ends. Our informants were quite typically criminals
- 1.7 It is not possible to accurately evaluate my testimony on Security Police illegalities without a proper appreciation of these introductory remarks. Without due consideration of these various topics, in as much as they thus relate to illegal operations, we are playing technical games and we are not interested in exposing the essential truth. We have to understand that the South African Police Security Branch, especially Sections A and C, do not recruit people like Johan Heyns, Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak or the Pope, do not have the same aims and approach and do not operate under the same restrictions .
- 1.8 It is similarly not possible, without a true appreciation of these introductory remarks, to understand the full implications of appointing an experienced member of the Security Police family, who reports to experienced members of this family, to control an investigation into allegations of Security Police irregularities; especially if these allegations are from a former member of the family with whom the security police have a long standing feud. Such an appointee, being a member in good standing, of the elitist clique, will remember their loyalties, but forget their special skills, and experiences and don an ordinary detective cap to search for evidence that they know they will not find.
- 1.9 Moreover, the commission may be of the opinion that parts of my testimony is not relevant to its very specific objectives and discussion of isolated incidents in my life would suffice to meet these objectives. However, we do have a public audience. Such discussion could cause a distorted public opinion about me that may be of no interest to the commission but may be of crucial importance to me. I am therefore quite happy to assist the commission in its task by providing whatever information, but I beg the commission to bear with me when I put all information into proper context for the public. I do not want these procedures to serve to discredit me, albeit not the intention.

- 1.10 I am of the opinion that this document could serve as a potent propaganda document. However, if the truth is propaganda, so let it be.
- 1.11 I offered to testify before the commission, full knowing what I am up against. Whatever the outcome, I wish to ensure that the relevant facts are presented in proper context as I see it and that it is presented in full view of the world. With respect, I wish to do so without being hampered by legal technicalities such as the scope of the commissions mandate, the manner in which my story should unfold and the effect all this might have on the structure of my story. I am telling it as it is, I am presenting it in English and I am publicizing it worldwide. I am in exile to expose and not to be co-opted into a cover-up.
- 1.12 Owing to the pressing circumstances of cross examination, I expect to have to revert to my mother tongue more often than not.

2. MY LIFE BEFORE JOINING THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

2.1. Recognize me?

I will highlight some of the important aspects of my life before joining the police force as these have bearing on my suitability for security work, my behaviour under various circumstances and on later attempts to discredit me.

2.2 Early years and school years (1945 to 1963)

2.2.1 I was born in Pokwani, South Africa, and grew up in Pretoria in a very much traditional, loving and caring Afrikaans family. My parents, both of whom are still alive, were honest, hard working and unselfish. They enjoy the highest respect of my brother, sister and I.

2.2.2 I can not really describe any outstanding characteristics of my primary school days. As a high school pupil, I was only interested in sport. In 1963 I was selected as winger for the final trials to select a Northern Transvaal school rugby team, when a broken arm put paid to this opportunity. I was also captain of my school athletic team and participated in most events, including sprints, long jump, high jump, shot put, hurdles (I broke Avril Malan's long standing hurdle record at school and was still holding it twelve years later). I captained my swimming team and participated in swimming sprints.

2.2.3 The academic activities at school were an absolute bore and a pain. I had to repeat Standard 9 and had to do additional exams to gain matric after initially only passing four subjects. This liability, together with my rebellious nature, insistence on what I regarded as my rights and my short temperedness, caused considerable friction between me and the teachers. My sense of humour did add an amicable dimension in my relationship with similarly minded teachers. I nevertheless objected strongly in principle to physical punishment at school and during the last two years at school I refused to subject myself to such punishment.

2.2.4 Later in my adult life, corporal punishment to my children at school prompted me to write to the Minister of Education on three occasions and brought me into much conflict with the South African education establishment. I did in fact manage to be proved correct on these occasions and to stop malpractices in this regard - details of these educational malpractices and feuds, are a topic for another entire can of worms.

2.3 Post Office and military training (January 1964 to March 1970)

2.3.1 I joined the Post Office in January 1964 and started off with a two year stint as a general clerk in the varied operations field. Here I gained wide enough experience, showed a thorough enough understanding of the Post Office activities and showed enough ability to identify irregularities, to become one of eight select members that investigated irregularities in the Transvaal - Witwatersrand excluded.

2.3.2 Within this select group I again distinguished myself to the extent that I received special commendation from the Post Office. None of my cases remained unsolved. During this period I collaborated closely with police handwriting experts, detectives and the flying squad dog handlers.

2.3.3 My Post Office activities were interrupted from July 1966 to March 1967, when I volunteered for service in the South African Navy.

2.3.4 My wife Karin and I got married on 19 July 1969.

3. EXEMPLARY SERVICE IN THE POLICE UNIFORM BRANCH (April 1970 to December 1976)

3.1 The same man, still a different place

3.1.1 As a result of my growing interest in investigation work, I joined the South African Police on April Fools Day 1970.

3.1.2 My considerable achievements and exemplary service in the uniform branch of the South African Police contrasts sharply with my criminal career that was to follow in the security culture of the same police force. I offer a summary of my service in the uniform branch in support of my submission that my criminal life in the security branch was part of an official security culture.

3.1.3 This contrast is not between the perfect uniform policeman and the perfect security thug. It is however strong enough to illustrate dramatic differences in behaviour by the same authentic Dirk Coetzee in these two environments; and if ever there is such a thing as exemplary conduct in the police, I qualified for this. In fact I got a medal to this effect in 1981 for what its worth.

3.1.4 All the traits that I have shown since childhood were finding expression. I displayed an ability to excel, to identify, expose and change things with zeal, associated bad temper and foul language and I displayed the ever present affinity for tomfoolery. In the uniform branch these traits were used constructively as I will illustrate.

3.2 Star Student constable

3.2.1 I was a Student Constable at Gezina Police Station in Pretoria for three months from April to June 1970. Here Luitenant-General Kobus Visser recommended the unusual step of issuing me with a vehicle and entrusting me with the investigation work of uniformed personnel.

3.2.2 In July 1970 I went to the Police College for six months training and was nominated as the best student in my Troop and later as the best student of 1970. I was also Troop Leader of Troop 37. During this six month period in the college I studied and passed four matric legal subjects, each in the first class.

3.3 Laying a sound foundation at Gezina

3.3.1 Back at Gezina in December 1970, the Pretoria North District detective commander, Colonel Kobus Visser who later became the CID chief with the rank of Luitenant-General, offered me the opportunity to join the CID branch. The chief of the handwriting section, Luitenant Fourie, with whom I became acquainted as a Post Office investigator, wanted me in his department. I turned down both these opportunities with the clear aim of wanting to start my police career with a thorough grounding of how a Police Station functions. I saw the police station as the heart of all police work and as the primary interface with the public, whom it serves.

3.3.2 At Gezina I gained experience of all facets of uniform work except those of the Station Commander and within six months passed the promotional examination with a first class to become Sergeant. I owe this early opportunity to write the examination, to recognition for my period of service in the Post Office. Here at Gezina, I was assigned to the detective branch while waiting for a dog handler's course to start. My success during these few weeks prompted the detective superiors to try and persuade me to cancel my approved application for the dog handlers course and stay on with them. I turned down this opportunity.

3.4 Dog school, flying squad and SCUBA diving team

3.4.1 In August 1972 I went to the dog school to be trained as a patrol dog handler. I qualified with my dog receiving an "A" certificate. At this stage four colleagues and I started the Pretoria police scuba diving team. In December 1972 I was transferred to the Pretoria police flying squad with my dog. I passed the Warrant Officer's examination with a first class in July 1973 and some weeks later was promoted accordingly.

3.5 Rhodesian bush war - my introduction to the security culture

3.5.1 During November 1973 I received anti-insurgency training and from January to March 1974 served in the Rhodesian bush war for the South African Police, as member in charge of the dog handlers based at Mount Darwin. The anti-insurgency training included the techniques of guerilla warfare of the ANC and Rhodesian and South African security forces.

3.5.2 Here we were co-opted to dispose of the bodies of slain freedom fighters. Us four dog handlers were commanded by Superintendent Saw, the British-South African Police station commander at Mount Darwin. A small unit of the

South African Security Police, under the command of Captain (now Brigadier) De Swart, were stationed at the same camp, working with the Rhodesian Special Branch.

3.5.3 One of Saw's senior uniform men were required to dispose of the corpses for the security police. We assisted him on several occasions because of the physical demands of digging the shallow graves. He was required to render the bodies unrecognizable. The bodies were transported by Landrover on the road to Bindura and disposed after turning left a small distance from Mount Darwin. A shallow grave was dug and lined with plastic. Dry branches were then put on the plastic. The bodies, as many as seven at a time, were put on the branches, covered with petrol from jerry cans and set alight. As soon as the bodies were sufficiently mutilated, with hands, feet and heads destroyed, the graves were covered with soil.

3.6 Sibasa - achievements, strychnine and future friends

3.6.1 I was transferred to Sibasa in June 1974 as second in charge of this police station. We controlled police activities in the budding "independent states" of Venda and Gazankulu. I looked after the administration and trained two sub-ordinates to take care of this function.

3.6.2 I encouraged all my sub-ordinates here to take promotional examinations, gave them the necessary lectures, and used old examination papers to teach them how to prepare for examinations most effectively. Most of these people are today senior officers in the Venda police force and still occasionally send me their regards. Examples of such people are the chief of the Venda police college, Colonel Mbara and the high ranking Nemajelili and Legudu

3.6.3 During this period I attended a boatsman's course at Binga, Lake Kariba in Rhodesia.

3.6.4 In 1975, whilst stationed at Sibasa, I wrote and passed my promotional examinations for Luitenant with a first class. I then had to attend an officer's course at the police college in Pretoria. We were 176 pupils in this class and I ended the course as one of the top ten in the class. I know this because at that stage promotions beyond the rank of Luitenant were first by class in chronological order and thereafter within class by performance on the course. I was among the first ten people from the class of the 1975 Officers School to be promoted in 1980 to the rank of Captain.

3.6.5 I do not know my position within the first ten. I do know, however, that Officers were urgently required in South West Africa and at the officers

course, Major-General Crafford recruited volunteers. I volunteered and was allocated to the post of Station Commander at Rheoboth. However, Luitenant-General Ben Venter, the then Deputy Commissioner of Police, previously commanding officer at the police college, cancelled the transfer to Rheoboth to assign me to the law section of the police college as a lecturer with effect from 1 January 1976. It was my instructors that informed me that I had initially been assigned to Rheoboth and that this change was because of my course results.

- 3.6.6 It was on the officer's course that I first received formal lectures on the ANC as a terrorist and communist organization. A special section "Preparing the police and public minds", Section 4.2, on this topic is justified since the views that I formed here prepared me for the willingness to carry out unconventional instructions. In this manner, these views helped me to gain acceptance and responsibility in the security branch.
- 3.6.7 I was promoted to the rank of Luitenant and returned to Sibasa in December 1975 to await my transfer.
- 3.6.8 Sibasa provided some other noteworthy experiences. Luitenant Tom Vreugtenburg was one of my Sibasa neighbours. His little mongrel dog had the utterly dirty habit of nightly entering my premises to urinate on my police dog's bowl of food. He thwarted all my attempts to fence him out. My neighbour Tom found this very amusing but I did not and I have no doubt at all that my dog Mica did not. He refused his food and I had to throw it away.
- 3.6.9 My other neighbour, Sergeant Daan Erasmus, currently a Warrant Officer in the law department of the police college, then came to my rescue. He introduced me to the details of strychnine poisoning, which once was widely used on jackal by farmers. He provided the strychnine and helped me prepare the bait. Here the mongrel story ends but a strychnine story starts. I have since twice used strychnine on dogs, once at Volksrust and once in Durban.
- 3.6.10 It was whilst stationed at Sibasa that I met Warrant Officer Koos Vermeulen, currently Major Vermeulen. He was station commander at the neighbouring Levubu Police Station. We became close friends and in later years Section C1 ("Hitsquad") colleagues. Koos and I were enthusiastic parrot catchers (Knysna Papegaai) at the time. On occasion, Koos, Tom Vreugtenburg, Daan Erasmus, one Alfred Tshivhasi - a politician with a checkered career, including a stint as cabinet minister in Venda - and I, went on special patrols to stock our garages with biltong from antelope that died in shooting incidents.

- 3.6.11 It was also at Sibasa that I befriended another future Section C1 man, David Tshikalanga alias Spyker. He attended school and in the afternoon did some gardening for me for pocket money.
- 3.7 Lecturer on the staff of the South African Police College**
- 3.7.1 On 9 January 1976 I started lecturing at the South African Police College. I lectured to numerous troops of Standard 8 and matric pupils for something like thirteen 35-minute periods per day and none of my students ever failed any of my subjects. I tried to avoid the mistakes that I fell victim to at school.
- 3.7.2 I treated my students like adults, did not attempt to dominate them and had understanding for their circumstances. They had to do late night cleaning for inspections and studying and after lunch you receive a tired, drilled and otherwise exhausted class. I gave them permission to sleep in my class whenever the need arose, provided they put up their hands first and informed me of their intentions. In this manner I could establish what their ability to absorb information was and whether I would be wasting their and my own time and should rather push harder when I got them fresh in a morning class. I would then not continue with the syllabus but would engage in any constructive discussion with those that wished to remain awake. This was a serious arrangement and I explained the rationale to them.
- 3.7.3 We officers at the college had to act as presiding officers in departmental trials where students were charged departmentally. The common charge was that students were absent from duty without leave over weekends or after hours during the week. The police authorities for this purpose assumed a student to be on duty for 24 hours each day in accordance with the definition of the word "duty" in Police Regulation 22. I interpreted this to mean that a policeman should always be available for duty in the broad sense otherwise each policeman should every night at home be charged for sleeping on duty and quite often for drinking - and whatever else - on duty. I argued that if the student was not assigned to any special duties during his otherwise off periods, he could not be guilty of absence from duty without leave.
- 3.7.4 This interpretation of mine was violently opposed at college officers' meetings. I was ridiculed and even instructed to rewrite the minutes of the trials in the absence of the trialed and then call in the trialed to sign the minutes. I bluntly refused and assisted students in preparing for their defence and an appeal should they be found guilty. The charge was a serious one with serious consequences such as being fined, losing pay and getting an official bad departmental record. As a result of such appeals, I was proved correct and the whole system of charging and punishing in this regard was changed.

- 3.7.5 Before this vindication of my views, the unpleasantness about the whole affair had led me to ask for a transfer.
- 3.7.6 With the Soweto uprising on 16 June 1976, I was in charge of a group of non commissioned officer instructors and student troops at John Vorster square in the gymnasium to guard key points in the city centre of Johannesburg and to assist at the mortuary. We helped to control relatives milling about to identify relatives that were killed in the uprising. At times there were as many as about 200 corpses, all blacks and packed wherever room could be found, such as in passages, under dissection tables, in foyers, in garages and so forth. This was another first hand experience of dealing with the "swart gevaar" communist onslaught.
- 3.7.7 My eldest son was born, another police victim to be, on 28 May 1976 whilst I was in the police college.
- 3.8 Volksrust - curbing crime, more strychnine, more future friends**
- 3.8.1 I arrived and accepted the command at Volksrust at the beginning of July 1976. Here I found that the towns business community were being harassed by a wave of housebreaking and theft. I immediately assigned three policemen to permanent night patrol to concentrate exclusively on housebreaking.
- 3.8.2 That year in December, when the housebreaking is supposed to be at its worst, we had not a single case of housebreaking. Immediately after I left, my housebreak preventing patrol was called off and housebreaking soared. The business community lodged an organized complaint at high level asking for an explanation for the renewed outbreak of crime.
- 3.8.3 We were very short staffed on the detective side when we received a complaint from one Oom Tienie, a bachelor farmer who stayed with his elderly mother on a farm along the road to Amersfoort. We had one tracker dog to serve a variety of needs over an enormous area and stray dogs had in one night killed nine of Oom Tienie's sheep. Some of the sheep were still alive when found but were maimed to the extent that they had to be put down. The tracker dog handler, Detective Constable Willie Mouton and I went to Oom Tienie who provide us with sheep liver and Willie managed to obtain strychnine. This was the end of the stray dogs and Oom Tinie's problem, but one dog poisoning story still remains to be told.

- 3.8.4 During this eventful year I did manage to pass Private Law I, and Introduction To The Study Of Law towards the B.Iuris degree via the University of South Africa.
- 3.8.5 Whilst stationed at Volksrust, Brigadier Ferdie Zietsman, head of the security police, sent Brigadier H R van der Hoven, his divisional commander of the Eastern Transvaal security police to recruit me for security. Brigadier van der Hoven came to see me in the company of his Ermelo security branch commander, Captain Nick Janse van Rensburg. These people have played a major role in my life ever since.
- 3.8.6 Brigadier Zietsman later went on pension as Luitenant-General Zietsman, the South African Police detective chief. Brigadier van der Hoven during 1981 became divisional commander, security police, Port Natal (Durban) where he went on pension around 1987 or 1988.
- 3.8.7 Captain Nick van Rensburg became Luitenant-Colonel on the staff of Colonel Gerrit Erasmus, divisional commander, security police, Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) in 1981. He later became regional commander, security police, Boland (Paarl) and in April 1989 was transferred to security head office, Pretoria, as Brigadier. He took over the command of Section C of the security police when Brigadier W F Schoon retired. This retirement had two years earlier been postponed at the request of the Cabinet. I think this was to wait for Brigadier Nick van Rensburg to become eligible as successor.
- 3.8.8 My interviewers offered me a job in the security branch, with a choice between Oshakati, Namibia, on the one hand and the Oshoek border post (Swaziland Border with South Africa) on the other hand. I accepted the Oshoek appointment, which fell under the command of Brigadier Van der Hoven.

4. THE CRIMINAL AND PROTECTIVE NATURE OF THE POLICE SECURITY CULTURE

4.1 Where I went and what I am up against

In order to be able to grasp how the kind of thuggery that I am about to relate, could have been ordered by the upper echelons of the security police and how difficult this would be to expose by an outcast from the security branch, a brief introduction to the security environment is appropriate.

4.2 Preparing the police and public minds - Sagmoedige Neelsie

4.2.1 I like many a young officer in all branches of the police force had the experience of listening to the lectures of Sagmoedige Neelsie ("Sweet Neelsie"), ie Brigadier Neels du Plooy from the security head quarters. Neelsie was also in good demand with the Koeksister Gild (appologies to Vrye Weekblad) including various concerned public societies, clubs and the like. Neelsie was accompanied on his information campaigns by one of the first ANC askaris, Bra Moss, currently a Captain in Section C1 at Vlakplaas and involved in the ongoing Piet Retief inquest.

4.2.2 Neelsie left nobody in any doubt about his credentials. He was a kindhearted, soft spoken and humble Christian with a formidable knowledge of the Enemy, which is the African National Congress and South African Communist Party Alliance. The equally timid and appropriately black Bra Moss, being a rehabilitated ANC terrorist, was as good a horses mouth as you may find anywhere. His dexterity with terrorist weapons invariably drew applause on him and Neelsie's crusades.

4.2.3 I was introduced to Neelsie when for more than half a day he lectured to our 1975 Officer's Course. We were kept in awe. From the moment Neelsie and Bra Moss entered the lecture room we were spellbound. There was none of the usual fidgeting and tomfoolery and when Neelsie spoke you could hear a needle drop. He entered with an arsenal of enemy armoury that had an ominous aura and was impressive to say the least. Neelsie's lectures consisted of cycles of emotion. He would start such a cycle in a calm and soft spoken manner and gradually work himself into a frenzy that left the audience in a trance.

4.2.4 Neelsie supported his lectures to we budding officers with a display of a collection of subversive and banned literature that ordinary citizens could only

whisper about and would never see. We were privileged to be let in on some of the innermost secrets of the onslaught.

4.2.5 The ANC was made out to be the most despicable threat imaginable to the Christian civilization in South Africa. They were Antichrists and communists - callous, heartless, cruel, killers of innocent Christian people. They hacked nuns to pieces and so forth.

4.2.6 In fact, come to think of it now, many of Neelsie's descriptions fitted the South African security police remarkably. But then, the security police are only fighting fire with fire and they are fighting for the survival of white Christian civilization, if you wish.

4.3 Quotable quotes

4.3.1 Brigadier Jan du Preez

4.3.1.1 "The general rule is that the Security Police or the Security Branch should adhere to all rules of the Legislator, including the police administration; the administrative rulings that apply to them. Now it is unfortunately so that the rules of the game of Security Work do not always permit this and there can be deviations at times depending on the particular circumstances, so there can be deviations from the rules. This is not to say that as far as the disciplinary rules are concerned they" and on being prompted to continue: "The disciplinary rules have nothing to do with the execution of the policeman's duties as member of the Security Branch, but in the execution of his statutory work there can at times be deviations."

4.3.1.2 This is a quote from Brigadier Jan du Preez as second in command of the security police at my internal trial on 23 July 1985 (Volume 12, Page 755 to 756 of the proceedings). The explanation stemmed from Brigadier Du Preez saying that I was often an unorthodox worker. Mr De Vos who appeared for me, begged Brigadier Du Preez "May I establish from you, in general, the unorthodox methods to which you referred within security context, do the Security Branch adhere strictly to the handbook prescriptions of how a case must be investigated".

4.3.1.3 "All I have against a kaffir is his colour" is another and cynical quote by Brigadier Jan du Preez to me personally. He generally makes no secret of his strong racist views as his colleagues and ex colleagues can attest.

4.3.2 Craig Williamson

- 4.3.2.1 "LAW ENFORCEMENT officers, such as members of the SAP and other organs of the security forces understand that the RSA is faced with a revolutionary onslaught which, if it is ever allowed to succeed, will plunge the southern tip of Africa into chaos." - Captain Craig Williamson in the October 1981 issue of the police magazine Servamus in an article with the title "Why spy?". This international terrorist and thief was at the time in Section A of the security branch. At present he is a member of the President's Council in the South African government.
- 4.3.2.2 Another quote from the same Servamus article reads: "Therefore the only real answer is secret operations against the enemy, using many of the secret operational methods devised by the communist revolutionaries themselves."
- 4.3.2.3 These views of the captain are rather like those given to us by Neelsie on the officers' course and referred to in Paragraph 4.2.5 of this testimony. Neelsie's were accompanied with more spitting, literally and figuratively but in both instances the threat that we are up against is made out to be of the utmost gravity. The captain's comments on methods was also the general perception in the security culture of how far we security people could go. It is not at all unheard of in Section C1 to be instructed to kill a terrorist or activist.
- 4.3.2.4 "It is a very devious way of talking, it is something that security people will understand" and also "I think for people in the profession, people who speak deviously to each other and who have a very intimate rapport with each other understand intimately, understand very well what is going on in this type of conversation." - Craig Williamson at my internal trial on 10 June 1985 (Volume 6, Page 292 and 293 of the proceedings).
- 4.3.2.5 To stand in court and carry on about the exact words used between security people, is often quite ridiculous. We do not say "Dirk, ask so and so to take a knife and kill Mxenge with it. Thereafter, if his car happens to be etc". Rather I would hear words with the drift of why not make a plan with Mxenge and on consenting be told not to use a rifle but make it look like a robbery. This would mean amongst many other things, that Mxenge should not like Steve Biko disappear and so forth. I will discuss the various examples in full later.

4.3.3 Major-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert

At my internal trial on 11 June 1985 (Volume 7 of the proceedings) Major-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert explained the concept of "the need to know". This concept not only protects security information but is also crucial protection against being implicated in criminal acts.

4.4 Controlling the police power base

4.4.1 You cannot fight the system

- 4.4.1.1 The South African Police is largely controlled by the security community to the extent that it cannot possibly be expected to effectively investigate allegations against the security establishment. In fact, the security police must have some, if not complete control over all matters affecting their interests.
- 4.4.1.2 In this regard I may point out that, with the exception of General Hennie de Wit, General Johan van der Merwe and Luitenant-General Alwyn Conradie, all the police chiefs mentioned in this section have met me personally.
- 4.4.1.3 As if this is not enough, the following were all involved in the feud between me and the security police, which started with my allegations of misuse of the powers of telephone tapping and spilled over into my internal and civil trials: Louis le Grange, then Minister of Law and Order, General Johan Coetzee, then Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe, then security chief, Luitenant-General Kleinjan Grobler, then CID chief, Major-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert, then Brigadier at security head office and now assisting the Commission, Brigadier Leon Mellet plus an army of support not mentioned in the analysis of the upper echelons below. Enough to frighten if not destroy a lesser mortal, I would suggest!
- 4.4.1.4 After my exile, Major-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert warned Larry Doyle, Bureau Chief of CBS NEWS, that he put his life at risk to interview me. I was presented to Larry as an extremely dangerous man that might talk to him but might also shoot him. I had to laugh when Larry told me this.

4.4.2 Commissioners of Police

- 4.4.2.1 General Mike Geldenhuys, who retired as Commissioner of Police, is an ex security police and National Intelligence policeman.

- 4.4.2.2 His successor, General Johan Coetzee rocketed through four ranks in four years in the security police before being promoted past his former superior Luitenant-General Hennie de Wit who was not a security policeman.
- 4.4.2.3 When the brilliant General Coetzee took his pension before the compulsory retirement age, General De Wit finally got the opportunity to become Commissioner.
- 4.4.2.4 General De Wit, when reaching retirement was succeeded by his deputy and former security police chief, General Johan van der Merwe who is still the Commissioner of Police. General Van der Merwe had also shooed through the ranks past many a colleague to become head of the security police.
- 4.4.2.5 In accordance with this trend, Major-General Basie Smith, current chief of the security police, should be the next Deputy Commissioner and the next Commissioner of Police.
- 4.4.3 CID chiefs**
- 4.4.3.1 Luitenant-General Kobus Visser had his spell in security as a Colonel.
- 4.4.3.2 He was succeeded by his second in command and previous chief of security, Luitenant-General Ferdi Zietsman.
- 4.4.3.3 Next was Luitenant-General Stan Schutte who was promoted from chief of security.
- 4.4.3.4 The odd man out, Luitenant-General Kleinjan Grobler, became the next CID chief
- 4.4.3.5 Next came the current CID chief, Luitenant-General Alwyn Conradie. He transferred from the security branch in Cape Town to command the police dog school, the police college and then became CID chief.
- 4.4.3.6 The present deputy CID chief is Major-General Jaap de Villiers Joubert, who is in charge of the investigations into hit squad allegations and assisting the Harms Commission. Major-General Joubert, before taking up his current position had been in the security police headquarters since 1978. He has also during this period served on the State Security Council.
- 4.4.4 Police public relations chief**

- 4.4.4.1 This position belongs to Major-General Herman Stadler. He transferred from the Port Natal (Durban) security police to security police head quarters in 1980 where he served until taking up his current position. At head office security he gave evidence as a specialist in terrorist trials. He was also in command of security police Section A for a while.
- 4.4.5 Press secretary to the Minister of Law and Order**
- Brigadier Leon Mellet, the exposed fake and liar, has been press secretary to the Minister of Law and Order since early 1980. In 1978 he was a journalist with the Natal Mercury and a good friend of the previous CID chief, Luitenant-General Kobus Visser, the present chief of the security police Major-General Basie Smith and the present chief of Section C at security head office, Brigadier Nick van Rensburg. His sympathetic reporting on police matters earned him a direct appointment in the police force's public relations department as a Luitenant-Colonel.
- 4.4.6 The current Commissioner of the Kwa Zulu Police**
- 4.4.6.1 Brigadier Jack Buchner is currently Commissioner of the Kwa Zulu Police. He was previously based in Rhodesia as liaison officer between the South African security police and the Rhodesian BSAP special branch, as member of the South African security police. He then for many years was at Section C of the head office security police where he was the chief interrogator of captured ANC and PAC freedom fighters. He assisted in court cases and I was present when he told someone about defendant advocates' planned strategies that he obtained via telephone tapping.
- 4.4.6.2 He, from Section C, and Craig Williamson, from Section A, representing the security police assisted Military Intelligence with raids into neighbouring states. I was present on occasions when they were busy planning the Matola raids with the information that Jack Buchner obtained from the Vlakplaas askaris that used to stay in the Matola house. The two askaris, Steven Mbanda and Sipho (alias Casper) accompanied the Matola operations (see later - the first operation was aborted). I was also present when they planned one of the raids into Angola.
- 4.4.6.3 The following circumstantial evidence suggests his participation in a Botswana raid in June 1985:- On 10 June 1985 at my internal trial, the Chairman, W F Krugel, president of the regional court, wanted to know from Craig: "Should we perhaps need you, Major, may we then recall you?". Craig replied: "Certainly, but may I just mention that I would be out of the country for the

next three days." to which the Chairman continued: "well give them my regards." and the minutes: "(Laughter)" (Volume 6, Page 308, of the proceedings). On 20 June 1985 on the 20h00 SATV news bulletin, Craig gloated and bloated about the raid in which many civilians died.

4.4.6.4 No wonder Kwa Zulu is burning and the ANC is being blamed for it!

4.4.7 Security control over government cabinet

4.4.7.1 I have reason to suspect security police control over Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis and that they had this control when Minister du Plessis stood an excellent chance in the last presidential election. I have equally good reason to suspect security police control over Fanie Botha when he was a cabinet minister. I can therefore not at all be sure that they do not have wider influence in the cabinet.

4.4.7.2 The following is a translation of part of the proceedings of my departmental trial (5 June 1985, Volume 2, Page 101 to 102):- Advocate Hennie de Vos is cross examining Major Suiker Brits, chief of police Murder and Robbery squad, Pretoria:-

"Mr De Vos: May I continue? Now apart from these documents, were documents also handed to you that related to Minister Barend du Plessis? -- That is so, a document was handed over to me. Now this document, were you also authorised to confiscate it? -- No, I was not authorised thereto, but the person in whose possession it was, gave it to me. He eagerly wanted me to have it. Good, you still have it in your possession I presume, or it is still in the police dossier or with the Attorney-General? -- It is. Chairman: The person from whom you obtained it? -- It is mr. Whelpton, yes." x (This "x" is the position of a cross reference mark on Page 102 of my copy to a note by Advocate Hennie de Vos on the back of Page 101).

4.4.7.3 A note in the handwriting of Advocate Hennie de Vos on the back of my copy of Page 101, with a cross reference mark to a corresponding mark on the text on Page 102, reads, and I translate:-

"X N.B. There was a search warrant that obliged Whelpton to hand over Barend du Plessis' documents. Immediately after Whelpton handed it over Maj. Britz phoned Genl. Grobbelaar and said 'General, good news - I got Min du Plessis' documents.'"

4.4.7.4 Mr Frans Whelpton, mentioned in the above translation, had before and during my trial told me, Advocate de Vos as well as my attorney Brian Currin what the contents of the document referred to was as well as how it all started. Minister Barend du Plessis, Minister Dawie de Villiers and Mr Frans Whelpton, former secretary to Minister Fanie Botha were close friends. Barend on occasions beat his wife. During a joint coastal holiday by the Du Plessis, De Villiers and Whelpton families, Barend's son came running to Dawie and Frans urging them to come and help because his dad wanted to shoot his mother. Frans and Dawie decided that Barend needed psychological help. Dawie made an appointment for Barend with a professor friend of Dawie's at the University of Stellenbosch. They told Barend that he should take Antoinette to the professor for help. Antoinette knew about this arrangement. The document referred to by Britz in the aforementioned translation was from the professor to Dawie to tell Dawie that Barend was a lost case. Barend had apparently cottoned on to the scheme and lost his temper.

4.4.7.5 The entire dogfight between me and the security police over illegal telephone tapping by the security police started with friction between Minister Fanie Botha, on the one hand and one Brigadier Blaauw and Frans Whelpton on the other hand. General Johan Coetzee and Minister Louis Le Grange sided with Minister Fanie Botha and I sided with Frans Whelpton and Brigadier Blaauw. This whole unpleasant business is documented in my internal trial.

4.4.8 Rivalry between the security organisations

4.4.8.1 Security sub-cultures

4.4.8.1.1 A brief history of the rivalry between the security forces will help to put current events into perspective and in particular show how the security police are able to manipulate the outcome of an investigation. The various security organisations formed distinct sub-cultures that are in constant rivalry. There were the down to earth, businesslike and unassailable security police sub-culture, the similar BOSS sub-culture under former security police chief General Lang Hendrik van den Berg, the more philosophical and academic National Intelligence sub-culture under Neil Barnard and the tank-and-parachute Military Intelligence sub-culture, all vying for recognition.

4.4.8.2 John Vorster era

- 4.4.8.2.1 During the reign of Prime Minister John Vorster the security police enjoyed great approbation in the fight against the total onslaught and shared freely in the governing of the country. This was the era of General Lang Hendrik Van der Berg, first security police chief and later Bureau of State Security Chief (the infamous BOSS), who could himself initiate a public petition begging the Attorney-General to charge him in connection with the Info Scandal. He was openly arrogant and unassailable, a master in controlling power structures, right up to his retirement.
- 4.4.8.2.2 During this era, the security police enjoyed a feeling of superiority and felt unthreatened by the military intelligence establishment, upon which the security police looked down.
- 4.4.8.3 P W Botha era**
- 4.4.8.3.1 The balance of power changed dramatically when Mr P W Botha succeeded Mr B J Vorster as prime minister. We in the security police had lost our monopoly. Military Intelligence rose to prominence under Mr Botha, their former Minister of Defence. We were expected to cooperate with Military Intelligence and this forced marriage frustrated the security police community immensely. I will illustrate this with an example:-
- 4.4.8.3.2 The Matola Raid into Maputu, Mosambique in January 1981 by the South African security forces is well known. Not as well known, is the fact that a similar attempt, planned and executed from the same temporary base and along the same route, was started towards the end of 1980. Various problems caused the earlier raid to fall behind schedule and the forces had to return to base from Mosambique with their mission unaccomplished.
- 4.4.8.3.3 The then Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Buchner, currently Brigadier Buchner, Commissioner of the Kwa Zulu Police, represented the security police in the planning these raids. Two Vlakplaas askaris, Stephen Mbanda and Sipho, alias Casper, who had stayed in the target house whilst in the ANC, accompanied both raids.
- 4.4.8.3.4 The temporary base, from which these operations were controlled, was on a farm off the Komatipoort to Border Gate road where the road runs close to the Lebombo Mountains and where there is a low crossing over the mountains to where a Mosambican road also runs close to the Lebombo Mountains. This is the place where a big group of security officers went to shoot and burn the Port Elizabeth activist Sizwe Kondile, as I will explain more fully later.

- 4.4.8.3.5 This orgy was attended amongst others by the current chief of Section C, Brigadier Nick van Rensburg, the then Captain Du Plessis who with Brigadier Piet "Biko" Goosen, head of the security police in the Eastern Cape at the time of the death of the activist Steve Biko, and one Sergeant Jan. These three were from the Port Elizabeth security police and had brought Sizwe Kondile up from Port Elizabeth to kill him here. Also present were the then Major Archie Flemmington and two of his men, from the Komatipoort security police, plus the then Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk and I, from the security police Section C1, Vlakplaas.
- 4.4.8.3.6 One of the topics discussed at this gathering was the pre-fabricated huts that used to be at that particular site. However, when Brigadier Van der Hoven was instructed to make the site available for the military raid, the Brigadier instructed Major Archie Flemmington to break down the buildings, so that the military people would have to provide their own facilities. Only the concrete slabs still remained when we gathered there.
- 4.4.8.3.7 National Intelligence under Neil Barnard seemed to have lost some of their arrogance and retreated quietly into a non-violent academic niche.
- 4.4.8.4 F W de Klerk era**
- 4.4.8.4.1 The current President F W de Klerk drastically curbed the influence of the military securocrats but the security police remained intact with their monopoly reinstated. While the security police was under severe pressure of hit squad allegations, the relatively inept military hit squads suddenly became exposed by police investigations. Several of these people have been arrested but not a single security policeman - not even an askari.
- 4.4.8.4.2 The police thugs are sticking together and are doing everything in their considerable power to isolate me. I am their only real threat, with whom they have had a long standing feud and who could not rely on their protection at all.
- 4.5 Cover-ups, red-herrings and incriminations by accomplices**
- 4.5.1 The eleventh command: Never get caught**
- The eleventh command was a favourite expression of General Ferdie Zietsman whenever someone had been caught out. The expression appropriately

describes the security police view of irregularities and they go to great lengths to obey this command.

4.5.2 Handling the McNully Commission - cover-up

- 4.5.2.1 The manner in which the security police handled the McNully Commission will serve as an example of one of their cover-up operations. It will also show how effectively the security police can handle the judicial annoyances. I will relate the sequence of events as experienced by myself in this regard. The McNully Report has been kept a secret to date. I trust that I will be providing enough detail, which taken in conjunction with this secrecy, will enable the Commission to corroborate my story. I also hope that the account contains several other details that may in some manner be corroborated.
- 4.5.2.2 At about 18h15 on Friday, 20 October 1989 David Tshikalanga phoned me from Venda and asked whether I had seen the news. I said no, and he said I should watch the eight 'o clock news. When I wanted to know what it was about he told me Almond had spoken.
- 4.5.2.3 I watched the 20h00 SATV news, which contained a report of Almond Nofomela's revelations about the existence of police hit squads. I phoned David Tshikalanga back that evening and asked him to come and see me.
- 4.5.2.4 On Saturday morning, 21 October, I went to see Brigadier Jan du Preez at his house. His wife "Tant San" who knows me very well, saw me there. I asked the Brigadier whether he had seen about Almond's story and what we were to do now. He simply said I should deny everything. I then mentioned the names of Brian Ngulunga and Joe Mamesela and asked what if they should also talk. He insisted that what does it matter whether one or two or more "kaffirs" should talk; I should still simply deny it. He did not appear concerned at all and since his manner is normally brief and businesslike I left soon afterwards. He did promise to keep me posted on developments.
- 4.5.2.5 Shortly after 17h00 on Saturday 21 October, I phoned Warrant Officer Connie Swiegelhaar, at her house. She has since my time been attached to Section C. I wanted to get hold of Paul van Dyk's telephone number. I had last spoken to Paul in 1982 when he was living in a duplex flat in Hennops Park, next to the Ben Schoeman Highway. She said she did not have it handy but would get hold of it for me through a Major Naude of Section C, security head office. I do not know him. She phoned me back after a few minutes with Paul's telephone number. During these phone calls, Connie had told me that Paul was in South West Africa on special duty and that Paul's wife was General Basie Smith's secretary.

- 4.5.2.6 At around 18h00 on Saturday, 21 October I phoned Paul's wife. I used the endearing name "Madame" for her at Oshoek where she was on my staff. Everyone else called her "Kleintjie". I called her Madame when she answered the phone and she immediately identified me. I asked whether Paul was there and she said that he is on his way from South West Africa where he was doing special duty. She would fetch him at the Waterkloof Military Air Force base at 20h00. I asked her whether she had seen the news and she replied she did and that we would have to see what happens. She said she would ask him to phone me when he got back.
- 4.5.2.7 On Monday, 30 October 1989 at 07h30 my phone rang and when I answered, Connie Swiegelhaar was on the line, saying there was someone that wanted to speak to me. Paul then took over and asked me whether he could come and see me. I said yes and he was there within half an hour with a light coloured Nissan Skyline. He parked in the street and I went and spoke to him in the street.
- 4.5.2.8 What in essence Paul told me there in the street, was that before he had left for South West Africa on 17 September 1989, he had spoken to Brigadier Schoon and said he should help Almond because would pick up shit (he used the word "kak"). Schoon's answer was that Almond knew too much and that justice should take its course.
- 4.5.2.9 During that discussion Paul told me that when the phone rang in South West Africa and he was urgently summonsed back, he immediately knew that Almond had spoken. He said he was not angry at Almond because he would have done the same in Almond's position. He also told me that on Friday 20 October advocate Claus von Lieries, the Attorney General phoned for Major-General Basie Smith and "Kleintjie" answered the phone. The General was not in and as she could find him nowhere she had to take down the message regarding Almond's allegations. He told me that her nerves were shattered.
- 4.5.2.10 I there learned from Paul for the first time that a third person, Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht was assisting the Commission by writing down the statements of the witnesses. The other two had been announced in the news media as the Commission, ie the Attorney General of the Free State, Tim McNully and the police CID chief Luitenant-General Alwyn Conradie.
- 4.5.2.11 Paul told me during that discussion that the week before, the following people had already given testimony before the Commission: Brigadier Willem Schoon, who simply denied all allegations and presented to the Commission the defensible functions of Section C1; Major Eugene de Kok, Luitenant Paul van Dyk himself, who denied all allegations including that he had told Almond

that he would help him - Paul said he argued that there was always a guard present, so how could he have said this without the guard overhearing it; Brian Ngulunga and Joe Mamasela who both denied the allegations.

- 4.5.2.12 Paul said on that occasion that Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht, before they gave evidence, emphasised to "them" that they should deny everything.
- 4.5.2.13 Paul also told me on that occasion that Almond's statement had been shown to him and pointed out that Almond was talking nonsense when saying that he, Almond, was present when we burnt the car.
- 4.5.2.14 Paul further said on that occasion that the knife wounds dealt to Mxenge according to Almond's statement, did not correspond with the stab wounds on the shirt worn by Mxenge at the time of the murder.
- 4.5.2.15 Also on that occasion, Paul said he did not think the Commission would get round to see me but that I should just deny everything and "laat die man daarbo weet" (let the man up there - in Venda - know). That meant (see Section 4.3.2.4 and 4.2.3.5 on devious language - an ingrained habit with us) that I should let David Tshikalanga know.
- 4.5.2.16 My reply, there, to Paul's advise was what if they turned against us and made us scapegoats. He said I asked "them" the same question that morning and they simply said they would never do that. I asked him whether he had heard about my departmental trial and how they turned the whole system against me and discredited me. He said that he had heard something like that but that he would shoot all of them should they turn against him. I pointed out that he would then be in even bigger trouble to which he replied that he would deny to the last moment and then some pretty big people would "shit".
- 4.5.2.17 Paul, before departing, said he would return to me on Thursday to update me but that I should not worry because Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht kept them informed. He also said that Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht had said that the Commission members were already starting to feel that Almond was lying and was merely trying to save his neck.
- 4.5.2.18 When Paul did not return that Thursday as promised, I phoned Warrant Officer Connie Swiegelaar at home on Friday 3 November after 18h00. She said that Paul just breezed passed around 15h00 that afternoon at the office and simply said that there was nothing to worry about. She did, however not know whether he was still around or had returned to South West Africa again. Unsolicited, she also told me that Eugene de Kok had requested all vehicle log sheets from head office and was frantically destroying evidence.

- 4.5.2.19 I left South Africa on 5 November 1989. Somewhere around 9 November I phoned home from London and my wife, Karin, gave me a message received by my son Calla to the effect that one Engelbrecht had asked that I should phone him at a 310...number. I knew this had to be Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht. I did not return the call and on 13 November Karin told me that Brigadier Krappies Engelbrecht had phoned her and left his house and office numbers with the request that I contact him. She said he just wanted to discuss something with me.
- 4.5.2.20 Some time around then Karin also told me that Mrs Kleintjie van Dyk, Paul's wife, phoned her to make a lunch time tea appointment in town. Karin said that it would be difficult. Kleintjie then made an appointment to come and visit Karin on Saturday 18 November 1989 with her two daughters who wanted to see my sons whom they have not seen for many years. She also said that Paul had phoned to tell me not to worry. Jacques Paauw of the Vrye Weekblad, however splashed my story on Friday 17 November and the appointment never materialised.
- 4.5.3 Showing Vlakplaas to the world - red-herring (requiring cover-up)**
- 4.5.3.1 Following my exposure of Section C1 hit squad base Vlakplaas, the chief of public relations, Major-General Herman Stadler, undoubtedly with the consent of the Commissioner of Police, General-Johan van der Merwe and the security chief Major-General Basie Smith, invited the press at one day's notice for an inspection tour of Vlakplaas.
- 4.5.3.2 An informant whom I will not reveal (but I am quite sure the security police know about), gave me particulars of a cover up operation that was necessary to prepare Vlakplaas for the press. The operation involved removing a large arsenal of Russian armoury. The cover up operation itself had nothing to do with Vlakplaas as I knew it. Vlakplaas was being used as a red herring and the cover had to do with the dramatically changed nature of Vlakplaas.
- 4.5.3.3 Eight years ago, when I was at Vlakplaas no such preparations would have been necessary. All that may have been required is to brief some askaris of whom there were fewer than 20 that the press could find without any special preparations. Showing Vlakplaas to the press then, would certainly have been a red herring. Our entire clandestine Section C1 arsenal fitted into the boot of my official car. That is exactly where our weaponry was kept and this was still the case when I handed it over to my successor Captain Jan Coetzee.
- 4.5.3.4 The entire nature of Vlakplaas and Daisy seems to have changed enormously since I was there. It is not in the least representative of the Vlakplaas

involved in my allegations. It has become such an ominous place that elaborate preparations appear to have been necessary before it could be shown to the press. Apart from the clandestine armoury, a dramatic buildup of staff and facilities has taken place and many new activities have been introduced. In fact, today Vlakplaas does not at all seem like the kind of place the press should see too much of.

- 4.5.3.5 The manner in which all and sundry are being led by their noses, is quite comical albeit also frightening. What exactly is happening at Vlakplaas?
- 4.5.3.6 My informant gave me the following information:-
- 4.5.3.7 The day before this tour, at approximately 10h00 the following Vlakplaas contingent set to work to clear the Vlakplaas hit squad arsenal for the big occasion: Captain Baker, Warrant Officer Jaap Raap, Warrant Officer Vermeulen, Warrant Officer Rassie, Sergeant Joe Willemse, Sergeant Piet Henning, Sergeant Willie Nortje and the labourers Godfrey Ndavona, Billy Mashilo, Johnnie Swart, Frik Claassen, Daniel Sikabe, Mannetjies (alias Swanepoel after the name on his overhaul), Makapan, Simon Morotho, Mosisa en Matheus.
- 4.5.3.8 These participants formed a long line from the two strong rooms to the flat-deck, white Bedford truck used at Vlakplaas. These strong rooms used to be the store room and the bedroom opposite it in the old farm house when I was there. The wooden floors had been replaced since by concrete floors, the doors replaced with safe doors and the windows have been built up.
- 4.5.3.9 They were removing an arms cache of exposed Russian weapons and closed containers. Light articles were passed along the human chain while heavy articles were carried. The items thus removed included: Mortar 82, 81, 60, RPG 7's, Gradpe (also called Lada), vehicle land mines, AK 47 Rifles, SKS's, heavy machine guns, Makarofs, Tokarefs and other pistols, cordite, heavily loaded South African police trunks and boxes. Three to four people were required to carry some of the containers.
- 4.5.3.10 The loaded truck was driven to Section A's Daisy farm by Sergeant Piet Henning. This is the much written about farm that was bought with IUF money stolen by Craig Williamson, and is internationally associated with Williamson and General Johan Coetzee. Billy Mashilo accompanied Sergeant Henning inside the cab while Godfrey, Sikabe and Makapan sat at the back. Jaap Raap followed with Piet Hennings official white Ford bakkie, with Mannetjies up in front with him.

- 4.5.3.11 On arrival at Daisy, they drove down and round to the southern side of the double story building with the pitched roof. Here they offloaded at ground level into a dark storeroom, which had no windows and had to be torch lit. Jaap Raap had the key to this room with him. When they arrived a similar arms cache was already there.
- 4.5.3.12 Early the next morning, before the inspection tour arrived, another truck load was transported from Vlakplaas to a farm close to Vlakplaas. This time a white double differential Nissan 10 meter tipper truck, also based at Vlakplaas, was used. The load was covered and the truck was not offloaded. Major Eugene de Kok's official Toyota Cressida was also removed from Vlakplaas and left with the truck at this nearby farm. The two vehicles were guarded here till after 16h00 that day by the labourer Nixon Ndavona, who was not one of the removal team the day before.
- 4.5.3.13 This second load contained a lot of boxes, big and small, light and heavy. Sergeant Nortje drove the Nissan truck, Sergeant Henning followed in his own official bakkie, Sergeant Steve Bosch drove Major Eugene de Kok's Cressida, whilst Warrant Officer Vermeulen followed in his own official bakkie. Official police issue armoury was all that remained in the strong rooms at Vlakplaas for the world to see.
- 4.5.3.14 To get to this nearby farm, one turns left into the Erasmia-Schurveberg road, carries on to cross the Hennops River twice, up and over a hill to a place on the right hand side described by some as the "place of the pigs". Opposite this place turn left into a road without signs. The house to which this road leads is not visible from the turn-off. Proceed along this road for a small distance to a farmhouse with out buildings. The outside walls are white with a round pattern on the walls.
- 4.5.3.15 Luitenant Morkel from Vlakplaas lives in this house. He is a bachelor. The house used to serve as single quarters for policemen stationed at Erasmia police station.
- 4.5.3.16 Leaving Nixon Ndavona with the truck and car, Sergeants Henning, Nortje, Bosch and Warrant Officer Vermeulen returned to Vlakplaas.
- 4.5.3.17 After 16h00 that afternoon Sergeants Bosch and Nortje, in Bosch's official Volkswagen Golf GTI and Sergeant Piet Henning and Warrant Officer Vermeulen, in a bakkie, left to fetch the Nissan Truck and the Cressida. Steve Bosch drove the Cressida back to Vlakplaas, Vermeulen the GTI, Nortje the Nissan truck and Henning with Nixon in the bakkie.

- 4.5.3.18 The labourers were not allowed to knock off at 16h00, but stayed on to offload the Nissan truck.
- 4.5.3.19 The same informant also told me where the weapons came from. During 1989 Major Eugene de Kock from Section C1, Vlakplaas, Major Naude, from Section C, security head office and the Vlakplaas members Warrant Officer Jaap Raap and Sergeant Piet Henning left for Oshakati and were away for approximately a week. They returned accompanied by a number of vehicles. One was a big yellow with blue stripes Mercedes horse and trailer. The driver was not from Vlakplaas. There were also two smaller vehicles. One was a single seater green vehicle and the other a light yellow vehicle with a tent canopy. This convoy was loaded with Russian armoury, a small Caterpillar with a spare differential and 75 plastic pipes. The pipes were later taken elsewhere. This particular consignment was in addition to an already existing cache.
- 4.5.3.20 The number of askaris attached to Vlakplaas have grown from less than 20 in my day to about 70 or more currently. Ten of these current askaris stay on the farm, whereas the others live in houses in townships, notably Mabopane and Letlabile. The policemen proper that are attached to the farm have grown from a contingent of about 15, of which 10 were whites, divided into four groups, each with a number of askaris, to a group of policemen proper that included more than 20 whites and who controlled nine groups of askaris. The number of labourers have increased from three to about twelve.
- 4.5.3.21 The number of vehicles associated with Vlakplaas have trebled.
- 4.5.3.22 Some of these latter day names and vehicles are: Major Eugene de Kok with a Toyota Cressida, Captain Baker with a red Ford Sierra, Luitenant Morkel with a white 4x4 Datsun bakkie and canopy, Warrant Officer Jaap Raap with his light coloured Isuzu bakkie, Warrant Officer Wood (carpenter and in charge of the armoury) who gets a lift with Sergeant Piet Henning who drives a white Ford bakkie, Warrant Officer Beeselaar (administrative and gets a lift with Henning, Sergeant Steve Bosch who handles intelligence and drives a golf GTI, one Marco who is a source for Bosch and was arrested in Botswana during November 1989, Sergeant John Mphofu with a white Mazda bakkie and canopy and official driver of the Nissan. Warrant Officer Peki Gadebe who drives a blue Ford Siera, Warrant Officer Manie (alias Standford) who comes from the Port Elizabeth security police and drives a yellow Huskey 12 seater mini bus and responsible for taking Koevoet immigrants from Pretoria station to Rustenburg (see later), Captains Khosa, Letsatsi and Bra Moss, Warrant Officer Vermeulen who drives a white Isuzu bakkie with canopy and a white bull bar in front, Warrant Officer Rassie with a white Opel and previously with a white Ford Sierra, Warrant Officer Brits who drives a Toyota Safari,

- Warrant Officer Hoffmann who drives a Toyota Corolla, Sergeant Joe Willemse who drives a white Isuzu bakkie with canopy, Warrant Officer Snyman with white Isuzu bakkie and canopy, a Warrant Officer with black hair who looks like a "coolie", Sergeant Toffie who always moves with "Coolie", Constable Broad with a white Mazda bakkie, and others.
- 4.5.3.23 For the purpose of the guided press tour, there were about ten policemen proper, seven askaris and the labourers on Vlakplaas on the day. The askaris were the Soweto Group, especially brought in for the press.
- 4.5.3.24 New facilities include upgrading of old buildings, new offices, new living quarters, garages, a clubhouse, a shooting range, security fence, soccer "stadium" and a braai area next to the river.
- 4.5.3.25 New activities include shooting practice with Russian armoury, parachute training somewhere else with each askari having to complete twelve jumps and assistance of immigration of ex Koevoet members. The immigrants from Namibia are met at the Pretoria station and transported by road for about 140 kilometers to a place "next to Rustenburg" where they are housed in a tent village of more than 100 tents and about 200 people. More permanent accommodation is being built in that area as well as on the Section A farm Daisy.
- 4.5.3.26 In keeping with the times, Vlakplaas has six AIDS cases whereas there used to be none known. The AIDS cases are Ndam, Chipa, Joe (PAC), Stretcher (PAC), Madliwa and Manjane. Except for Sergeant Madliwa, these are registered as head office informers.
- 4.5.4 Working voluntary suspended policemen - God knows?**
- 4.5.4.1 None of the members of the security police against whom the most serious allegations regarding hit squads have been made, have been suspended or arrested. According to the news media, some of these policemen have gone into voluntary suspension.
- 4.5.4.2 These self suspended policemen went on a holiday during December. Then, when they had lost their news value, they resumed duties. My informant tells me that regular meetings are being attended by them at Vlakplaas with the current Section C commander, Brigadier Nick van Rensburg. Attendees of these meetings include: Major Eugene de Kock; Major Koos Vermeulen; Colonel Jan Coetzee who was my successor as hit squad commander on 1 January 1982, Constable Joe Mamesela, Constable Brian Ngulungwa and Sergeant Jeff Bosigo.

4.5.5 Captain Dirk Coetzee, the nut case - incrimination

- 4.5.5.1 News reports in various media, as well as Section 7 of this testimony on the "Abandoned policemen", abound with details of the incriminating public and private campaigns against me. Cross examination of government cabinet members that attended the original "bushveld" briefing on the hitsquad allegations might provide examples of covert slandering.
- 4.5.5.2 In response to my hit squad allegations, General Johan Coetzee, ex Commissioner of police, alleged publicly that I had smuggled illegal Portugese immigrants into South Africa. This completely false allegation is based on an incident where I provided a police informer and a diamond smuggling friend, Mss Rika Lourens Botes, with a false alibi in the form of exit and entry stamps in her passport. Section 5.2.7 of this statement tell the true story, which had nothing to do, as far as I know, with smuggling illegal immigrants. Be this as it may, it has nothing to do with any hit squad operation, except to prejudice the public and thus take the sting out of my allegations.
- 4.5.5.3 General Johan Coetzee, following my hit squad allegations, publicly stated that I was involved in a porn ring whilst stationed at Oshoek and that as a result he had transferred me out of the security police to the Middleburg, Transvaal Uniform Branch of the police. The fact is that he had ordered my transfer to the uniform branch in Sunny Side, Pretoria. He had done so because of incorrect information and after learning that I was merely prepared to take the rapp to protect a whole chain of policemen and lawyers and learning also of my achievements at Oshoek, he cancelled the arrangement and transferred me to Middelburg Transvaal, police security branch. This incident of how I closed my eyes to a policeman friend bringing a single porn film into the country is detailed in Section 5.2.8 of this testimony under the heading "Oshoek". Again, none of this has anything to do with a hit squad operation and is simply meant to prejudice the public as a lightning conductor after my allegations. Johan Coetzee has no respect whatsoever for true justice.
- 4.5.5.4 According to General Johan Coetzee, via the media and in response to my hit squad allegations, I had on previous occasions made such wild allegations against seniors. Since he is not specific, I have to assume he refers to allegations that I made during the buildup towards my suspension, departmental trial and civil trial. Apart from the fact that this is again an attempt to prejudice the public and avoid the issue, I deny that any such allegations were wild. Some would seem to have been proved correct as discussed in Section 7.2 of this statement, on my internal trial.

- 4.5.5.5 The ever arrogant ex-Major Craig Williamson, well known international thief and terrorist with the "master spy" self-image and a position on the President's Council, is never at a loss of something to waffle on about with a learned air. Apart from his attempts to discredit me at my departmental trial, he saw fit to explain to the media that my mental equilibrium was upset as a result of I being a diabetic and that it was supported by psychiatric reports. In fact there has never been such reports. His unstable memory refers him to footwork at my departmental trial where I got a physician, Dr Marquard de Villiers to explain from text books what could happen if a diabetic went into an insulin coma. Craig wants this lie or lapse of memory to mean to the public that my allegations about hit squads are false.
- 4.5.5.6 The police, enthusiastically supported by the media, propagated the lie that I was dishonourably discharged from the police force. The truth is that I am a police pensioner that has been discharged on medical grounds. The police and the media may safely call me Captain Coetzee if they do not like to call me Dirk.
- #### 4.6 Dirty washing
- 4.6.1 I would find it difficult to accuse the security police of incriminating me with dirty washing. Suffice it to say, that there was considerable tolerance in our security police circles to a variety of human weaknesses such as adultery, excessive drinking, naked racism, foul language and the like. These sins were variously present amongst us and I certainly did not stand out as a sore thumb in this regard.
- 4.6.2 If we were to decide that mud throwing were relevant, I will join in the fun and some mighty big faces will get covered in it.

5. MY RISE AND FALL IN THE POLICE SECURITY CULTURE (January 1977 to December 1981)

5.1 Life with the elite

- 5.1.1 I have surveyed my early years as well as my adult life, first as a "haasman" (civilian) and then in the uniform branch of the police. I hope this will have exposed to the Commission and our audience a balanced picture of a reasonably consistent personality and the manner in which this finds expression in various circumstances. This should help to form a balanced view of my behaviour in the security police and should also help to put any serious assaults on my character into proper perspective.
- 5.1.2 I have also attempted to expose the overt and covert nature of the security culture. I trust this will also contribute to a balanced evaluation of the operations of the security police, of all the events in which I was involved and of the circumstances under which we meet here.
- 5.1.3 I have shown that I had come to the notice of the security police and had been recruited for their border post at Oshoek. I am now in a position to relate to you the events in the security police.
- 5.1.4 First there was Oshoek where, on the positive side, I industriously set about upgrading border control operations and facilities, improving the image of Oshoek as a friendly and helpful gateway to South Africa and getting to know my Swaziland neighbours in all spheres of life. On the negative side, I started taking my serious apprenticeship in the "dirty war" against the ANC and SACP and in addition was guilty of some irregular favours for friends. One of these favours caused me to take a somewhat unearned rapp and nearly saw me out of the security police, but owing to a turn of events, I made the grade and was transferred to Middleburg, Transvaal, security branch.
- 5.1.5 Middleburg was my clean spell in the security police. I set about diligently to become familiar with the area for which I was responsible and spent many hours in the veld. I was happy. Then domestic problems set in with my one year old child being diagnosed as a diabetic and my wife being unhappy with conditions at Middleburg. I was landed with the most amazing divorce and obtained the most amazing reversal of this ruling. This resulted in my transfer to Section C1 of the security police at head office in Pretoria. My responsibility was Vlakplaas.
- 5.1.6 At Vlakplaas I inherited the askaris that were used to spot and report ex comrades. I set about, eager as ever, to improve their working and living

conditions and putting their operations on a sound organizational footing. I started getting more glimpses of the "dirty war" and moved, with Vlakplaas, into the hit squad arena. Here all hell was loose as I will relate. This went on until I attempted to resist some transfer arrangements of General Johan Coetzee and that was the end of my career in the security branch.

5.2 Oshoek

5.2.1 Border control

- 5.2.1.1 I started as border post commander at Oshoek on 4 January 1974. My immediate superior was Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, who was second in command to Brigadier H R van der Hoven, divisional commander, security police, Eastern Transvaal. My task was passport control.
- 5.2.1.2 A later hit squad colleague of mine, then Sergeant Paul van Dyk, had arrived at Oshoek a day or two before me. It had been decided to appoint a representative of Ermelo security police at the border post. The Ermelo security police was responsible for security work relating to ANC-PAC activities in Swaziland. Paul reported to the then Captain Nick van Rensburg, currently Brigadier van Rensburg, Section C commander. I was later to become more involved in their activities.
- 5.2.1.3 When I arrived at Oshoek, there had been much strife between the previous border post commander and his staff and amongst his staff themselves. Much of this related to alleged irregularities such as selective handouts. Shift arrangements were inconvenient and the relations with the Swazi people were non-existent. There was an air of mistrust between the South African border post and the Swazi customs officials. The appearance of the post was unsatisfactory and the spirit generally unhealthy.
- 5.2.1.4 I immediately set about upgrading conditions at the border post and establishing amicable relations with the Swazis. When I was happy that the passport control operation was running smoothly and that the necessary delegation of duties were in place, I was able to concentrate my own efforts on public relations in Swaziland. This proved useful to the Ermelo security branch and they involved me in their operations.
- 5.2.1.5 It was at Oshoek on 13 November 1978 that the second of my two sons, Carl ("Calla"), was born.

5.2.2 The House That Dirk Built

- 5.2.2.1 I wanted us to be happy and proud of our border post. The place had to be clean and neat and the working and community atmosphere pleasant, relaxed and stimulating. I wanted to see to it that the personnel enhanced their careers and that personal conditions improved. To avoid friction I wanted us to share the numerous gifts that were bestowed upon us.
- 5.2.2.2 The Swazi people made us name plates for our offices, stickers to mark passport control windows properly for the public, provided paint with which we ourselves painted out our building inside, they fixed our public toilets and we ourselves painted them. We enclosed our guard house to be warm and dry. We painted the signs on the road and area at the border post with paint I obtained from the Transvaal Roads Department. We also had new signs and warning corrugations put up some distance before the border post to curb the high occurrence of runaway trucks.
- 5.2.2.3 I got RSA emblems from a government department (Internal or External Affairs - I can't remember which) via one Captain Bruce Smith of the police special guard unit, and put these on the public glass doors to enhance our image as a gateway to South Africa. I also obtained from Bruce photographs of all our prime ministers and of the cabinet ministers at the time, as well as of police chiefs. He had them framed for me. These we put in my office and in the public passages to my office. We panelled my office walls and built a wall to separate an office for the typists. Electrically controlled locks were installed to control passage between the public area and my office. I got huge floodlights from a Swaziland and a South African mine to light up the public and parking area properly.
- 5.2.2.4 We developed our garden with plants provided by a Swaziland nursery.
- 5.2.2.5 I also drastically reformed our working conditions. I arranged through Colonel Gough for extra posts so that the wives of all border post members could be employed, reorganized shifts so that husbands and wives worked together and to otherwise accommodate our various needs and problems. I borrowed an electrical typewriter for the typist.
- 5.2.2.6 There was the usual upward battle with authorities to accept staff medical trips to the remote facilities, as official duty so that they could use my official vehicle for this purpose.
- 5.2.2.7 To make the work more varied, stimulating and effective, I introduced border patrols and various other security procedures and encouraged the staff to take

responsibility for carrying out these measures. They did so enthusiastically and with great success.

- 5.2.2.8 I encouraged the three sergeants at Oshoek to enter for the Warrant Officer's examination, obtained old examination papers and assisted them with my study methods. All three these sergeants and only one other sergeant from the entire District (or it might have been the entire Region) passed that examination. Three of my staff became border post commanders at neighbouring border posts during my stay at Oshoek. A fourth regularly did border post command relief duty.
- 5.2.2.9 We converted an old ruin, at one stage used to accommodate pigs and the odd sheep, to a clubhouse which had a surface of 25ft x 25ft, 20ft high thatched pitched roof, wall-to-wall carpets, flushed toilets for ladies and gents, hot and cold water, a huge bar with sink and under-bar-counter, and fridge, electricity, a huge stocked fridge from Coca Cola, Swaziland, furniture supplied by Swazi Pine, music, dart board and the like. All this was done by boarder post personnel, Swaziland volunteers and donations from businesses, mainly in Swaziland but also from South Africa.
- 5.2.2.10 This huge, unlicensed Police shebeen was supplied with free electricity via a clandestine connection installed by a friend from Swaziland. The story of this clubhouse, how it was built and how it fostered relations, was published with great acclamation in the police journal, Servamus, of May 1980, under the title "THE HOUSE THAT DIRK BUILT". This article was called for by the then 2-IC of the CID and previous security police chief, Major-General Ferdi Zietsman after a visit in November 1979 to Oshoek by him and the then Brigadier Johan Coetzee, chief of security and later Commissioner of Police.

5.2.3 PRO and assimilation into Swaziland

- 5.2.3.1 From day one, in conjunction with the building up of the border post, I started working on my relationships with the Swazis at the border post, with all government officials that came through the post, the business establishment, the professional community and the broader community. The animosity towards the post disappeared overnight and Oshoek was on the map.
- 5.2.3.2 I arranged with Brigadier van der Hoven, via Luitenant-Colonel Gough, to extend the official preferential treatment ("longstamp") for frequent travellers, to dignitaries as well as all other deserving cases regardless of their standing and how often they travelled.

- 5.2.3.3 In consultation with Brigadier van der Hoven, I devised a VIP stamp that entitled the bearer to preferential treatment at all eleven Swaziland border posts. This was to avoid other border posts destroying good relations that we built up at Oshoek.
- 5.2.3.4 With Brigadier van der Hoven's consent, I started implementing existing provisos to make border control duties available after hours and applied these in a more flexible service-oriented manner.
- 5.2.3.5 The Swaziland side had customs officials but no passport control. These customs officials entrusted me with a key to assist me with after hours problems.
- 5.2.3.6 To the security police, these various measures and privileges that were devised to provide a better service, offered the ideal opportunity for covert operations. They started grossly exploiting it and involving me in their operations. I became aware of the nature of the clique and the twilight world of their secret war. This was way beyond anything I had ever imagined to exist outside the worst criminal world. I was taught that this was absolutely essential and that they were merely fighting fire with fire. This was not a parlour game that you could always fight in courts. Neelsie's lectures came back to me and were becoming the hard reality.
- 5.2.3.7 All the while, my assimilation into Swaziland continued at pace. I enjoyed special recognition from the King and the royal family. At the start and end of each hunting season, the King's secretary, Martin Mtiniso brought me a gift from the King in the form of a blue wildebeest and four impala. In this, the entire border post shared.
- 5.2.3.8 Later on when my superiors learned about these gifts, they begged me to arrange something for them as well. This led to us poaching the dear benevolent King's game.
- 5.2.3.9 I was a guest of honour at Swaziland's tenth independence anniversary and at the eightieth anniversary of His Royal Highness, the late King Sobusa II. The King had four special sets of "eyes and ears amongst the nation", called Ndebazabantu. The most senior of these men, Malaza was my special escort and attendant who received my wife Karin and I on route and cared for us at both these functions.
- 5.2.3.10 I was also a standing honorary guest at the business community's Thursday Lunch Club, including members like Martin Mtiniso; the Minister of Health, Dr Pim Dlamini; professionals like attorneys and architects; and many more.

- 5.2.3.11 When Swaziland decided to implement passport control, they came to me for help. The Swazi police chief to be in charge of passport control and the policemen picked to become border post commanders at the three main border posts, came to my office. During a number of such visits I provided them with comprehensive training. I showed them how to set up an efficient infrastructure and how to conduct the operation. I adapted our own system to their special needs, presenting them with a stream lined operation based on our experience.
- 5.2.3.12 Major Nick van Rensburg of Ermelo security police, brought numerous guests, including many policemen, to be entertained in Swaziland at cabaret shows, eating, drinking, casino tours and the occasional blue movie. Examples are the current Major-General Daantjie Malan (Head Office), Brigadier Jack Buchner (Commissioner of the Kwa Zulu police), Brigadier Leon Mellet (press secretary of the Minister of Law and Order); the late Colonel Gough (a good friend of mine); and numerous others.
- 5.2.4 Assisting other branches of the police force**
- 5.2.4.1 My knowledge of Swaziland enabled me to assist a variety of other branches of the police force. I provided them with information, introductions and even solved the Carlos Rosha (alias Ginger) murder case for Luitenant Staal Burger of Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad who later became Colonel Staal Burger of the infamous CCB military intelligence hit squads.
- 5.2.4.2 Allow me, as an interesting aside, to elaborate upon some details of this murder investigation, since Staal is today in the centre of the hit squad publicity. Rosha was a wanted habitual criminal in South Africa who fled to Frelimo. Here he occupied a senior position in their security police. At Frelimo he lined his own coffers and secretly and illegally entered South Africa where he was found murdered in a flat in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. A Swaziland Portuguese contact, Tony Siera, informed me of a friend of his, Thomash, whom we had locked up in South Africa as an illegal immigrant. Tony said that Thomash could help us solve the murder. I arranged with Staal to release Thomash, arm him and let him loose in Johannesburg to solve the murder, trusting Thomash to return to us. He returned as promised with the identity of the true murderer, Moraish (vernacular spelling), a portuguese immigrant that worked at Secunda. He also told us that Moraish drove a white Triumph motor car.
- 5.2.4.3 Staal came up to me so that we could start searching for Moraish. On his way to Oshoek, Staal with his wife were refueling at Leslie where in passing he gave the police at the charge office and a Portuguese officer a description of

Moraish and his vehicle. Before Staal arrived at Oshoek, I got a message from Leslie police to say that the Portuguese officer had spotted and arrested Moraish and that Moraish was being held at the charge office.

- 5.2.4.4 Staal left his wife at Oshoek and him and I returned to Leslie to fetch Moraish. We took Moraish to Oshoek where we locked him up while we enjoyed the week end. We did not have official detainment facilities at Oshoek but used an old police cell that was on the site. My parents were also visiting at Oshoek at the time and Staal and I teased "Granny" a lot about her concern for the welfare of our prisoner. Even before the uncovering of the CCB, my brother tells me, "Granny" was hoping that Staal would somehow come to the fore to clear up misconceptions about me and the hit squads. She was sure Staal, as an ex Murder and Robbery Squad chief, knew more about the truth of the matter.
- 5.2.4.5 I will now return from this aside to the matter in hand, as I page through my Swaziland address books:- Some of the other police branches I helped are: Luitenant Gerrit Viljoen of East Rand Murder and robbery; Luitenant Piet van Heerden of the vehicle branch; Several Gold and Diamond branch policemen; Illegal Immigrant branch in Johannesburg; Luitenant Deersans from the Commercial Branch; Luitenant Frik Truter of the Ermelo drug squad; Major Sarel Nienamer from Sabie Military Intelligence.
- 5.2.5 BOSS - Bureau for State Security**
- 5.2.5.1 Several people from the Bureau for State Security also visited me for a variety of reasons relating to information. These included Joe Bell, M N S Wilson, Willem Dreyer, Jan Victor, Jeff Chats, Christine Claassens and Mesrs Alberts and Claassens
- 5.2.6 Security apprenticeship**
- 5.2.6.1 The Deta Air connection**
- 5.2.6.1.1 Rall Matheus was a Portuguese citizen with permanent residence in South Africa. He had the Frelimo Deta Air agency in Swaziland and was assisted there by his manager Carlos Madoreira Lopes who currently works for Swazi Air. Refugees from South Africa went to the UN High Commission for Refugees in Swaziland from where they were flown to Maputu with the Deta airline. Major Nick van Rensburg required passenger lists of these refugees to keep the "terroris" files up to date.

- 5.2.6.1.2 I contacted Rall and we immediately became the best of friends. From then on, whenever there were refugees on a flight, he supplied me with a passenger list. At some stage Rall decided to defraud Deta and delayed payments to them. During this latter period he allowed his friends to fly free of charge worldwide at Deta's expense. My wife, Karin and I flew to Durban and to Cape Town where I visited my friend Captain Bruce Smith.
- 5.2.6.1.3 Rall was later caught and locked up in Swaziland. His business partner Dr George Msibi, brother of the then Deputy Commissioner of Police, Titus Msibi, arranged bail for Rall who had to surrender his passport. He did, however, have another passport. With Major Nick van Rensburg's permission, I smuggled him across the border in my car's boot where he had permanent residence. He had R 80 000 with him. His car and his wife was brought through to South Africa by Sergeant Andre van der Berg of my staff. Andre is currently stationed at Amersfoort. Rall is still in South Africa.
- 5.2.6.2 Stealing from the escudu racketeers**
- 5.2.6.2.1 The Portuguese from Mosambique had a racket in which they bought escudus with dollars on the black market in Maputu, getting a very favourable exchange rate for their sought after dollars. They then brought the escudus to South Africa where they exchanged it for Rands with Mosambican citizens working on the mines of the Witwatersrand. They again got a very profitable rate. The miners thus got escudus that they were allowed to take to Mosambique without having to declare it at the border and having to pay tax on it to the Mosambican government. The Portuguese then bought dollars again with the rands and started repeating this chain of events.
- 5.2.6.2.2 We apprehended a Mosambican citizen who was bringing 15 million such escudus into South Africa at Oshoek. I contacted Major Steve van der Merwe (phone 684444, Durban) and Colonel Shearman (phone 8368828, Johannesburg), both from the police commercial branch. They worked with violations of laws regarding foreign currency. Both officers told me that escudus were virtually worthless, that it was no crime to bring it into the country. They were, strictly speaking required to deposit the money into a bank in South Africa within seven days of entering the country.
- 5.2.6.2.3 I could still not quite believe that this was in order and phoned Major Nick van Rensburg of the Ermelo security police. He asked me about the person being held. I told him the man was frightened and had begged me to just let him return to Swaziland. Major Nick van Rensburg told me to scare the man some more, send him back to Swaziland and keep the escudus. This I did, as

- Paul van Dyk and others at the border post knew. I gave the escudus to Major Nick van Rensburg.
- 5.2.6.2.4 This again happened when another man was caught with seven million escudus.
- 5.2.6.2.5 Major Nick van Rensburg told me that some of the money was channelled through Colonel Viktor, then chief of Section C, security police head quarters, to his Rhodesian police special branch friends with whom the South African security police closely cooperated. The Rhodesians were said to use the money in cross border operations in the north of Mosambique.
- 5.2.6.2.6 Some of the money was exchanged at the mines for Rands by the staff of Major Schalk Visser, Soweto security police. Schalk Visser later took over from Brigadier van der Hoven as divisional commander of the Eastern Transvaal security police. The Rands thus obtained were used as unrecorded security funds.
- 5.2.6.2.7 Hassen Patel, owner of the Mediterranean restaurant in Mbabane, Swaziland knew about both incidents and on both occasions carefully approached us and tried to negotiate the return of the escudus. Nick would hear nothing of this.
- 5.2.6.3 Meddling in Swaziland politics**
- 5.2.6.3.1 Swaziland had an opposition party under the leadership of Dr Ambro Zwane who was strongly pro-ANC. The security police had pamphlets made in the name of Dr Zwane's party, inciting the Swazi people against their King. I accompanied Major Nick van Rensburg and some of his staff, including Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs and Sergeant Chris Rorich into Swaziland where we distributed the pamphlets at public places such as bus stops and the market, around Mbabane and Manzini. Dr Zwane spent long periods in detention as a result.
- 5.2.6.4 Greasing the palms of the Royal Swazi Police**
- 5.2.6.4.1 Major Nick van Rensburg did many special favours for the then Commissioner of the Royal Swazi Police, Timothy Mtetwa, and his deputy Titus Msibi, such as servicing and repairing cars at Ermelo. Major Nick van Rensburg told me this and I was present on an occasion when he had such a Mercedes generator fixed.

- 5.2.6.4.2 Nick also told me and it was obvious from circumstances, that the following Swazi police officers were on the "payroll" of the Ermelo security police and received regular payments: Charlie Bell, detective chief; Shabalala, security chief; Sandy Mdiniso, senior security policeman; Frans Nxumalo, a senior officer on Charlie Bell's staff who spoke Afrikaans well; and a senior officer in the fingerprint and photographic department, whose name I can't remember.
- 5.2.6.4.3 As regards Sandy Mdiniso, Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs and Sergeant Chris Rorich from Ermelo security police, in my time at Oshoek, one night rolled their Cortina on the Losita Palace road between Manzini and Mbabane, Swaziland. Secret Swazi Police documents relating to ANC members and activities, were found in the boot of the car and the origin of these was traced back to Sandy.
- 5.2.6.4.4 As a result, Sandy was transferred to Hlangano district. Martin Mdiniso, Sandy's uncle and private secretary to the King, later asked the King to forgive Sandy. For some years now, Sandy has been the Commissioner of Police in Swaziland. Chris Deetlefs to this day has a damaged shoulder from that car accident. He in 1981 succeeded Major Nick van Rensburg as head of security at Ermelo. He remained there until 1989 when he was transferred to the regional security office, Middelburg, Transvaal. He is today a senior Major.
- 5.2.6.4.5 The South African security police donated a fleet of new Ford Cortina's and Grenada's to the Royal Swazi Police to use during the tenth anniversary of independence and the King's eightieth birthday. They were allowed to keep these.
- 5.2.6.5 Gladiator Leon Mellet's glorious return**
- 5.2.6.5.1 Brigadier Leon Mellet, press secretary in the office of the Minister of Law and Order since the early 1980's is well schooled in talking and writing fiction. Leon, in 1978 was still a journalist for the Natal Mercury. This was the year that he became a hero.
- 5.2.6.5.2 In 1978 Major Nick van Rensburg called Leon, a good sympathetic friend of the police, to come and do a story on the ANC presence in Swaziland. The idea was to make the ANC and embarrassment to the Swazi government. Leon drove with his little Volkswagen Beetle from Durban to Ermelo. He left his Beetle there and came to Oshoek with Major Nick van Rensburg and Sergeant Chris Rorich. I joined them there and together we left for Swaziland.

- 5.2.6.5.3 We took Leon to ANC houses in Manzini where he took photo's with a flash camera. On the way we gave him information for his article. In the Fairview suburb of Manzini, we came across a red Datsun 120Y parked on a low-level bridge. Nick recognized this car as belonging to an informer of his, Skosana. He had that very week reprimanded Skosana for being lax. Chris and I got out and found Skosana and a woman naked and making love in the back of the car.
- 5.2.6.5.4 We reported this to Nick who told us to "fuck him up". I grabbed a huge boulder and hauled it through the front window whilst Chris slashed the tyres with a knife. Skosana was out of the car in a flash, running down the creek. The woman remained silent and we drove off. All this caused us great merriment and Nick was pleased with the well earned punishment.
- 5.2.6.5.5 We went to the then ANC transit house, known as the "White House" at the end of a street. Leon was taking a photograph through the gate in the high fence with his flash camera as a Volkswagen Beetle came down the street. At the flash the driver hooted vigourously, made a desperate U-turn and sped off. We discussed this during the course of the evening and with this as inspiration, a good story for his paper gradually emerged.
- 5.2.6.5.6 It was decided during the course of the evening that Leon would report that he had been chased by the ANC and that they shot at him, whilst he was doing his story. Back at Ermelo they would park Leons car at the ghole course and shoot holes through it with a police pistol to give credibility to his story. We went on a drinking and eating spree.
- 5.2.6.5.7 Nick left for Ermelo the next day while Leon and Chris remained for another day of fun in Swaziland. When the story duly appeared in the newspaper, Nick brought me a copy. The picture of the car with the bullet holes appeared in the newspaper, with Leon squatting next to the car and pointing at the bullet holes. Mellet will not be able to substantiate his version with border control records that his car passed through the border.
- 5.2.6.6 Car thefts**
- 5.2.6.6.1 One day, Major Nick van Rensburg wanted to know whether I had a contact at Leyds Motors, Mbabane, the Peugeot-Toyota agency, where he knew the ANC bought their Peugeots and Toyota Land Cruisers and had them serviced. The idea was that if we could get duplicate keys made, we could steal these vehicles.

- 5.2.6.6.2 I did, of course - because I knew somebody virtually everywhere - know the work shop foreman, Jose Rollo Noivo. (I hear he has since gone to Portugal). His work telephone number was Mbabane 437143, and his home telephone number was Mbabane 43345.
- 5.2.6.6.3 According to Nick, security Windhoek was already busy with such operations and was supplying cars for Colonel Victor, head of Section C, head office. Colonel Victor in turn was said to pass these cars on to the Rhodesian police special branch to replace vehicles lost in land mines. Later on when I was stationed at Vlakplaas one such stolen vehicle that arrived there from Windhoek was a Valiant. This car was used as a so called "askari car".
- 5.2.6.6.4 One morning, whilst drinking coffee with Charlie Bell, chief of the Swazi detectives, he received a call from the South African police stolen vehicle branch in Johannesburg, to say that they had found back a Peugeot 504 with registration number SD 17163 belonging to Stanley Mabisella. I used signs to show Charlie that it was one of the cars we had stolen, after which he informed the caller that he would come back to him. I then explained that it was one of our thefts and suggested that he contacted Major Nick van Rensburg.
- 5.2.6.6.5 Nick was very embarrassed that he had lied to me about the Rhodesian destination and that he had been exposed when I discovered that the car had been found in Soweto. He explained that not all the cars went to Rhodesia and that this one was sold by an informer in Soweto to build up the unrecorded security fund. I became suspicious and later when I was transferred to Section C1, head office, I became aware of trouble amongst Rhodesian special branch members about gift cars that Colonel Victor had distributed amongst them.
- 5.2.6.6.6 The first keys that Noivo gave me, was that of Stanley Mabisela, chief representative of the ANC in Swaziland, whose stolen car, as I have explained, was later found in Soweto. The alarm went off on our first attempt and we had to get the hell out of there. We came back, however, when Noivo had demonstrated how to stick the long nosed pliers through a specific slot near the bottom, pull the hooter wire through and cut it. This we did a few nights later and Stanley had lost his car. I have met Stanley since and we had a good laugh about the matter. He told me how he had run to the window during the first attempt when the alarm went off, and cocked his gun.
- 5.2.6.6.7 This car thieving operation was later extended to so called "hostile country" embassy vehicles, based in Maputu, when owners came to shop and service their cars. I remember us stealing a light blue Toyota 12-seater mini bus at the Highlands view hotel in Mbabane, where the occupants spent the night.

- 5.2.6.6.8 The owners of Clarke's Motors, Peter and Hillary Clarke, and I had become friends. Their garage was located at the Mbabane industrial sites. One day during a visit I noticed seven brand new Land Rovers that the United Nations had bought from Clarke's motors. They included different types such as bakkies and station wagons.
- 5.2.6.6.9 That night, several of us, including Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs, Sergeant Chris Rorich, Sergeant Paul van Dyk, Sergeant Andre van der Berg and Constable Johan de Wit - I think that was the lot - from Oshoek and Ermelo security, went to steal the vehicles. We used a bolt cutter to cut the padlock at the back of the workshop but in the dark, when we attempted to push out the first landrover, we pushed it into the service pit and blocked the entrance. What a blow! We had to abandon the operation.
- 5.2.6.6.10 I still receive Christmass cards from the Clarkes and have written to them, whilst in exile, to tell them of my involvement in that incident. They stay at 11255 S.W. Center Street Beaverton, OR 97005.
- 5.2.6.6.11 One night Major Nick van Rensburg, Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs, Sergeant Chris Rorich and I went to Hassen Patel's Mediterranean Restaurant where we ate and drank on the house. After doing a fine job of that, we thanked him and left. When we got outside we discovered that Chris Rorich had stolen Hassen's white BMW 5-series ignition keys. We found that utterly amusing and Chris drove off with Hassen's BMW, taking it back to Ermelo.
- 5.2.6.6.12 We had hardly reached Oshoek when Hassen phoned to tell us about the theft and asked us to keep an eye out for the car. I do not know what happened to this car.
- 5.2.6.6.13 There were several other thefts and attempted thefts. I will relate one more. Nick van Rensburg, Chris Deetlefs, Chris Rorich and I on one of our drinking sprees in Swaziland, ended up at the Portuguese Club in Manzini. On leaving, Chris Rorich noticed an old parked Volkswagen Beetle with the keys in the ignition and drove off in it. After struggling up a long hill, with many a long hill to go before we would reach Oshoek, we shoved the little car over the side of a steep slope into the bushes and left.
- 5.2.6.6.14 I think this illustrates why I can call us, like I did in the introduction, a close-knit gang of thugs that operated above the law. And this was still my apprenticeship.
- 5.2.6.7 **Burglaring the UN office for refugees in Swaziland**

- 5.2.6.7.1 The UN office for refugees in Swaziland was in the outbuildings of a house on the North Western corner of Gilfilian and another street, which was either Hill Street or thereabouts, in Mbabane. These buildings were below the level of Gilfilian Street.
- 5.2.6.7.2 Major Nick van Rensburg asked me to burgle the place and to get the refugee files. I coopted Jeffrey Clarke, approximately 18 year old son of Peter and Hillary Clarke, to do surveillance since he was a local and would not rouse suspicion.
- 5.2.6.7.3 One Friday night, Sergeant Andre van der Berg, Warrant Officer Koos van der Lith (currently Major van der Lith, station commander, Secunda), Jeffrey Clarke and I went to ransack the house. Koos waited in the official Datsun Laurel, on the property of Rall Matheus, across Gilfilian Street. The car was parked under a huge tree. Carlos Madoreira Lopes of Swazi Air now stays there.
- 5.2.6.7.4 We entered the burglary house through a window. Inside we discovered that this was a Swaziland government department working with housing. After leaving the premises it dawned on me that the offices we were looking for might be in the out buildings.
- 5.2.6.7.5 On Saturday morning I went to the chief of the detectives, Charlie Bell and asked him whether they had any reports of housebreaking of significance the previous night. He said no and wanted to know what we were up to again. I told him not to worry but to watch.
- 5.2.6.7.6 On Saturday night the same team returned to the site of the burglary. I can't remember whether Jeffrey accompanied us again. We entered the out building through the window facing the gate. This window was next to the front door on the right hand side as one approached the building. We were wearing gloves. I failed to pick the locks of the quite new steel filing cabinets, so we tore them open with a crow bar.
- 5.2.6.7.7 We removed all the files, several telex tapes on reels, letter heads, envelopes, UN-emblem vehicle door stickers, some books and a paper shredder (when I enquired some years ago, this shredder was still doing duty in the offices of the Ermelo security branch). I forced open the petty cash box to look at the contents and we took this along as well. It contained about 60 Emelangeni.
- 5.2.6.7.8 We loaded all this loot in the Datsun, filling the boot, back seat and floor. The car hung low under the weight and we had no suspension. We drove to the Royal Swazi Spa Hotel where we had a good steak and a few drinks with

- the contents of the petty cash box. I put the receipts in the box and gave it, together with the entire load to Major Nick van Rensburg on Sunday morning.
- 5.2.6.7.9 The loot was offloaded at the Ermelo security branch offices by Nick, Chris Deetlefs, Chris Rorich and me.
- 5.2.6.7.10 I visited Charlie Bell of the Swazi police on Monday morning. He duly cursed us and said that when he received the call he immediately knew it was us. He had to send his 2-IC, Superintendent Jeremia Dube to the scene of the crime, as he said he would not be able to contain his laughter. He said we had wrecked the place.
- 5.2.6.7.11 I later saw part of the loot in a store room at the regional security head office at Middleburg.

5.2.6.8 Manzini Post Office bomb

- 5.2.6.8.1 I was not present on this operation. My account of the Manzini Post Office parcel bomb operation is based on what Major Nick van Rensburg, Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs and Sergeant Chris Rorich told me. They said that the then Luitenant W A L du Toit, now Luitenant-Colonel du Toit, of the technical division, security head office had prepared the bomb. Wahl, who is a friend of mine, later told me that he had prepared the bomb, explaining the mechanism to me.
- 5.2.6.8.2 The bomb had two circuits. One was a timing device, which allowed one to set the time required by the operator to safely handle and transport the device after closing it and before leaving it in position. The timing device may be one that allows the operator to select a safe period of up to twelve hours, or it may be one that allows the operator to more accurately select a safety period of up to one hour. This particular bomb allowed for the more than one hour safety period required for this operation.
- 5.2.6.8.3 Once the selected safe-time expires, the bomb is ready to explode when tilted. The trigger mechanism was a glass tube that was tilted at an angle of 45 degrees. At the bottom of the tube was a small quantity of mercury. The bomb was triggered by tilting the parcel enough for the mercury to roll forward and connect two contact points. The mercury conducted a current across the points to set off the explosion.
- 5.2.6.8.4 In Manzini, there was an attorney firm, "Scott-Smith", by two British subjects. They had in their employ, a messenger-clerk, Bafana Duma, who was a member of the ANC. He used to collect their post at the Post Office every morning and also used the post box for the purposes of the ANC.
- 5.2.6.8.5 One night late - it was after midnight - I met Nick and the Chris duo in Swaziland. They joined me in my eating and drinking. They told me that they had planted a bomb for Duma at the post office and asked me to buy the newspaper, which was the Swazi Times, the next day. Nick and them told me that they had obtained a key to the Scott-Smith post box from a woman.
- 5.2.6.8.6 Early that morning the bomb went off and Bafana Duma lost his arm. The Post Office was badly damaged. I visited the Post Office later that morning and the Swazi Times had a front page photograph showing the result of the blast, with Bafana Duma's spectacles lying on the stoep. Nick and them were highly pleased with the outcome of the operation. Duma later got an artificial arm. I am told that he died some years ago of natural causes.

5.2.6.9 Ambush and murder of Land Cruiser driver

- 5.2.6.9.1 Here I was again not present. The ambush and murder of the Land Cruiser driver was a joint venture between the divisional commander of Pietermaritzburg security, Brigadier Hans Dreyer and Brigadier van der Hoven, Eastern Transvaal security. Brigadier Dreyer was the founder and commander of the notorious Koevoet in South West Africa (now Namibia). I learnt of the operation from Luitenant Jerry Fourie and Warrant Officer Johan (alias Sakkie) Fourie, from Pietermaritzburg as well as Major Nick van Rensburg and his men.
- 5.2.6.9.2 Jerry Fourie also handled informers in Swaziland and Mosambique. He had introduced me to his informers whom I assisted with various problems. They were Floriano da Silva, his brother Jao Quim, Jose Vaz, Carlos Cardosa (alias Shorty) and the brothers Bernardo and Andrea Timanie.
- 5.2.6.9.3 One example justifies a small aside from the main story. One of the informers had returned to South Africa via Oshoek after an aborted assassination attempt. He had disposed of his Russian Makarov pistol and silencer in an old type of high water bowl of a flush toilet on the Swaziland side. This put the apparatus out of order and instead of fixing it immediately, the Swaziland staff locked the door and put an "out of order" sign on it. Jerry phoned me from Pietermaritzburg and asked me to retrieve the weapon, which Sergeant Andre van den Berg then did.
- 5.2.6.9.4 With the preparations for the Land Cruiser ambush, Jerry and Sakkie Fourie came through to Swaziland where they posed as land surveyors on the road near Namahash border post between Swaziland and Mosambique. They were monitoring the movements of ANC members across the border and selected a suitable site for an ambush. They had information that a Land Cruiser with a load of ANC freedom fighters would cross the border.
- 5.2.6.9.5 The site selected for the ambush was in a dip in the dirt road, a few kilometers from Namahash, on the way to Manzini. It was next to the farm Nkalashane that belonged to De Neys de Bruin, a security police informer. The farm's northern boundary was also the border with Mosambique and the western side bordered on South Africa. They decided that they would cut the fence, chase De Neys' cattle into the road and then ambush the Land Cruiser when it stopped.
- 5.2.6.9.6 Amongst those involved from Pietermaritzburg, were Brigadier Hans Dreyer, Jerry and Sakkie Fourie, Sergeant Basie Erwee and from Eastern Transvaal there were Brigadier van der Hoven, Major Archie Flemmington from Lebombo, some of Major Flemmington's men, Major Nick van Rensburg

from Ermelo and his men, as well as Captain Gert van Wyk from Nelspruit and his men.

- 5.2.6.9.7 De Neys' farm was entered from the South African side where Brigadiers van der Hoven and Dreyer remained behind. They were having drinks and a braai. The rest of the party proceeded with the ambush as planned. But the plan went sour.
- 5.2.6.9.8 The Land Cruiser stopped but there were no passengers on the back. Jerry Fourie wanted to smash the windscreen with a baseball bat to make the driver throw up his arms so that Basie Erwee could open the door and grab him. The driver was too quick and opened fire, shooting Jerry and Basie down notwithstanding their bullet proof vests.
- 5.2.6.9.9 The rest of the squad opened fire and heavily wounded the driver. The passenger in front jumped out and escaped to Manzini with a bullet in his buttock to report the incident to the Swaziland police. The Land Cruiser was covered in petrol and set alight. On photo's that Nick later obtained from their Swaziland police contact I could see (Nick showed me) that the vehicle did not burn out completely and it was riddled with bullet holes.
- 5.2.6.9.10 The ambush group returned with their two casualties and the wounded driver. The driver died on the South African side and they disposed of the body - no one has told me how. Jerry Fourie and Basie Erwee were rushed to the Nelspruit hospital where emergency operations were carried out.
- 5.2.6.9.11 The morning after the ambush, Sakkie arrived at Oshoek and told me the story. He had to make a few urgent phone calls, amongst other things to inform a woman in Swaziland that she had to get out of the country.
- 5.2.6.9.12 The cover-up while dealing with the procedures to get medical benefits for injury on duty, created a good few head aches and I do not know how these problems were solved.
- 5.2.6.9.13 The ANC has identified the Land Cruiser driver to me as one Kehla. They knew he was missing but did not know what had happened to him.
- 5.2.6.10 Mpaka railway line bomb**
- 5.2.6.10.1 One day Major Nick van Rensburg phoned me and told me to stand by; they would come and pick me up after dark. Nick came and fetched me. I cannot remember all the details, but I do know that we went to Waverley Border Post, which closes at 16h00.

- 5.2.6.10.2 On route to Waverley, Nick told me we were going to blow up the Swaziland-Maputu railway line and implicate the ANC in this. I cannot remember the details of how we got there, but at Waverley we were four people, ie Major Nick van Rensburg, the Chris duo and I. While Nick, Chris Deetlefs and I were transferring petrol between two vehicles, Chris Rorich was testing a timing device.
- 5.2.6.10.3 This operation was a success in the most unusual manner. The bomb did not initially explode and I suspect that this was owing to the tampering Rorich's fiddling with the device. The cheap Russian pocket watch used in the device, after being wound up, sometimes requires a good shake before it will start ticking. Luitenant Wahl du Toit, who prepares these things at the security head office technical division, had an ingenious way of circumventing this problem. He would wind up the hair spring and keep it in that position with a piece of gut that is then snipped instead of having to shake the apparatus. To achieve this, he drilled a hole through the glass, face plate, the hair spring fly wheel and the back plate of the watch. He would then thread the gut through these openings and tie it together to form a loop around the watch. All that was needed when the bomb was set, was to wind up the watch, set it, cut the gut and pull it out.
- 5.2.6.10.4 I saw that to test the apparatus, Chris was setting the time arm to the "12-position" to see if it made contact with a test light. To do this he would have had to cut the gut. I suspect he did so in which case he would not have been able to reload the hair spring and may even have damaged the watch in attempting to do so. Wahl agreed with my hypothesis when I discussed this with him.
- 5.2.6.10.5 The border post was deserted and Nick had a key to get through the gate. We went through with our bomb and continued to Mpaka railway station, which is the last one on the way to Mosambique from Manzini. I was to guard the car with a shot gun. However, we found a nice hiding place for the car and I could go along.
- 5.2.6.10.6 We wanted to plant the bomb on the bridge just before entering the station. A shunting locomotive made this impossible. We therefore moved on to the first cutting before the bridge and Chris Rorich placed the bomb. We then left.
- 5.2.6.10.7 We got home in the pre-dawn hours. Around nine the Chris-duo were back at Oshoek, showing clear signs of lack of sleep. They told me the bomb did not go off and was found by railway workers. The Swaziland police called in the help of Ermelo security police, in the form of deadbeat bomb expert

Rorich, to defuse the bomb. He used fishing tackle to haul the bomb off the railway line and then detonated it.

- 5.2.6.10.8 The success of this venture was that the Ermelo security police were heroes in the eyes of the Swaziland police.
- 5.2.7 Mss Botes' alibi**
- 5.2.7.1 The case of Mss Botes' alibi is probably what General Johan Coetzee referred to when he accused me of smuggling illegal Portuguese immigrants into South Africa. The General, however, seems to have gotten a story all wrong. It was certainly the first time that I heard of this particular allegation. Let me put the story right for the General.
- 5.2.7.2 Mss Rika Lourens-Botes had an agency in Malvern Johannesburg that organized visas, work permits and temporary and permanent residence permits for Portuguese immigrants. She had good contacts at the Department of the Interior and she in general had her way with them. It was never necessary for her to ask me to smuggle Portuguese into South Africa.
- 5.2.7.3 She often visited Swaziland to see clients and this is how we met and became good friends. She told me that she was an ex attorney. Rika provided us with reasonably interesting bits of information from the Portuguese community and Major Nick van Rensburg and his staff also met her personally and got to know her well. She was very intelligent with a strong personality and although friendly had a somewhat disorganized, overpowering way with people.
- 5.2.7.4 One day whilst she was having visas stamped into the passports of immigrants that she had come to collect, she asked me to provide her with back-dated entry and exit stamps in her own South African passport. I arranged this for her on my side and the Swaziland side of the border. She had some cock and bull reason for this that I did not even bother about.
- 5.2.7.5 One day she phoned me to tell me she had been caught in a diamond trap and that she had used these stamps as an alibi. The trick backfired when it was proved that she was in Johannesburg at the time.
- 5.2.7.6 I immediately phoned Major Nick van Rensburg who put me at ease and said he would notify Brigadier van der Hoven and Nick's brother who was a detective in Johannesburg, I think also in the gold and diamond branch. Rika was found guilty and Colonel James Beezelaar of the gold and diamond branch

then went for my blood. Nick told me that I knew my rights and that I should just remain silent and deny everything.

- 5.2.7.7 When James Beezlaar could not make any headway with me, he sent the dossier to Brigadier Johan Coetzee, the future Commissioner of Police, who decided that the then Brigadier Stan Schutte, divisional CID chief for Eastern Transvaal should investigate the matter personally. Stan Schutte was an ex security policeman. Later he was to become chief of the security police with the rank of Major-General. Yet later, he became Luitenant-General Schutte, the CID chief of South Africa.
- 5.2.7.8 Stan discussed the case with Brigadier van der Hoven. They called me to Middleburg and on arrival sent me to Luitenant-Colonel Ronny van der Westhuizen, the district CID chief. Ronny is today Major-General van der Westhuizen who is assisting the Harms Commission with investigations into the hit squad allegations.
- 5.2.7.9 When I reached Ronny he had already written up half of a statement on my behalf. He just filled in my names at the top and continued to complete the statement without my assistance. He had a short and sweet story ready for me. All I can remember was that in that statement I admitted that I knew Rika and that she was an informer of mine. The rest I cannot remember but it should still be on my file. I signed and never heard of the matter again.
- 5.2.8 Taking the rapp for Bruce's blue movie**
- 5.2.8.1 Bruce's blue movie again got me on the wrong side of the Commissioner of Police to be. Luitenant Bruce Smith and his wife Rita had been close friends of my wife Karin and I, since 1972. They came to visit us at Oshoek. Now, Bruce is as randy as ever a man can be.
- 5.2.8.2 I could at any time drive the 18 kilometers from Oshoek to Mbabane in Swaziland where I could legally watch as many blue movies in as big or small a company as I cared and it did not cost me a cent. It is common knowledge that when you have seen two or three of these things, you've seen them all. This I had done and after that it was only when it was really terribly important for a guest that I would force myself to go and see yet another blue movie. My guest Bruce was a case in point.
- 5.2.8.3 Bruce and I - the wives were not interested - went to Rall Matheus' Cineland in Mbabane in Bruce's red BMW. Rall put up a film just for the two of us and at the end Bruce wanted to know if Rall had a blue movie for him. Rall

gave Bruce a film and there in front of Rall, I told Bruce that I wanted to have absolutely nothing to do with that film.

- 5.2.8.4 Bruce took it through in the boot of his car. I knew that and that was my only offense. Bruce and his chief at the special guard unit, Pretoria, currently Major-General Roy During, plus their friends watched this movie until they must have been able to replay it in its entirety with their eyes closed, if Bruce's subsequent stories about the movie are to be believed.
- 5.2.8.5 Thereafter Bruce passed it on to the technical division at head office security, Pretoria, with viewers such as Captain Koos Benade, Luitenant Wahl du Toit and Luitenant Koos Moolman. My brother in law, Abri de Villiers, ex security police Luitenant and at that stage a Pretoria attorney, eventually got hold of the film and circulated it amongst his circle of acquaintances.
- 5.2.8.6 Next, when the entire adult Pretoria's morals had been duly undermined, Abri passed it on to another brother in law, Willem ("Wilhelmpie") Krause. Wilhelmpie's wife did not approve. She phoned the police who caught Wilhelmpie red-handed. He was charged and when asked where he got it, he said from his brother in law Abri. And, of course, the police wanted to know from Wilhelmpie where Abri got it, to which he replied that Abri got it from his brother in law, Dirk Coetzee.
- 5.2.8.7 This information was passed on to the narcotics police chief, Luitenant-Colonel Basie Smith, who today is the security police chief, Major-General Basie Smith. Basie passed the story on to Brigadier Johan Coetzee, chief of the security police. I had in the meantime heard this story via the family in law, and went and explained the full story to Major Nick van Rensburg, Luitenant Colonel Gough and Brigadier van der Hoven. I told them that they need not do anything to clarify the matter with Johan Coetzee but that I just wanted them to know the true facts. I would rather take the rapp than let a lot of policeman get into trouble as a result of Wilhelmpie's stupidity.
- 5.2.8.8 Johan Coetzee transferred me to the uniform branch at Sunnyside police station in Pretoria. The transfer was due for 13 December 1979.
- 5.2.9 Making the grade**
- 5.2.9.1 Three weeks before my transfer was due, Brigadier Johan Coetzee and Major-General Ferdie Zietsman, on their way to Swaziland spent the night at the holiday resort Badplaas near Oshoek. Here Brigadier van der Hoven and Major Nick van Rensburg briefed them on the situation in Swaziland. Nick

told me later that after all the shop talk, whilst relaxing at a braai, Johan made a negative remark about me with reference to the blue movie incident.

- 5.2.9.2 There and then Brigadier van der Hoven told Johan and Ferdie the true sequence of events. He also told them about good work I was doing and what I had achieved in general. They were told about the clubhouse and the role it played in fostering relations.
- 5.2.9.3 On arrival at Oshoek the two VIP's wanted to inspect the clubhouse and were knocked off their feet. Major-General Zietsman, who was chairman of the board of the police magazine Servamus, was adamant that he would get the editor, Luitenant-Colonel Leon Menge, down to do an article on the place. This he did. The article appeared on pages 20 to 23 of the Servamus issue dated May 1980 under the headings "OSHOEK, SYMBOL OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH BLACK STATES" and "THE HOUSE THAT DIRK BUILT".
- 5.2.9.4 Johan Coetzee wanted to know how I would like to be transferred to the Middleburg police security branch. When I asked what about the Sunnyside transfer that was due in three weeks, he said that was the issue and repeated his question. I told him I would love that.
- 5.2.9.5 They went into Swaziland and returned to Pretoria that same day. The next morning early Colonel Gough informed me that they had received a telex from security head office, which cancelled my Sunnyside transfer and announced my transfer to Middleburg.
- 5.2.9.6 I had made the grade to the security proper and before Christmass 1979 left for Middleburg.

5.3 Middleburg

5.3.1 The non-violent face of security

- 5.3.1.1 I started at Middleburg as 2-IC of the Branch security under Captain Louis Smuts. I was handed 12 personal files on suspected ANC supporters. This was the first and the last time in the security police that I dealt with such files.
- 5.3.1.2 The seven months at Middleburg may be characterized as extremely peaceful months. First of all, Middleburg was quiet as far as ANC activities went. Secondly, I spent most of my time getting to know my operational area.

Brigadier van der Hoven still occasionally sent me to Swaziland but I cannot even recall what for.

- 5.3.1.3 On the domestic side, on the other hand, I had a turbulent time, with my wife getting discontented and my year-old son being diagnosed as an insulin dependent diabetic. These upheavals resulted in my transfer to Pretoria and Vlakplaas.

- 5.3.2 Assimilation into the operational area**
- 5.3.2.1 I set about getting to know the operational area, which included the towns of Marble Hall, Groblersdal and the Nebo and Sekukune Land areas. I visited businessmen, tribal heads, and tribal witch doctors.
- 5.3.2.2 To win the goodwill of the witch doctors, I visited the Kruger National Park and obtained animal material that they required for their practices. It was useful to have the support of these gentlemen, because they had the most incredible knowledge of what went on in their areas. The tribal people went to the witch doctors with virtually all their problems, including health, business, social and otherwise. Criminals and other people would visit the witch doctor to be given "medicine" for protection.
- 5.3.2.3 I can site examples that I could only explain by accepting that these guys were clairvoyant but unfortunately I do not remember the details any more.
- 5.3.2.4 There is little more to say. A typical daily routine out in the veld was to pry around during the day, get to a bottle store before closing time, buy twelve beers and a two litre can of wine, find a place in the great outdoors to sleep, have a braai, snorkel through the booze and fall over. This little carefree band consisted of Joel Madihlaba, my Venda friend Spyker and I. My four year old son, Dirk, often accompanied me on these excursion that could last up to a week.
- 5.3.3 Domestic problems**
- 5.3.3.1 In December 1979 the first sign of diabetes melitus started manifesting in our year old-child, but we of course had not the slightest inkling that this was the problem. From the first week in January 1980 his condition deteriorated drastically and daily and the doctors and specialists were not making any headway. To us they hid their ignorance and comforted us with all sorts of diagnoses of common child afflictions.
- 5.3.3.2 While I was working and drinking away in the veld, happier than ever, my wife Karin had started making so many trips to the doctors in Pretoria that she eventually decided to move in there with her mother. On 6 February 1980 the child fell into a diabetic coma. He was in the coma for two days before it was finally discovered that he was a diabetic. He was put on insulin, came out of the coma on day three and could leave the hospital after three weeks.
- 5.3.3.3 We had to go through a process of education and practice for months before we were able to control his blood sugar reasonably well. During this period

- I still spent most of my time in the veld while Karin could not risk leaving Pretoria.
- 5.3.3.4 Karin wanted me to move to Pretoria, while I enjoyed my work so much that I tried hard to hang on to Middleburg against my better judgement. I went to Pretoria to spend the weekends with Karin and the children. She started to threaten with a divorce and sent summonses, but I was too blind to take it seriously and filed it in the dustbin.
- 5.3.3.5 I think it was around April 1980 that I was promoted to Captain.
- 5.3.4 The road to Vlakplaas**
- 5.3.4.1 One morning in June, with my marriage still quite intact in my judgement, my wife left home all dressed up and that afternoon when she did not return, I started to become suspicious. An alarm bell suddenly started ringing. My brother in law, who is an attorney pointed out that it was a Tuesday, which is divorce day in the supreme court. He went and checked and reported back: "Case Number 30 today" - I was no longer married.
- 5.3.4.2 I reported to Brigadier van der Hoven who gave me a few days leave. I went on a legal crusade, explained my story and signed documents. My wife did not oppose, and within three weeks I had the divorce set aside to be a happily married man still. The case became a decided case in the Marriages Law.
- 5.3.4.3 By now I realized that attempting to hang on to the Middleburg working conditions was wishful thinking. Brigadier van der Hoven arranged a transfer and I was on my way to Section C1 (Vlakplaas), Security Head Office, Pretoria.
- 5.4 Vlakplaas**
- 5.4.1 Inheriting the askaris**
- 5.4.1.1 I reported at Section C during early August 1980. Colonel J J Viktor was the officer in command - he retired in 1989 as Major-General Viktor, Divisional Commissioner, Soweto. Viktor put me in charge of Section C1 (Vlakplaas) and I occupied this position until 31 December 1981, ie for one year and five months.

- 5.4.1.2 Vlakplaas is a 44 ha farm, seven kilometers out of Erasmia, on the Schurveberg road. The police had hired Vlakplaas from a Mr Steward in 1978. The southern border of the farm is the Hennops River. There was an old farm house with an out building that included a garage and two servant rooms.
- 5.4.1.3 A store room in the farm house was stocked with supplies that Viktor had received from his Rhodesian special branch friends. This included loads of canned food, stacks of shoes, overhauls, shirts, trousers, blankets, beds and mattresses and an assortment of other supplies.
- 5.4.1.4 Viktor had a proper "maplotter" enterprise at Vlakplaas, with a number of farm animals, some of uncertain lineage, including fowl, geese, ducks, turkeys, a cow, goats, and a dog or two. He and the askaris had a veritable squatter garden with a few mealie plants, some pumpkin and sweet potato creepers, tomatoes, green beans and onions.
- 5.4.1.5 The farm was used as base for freedom fighters of the ANC that were caught and "turned" against their former comrades to work for the police. In a few cases they had walked over of their own accord. These are the so called "askaris" a Swahili, ultimately Arabic word, meaning "a black soldier". Viktor acquired the nickname "Makarios".
- 5.4.1.6 The task of the askaris was to mix with the population at public places such as shebeens, bus stops, railway stations and taxi ranks, spot ex ANC comrades and point them out to qualified policemen.
- 5.4.1.7 When I arrived at Vlakplaas the askaris were registered as Head Office informers and received an allowance of R200 per month. I looked after the administration, which was not much to say the least, as well as the farm and the daily needs and living conditions of the askaris. Whenever the askaris were needed for a task, the required number were fetched by the various security branches and returned when they had finished their missions.
- 5.4.2 Management and organizational structure**
- 5.4.2.1 When I arrived at Vlakplaas, Brigadier Johan Coetzee was chief of the security police. He was a senior Brigadier, ie a "Brigadier, deputy commissioner". His 2-IC was Brigadier Jan du Preez, which is a junior "Brigadier Assistant Commissioner". Under these two, security head office consisted of sections A to F (or G or thereabouts).

- 5.4.2.2 Each section has its own commander with the rank of Colonel or lower. Section A, the one to which "super spy" Craig Williamson belonged, was commanded by Colonel Piet "Biko" Goossen. Section C was the "ANC-PAC Desk" where Colonel J J Viktor was in charge.
- 5.4.2.3 Each section was sub-divided to suit its needs. Section C was sub-divided into Section C1, C2 and C3 (and perhaps a C4). Each sub-section had its own commander. I was in charge of Section C1, which was Vlakplaas.
- 5.4.2.4 Every weekday morning at 07h30 the sub-section officers met with their section commander to keep him informed on what was happening in the sections. At 08h00 the section chiefs and the security 2-IC met with the security police chief. This eight 'o clock meeting was generally referred to as the "San Hedren".
- 5.4.2.5 Outside of head office security, the country is divided into Divisions and the Divisions into Branches. The infamous Koevoet, that operated from Oshakati in Namibia, fell directly under security head office in Pretoria. Divisions and branches that we got involved with during operations in my time, include the following:-
- 5.4.2.6 Port Elizabeth security branch, headed from 1981 by Luitenant Colonel Nick van Rensburg, fell under the Eastern Province Division, headed by Colonel Gerrit Erasmus. Major Nick van Rensburg had transferred from Ermelo to Port Elizabeth in 1981. Colonel Gerrit Erasmus is at present Major General Erasmus who heads the Witwatersrand police.
- 5.4.2.7 The Aliwal North security branch was headed by a Major whose name I have forgotten but whom I can still remember well.
- 5.4.2.8 The Durban branch with Captain Andy Taylor fell under Brigadier van der Hoven who was the divisional commander of Port Natal (Durban). He had transferred from the Eastern Transvaal Division, Middleburg Transvaal, in 1981.
- 5.4.2.9 The Lady Brandt branch headed by Captain Louw as well as Warrant Officer Hendrik Prinsloo, currently Captain Prinsloo of the Northern Transvaal security division in Pretoria, reported to Colonel Coetzee of the Orange Free State (Bloemfontein) division.
- 5.4.2.10 The Zeerust security branch with Captain Rudy Kraus, fell under the Western Transvaal divisional commander at Potchefstroom.

- 5.4.2.11 The Krugersdorp branch was headed by Captain Jan Coetzee who reported to the Divisional Commander, West Rand security.
- 5.4.2.12 Major Chris Deetlefs of the Ermelo security branch, Captain Gert Visser of the Nelspruit branch, Major Archie Flemmington from Lebombo (Komatipoort) branch, at first reported to Brigadier Van der Hoven and when he was transferred to Durban, to Brigadier Schalk Visser (ex Soweto), of the Eastern Transvaal division.
- 5.4.2.13 The security police is a small and intimate organization with a close rapport.
- 5.4.3 Vlakplaas contingent**
- 5.4.3.1 Before I was appointed to Vlakplaas, Warrant Officer Letstatsi stayed on the farm with the askaris while a Major Gawie Richter and Constable Groenewald of Section C took turns to visit the farm daily and ensure that everything was in order.
- 5.4.3.2 I do not have records at my disposal but relying on memory can count about 17 askaris in total that were at Vlakplaas at some stage during my stay there. Of these, about 13 lived on the farm while the rest stayed in townships in the area. Three deserted back to the ANC during my stay and three were killed by us. Two landed in goal with long sentences for murdering their girl friends. It should be obvious that I was back in the rough.
- 5.4.3.3 The askaris in my time, whom I can remember, were: Steven Mbanda; Jeff Bosigo; Brian Ngulungwa; Thabo Makgagae; Petrus Kgoadi; Siphon (alias Casper); Ernest Rhamatlala; Piet Mogai (alias Oupa) who lived in Sebokeng; Joe Mamasela who also lived in Sebokeng; Bra Moss who also did not stay on the farm; Ghost who was abducted in the raid on Matola in February 1981 and who got 11 years for murdering his girlfriend; Bobby Modiba who got 15 years for murdering his girlfriend (we were still trying to help him in connection with the murder of one girl friend when he shot another); three that defected back to the ANC, namely the brothers Chris and Johannes Mnisi as well as Ben Lucky Zwane; and the three that we killed, namely Isaac Ace Mohema, Peter and Vhusi who was also abducted in the raid on Matola.
- 5.4.3.4 All the smoking askaris also smoked dagga (marijuana). With a few exceptions they drank heavily.
- 5.4.3.5 Also on the farm, were three ex Rhodesian Zapu freedom fighters that worked as labourers. They were: the brothers Godfrey and Nixon Ndavona; and Mathews.

- 5.4.3.6 Five Mosambican Renamo fighters occasionally spent time on the farm. I remember the names of Amaro, George and Nicolas Karamanolis.
- 5.4.3.7 David Tshikalanga, alias "Spyker" who as a scholar did gardening for me at Sibasa, had joined me at Volksrust and followed me to Oshoek, Middelburg and Vlakplaas. He was first appointed as a "HKZ" guard for R50 per month, later as an "HQ" informer for R200 per month and eventually a Student Constable and Constable.
- 5.4.3.8 Warrant Officer Letstatsi who was on Vlakplaas when I arrived there, stayed on during my stay. Of the Policemen that were transferred to Vlakplaas during 1981, I can remember Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant Officers Paul van Dyk and Connie Swiegelaar, Sergeants Koos Schutte, Louis Olivier, "Balletjies" Bellingham, Ernst van Jaarsveld, Louis le Roux, Braam du Preez, Almond Nofomela, John Mpofo, Sollie who was Makarios' "agterryer" (equivalent of "side kick" but black and following behind) like Spyker was mine and another whose name I can't remember. Almond, John and the one I can't remember, arrived at Vlakplaas from the Police College some time around January 1981.
- 5.4.3.9 I may have missed a name or two of the askaris and policemen. Some of those mentioned left again during my stay.
- 5.4.3.10 Our fleet of official vehicles included: a 3 litre Cortina bakkie with BPC registration number; a white Datsun Laurel (mine), with false registration DJC036T (my initials and age); a blue Datsun Laurel (Koos Vermeulen); a 3 litre Cortina (Paul van Dyk); a 3 litre Cortina (Louis Olivier) and four beige Toyota bakkies with white canopies, used by Almond Nofomela, John Mpofo, Sollie, I think Warrant Officer Letsatsi; twelve seater Toyota High Ace mini busses that gradually replaced the Toyota bakkies; a Ford F100 (Koos Schutte); a flat deck Bedford truck used on the farm; and three or four askari vehicles of dubious origin.
- 5.4.4 Vlakplaas reformer**
- 5.4.4.1 When I arrived at Vlakplaas, the askari rations came out of the security police secret fund and Victor's Rhodesian special branch connections. The askaris were registered as "HQ" informers and were paid from the secret fund.
- 5.4.4.2 Via the police Quartermaster, I arranged for official orders for the supply of daily bread and milk, meat vegetables, fruit, cheese and everything required for a decent diet. I obtained a decent generator for electrical power supply

and a paraffin deep freeze for the farm from the anti insurgency unit in exchange for loot such as shoes, from our store. I obtained a TV set out of the police "facilities fund".

- 5.4.4.3 From the Provincial Administration nursery, I scrounged numerous trees and shrubs that we planted on the farm.
- 5.4.4.4 Major Kruger in the Defence Force (I can't remember the unit), provided a grader that leveled and ripped large tracts of land along the Hennops River. Somewhere we also managed to get hold of a tractor to plough and cultivate these lands.
- 5.4.4.5 To improve the askari income and standard of living, I had them appointed as policemen. This gave them a better salary, subsistence and traveling allowance, free police medical benefits and a clothing allowance. They could now obtain service pistols to protect themselves - it is a pity that some started shooting girl friends and solving personal problems at shebeens with these pistols.
- 5.4.4.6 I arranged for a private post office box at Erasmia Post Office for the askaris and obtained a pass book and travel document for each. I gave them driving lessons and arranged to have them tested in Bronkhorstspuit with Koos Vermeulen's trafic officer friends. Koos, at that stage, was station commander, Bronkhorstspuit.
- 5.4.4.7 To give the house and out buildings a much needed face lift, I obtained paint with either the building branch or the quarter master - I am not sure which.
- 5.4.4.8 Major Visser Antoniuson who was in charge at the Voortrekker Hoogte prison, supplied me with manure and lawn.
- 5.4.4.9 Vlakplaas was now properly operational and looking respectable. Recognize me?
- 5.4.5 **Sleuth-hound groups**
 - 5.4.5.1 In hind sight, the development of the sleuth-hound groups may well appear to be the intentional forerunner of organized hit squads. As far as I am concerned, this was definitely not the case. Although I had on occasion been called from Vlakplaas to participate in dubious operations elsewhere, our primary function at Vlakplaas was surveillance and the development of the sleuth groups was purely to perform this function in a more professional manner

- 5.4.5.2 When the police contingent was strengthened in January with the arrival of Almond Nofemela and his group, they started accompanying the askaris on their surveillance.
- 5.4.5.3 Somewhere in the early 1980, Colonel Schoon was transferred to head office security from Oshakati security, as 2-IC to Viktor. When Viktor was transferred as divisional security commander for Northern Transvaal, Schoon took his place and Luitenant-Colonel Roelf van Rensburg came in as his 2-IC.
- 5.4.5.4 The black junior policemen that accompanied the askaris, still had to work under the white senior policemen of the branches that needed them. I suggested that we appointed white policemen so that we could go to the branches as a properly organized group to perform the required tasks.
- 5.4.5.5 My proposal was accepted and we appointed several white policemen. As best I can remember, this happened towards mid-1981. We formed four groups under myself, Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk and Sergeant Louis Olivier. Each group had two vehicles: one was a "whites'" vehicle with the officer in charge and another policeman; and the other was the "blacks'" vehicle with a black policeman and a number of surveillance askaris.
- 5.4.5.6 While the blacks' vehicle mixed with the black population, the whites' vehicle remained out of sight in the vicinity. Of course this often deteriorated into the blacks mingling all too well at the shebeens while the whites had their version of similar haunts.
- 5.4.6 **More glimpses of the "dirty war"**
 - 5.4.6.1 At Vlakplaas I was present at various conversations between Viktor and his Rhodesian special branch friends. I heard how they booby trapped arms caches, eg by taking out the delay fuses of hand grenades, poisoned food caches, clothes and water holes and so forth.
 - 5.4.6.2 Viktor was also always involved with operations into Zimbabwe and Mosambique, such as car bombs. Viktor was less approachable than, eg, Nick van Rensburg, Brigadier van der Hoven and Brigadier Jan du Preez, with the result that I do not really know details of these instances. Viktor at one stage housed the Lesotho exiled opposition party leader, Nsu Semogetle, at Vlakplaas whilst the question of arms supply was being discussed with him.

- 5.4.6.3 I witnessed some of the planning of the attempt on the life of Chris Hani and the disaster afterwards, as discussed later in this statement (Section 5.4.11.1).
- 5.4.6.4 Immediately after the Sasol bomb blast, Viktor sent me to Major Nick van Rensburg at Ermelo security branch to lead a four man team to blow up two houses in Swaziland (see Section 5.4.14.1).
- 5.4.6.5 The night of the first, abortive, raid on Matola, Viktor and I went to Oshoek where we joined up with Chris Deetlefs, Chris Rorich and Paul van Dyk to go and blow up the ANC Land Cruiser parked at "Flat 6 and 9", Manzini (see Section 5.4.14.2). Viktor stayed behind a few kilometers before Oshoek at the Red Hill turn off, where he parked his car in a wattle bush, arranging his stretcher, "karos" and other mod-cons. The creaking bush must have been too much for his nerves, because when we returned that night, he was sitting fast asleep in his car with the abandoned luxuries outside.
- 5.4.6.6 The official secret police fund is administered in such a manner that the Auditor General's representative, who was Mr Botha at that stage, basically could only check that there was a receipt for each amount spent. A policeman is not forced to reveal his informants and Mr Botha had no way of checking that the money was really spent as claimed. (I remember Mr Botha's private Valliant car being bought by us out of the security fund to use as an askari car.)
- 5.4.6.7 When Colonel Schoon took over Section C from Viktor, one of his Oshakati police colleagues, Luitenant-Colonel Piet Viljoen, today Brigadier Piet Viljoen at security head office, was transferred from Oshakati to security head office. Piet Viljoen's wife, Joan Viljoen worked as a typist in Section C, which was headed by Schoon. She missed their South West Africa allowances and Brigadier Schoon instructed me to register a fake "HQ" informer, "Johannes Nkosi". His informer number was somewhere between 9 and 13 - I cannot quite recall it.
- 5.4.6.8 I sometimes signed at month end as Johannes Nkosi and I remember Sergeant Koos Schutte also signing. After I had left there, Koos told me that all and sundry were doing this signing. The money was handed to Schoon who gave it to Joan. Koos said this went on for years.
- 5.4.6.9 In 1984 with the build up to my internal trial and my phone being tapped, I cursed the covert listeners led by Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert, and spelt out all their sins to them. In this manner I also mentioned Schoon's little secret fund operation. Jaap told Schoon, who mentioned it to his 2-IC, Luitenant-Colonel Jack Cronje, who in turn sent a message to me via Sergeant Koos Schutte.

- 5.4.6.10 The message was that if I dropped Schoon on that one, he would drop me on the Lesotho diamond dealer murder (see Section 5.4.18). What Jack Cronje obviously did not take into account, was that the diamond dealer's radio had been built into Schoon's official light yellow Cortina car. Schoon was just as much an accomplice in covering up the murder and he knew about everything, including where the radio came from. I sent back a message to Jack, begging him to do just that.

5.4.7 Vlakplaas enters the hit squad arena

5.4.7.1 When I arrived at Vlakplaas, Viktor was an established coordinator of "hit" operations. As mentioned before, I was on occasion sent from Vlakplaas to participate. When we organized the Sleuth groups properly, some of them were simply also employed as such to perform "hit" operations. Vlakplaas as before was operating in response to requests from branches and in collaboration with the branches. All instructions came from Viktor and his successor Schoon in response to problems experienced at branches.

5.4.7.2 Such groups were highly effective and the Vlakplaas contribution to "hit" operations escalated dramatically. In my time, there was no additional training ever given to any askari or policeman at Vlakplaas, as I understand the case is currently.

5.4.7.3 The hit squad operations during my involvement at Vlakplaas, are documented in as much detail as I can remember, in the sections that follow. Unless otherwise indicated, the operations were carried out during 1981. I can often not sequence events, date them accurately or say exactly who was at Vlakplaas and where they were at the time.

5.4.7.4 IF I HAD THE INVESTIGATORY OPPORTUNITIES, INCLUDING POWERS OF DETENTION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION, OF A SECURITY POLICE OFFICER IN THIS MATTER, I WOULD WRAP IT UP FOR THE COMMISSION IN NO TIME. IT WOULD BE A SONG. IN FACT, IF IT WERE AT ALL POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER A TRULY INDEPENDENT AND COMMITTED INVESTIGATORY TEAM AND GRANT ME THE NECESSARY TEMPORARY IMMUNITY AND PROTECTION, I HERE AND NOW SERIOUSLY OFFER MY SERVICES TO SUCH A TEAM WITH GUARANTEED RESULTS. MY POLICE RECORD SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

5.4.8 Vlakplaas-Port Elizabeth hit squad operations

5.4.8.1 Chasing up some or other union's telephone bill

5.4.8.1.1 Luitenant Colonel Nick van Rensburg of Ermelo fame knew I could use a telephone well. I can sit at a telephone and organize things from there, with the best. It was my habit to let the telephone do the work rather than chasing up and down all over the place. My greatest frustration in exile is not having a telephone and not being able to rely on the privacy of my conversations in South Africa.

5.4.8.1.2 One day during 1981, whilst in Port Elizabeth with a team, Nick asked me to help him chase up a telephone bill in order to victimize some union or other. This I did one night from Nick's office.

5.4.8.1.3 Two phones in the offices of this union were being tapped. From the recording room at the security head office in Port Elizabeth, the two tapes were each connected via a lead to a telephone in Nick's office. In Nick's office the two telephones could be inter-connected via a set of two clamps from each phone. By phoning two people, one from each phone, and connecting the two phones, they could talk at the union's expense. One could also use one phone and talk at their expense yourself. When I got there that night, everything had been thus set up.

5.4.8.1.4 That night I phoned all over the country, to South West Africa and to the United States of America. On the one phone, I phoned up Hillary Clark in the United States. I knew her from Swaziland. On the other phone, I phoned up her daughter Tansey who at that stage was in Johannesburg. Tansey is now with her parents in the US. I also put my friend Jan Calitz in Windhoek, South West Africa, in contact with his brother Jurie Calitz in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. At some stage this dual system gave problems and I had to continue with single unit conversations myself.

5.4.8.1.5 Nick wanted to bring the union in confrontation with the Post Office. It was plain harassment. The union's phones were also being taped by the National Intelligence people in Port Elizabeth and the next morning they phoned Nick to enquire what on earth had been happening on the phones the previous night. Nick spluttered and shook with merriment when he related this to me.

5.4.8.2 Theft of Uitenhage activist's Audi

5.4.8.2.1 Also in Port Elizabeth, Luitenant Colonel Nick van Rensburg handed me the key of an Audi 80 that belonged to some activist or other. Nick and a Sergeant Jan somebody of his staff took me, Almond Nofomela and Spyker Tshikalanga to a black township. I cannot remember clearly, but there may have been one or two other Vlakplaas people as well. I can also not definitely remember where the Township was, but I think it was at Uitenhage.

5.4.8.2.2 If I am not mistaken, we travelled on a road from west to east in the Township and turned north at a crossing. The house of the activist was very close - the second or third house on the left - to that crossing. The house had an ordinary wire fence in front and the Audi was parked in front of the garage. The house was on the right hand side of the garage when one faced it from the street and had a verandah. The driveway was very short.

- 5.4.8.2.3 Nick had told me that the Audi had been very recently overhauled and had just come out of the service garage who did it. It was early evening, just after dark. While Nick and Jan waited around the corner with Nick's and my official vehicles, Almond, Spyker and I - I somehow remember Joe Mamesela being present, but am not sure - proceeded to the house on foot.
- 5.4.8.2.4 There were people in the room next to the front door (sitting room?). I was worried that the Audi would not start immediately or that I would fumble with the gears, so I sent Spyker and either Joe or Almond, to hold the front door handle tight while I started the car. Out in the street I threw open the doors and Spyker and whoever, ran for the car amidst screaming and chaos from the house.
- 5.4.8.2.5 The other two jumped in the car - if there was a third person he must have been in the car already because only two had gone to the front door - and sped off around the corner in the direction that we had come from. We went along the main coastal road from Port Elizabeth and took the Jeffrey's Bay turnoff to the left.
- 5.4.8.2.6 Instead of continuing left to Jeffrey's Bay, we turned right and over the main road to the site where we were going to burn the car. This road from Jeffrey's Bay over the main coastal road did not continue far. Where it ended, we turned into a deserted little tarred road to the left.
- 5.4.8.2.7 We stopped and at that stage Sergeant Jan pleaded for the tyres. I said fine, but then Jan would have to go and burn the car himself later. Nick agreed to that. We drove back over the main coastal road and into Jeffrey's Bay to the police station. That was my one and only visit ever to Jeffrey's Bay.
- 5.4.8.2.8 As we approached, the police station was on the right. On turning into the grounds, the police station was to the right and the garages to the left of the entrance. We parked the car in one of the garages. Also parked in one of these garages I noticed a light blue or green two-door Datsun Stanza. Here the story of another hit squad operation starts. This other operation is the murder of Sizwe Kondile, which is dealt with in the next section.

5.4.8.3 Murder of Sizwe Kondile

- 5.4.8.3.1 The title of this section could be "murder of security police detainee" because it is only since I have been in exile that the ANC told me who this man was.

- 5.4.8.3.2 After parking the Audi as explained in the previous section on "Theft of Uitenhage activist's Audi", I went with Colonel Nick van Rensburg into the police building and down a passage behind the charge office. The passage ended in a door. We went through this door and I identified it as a "white" single quarters room ("single" meaning "unmarried") - the reason for this identification is not altogether simple to explain but the identification is a simple enough matter for a South African policeman.
- 5.4.8.3.3 There were two beds in the room. On one of these, there was a black security policeman and on the other bed, handcuffed to the bed was somewhat slender black man of medium height. He had a full but not bushy beard. Nick wanted to know if everything was in order and we left again.
- 5.4.8.3.4 During my stay in Port Elizabeth, I stayed with Nick at his house. On our way back to his house Nick explained that the prisoner we saw was arrested when he came into South Africa from Lesotho. During his detention and interrogation, he at some stage dived through a window with his hands cuffed behind his back and landed on his head on the cement outside. His behaviour became peculiar afterwards and they got in a friend who was a medical doctor to examine the prisoner. The doctor warned them that this was a potential second Biko case. The man had sustained a brain injury.
- 5.4.8.3.5 I cannot recall his name mentioned and in any event did not remember the name from there. Nick told me that they would have to make a plan with this prisoner but that he would still make the necessary arrangements. Here we discussed that Nick would bring the prisoner to Komatipoort where we would dispose of him. The impression would be created that he would after his release - I do not know whether at that stage the man was being officially held or had been officially released already - have fled the country. I would take the car to Swaziland and park it at one of the Holiday Inns at Mbabane, Swaziland
- 5.4.8.3.6 At some stage I then returned to Pretoria and Vlakplaas.
- 5.4.8.3.7 One day Colonel Schoon instructed me to meet up with Major Archie Flemmington from Komatipoort and told me that Colonel Nick van Rensburg would join us there. It was clear that we had to get rid of someone and I assumed it would be the prisoner that I had seen and discussed with Nick at Jeffrey's Bay.
- 5.4.8.3.8 I told Schoon that we would need "knockout drops" for the operation and asked him to make the necessary arrangements with Brigadier Lothar Neetling, now Luitenant-General Lothar Neetling, of the forensic laboratory.

- 5.4.8.3.9 About four drops of this colourless, tasteless, odourless "knockout drops" in any drink dopes a medium built man in the manner that I will describe in the discussion of the murder of Vusi and Peter (Section 5.4.16) and corroborated by the personal experience of Godfrey Ndowana whom I have since met in exile. In essence, General Neetling told me, the drops had the effect of chloroform. Too much, approximately eight drops on a medium built man, would kill him.
- 5.4.8.3.10 Paul van Dyk and I fetched the drops from Neetling and proceeded to Komatipoort. There we met Major Archie Flemmington and two of his men. From there Archie and two of his men, with Paul van Dyk and I, went to the farm from which the raid into Matola (see Section 4.4.8.3.2 to Section 4.4.8.3.5 on the Matola raid) was controlled.
- 5.4.8.3.11 After some time at this Matola raid base, Luitenant-Colonel Nick van Rensburg, Captain Du Plessis, Sergeant Jan and the prisoner, whom I recognized as the one I saw at Jeffrey's Bay, arrived in an official Cortina. On arrival the prisoner was handcuffed and had a balla clava pulled over his face to hide his identity from the public whilst traveling. The balla clava was removed after they arrived.
- 5.4.8.3.12 The man was given the knockout drops in a drink and was well doped within half an hour. The reason why the victims were thus doped, in my opinion, is that nobody involved had the courage to shoot a helpless and fully conscious man at point blank range. A slightly built, tallish Sergeant or Warrant Officer from Archie's staff, who had light coloured hair, shot the victim at point blank down the top of his head. He used a Makarov pistol with silencer belonging to Archie Flemmington.
- 5.4.8.3.13 The body was put on a huge pyre of dense, heavy bushveld wood and tyres, and cremated. The hands, feet and face are destroyed quickly but it takes about seven to nine hours before nothing but ashes remain. All the while we were carrying on with talking and drinking around a braai.
- 5.4.8.3.14 It was here, at the cremation, that Nick told us that he had decided on the way to have the victim's car taken to Swaziland by Chris Deetlefs and Chris Rorich of Ermelo security. They would park the car at the Legogo Holiday Inn near Mbabane.
- 5.4.8.3.15 I also gathered from the discussion that night that the victim was arrested when he came into South Africa from Lesotho, that he had been officially detained, officially released and then unofficially kidnapped. In exile I established that the Datsun Stanza that the victim had used, belonged to Chris Hani, commander of the military wing of the ANC.

5.4.8.3.16 I suspect that when I saw this prisoner at Jeffrey's Bay, he was already illegally held. Prisoners are not kept in single quarters and their vehicles are not kept in police garages.

5.4.8.3.17 Eventually we all returned to our bases. I, naturally, as always, reported to Schoon.

5.4.8.4 Theft of union combi

5.4.8.4.1 One afternoon, Colonel Willem Schoon phoned to Vlakplaas to say I should urgently phone Colonel Nick van Rensburg at Port Elizabeth. I phoned Nick and he said that a number of union members from Port Elizabeth were on their way to Harare for a union congress in a Volkswagen Combi. They would stay overnight in Johannesburg where they would be joined by other union members.

5.4.8.4.2 Nick said that Nick and them had deposited dagga through the air vents of the combi into the engine compartment. They then phoned some police station on the way to say that they should stop and search the combi since it was transporting dagga. I do not clearly remember where they were stopped but the names Queenstown or King Williams Town come to mind. Nick was irritated with the police whom he said could not find the dagga and according to Nick that was not possible.

5.4.8.4.3 Nick said that he would phone me back and in the meantime would establish where the group would overnight. He emphasized that I had to do whatever necessary to prevent that combi from reaching Harare.

5.4.8.4.4 He phoned me later to tell me that the combi group were booked into the Johannesburg Hotel and were due to leave at 03h00 the next morning. He gave me a description of the combi, which was red and white with a "CB" registration number. I, Paul van Dyk, Koos Vermeulen, Koos Schutte (the mechanic at Vlakplaas) and Almond Nofomela left in my white Datsun Laurel for Johannesburg from Vlakplaas early that night.

5.4.8.4.5 At the Johannesburg hotel the others waited in the car opposite the parking entrance while I went in. Inside there was only one passage and to fit in the cars they were being double parked. The guests had to leave their keys in the cars and attendants were shunting around the cars to allow parking and leaving. On entering I immediately spotted the combi, which was parked in the second row from the northern wall, along the open passage, near the

entrance. I inspected it and saw the keys were inside and the parking ticket was on the dash board.

- 5.4.8.4.6 I returned to the car and suggested that since it must have been a black driver that took the combi inside, it would be best if Almond Nofomela fetched it. But Koos Vermeulen was just too keen to go and fetch the combi, so I let him. He started the combi, paid a small parking fee at the exit boom and off we went. Koos was following us without lights and we had to wave him to a stop and assist him to get the lights switched on.
- 5.4.8.4.7 Back at Vlakplaas I saw that the combi was a brand new automatic with a good pioneer radio, a booster and four round speakers. When we checked the engine compartment it contained several dagga sticks that were neither the size of a "zol" nor the typical "arm". They were more like big longish cigars. These lay open before our eyes when we opened the compartment.
- 5.4.8.4.8 I phoned Nick from Vlakplaas and told him the good news. Nick was very pleased and suggested that we should sell the combi in Swaziland. I cleared Nick's suggestions with Schoon the next morning after filling him in on the details. Schoon approved of Nick's suggestion.
- 5.4.8.4.9 Koos Schutte fitted the radio and four speakers into my official car, the white Datsun Laurel. The booster he fitted into his private Ford Fairlane. We fitted the combi with a false license disk and third party with matching number plates. The license and third party was from the security police printing press at head office and of the same type that all official operational cars are fitted with.
- 5.4.8.4.10 At this point I will digress to explain the significance of a number plate on our vehicles. The official vehicles are registered with an "SAP" number for police administrative purposes. In addition our cars were registered in the normal manner with license and third party disks and a license plate number. These we did not use. Instead we used forged disks that were issued from the security police printing press and on these filled in a registration number of our own choice. Mine was "DJC 036 T", my initials and age. I would get a whole stack of disks, all with the same serial number and for the twelfth month. These I would dish out as required. The false registration number was normally used but on special operations we would replace it with yet another set of false number plates.
- 5.4.8.4.11 I contacted Arnaldo Santos, a portugese citizen in Swaziland and partner of Mario Lopes who was then the owner of Matstapa Motors. Paul van Dyk, Koos Schutte and I, and I do not know who else, took the combi to the

Oshoek border where Arnaldo fetched it on the South African side, paying us R7000 cash in South African currency.

- 5.4.8.4.12 The money for the combi was kept locked up at head office by Brigadier Schoon. At a later stage we were called out to Lady Grey following the shooting of "terrorists" on the road between Elliot and Barkley East. It was some time around August 1981 and it snowed in Johannesburg. We were based at Lady Grey in the police single quarters from where we conducted surveillances and road blocks in the area. It was during our stay here that Colonel Nick van Rensburg and his commander, Brigadier Gerrit Erasmus, stopped over at the single quarters where we stayed and collected the money for the combi. I had brought the money along according to arrangements previously made.
- 5.4.8.4.13 Arnaldo Santos to whom we sold the combi, has since been shot in Mosambique on the road between Maputo and Komatipoort. I do not know whether this was by Frelimo or the resistance movement MNR soldiers.
- 5.4.8.4.14 His partner, Lopes, was later, still in the early eighties, involved in an international motor car theft syndicate. Expensive cars like Porches and Ferraries, that had been stolen overseas, were brought through Mosambique and Swaziland, registered in the "independent state" of Bophutatswana and then sold in South Africa. Captain Piet van Heerden of the vehicle branch at the time could confirm all this. Lopes has since left to Portugal but can easily be traced through the Portugese community in Swaziland.
- 5.4.8.4.15 Colonel Nick van Rensburg later told me of the chaos caused by this theft. The combi was so new that it had not even been insured yet. On their return to Port Elizabeth, the union people tried to get a back dated insurance but Nick picked this up and through an anonymous call to the insurance company tried to thwart their efforts.
- 5.4.8.5 Poisoning and murder of Sipiwo Mtimkulu**
- 5.4.8.5.1 Perhaps, from a legal perspective, the title of this section may be said to be unfair. It could also read "Poisoning and disappearance of Sipiwo Mtimkulu". Moreover, I again only later learnt the name of this victim. He was always in our security circles referred to as the "wheel chair chap".
- 5.4.8.5.2 At some stage I was forewarned that I would be needed to assist in dealing with the person that was later to become the wheel chair case. I cannot remember how this came about. He would have been killed in a similar manner to the murder of Sizwe Kondile, discussed in Section 5.4.8.3.

- 5.4.8.5.3 Having spoken to Nick and Brigadier Jan du Preez on separate occasions, I gathered that the security police were concerned about another disappearance so soon after Kondile. Van der Hoven then flew down to Port Elizabeth from Durban to hand Nick some poison for Siphiwo. The poison was given to him in a drink during his release.
- 5.4.8.5.4 I never became personally involved in this case, but got news on developments from Brigadier Jan du Preez and at one stage early on, from Nick van Rensburg.
- 5.4.8.5.5 Siphiwo was meant to die from the poison but he did not. Instead he was paralyzed and seriously ill and ended up in the Groote Schuur Hospital. Here the poison was identified and the security police were accused. Siphiwo filed a civil claim against the police.
- 5.4.8.5.6 Major General Johan Coetzee, then chief of security, then personally investigated this case. Jan du Preez told me it had been decided to kidnap Siphiwo and get rid of him. He told me this happened with Siphiwo's next planned visit to Groote Schuur. Siphiwo's driver disappeared with him and their combi was later found deserted near the Lesotho border. Jan du Preez said this was to create the impression that Siphiwo for some reason left the country.
- 5.4.8.5.7 I later in exile saw a document compiled by the Law Society for Human rights and there learnt many other details of this case.

5.4.9 Vlakplaas and Aliwal North hit squad operations

5.4.9.1 Attempted burning of Aliwal North police activist's car

- 5.4.9.1.1 The other day in exile, when I was reading Almond's cross examination at the Harms Commission, I was reminded of this and the next case that I had forgotten about. The incident happened while we were at Lady Grey where I handed the money for the stolen union combi to Colonel Nick van Rensburg and Brigadier Gerrit Erasmus (see Section 5.4.8.4.12).
- 5.4.9.1.2 At Aliwal North police station there was a black constable who regularly attended some court case in which activists were involved. He was also said to be very arrogant and cheeky with his superiors at the police station - in our language at the time: "a proper bloody communist".

- 5.4.9.1.3 The major in charge of security at Aliwal North asked us to put him in his place. I think the constable drove a Toyota Cressida. He lived in the black township of Aliwal North in last row of houses on the far side of the township with respect to Aliwal North.
- 5.4.9.1.4 I can only vaguely remember the details but I do recall that Paul van Dyk and I, and I am not sure who else - Almond under cross examination said he was also there - were involved in smashing a window and attempting to set the car alight with petrol. The car did not catch fire properly.

5.4.9.2 Burning car and small truck of Rhodes leftist hippies

- 5.4.9.2.1 This must be the incident that Almond referred to under cross examination as the farmer that had to be killed and when he was not at home they burned his vehicle etc. near Port Elizabeth. Almond has got the incident all wrong. He was present, but let me refresh his memory insofar as I can remember:-
- 5.4.9.2.2 This is another incident that happened while we were at Lady Grey (see Section 5.4.8.4.12). A small white community, including what we regarded as a number of leftist hippies, lived in the little town of Rhodes, north of Barkley East. Rhodes is situated in a basin in the mountains next to Lesotho. The presence of these hippies, who by all accounts were quite peaceful, was a thorn in the flesh of the Aliwal North security police.
- 5.4.9.2.3 At the request of the major, we decided to burn their two vehicles. One was a Volkswagen and the other a small truck with a blunt front end. We picked up a sergeant or warrant officer of Barkley East security and he pointed out the houses where these hippies lived.
- 5.4.9.2.4 Before coming within sight of Rhodes, we removed the fuse of the brake lights and drove down the mountain without lights and with night vision glasses. These resemble binoculars, fitted on the head with elastic bands and were rather heavy.
- 5.4.9.2.5 Paul, Almond, Spyker, the Barkley East policeman and I parked the car at the entrance of the town and proceeded on foot. To get to the two houses involved one turns right into the first road on entering the town from Barkley East. A small distance further, this road turns left, with "hippie house" A on the right. The truck was parked in front of the house, facing Barkley East. Further along, this road turns left again to join up with the main road on the far side of the town near the police station. Just before this last left turn on the right hand side, was "hippy house" B. A Volkswagen was parked in front of the house, facing away from Barkley East.
- 5.4.9.2.6 I cannot remember who did what, but together we first poured petrol over the Volkswagen and set it alight. Thereafter we poured petrol from a police Jeys Flued container into the cab of the truck and set it alight. We left this container in the cab. The petrol container that we used for the Volkswagen was discarded in the veld on the way back to our vehicle. We left the town basin, up the mountain, without lights, in the same manner that we arrived.
- 5.4.9.2.7 We later learnt from the major at Aliwal North that the Volkswagen did not burn out and that the truck was partly saved by the owner when he awoke.

The district CID officer at Aliwal North, a captain, visited the scene of the crime and led the investigation. He identified the container in the truck as being a Jeys Flued tin of police origin.

- 5.4.9.2.8 The CID policeman expressed his suspicions to the security police, but said that what he could not understand, was that the owner of the truck had said that he specifically looked out for a vehicle leaving up the mountain but saw none. The victim was convinced that it had to be someone in the town. No one bothered to solve the detective's problem.
- 5.4.9.2.9 We dropped the Barkley East policeman and I am almost certain that we then filled up with petrol before departing for Lady Grey where we were based.
- #### 5.4.10 Vlakplaas-Port Natal (Durban) hit squad operations
- ##### 5.4.10.1 Murder of Griffiths Mxenge
- 5.4.10.1.1 I am not able to recall many of the kinds of details of the Mxenge murder that will be required of me by the Commission. It should be remembered, however, that this happened long ago. Moreover, I remember things that were important to me. At that stage I considered important those details required to carry out the task on hand and not those details that would be useful one day when testifying to a Harms Commission. We were not exactly in the habit of discussing our crimes in court.
- 5.4.10.1.2 During November 1981, the four groups from Vlakplaas were all sent to Durban for surveillance purposes. The askaris and black policemen slept in a dormitory next to the dog unit at C R Swart Square Police Station in Durban. The white policemen stayed in the single and officers' quarters in a building next to the police office block.
- 5.4.10.1.3 Whilst down in Durban, I reported to Brigadier van der Hoven, the regional security commander, every morning at about 07h30 and in the afternoon before 16h00, which is when he retired for the day, for briefing, messages and instructions.
- 5.4.10.1.4 One morning, at such a meeting, Van der Hoven gave me background on a certain Griffiths Mxenge and said we should make a plan with him. He explained that Mxenge was an ex Robbin Island convict and an attorney. He acted as instructing attorney in activist and ANC terrorist trials. Van der Hoven said that more than R 100 000 from the ANC had passed through

Mxenge's account during the past year and that security police were trying to build up a case against Mxenge to take him to court.

- 5.4.10.1.5 When I agreed to make a plan with Mxenge, Van der Hoven said that we must not shoot or abduct him but that we should rather make it look like a robbery. He took me to Captain Andy Taylor, whom I knew and who was working on the Mxenge case. Van der Hoven asked Andy to give me some information on Mxenge and left.
- 5.4.10.1.6 Andy and I did not specifically discuss the reason for me requiring this information. We talked a little and basically he repeated things that Van der Hoven had told me. He also told me that Mxenge had four dogs. He thought three of these were bull terriers.
- 5.4.10.1.7 I am not sure at all, but I think Koos or Paul or both might have been present at one or both these discussions.
- 5.4.10.1.8 Andy assigned one of his staff to me to point out Mxenge's place of work, where he parked his car and where his house was. At some stage, everybody from Vlakplaas who eventually formed the hit squad, were shown these places. I cannot recall how many trips were made, who were present on each trip and what particular sites were visited on any one such trip.
- 5.4.10.1.9 An important point is that I asked Brigadier Van der Hoven to arrange with Brigadier Schoon for Joe Mamasela to be sent down. Joe and Almond did not smoke or drink and were both intelligent, healthy, fit and in my judgement had the killer instinct. I intended these two to form the core of the hit squad.
- 5.4.10.1.10 Joe, as an ex criminal was recruited by West Rand security and handled by Captain Jan Coetzee, who later succeeded me at Vlakplaas. Joe had done several crash courses with the ANC in Botswana. He worked with Jan Coetzee at West Rand security when Jan needed him, which was most of the time. Otherwise he worked with me and my group.
- 5.4.10.1.11 In response to my call, Sergeant Koos Schutte, mechanic and foreman at Vlakplaas, brought Joe down to Durban.
- 5.4.10.1.12 I was in charge of this operation. The other Vlakplaas people involved were Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk, Constable Almond Nofomela, Student Constable David ("Spyker") Tshikalanga and askari Brian Ngulungwa. Brian was involved because he was a Zulu and the only one that knew the Umlazi area.

- 5.4.10.1.13 Mxenge's office was in the centre of Durban in an Indian area on the northern side of a street running from east to west. He parked his car in an open parking lot, behind the buildings across the street from where he worked.
- 5.4.10.1.14 One approach to Mxenge's house was via a road that ran well below his house and round and up a steep slope to his driveway. From the street, his garage was on the right hand side of his house and although I am not quite sure, I think there was a car port in front of the garage.
- 5.4.10.1.15 From the mess at the C R Swart single quarters, I obtained a chunk of meat. I cut this into four pieces and treated it with strychnine that I kept in the car. I had obtained the strychnine from Captain Wahl du Toit of the technical division at security head office. Each piece of meat was given a cut into which a knife point of strychnine was inserted. The meat should not be too big, so that the dog can swallow it whole. The strychnine is put inside such that the dog would not taste it. Only a knife point is used otherwise the dog will vomit out the meat and with it the poison.
- 5.4.10.1.16 Again I can't be sure, but I vaguely recall Koos Vermeulen, Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofomela and Joe being present at the preparation of the meat. There may have been others.
- 5.4.10.1.17 That evening Koos Vermeulen, Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofomela, Joe Mamesela and I, drove to Mxenge's place where Almond got out to throw the meat for the dogs. Again, there may have been one more or one less. These are the people I seem to remember.
- 5.4.10.1.18 I think newspaper reports after the murder said that three of Mxenge's dogs were poisoned.
- 5.4.10.1.19 I left the details of the murder to be worked out by Almond and Joe. My instructions were that they were not allowed to shoot and that it must look like a robbery. They were therefore to take some of his personal possessions like his wallet, watch and jacket and if the opportunity arose they were to take his car as well. I cautioned them to wear old clothes and old shoes that I could destroy if necessary. They were also to see that their pockets were empty so that nothing could be lost at the site of the crime - no cigarettes, no id books, no watches with names or serial numbers, etc. I arranged for a meeting place at a bar that faced east. I would be there hourly every night after nine.
- 5.4.10.1.20 At some stage I assigned Spyker and Brian Ngulungwa to Almond and Joe. The four of them had to murder Mxenge. I let them have a big hunting

knife, which Koos Schutte had with him and two Okapi knives. I do not know where we got the Okapi knives from.

- 5.4.10.1.21 One rainy Thursday night - I worked out afterwards that it must have been a Thursday and the newspapers confirmed this - when I stopped at the bar round about ten 'o clock, I found the four of them in the bar. Joe was wearing Mxenge's jacket, watch and round silver watch with a flexible strap and a fold-up wallet. The sleeves of Mxenge's jacket were too short for Joe. The jacket was grey, of a coarse texture and looked like a sports jacket.
- 5.4.10.1.22 I called them out and they gave me a brief account in the street. They had already changed and I put their clothes and shoes, the knives and Mxenge's belongings, ie the jacket, watch and wallet, in my car's boot. They gave me the keys to Mxenge's car and told me the car had been parked right next to the entrance of C R Swart police station on an open parking lot.
- 5.4.10.1.23 I went to the single quarters, called Paul van Dyk and Constable Braam du Preez and asked them to pack and prepare to leave. I waited for them and took them to Mxenge's car. Here we fitted false number plates and I asked them to leave immediately for Golella border post where Warrant Officer Freek Pienaar was stationed. Paul and I knew Freek well. Freek was the only security policeman at Golella and fell under Ermelo security.
- 5.4.10.1.24 I said they should wait for me just outside Golella on the North Coast road.
- 5.4.10.1.25 It was fairly late when I reported to Brigadier van der Hoven at his flat in the married quarters of C R Swart Square. I told him the job had been done and he was concerned to know whether we had left any traces. I said then that Paul and Braam had left with the car and that I would report back to him the next morning.
- 5.4.10.1.26 I reported to Van der Hoven the next morning just after seven. He said that Mxenge's wife had phoned to say Mxenge did not return home and wanted to know whether he had been arrested. Van der Hoven said that Schoon had given instructions that the entire Vlakplaas contingent should pack up and return to Pretoria. I instructed everybody accordingly and I left alone in my Datsun for Golella where I met Paul and Braam as arranged.
- 5.4.10.1.27 Paul and Braam waited for me some distance before the huge river immediately south of the Golella border post turn off. I cannot remember whether Freek Pienaar was with them. We continued to the border post and Freek accompanied us to a vacant police house with a garage outbuilding. We parked Mxenge's brand new white Audi in the garage, closed the garage

window with newspapers, locked the door and asked "Pine" Pienaar to keep an eye on it.

- 5.4.10.1.28 From there, Pine again accompanied us to where we disposed of Mxenge's belongings. For this purpose we drove back to the North Coast Road, turned left. Just before crossing the big - is it the Pongola? - river, we turned right off the main road with the river next to us. We burnt the jacket, wallet and number plates with petrol. The number was still discernable on the blackened number plates, so Paul rolled up these. We threw the number plates and watch into the river.
- 5.4.10.1.29 I do not remember what we did with the Okapi knives. The hunting knife used was returned to Koos Schutte and about a year and a half ago was in possession of a friend of Koos, Paul Pretorius, telephone Pretoria (012) 5-9559. Paul Pretorius knows the story of this knife.
- 5.4.10.1.30 That Friday night we returned to Pretoria. On Saturday morning I went to Brigadier Jan du Preez' house to enquire what we should do with the car. Brigadier Du Preez was outside in the fruit orchard on his small holding. As I approached he said that the world was buzzing with the Mxenge story. He also told me that General Johan Coetzee, chief of the security police, was in a meeting on the Friday morning when the news broke and that the meeting was interrupted to inform him. He said that the General wanted to know whose work it was. Brigadier Du Preez said something to the effect that it was better for both of them that the General did not know.
- 5.4.10.1.31 I suggested to Brigadier Jan du Preez that bearing in mind that Mxenge's car was brand new, we could exchange it with Brigadier Hans Dreyer from Koevoet for a good askari car. Brigadier Du Preez would have nothing of this and he instructed me to burn the car.
- 5.4.10.1.32 The next day, Sunday afternoon, Paul van Dyk, Koos Schutte and I left with about 20 or 25 litres of spare petrol and a full tank so that we would be able to show that we could not do the full distance with whatever petrol intakes we were going to do. Before we left I checked and found that my spare wheel was flat. We therefore stopped at Bronkhorst Spruit and borrowed the spare wheel of Koos Vermeulen's Datsun. Koos stayed at Bronkhorst Spruit.
- 5.4.10.1.33 Koos Vermeulen insisted on accompanying us and the four of us set off for Golella. At some stage during that night, either on the way to Golella or when coming back, we refueled at Piet Retief police station and Paul van Dyk signed the petrol register.

- 5.4.10.1.34 Paul drove, Koos Vermeulen sat in the front passenger seat and I sat behind Koos, with Koos Schutte on the back seat on my right. Koos Schutte played his mouth organ and guitar - he plays them together and manages some singing in between. I poured the drinks. I had the full bar. Koos Vermeulen was an abstainer, Koos Schutte drank brandy, I drank beer and Paul drinks anything that will make him drunk.
- 5.4.10.1.35 At Golella border post we fetched Pine and collected the Audi. Koos Schutte at some stage crawled under the Audi and drained petrol into a five litre can so that we could burn the car. Paul and Koos Vermeulen went ahead with the official car to check for road blocks. I drove the Audi while Koos Schutte clambered to and fro in the car, taking out the radio and speakers.
- 5.4.10.1.36 Before Piet Retief we turned off to the right towards Mahamba and before Mahamba we turned left and right again towards Botha's Hoop border post. A short distance before the Botha's Hoop border post, we turned right into a plantation road and proceeded till we found an opening between two plantations. I turned left into the veld towards the border fence for some distance and stopped.
- 5.4.10.1.37 Paul, who knew the Swaziland border very well, took us to this spot, which in security circles was a well known crossing point of ANC freedom fighters entering and leaving the country illegally.
- 5.4.10.1.38 By now Koos was trying to remove the battery from under the left back seat, but without success. He did not have the necessary spanners. I do not remember what else he stripped from the car. We opened the boot and bonnet and poured petrol into the boot, on the seats, on the dash board and on the engine. We did not close the bonnet fully. Koos stroke a match and that was it.
- 5.4.10.1.39 As we drove away we could see the red glow of the burning car in the distance. Pine informed us that later that morning (Monday morning) forestry workers found the still smouldering car. They notified the local police. The Durban murder and robbery squad came and took photographs of the car.
- 5.4.10.1.40 Monday morning back at the office, Schoon, before I could say anything about the incident, asked me whether we had left any tracks. I said not as far as I knew. At some stage Brigadier Jan du Preez entered and with only the three of us present, they decided that Almond, Joe and Spyker would each receive a thousand rand for the good work. This would be arranged as a R3000 claim by Brigadier Hans Dreyer of Koevoet. Brian who played the most passive role in the murder did as a result not receive any reward.

- 5.4.10.1.41 Some time later, I received R3000 cash from Schoon to distribute between the three. I did not sign for this and handed it over to the three; I cannot remember when and where. I do know that by nature and habit I would have handed it out with more than one present as a witness. I also know that none of them signed for the money.
- 5.4.10.1.42 The radio of Mxenge's Audi was installed in Brigadier Jan du Preez' Mercedes 230E subsidized car by Sergeant Koos Schutte. At Mauritius, after fleeing the country, I said that the radio was built into either Brigadier Jan du Preez' or Brigadier Schoon's car. This was because Brigadier Jan du Preez was so close to me and I could not get myself to incriminate him. (A radio did at one stage go into Schoon's official Cortina, but this was from the Lesotho Diamond dealer's car to which this statement will return later.)
- 5.4.10.1.43 I learnt from Brigadier Jan du Preez last year that the Mercedes with the radio was stolen and later found back. When he got it back the radio was missing.
- 5.4.10.1.44 Later when Schoon told me that the detectives could not find any leads, I returned the foursome's old clothes and shoes to them.
- 5.4.10.2 Planning to kill Swazi detainee**
- 5.4.10.2.1 The security police at C R Swart Square, Durban at some stage held a Swaziland citizen whom I never met personally and whose name I can't remember. I was nevertheless party to the planning of his murder and as a result had his altered passport in my possession for years and without doubt as early as December 1981.
- 5.4.10.2.2 The murder must have been planned towards the end of 1981. Brigadier van der Hoven was Divisional Commander and Captain Andy Taylor handled the "ANC-PAC Desk", at the Durban security police at the time. After discussions with Van der Hoven and Taylor, I started preparing for the murder of the Swaziland citizen.
- 5.4.10.2.3 I received the detainee's Swaziland travel document and personally replaced his photograph with that of Brian Ngulungwa. The plan was that the detainee would be released, kidnapped and disposed of while on the day of release, Brian would cross the border to Swaziland on the released man's travel document. Brian would return to South Africa on his own passport. I had chosen Brian because he was a Zulu and the Zulu and Swazi languages are closely related.

- 5.4.10.2.4 This operation was delayed until early January 1982 when I had already transferred to the police drug squad in Pretoria. Brigadier Jan du Preez knew about this pending operation. During early January 1982 he arranged with my new superiors in the detective branch Luitenant Colonel Basie Smith, present chief of the security police, that I be allowed to assist the security police in an unfinished project that I was involved in. Brigadier Du Preez said I should contact Brigadier Van der Hoven and make arrangements with him.
- 5.4.10.2.5 When I phoned Brigadier Van der Hoven, he said that it was not necessary for me to come to Durban as the matter has been dealt with. I reported this to Brigadier van der Hoven.
- 5.4.10.2.6 I kept the travel document for many years before I destroyed it and have no idea what had happened to this detainee.

5.4.11 Vlakplaas-Bloemfontein hit squad operations

5.4.11.1 Attempted murder on Chris Hani

- 5.4.11.1.1 Shortly after my arrival at Vlakplaas in August 1980, I heard via Colonel Viktor, who commanded Section C, and Captain Wahl du Toit of the technical division, both from security head office, about a plan to kill Chris Hani of the ANC in Lesotho.
- 5.4.11.1.2 The murder was planned with the cooperation of an informant, Ernest Ramatlala, from Bloemfontein security police. Ernest, whom I later nicknamed "Mosjesh", was a Lesotho citizen and a member of the Lesotho Youth Organization. He was also a close confidant of Chris Hani and Hani's dogs knew him well enough not to raise alarm when he went there.*
- 5.4.11.1.3 The plan was to plant a motor car bomb that would be triggered by a wheel mechanism. This mechanism was prepared by Wahl du Toit.
- 5.4.11.1.4 Ernest came from Lesotho to be instructed how to handle and plant the bomb. However, on the night that he went to plant the bomb, he accidentally triggered the mechanism himself while planting the bomb on Hani's car.
- 5.4.11.1.5 He survived the blast and Hani's kicking and cursing but was seriously injured. He spent months recovering in a Lesotho hospital under police guard. When he eventually appeared in court, bail was arranged for him and he escaped into

South Africa as planned in advance. He landed up with me at Vlakplaas where he told me his story in detail.

- 5.4.11.1.6 Ernest has since been made a policeman. He got married and is currently living in Queenstown where he is with the security police. He today has serious scars on both legs and his knees have suffered particularly badly.

5.4.11.2 More Bloemfontein stories

- 5.4.11.2.1 Three or four of the Vlakplaas Sleuth-hound groups were on our way to a surveillance operation along the Lesotho border when I dropped in at regional security head office in Bloemfontein. They are in charge of Lesotho matters. I met the staff for the first time. The regional commander was a Colonel Coetzee who was later transferred as regional commander Western Province (Cape Town) with the rank of brigadier.
- 5.4.11.2.2 At Bloemfontein I also met one of the meaner security police stalwarts, Warrant Officer Hendrik Prinsloo. We became good friends. During discussions on elimination methods with Hendrik, I learned that his favourite method of disposing of activists was to poison them. Hendrik is currently the Captain Prinsloo who is with the Pretoria security branch and whose name came up during Almond's cross examination. His name came up during the discussion of the build up to the Japie Maponyane disappearance and alleged murder.
- 5.4.11.2.3 Since going into exile, I have heard of cases of poisoning of activists in the Bloemfontein area and suggest that the Commission acquires any related records that may exist.
- 5.4.11.2.4 It was in Bloemfontein, from Hendrik that I first heard the name of the current Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe. Hendrik spoke well of Luitenant Colonel Johan van der Merwe whom he saw as the right man for this secret war of ours. Johan from there transferred to Windhoek security and from there rocketed via head office security to security chief, Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner of Police.
- 5.4.11.2.5 In 1983 when Hendrik was transferred to the Pretoria security police as a Luitenant, he visited me where I was at head office in the recruiting division. He assured me that as soon as Van der Merwe, who was already at head office, became security chief, Hendrik would put in a word to get me back into the security branch. Hendrik Prinsloo and Johan van der Merwe had a trusting relationship, like that between Craig Williamson and Johan Coetzee;

between me and brigadiers Jan du Preez, Van der Hoven and Van Rensburg; and between Eugene de Kock and Brigadier Schoon.

5.4.11.3 Attempted murder of Lehlonohono "A"

5.4.11.3.1 While still in the security police, this man was known to me and in security police circles as "Comrade A". I learnt the name "Lehlonohono" whilst in exile where he is also known as Comrade A.

5.4.11.3.2 The attempted murder of Comrade A happened whilst on the Lesotho border surveillance operation mentioned in the foregoing Section 5.4.11.2 ("More Bloemfontein stories"). It must have been around mid-1981.

5.4.11.3.3 My group and I were stationed at Lady Brandt security branch near the Masero Bridge border post. Captain Louw was the Lady Brandt security branch commander. He relayed to me a message that we should get rid of Comrade A, an ANC member who stayed in Maseru. Captain Louw assigned one of his staff members to me to accompany Almond Nofomela on the operation.

5.4.11.3.4 I equipped Almond and the Lady Brandt policeman with fire arms and a Russian hand grenade from the arsenal in the boot of my car. We drove to the Ficksburg Bridge border post, I in my car and Almond and the Lady Brandt man in an old askari Valiant that they could abandon if necessary. I think the askari car had a yellowish "pumpkin" colour. Someone could have accompanied me in my car, but I do not remember such detail.

5.4.11.3.5 At Ficksburg Bridge, Almond and the Lady Brandt man crossed the border. I saw them across and proceeded to the Maseru Bridge Border post where they were to exit after the mission and meet up with me.

5.4.11.3.6 The basic plan, as discussed at Lady Brandt, was that Almond and his partner would proceed from Ficksburg Bridge to Maseru where Comrade A stayed. There they would knock on his front door, shoot him when he opened the door and fling a hand grenade into his house. They would then exit at Maseru Bridge border post and join me. If the worst happened and the plan went sour, they would abandon the car and flee the few hundred metres across the border.

5.4.11.3.7 The twosome arrived at our agreed rendezvous late that night. They said that they proceeded according to plan but that Comrade A, whom they could see through the window, did not open when they knocked. They then shot at him through the window. I do not remember whether they said anything about throwing the hand grenade into the house.

5.4.11.3.8 I later learnt that Comrade A was not killed in this attempt.

5.4.12 Vlakplaas-Zeerust hit squad operations

5.4.12.1 Attack on Joyce Diphale's house, Gabarone

5.4.12.1.1 Colonel Schoon sent me to Zeerust saying that I was to join up with Zeerust security plus Captain Jan Coetzee from Krugersdorp for a mission into Botswana to eliminate the occupants of an ANC house in Gaborone.

5.4.12.1.2 With this general information I left with Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofomela and Spyker Tshikalanga. I do not remember the details of how everybody that eventually went to Botswana on this mission, got to our mission base at a house near the Kopfontein border post.

5.4.12.1.3 This mission base was a house that Captain Koos Vermeulen and his men regularly used as a base whilst working in this area. It was an old deserted farm house, well into the farm and away from the farmer's residence.

5.4.12.1.4 To get to this farm from the Kopfontein border post, one travels along the main road to Zeerust in an easterly direction for a few kilometers where the road turns towards the south. As one rounds this turn there is a high ridge to the left, running in a west-east direction. The road into the farm turns off the main road here and runs along the northern foot of this ridge. One passed the farmers house on the right and went deeper into the farm to the old farm building where we congregated.

5.4.12.1.5 South African security police matters in the Gaborone area of Botswana fell mainly under the Zeerust branch. Captain Jan Coetzee from West Rand security branch in Krugersdorp, "handled" Joe Mamasela, who used to live in the target house of this mission whilst undergoing ANC crash course training. Joe did, of course, during my time join us at Vlakplaas when not needed by Jan Coetzee.

5.4.12.1.6 The mission members that met here were: Captain Rudi Kraus who commanded the Zeerust security branch, Captain Jan Coetzee and Joe Mamasela from West Rand security and the Vlakplaas contingency, including myself, Captain Koos Vermeulen, Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk, Constable Almond Nofomela and David ("Spyker") Tshikalanga.

- 5.4.12.1.7 During the early afternoon on the day that we all congregated there, Jan Coetzee, Rudi Kraus and Joe Mamasela briefed us on the location of the target house and the layout at the house. They had a plan of the house showing the rooms. Among the important features were: the couple Roler and Joyce's bedroom in the south eastern corner with a window to the south; the back and front entrances; the kitchen; a small rear stoep; and the front stoep. I cannot clearly remember the rest of the layout exactly. We were also told that there was no garage and that if the 1400 Datsun bakkie - I think it was light blue - was parked outside the house, then Roler was there.
- 5.4.12.1.8 After 14h00, Joe, and I think Almond, used my old police 3 litre Cortina bakkie with BPC registration number for a reconnaissance trip to the target house. Joe, or the two of them, went through the Kopfontein border post.
- 5.4.12.1.9 When he or they returned, I took the same bakkie to familiarize myself with the surroundings. I returned and explained the details of the plan as we later carried out, except for a few opportunistic improvisations offered by the weather.
- 5.4.12.1.10 The border post closes at 20h00. That evening at about 19h45 we sent Joe in again, with the same bakkie, to go and ensure that the road was clear of road blocks and to return around 21h00 to meet us a kilometer or two inside the Botswana on the road from Kopfontein to Gaborone.
- 5.4.12.1.11 The rest of the hit squad crossed the fence south of the border post, walked to the west in the veld for some distance and then swerved north towards the road to Gaborone. At the road we concealed ourselves and waited for Joe.
- 5.4.12.1.12 When Joe arrived, flicking his lights as arranged, to identify himself, Paul took the wheel, Koos and I got in the cab with Paul and Joe, Almond and Spyker mounted on the back. We left Rudy and Jan behind at that point as markers and to guide us back to the fence.
- 5.4.12.1.13 About two blocks from the target house we left Spyker and Paul under a tree with the bakkie and the remainder of us continued on foot.
- 5.4.12.1.14 Joe was armed with a Tokaref pistol and Almond with a Makarov pistol. Koos and I each had an HMK sub-machine gun with silencer and a canvas bag attached to the side to catch empty shells. These we carried in an empty maize bag. (I carried five such weapons, specially prepared like this by security head office, in the boot of my car.) Koos had a Russian hand grenade. Before entering Botswana, Koos and I had blackened our faces and hands. For this we used stage make-up that I had been carrying in my brief case for some months for just such an eventuality. The askaris and

- policemen called this brief case may "toorsak" ("sorcerers bag"). We wore long sleeved shirts and rolled up balla clavos to cover our hair and ears.
- 5.4.12.1.15 We walked along a road from where we would turn left into a side road to get to the target house, which was the second house on the left in this side road. At the corner, just before the left turn, Koos and I took up concealed positions in the long grass of the strip between the house and the road. Joe and Almond patrolled the street. We could see the bakkie belonging to Roler parked next to the back stoep of the target house. We could hear a loud party going on across the road from the target house and people were mingling in the street.
- 5.4.12.1.16 There were dogs barking on the stand next to us as well as the neighbouring stand further back. I noticed that a thunder storm was building up and decided to wait for the storm to break. This happened around midnight. The rain poured down and there was much thunder and lightning. Then the lights also went out. People were in their houses and the dogs were taking shelter.
- 5.4.12.1.17 We could then get up and the four of us walked undisturbed along the street to the target site and in through the gate. Koos took up position near the bedroom window at the back. Almond, Joe and I were at the back stoep deciding how to get the door open.
- 5.4.12.1.18 We looked through the kitchen window and at that stage two women entered the kitchen from the passage. They were carrying a lit candle in a candlestick and proceeded to unlock and open the outside door.
- 5.4.12.1.19 There was no time to think or talk. The women spun round. Joe grabbed one from behind, covering her mouth. He shot her at point blank and she collapsed on the stoep. The other woman fled into the house, screaming, while Almond and Joe fired shots after her.
- 5.4.12.1.20 The shooting and the people in the doorway caused a momentary delay. I pushed Almond and Joe aside and ran into the kitchen. At the passage entrance I sprayed bullets down the passage with the HMK. I argued that the woman would be trapped in the cross fire with Koos firing through the bedroom window and hurling in the hand grenade.
- 5.4.12.1.21 I ran out and shouted to Joe and Almond to follow. I could see Almond firing a last shot at the fallen woman. As I ran past Koos, I shouted that he should follow us. He asked whether he should shoot and I realized that there had been no crossfire. This was Koos' first operation of this nature. He first fired a spurt through the window and then followed us, forgetting to throw the hand grenade.

- 5.4.12.1.22 We cleared the fence to the corner stand and from there another fence behind that stand. From there we ran through the gate, into the street to where Paul and Spyker were waiting in pouring rain.
- 5.4.12.1.23 We clambered onto the back and with Paul behind the wheel, sped off. It was bitterly cold on the back and after a while I stopped Paul so that I could join him and Spyker in the cab.
- 5.4.12.1.24 We raced towards the border and on approaching our markers, flicked the headlights. The two soaked and anguished figures appeared in the road. I got onto the back so that one of them could get into the cab to guide us. We then branched off the road to the right and made our way through the veld to the border fence south of the border post.
- 5.4.12.1.25 He we cut our way through three border fences and pushed the bakkie through the quagmire. We reached our farm base tired, cold and wet, in the early hours of the morning.
- 5.4.12.1.26 According to the feedback we later received from Jan Coetzee, the woman who collapsed on the stoep ended up in hospital and did not die. The woman who fled into the house was Joyce and she was unscathed except for some skin wounds caused by cement shrapnel. The two women had dropped Roller at the air port that afternoon and he was out of the country.
- 5.4.12.1.27 In exile I have learnt that Joyce is now staying in Canada and has recently suffered a stroke.
- 5.4.12.2 Aborted murder of Marius Schoon**
- 5.4.12.2.1 Schoon called me one day and said I must report to Captains Rudy Kraus and Jan Coetzee at Zeerust. He said that the mission would be to take out Marius Schoon whom he said was a white ANC member in Botswana. Captains Kraus and Coetzee would brief me on the mission.
- 5.4.12.2.2 I was ready to depart when Schoon called me to his office. Brigadier Jan du Preez was there and I was told that General Johan Coetzee, chief of security,

- had called off the mission. When I asked why, Brigadier Jan said that the General had not given a reason.
- 5.4.12.2.3 Section 5.4.17.3 of this statement explains how Marius was later tipped off that he was on the South African security police hit list and fled the country. Later, in 1984, his wife and child were killed in a bomb blast in Angola.
- 5.4.12.2.4 For my mission, I was going to use a black brief case that was fitted with a 9 mm machine pistol with a silencer. The brief case was prepared by Captain Wahl du Toit of the security technical division at head office long before this mission and it had been part of my arsenal for some time.
- 5.4.12.2.5 Wahl du Toit and Captain Louis Koekemoer, Johan Coetzee's staff officer, told me the pistol was donated to the technical division by General Johan Coetzee, chief of police security, after he got it as a present from a visiting United States police contingent. The pistol is cocked inside the briefcase before it is closed and then carried in the normal manner. To use it, the brief case is clutched under the arm with the hand on an extended trigger mechanism underneath the brief case. All empty shells are caught in the brief case and the pistol is well silenced.
- 5.4.12.2.6 According to press reports (see Sunday Star, 26 Nov 1989) Almond Nofomela's 17 year old brother, Charles, referred to a similar brief case that Almond called "Sipho". Almond is reported to have said that this was his best "friend" and that he never went anywhere without it. In my time, Almond certainly did not carry this weapon.
- 5.4.13 Ermelo hit squad operation**
- 5.4.13.1 Blowing up Bethal prosecutor's car**
- 5.4.13.1.1 One day in the company of Nick van Rensburg and some of his men, they told me how, during a "terrorist trial" in Bethal, they blew up the public prosecutor's car. The idea was to anger and influence the judge in the trial. They said that the car had been blown up by Nick, Warrant Officer Chris Deetlefs and Sergeant Chris Rorich. Nick told me this story while he was still branch commander of Ermelo security police.
- 5.4.14 Vlakplaas-Ermelo hit squad operations**

5.4.14.1 Swaziland bombing, killings and injury

- 5.4.14.1.1 Three days after the Sasol bomb blast at Secunda, Colonel J J Viktor sent me to Ermelo to report to Major Nick van Rensburg. Viktor was in charge of Section C of the security police head quarters and Nick at the time was branch commander of the Ermelo security police. Viktor said that I had to lead a mission into Swaziland to bomb the ANC transit house in Manzini. I think it was shortly after August 1980.
- 5.4.14.1.2 Before leaving Pretoria, I had to collect two Russian pocket watch timing devices prepared by Captain Wahl du Toit of the security head office technical division. I also had to collect a box of PE4 explosive from a Military Intelligence office in Pretoria. The office was in a building - I think it is called the Zanza Building - next to the Eendracht primary school, in Proes street near the corner with Schubart street.
- 5.4.14.1.3 Viktor had arranged for the explosives via a Major Kallie Steyn from Military Intelligence. Kallie had a desk in an office that he shared with me, Jack Buchner, Stan Hancock and Willie Botha, when he was in.
- 5.4.14.1.4 When I arrived at Ermelo, the rest of the mission members were already there. They were Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk of Oshoek, Sergeant Krappies Hattingh who was the explosives expert at Middleburg security branch and Sergeant Chris Rorich who was the explosives expert at Ermelo security branch.
- 5.4.14.1.5 Nick told us we had to blow up the new transit house of the ANC (not the "White House" that Leon Mellet photographed during his heroic excursion into Swaziland - see Section 5.2.6.5). We were also to blow up the small wooden house occupied by Mawick Nkosi, who they said was the man that built false panels into vehicles to smuggle arms and explosives into South Africa.
- 5.4.14.1.6 I was in charge and Nick left the details of the plan to us.
- 5.4.14.1.7 We left in either Rorich or Paul's official car. At that stage I had a 3 litre Cortina bakkie, which I left at Ermelo. We drove to a bridge just outside Amsterdam on the Piet Retief road where we left the road and parked under the bridge.
- 5.4.14.1.8 Here, under the bridge, we kneaded the 40 of white explosive dough to blend it properly with its oily component. We kneaded and we drank. The dough was separated into two lots, roughly in a 1:2 or 1:3 proportion. We proceeded to prepare the bombs.

- 5.4.14.1.9 To make the bomb, we flattened out the dough, and bundled the one end of the explosive cordite ("knaal lont") onto the dough. We then closed the dough around the bundled cordite to form a huge ball. After stringing out a good length of cordite we fixed the detonator to the other end. To this we attached the timing device with battery clip but without the battery. The white bombs were put in big plastic carry bags.
- 5.4.14.1.10 **Ab**
under the bridge, we filled two operational sandbags, of the kind used to build military fortifications, with sand. These were for placing on the bombs to concentrate the blast.
- 5.4.14.1.11 **We**
loaded the bombs into the car and started a braai to while away the time till after midnight. We then got back onto the road and drove to Amsterdam. From there we drove towards the Nersten border post. Before we reached the border post, we turned off the road. Paul who knew the border backwards, guided us along a track road that led through a bushy area to the border fence south of the border post.
- 5.4.14.1.12 **The**
fence consisted of planted droppers with floating droppers in between. We wiggled out one planted dropper and while three of us laid the fence flat and stood on it, the vehicle was driven across. After crossing we stuck the planted dropper back in the upright position.
- 5.4.14.1.13 **On**
the Swaziland side we made our way through young wattle brush to a road and proceeded to Manzini. We were well prepared for road blocks and battle. We had our service pistols, two HMK machine guns, two pump action shot guns and two hand grenades.
- 5.4.14.1.14 **In**
Manzini - it must have been around 02h30 - we stopped close to Mawick's house. A Valiant motor car was parked at the front door. The four of us got out and opened the boot. We decided that Paul van Dyk and Krappies Hattingh would plant that bomb while Rorich and I kept watch. Both watches were wound there and set to trigger after 15 minutes.
- 5.4.14.1.15 **Will**
did not have time to fit his fail-safe hair spring tensioning fish gut that ensured that the watches will start ticking without a shake (see Section 5.2.6.10). We therefore gave both watches a shake and I made every one of

us satisfy himself that both watches were ticking, so that no one could point a finger at Wahl if the bombs did not explode, as was the case in the Mpaka railway line bomb (see Section 5.2.6.10).

5.4.14.1.16 The
bomb was placed at the back of the house and the detonator battery fitted. We drove along this gravel road in an easterly direction for another block and turned south at the intersection. The new transit house was a small distance from the intersection, on the left. Opposite it was a block of flats.

5.4.14.1.17 We
parked right in front of the northern neighbour's house; the one before we reached the transit house. Rorich and I got out. He carried the explosives and I carried the sand bag. Rorich put the bomb against the northern wall of the house, with the sand bag on top. We took the cordite up a small embankment and across the neighbour's lawn. On the lawn, close to the street, we clipped in the battery and drove off.

5.4.14.1.18 We
wanted to know that the bombs went off, so we drove in a northerly direction and stopped under a tree near the Manzini goal. Here we unpacked our beers and drank while we waited. A few minutes later, around 03h00, a bright white mushroom shot into the air, followed by an almighty explosion a second later.

5.4.14.1.19 We
wasted no time and drove off towards the main road to Mbabane. Less than a minute later the second flash and another almighty explosion followed.

5.4.14.1.20 At
Malkerns we branched off the Manzini-Mbabane road towards the south and Hlangano. Before reaching the Houtkop border post turnoff, we turned west and reached the border at a farm gate with a chain and several padlocks. These padlocks interlocked to form part of the chain so that anyone owning a lock could open the gate. Ermelo had cut the actual chain at the last lock and added their own padlock. Rorich carried the key on this mission.

5.4.14.1.21 We
reported back to Nick just before dawn. He was highly pleased that the mission had gone off well and immediately contacted Brigadier van der Hoven to give him the good news. According to Nick, van der Hoven had then still not slept a wink and had been sipping his Boll's brandy all night to await news.

5.4.14.1.22 See
time later, I cannot remember how long, I visited the scenes of the explosions. All that remained at the Mawick house was the Valiant motor car with some planks from the house strewn over it. The transit house was wrecked and remained so for years afterwards. The roof and windows on the southern part of the northern neighbour's house were badly damaged. I suppose the walls may have suffered as well.

5.4.14.1.23 The
feedback that Viktor and I got from Ermelo security, was that the only person in Mawick's house had been a young child, who was killed. They said that one ANC member was killed and three wounded in the transit house. The killed man had slept next to the wall where the bomb was placed and he had been ripped to pieces.

5.4.14.1.24
When Section A did something simple, they received the highest rewards for bravery (see Section 5.4.17.1 on the London bomb blast of the ANC offices) from General Johan Coetzee, godfather of Craig Williamson and Section A. Johan Coetzee was, however, always finding opportunities for biting remarks about Section C mishaps, and about my activities in general. Brigadier Jan du Preez told me and Viktor that General Johan Coetzee had made the snide comment that it was no big deal to kill a young child.

5.4.14.1.25 I
mention Johan Coetzee's attitude because this was one of several such manifestations of a smouldering antagonism between him and me that was one day to come to a final head and eventually lead to me transferring from the security police. We got involved in a long and bitter feud that flared up again in events leading to the farce that was my departmental trial and other events (see Section 7 on "The Abandoned Policeman"). Judging from his public statements this war is all but over. It is no use pretending that current events do not also include such personal under currents that are relevant to the manner in which hit squad revelations are handled.

5.4.14.2 Attempted bombing of ANC Land Cruiser "Flat 6 and 9" Manzini

5.4.14.2.1 I here have to repeat a few details that have already been provided in Section 5.4.6.5 of this statement. On the night of the first abortive raid on Matola - it was during the second half of 1980 - Viktor and I went to Oshoek where we joined up with Luitenant Chris Deetlefs, Warrant Officer Chris Rorich and Warrant Officer Paul van Dyk.

- 5.4.14.2.2 Viktor and I had brought a vehicle bomb with us. The bomb had been prepared by Captain Wahl du Toit from the technical division at security head office. It was a metal box that could hold half a kilogram of plastic explosive. A hole with the same diameter as a detonator was drilled into the side of the box. After filling the box with explosive, the lid is slid into the closed position. The detonator is then pushed through the hole in the box, into the explosive and connected to the Russian-watch time device and battery that all clipped into position on the box. The box had a strap that could be used to fix the bomb to any part of the vehicle.
- 5.4.14.2.3 Viktor set up his elaborate camp in a wattle bush at the Red Hill turn-off, 3,5 km before the Oshoek border. Paul, the Chris duo and I set off for Manzini in Swaziland. Our mission was to go and blow up an ANC Land Cruiser at "Flat 6 and 9", Manzini.
- 5.4.14.2.4 We reached Manzini fairly late that evening, drove past the show grounds and about half a kilometer further, on our left, arrived at the Manhattan Store. The entrance to "Flat 6 and 9" is under the building just beyond the store and is sealed off by guarded gates at night. "Flat 6 and 9" is how flats numbers 6 and 9 here were collectively known. The flats were used by the ANC.
- 5.4.14.2.5 We went round the back of the Manhattan Store where one could get to the parking lot by climbing over a fence. This was not necessary because we could see from outside that the Land Cruiser was not there. We then passed the time at the nearby Mosambique Restaurant but when by way past midnight, the Land Cruiser had not returned, we abandoned the mission and went back to Viktor. Crossing the border at Oshoek was quite simple with Paul stationed there.
- 5.4.14.2.6 Viktor and I then left for Komatipoort in the early hours of that morning. He wanted to find out how the raid into Matola had gone because of Section C's involvement (see Sections 4.4.8.3.2 to 4.4.8.3.4 of this statement for details of our involvement).
- 5.4.14.3 Kidnap of Joe Pillay, Swaziland**
- 5.4.14.3.1 Between the Eastern Transvaal security police and the head office security police, it had been decided to deal the ANC in Swaziland a spectacular and crippling blow. This was during late 1980 or during 1981. Several of my colleagues and superiors were involved on a number of occasions in preparing for this mission. Colonel Schoon and Brigadier Jan du Preez as

- well as Colonel Frans van Eeden from the "Explosives Desk" were among them.
- 5.4.14.3.2 The basic plan was that I would lead a group, including policemen and askaris to Swaziland. There we would scout for suitable ANC targets and hit as many as possible of these in one night. This boiled down to eliminating the ANC people in the dwellings where they lived and operated from.
- 5.4.14.3.3 I led the mission. Captain Paul Hattingh, 2-IC to Colonel Frans van Eeden of the explosives desk at security head office would be responsible for the explosives. Hattingh was an instructor that trained security police explosives experts. Paul van Dyk - I cannot say whether he was still attached to Ermelo security at Oshoek or whether he had already transferred to Vlakplaas - was the other policeman on this mission.
- 5.4.14.3.4 A number of askaris went with. I am not sure who they were, but as may be seen from the following account, the correct names may be ascertained from police and court records in Manzini. Amaro went, as did Petrus Kgoadi, Jeff Bosigo, I think Thabo Makgagi, and one or two others. The green security police Valiant that until then was used at Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg, was obtained as operational car for the askaris. It was a neat car but getting a bit long in the tooth. We fitted new tyres for the operation.
- 5.4.14.3.5 The askaris left in their car and Paul Hattingh and I followed in Paul's 3 litre Cortina bakkie with canopy. The bakkie was loaded with Paul's merchandise. On arrival at the counter insurgency base near Oshoek, we found that Paul van Dyk had pitched a tent for us here. We first offloaded here, but it was rainy and we changed our minds about staying there.
- 5.4.14.3.6 We locked up our explosives, arms, ammunition and devices at Oshoek and went and stayed at the Smokey Mountain Village, which is a motel in the Ezulweni Valley between Mbabane and Manzini. I knew the owner, Doug Goldman, well and we stayed there for free.
- 5.4.14.3.7 For the askaris we arranged accommodation in a big house that used to be the Dutch Reformed Church parsonage and which was hired by Johnny Vaz of Swaziland Engineering for his single workers. The askaris came to Smokey Mountain Village twice a day to meet with us. They were making slow but good progress when Schoon started getting restless.
- 5.4.14.3.8 We received a message through Luitenant Chris Deetlefs from Ermelo security to say that I should phone Colonel Schoon. I contacted Schoon and he said that I should come to Pretoria to brief him on our progress. I expressed my doubts about leaving the askaris there but Schoon was adamant.

He suggested I got Chris Deetlefs from Ermelo to look after the askaris. I asked Chris, who had brought me the message to do this for me but as I later discovered, he could not be bothered.

5.4.14.3.9 I cannot remember what had happened to Paul van Dyk, because if he had been there, I would have asked him to look after the askaris. Hattingh and I left for Pretoria and this proved to be the undoing of the operation.

5.4.14.3.10 The askaris had by now already detected the house of a certain Joe Pillay. They had identified him as an ex member of the "Natal Machinery" of the ANC and wanted to kidnap him but I told them to wait until we had greater certainty about all our targets.

5.4.14.3.11 I reported to Schoon on the day that we left the askaris in Swaziland and I briefed him on the situation. He was satisfied. That night at home in Pretoria, around midnight, I received a call from the border post commander at Oshoek, Luitenant Koos van der Lith. He said that the askaris had kidnapped Joe Pillay in Swaziland and brought Joe across the border fence to his house. One of the askaris stayed at Oshoek but the rest had returned to Manzini.

5.4.14.3.12 I somehow arranged with Koos van der Lith at Oshoek and Chris Deetlefs at Ermelo security that Pillay be brought to Vlakplaas the next day. I begged Koos to urgently, that night, get a message to the askaris to tell them to get out of Swaziland immediately. I reported to Schoon early the next morning and expressed my concern about the askaris still being in Swaziland after the kidnapping.

5.4.14.3.13 Immediately after the 08h00 "San Hedren" meeting at head office, I met in passing the security chief, General Johan Coetzee, in the passage in front of Schoon's office. Out of the blue, he congratulated me on my good work (he obviously was unaware of the precarious current situation) and went on in the same breath, to tell me that one of these days the ANC would be knocked in London as well (one of those days the ANC did get knocked - see Section 5.4.17.1).

5.4.14.3.14 Schoon arranged for Captain Andy Taylor from Durban security and Captain Jerry Fourie from Pietermaritzburg security, to come up to Pretoria to interrogate Joe Pillay. They were familiar with conditions in Durban, which

was where Pillay was said to have been active. With Andy, Jerry and Joe Pillay all on their way to Pretoria, the news broke that the askaris had been caught by the Swaziland police and army and were in goal in Manzini.

5.4.14.3.15 I later learnt that the kidnapping was a big commotion and a noisy affair. Eye witnesses had noted the registration number and other details of the Valliant motor car and reported the incident to the police. The next morning their car was spotted and a chase ensued. They fled to the house where they stayed and hid in built in cupboards. The Swaziland police and army tear gassed them out of the house and arrested them.

5.4.14.3.16 In the meantime Andy, Jerry and Joe had all arrived at Vlakplaas. Major Kallie Steyn from Military Intelligence and a Sergeant du Plessis, also from Military Intelligence arranged for us to interrogate Joe.

5.4.14.3.17 Jerry, Andy, Kallie, Sergeant Du Plessis, Spyker Tshikalanga and I, took Joe to a very special and very impressive place that belonged to Military Intelligence. Joe, who was blindfolded, may be interested to know where he spent those days.

5.4.14.3.18 We took Joe out on the Pretoria to Kempton Park highway, turned left opposite the Fountains Drive-In, up George Storrer Drive. We drove past the Klapperkop Fort turnoff and on to the old observatory on the mountain summit.

5.4.14.3.19 At the observatory there were administrative buildings, an underground bunker lecture hall, four VIP houses, classed as "A, B, C and D". The huge dome was closed up and converted into an ultra luxurious conference room. Kallie showed us inside this dome. Andy, Jerry and I slept in the class D house for one or two nights. Kallie and Sergeant du Plessis slept at home. Spyker guarded Joe in the bunker.

5.4.14.3.20 The first evening at dusk, the current Admiral Dries Putter came round to the bunker where we were questioning Joe and asked us to leave the premises. Kallie said we were there with the permission of his General van der Westhuizen, to which Putter said that we should stay inside the bunker and not come out.

- 5.4.14.3.21 A
 little later, after dark, a helicopter landed and we saw a convoy of black limousines arriving at the dome. Kallie said that this was Jonas Savimbi from Unita in Angola arriving for a secret meeting with the government. He occasionally attended meetings here and stayed overnight. He landed with a fixed wing aircraft at the nearby Waterkloof Military Air Force base and from there is brought to the observatory by helicopter.
- 5.4.14.3.22 Joe
 had been badly beaten up by the askaris. During the interrogation Jerry and Andy slapped and shook the frail Pillay a number of times and Kallie brought an army doctor to administer "truth serum" ("waarheidserum") intravenously with a drip. Joe was lying on a stretcher on his back. I watched while the doctor regulated Joe's condition. Joe was kept in a state of semi-consciousness where he just could not gain control over his thoughts. He had an erection and was fiddling with his penis.
- 5.4.14.3.23 I t
 became obvious that Joe had withdrawn from being an active and involved member of the ANC. He was concentrating on his teaching in Manzini.
- 5.4.14.3.24 I n
 the meantime the kidnapping had caused an international uproar. Foreign Affairs and General Johan Coetzee had meetings and Johan undertook to personally put matters right with the Swaziland government. Johan and a senior Foreign Affairs Official went down to Nersten border post on a Sunday to meet with their Swaziland counterparts. They undertook to smuggle Joe back across the border and release him in Swaziland. The Swaziland police would arrange bail set at R800 per person and we would smuggle the askaris back into South Africa.
- 5.4.14.3.25 Joe
 was then kept at Sergeant Koos Schutte's house in 20th Avenue, Rietfontein North, Pretoria for a few days where Spyker guarded him. Here we sat on the lawn outside one night with the TV news on in the room on the stoep, when a surprised Joe noted that he was being discussed on the news.
- 5.4.14.3.26 Koos
 and Spyker then took Joe to Lothair police station where he was handed over to Chris Deetlefs from Ermelo security. He was kept there for a few days while his bruises healed. Chris then took Joe across the border at Oshoek, in the boot of a car. He handed Joe a small amount of money - I think R15 - to see him on his way home.

- 5.4.14.3.27 By
 this time the askaris had been released on bail and smuggled back into South Africa, also in the boots of motor cars.
- 5.4.14.3.28
 Corroborating evidence for my account should be available as Joe's own accounts of his experiences and in Manzini court records.
- 5.4.14.4 Attempted kidnap of General**
- 5.4.14.4.1 Towards December 1981, Paul van Dyk, Almond Nofomela, Joe Mamasela, David Tshikalanga and I - there may have been other Vlakplaas teams or members but I cannot remember - were operating along the Swaziland border. We were based in an empty police house at Nersten border post and doing surveillance work.
- 5.4.14.4.2 Colonel Schoon of Section C, security head office, asked me to try and kidnap an ANC member named General. The idea was to get him into South Africa and to question him about ANC dwellings. We would then dispose of him afterwards.
- 5.4.14.4.3 The man to be kidnapped was a close friend of Dennis Gordon Lockwood, an informer of mine in his sixties. Lockwood was a wheeler-dealer type who had all sorts of schemes to make money. His wife lived in their house in Sandton, Johannesburg, but he visited Swaziland weekly for several days at a time on business. Here in Swaziland he had a permanent flat at Matenga Falls. He also had a girl friend who was a model from Soweto and who often stayed with him in Swaziland.
- 5.4.14.4.4 I got Lockwood's cooperation in a plan to dope and kidnap General. To this end I obtained "knock-out drops" from Brigadier Neetling of the forensic laboratory after he had cleared it with Schoon. I gave Lockwood the drops in Swaziland and he specially bought a few bottles of wine for the doping.
- 5.4.14.4.5 I phoned Lockwood every afternoon late to enquire whether that night would be the occasion to kidnap General. I phoned from Oshoek and Nersten. One night the stage was set and I arranged for Carl Pearson, a friend of Lockwood, to assist Lockwood. Carl was younger than Lockwood, in his early forties and big and strong. They would be having drinks with General at Lockwood's flat.
- 5.4.14.4.6 My group, consisted of Luitenant Koos van der Lith, who was border post commander at Oshoek, Almond Nofomela and I. We went to the First Horse

Restaurant about two kilometers from Lockwood's flat. Carl would call us to move in when the drinking was in full swing.

- 5.4.14.4.7 Our plan was simple. General would be doped, put into the boot of Koos' official Datsun Laurel and we would drive him across the Oshoek border. We came in Koos' car so that we would not have problems at the border. None of us were armed.
- 5.4.14.4.8 Carl was late. I think he called us after 22h00. He said that they were drinking heavily but General was still on his feet. General's Mosambican driver (they arrived in a Mazda) had already been knocked out by the drops. We decided to move in.
- 5.4.14.4.9 Koos waited for us on the road about one hundred metres from Lockwood's flat. Almond and I sneaked up to Lockwood's BMW, which was parked under a car port next to the flat. As previously arranged, Almond and I got into the BMW and reclined the seats to lie there waiting.
- 5.4.14.4.10 A6
a while Lockwood emerged on the pretext that he was going for a widdle. Lockwood was not really going for a piss but he certainly was pissed out of his mind. He wanted to make me believe that the drops weren't working. I asked him to open his bedroom window so that I could get inside and evaluate General's speech.
- 5.4.14.4.11 Almond and I sneaked up to within two metres of General. By listening to General I immediately knew that he was not in a drinking mood and must have been ditching his drinks on the sly. At that moment General got up and announced that he was leaving and was going to the toilet.
- 5.4.14.4.12 Within seconds he walked round the corner immediately behind him, into the bedroom where Almond and I stood. Before he could switch on the light we had him on the floor. He looked slender and small but was as strong as a lion. He had rolled over on his stomach with Almond on his back. Almond was trying to smother General's screams for help while I attempted to choke him. General got his teeth into Almonds forearm. Almond grimaced and said General was biting him. I said bite him back and Almond got his teeth into General's scalp.
- 5.4.14.4.13 General let go of Almond's forearm and I summonsed Almond to a quick escape. I turned back and saw Almond had lost a shoe and every time he

tried to retrieve it, General got hold of his arm and attempted to pull Almond into the light. Almond was throwing punches and when General let go again Almond had found his shoe and escaped through the window with me.

- 5.4.14.4.14 General ran out the front door while we escaped around the back of the house. Lockwood later told us that in his innubriated state he realized his predicament and started emptying the contents of the bedroom drawers and cupboards onto the floor. He also threw the money that he had in his pocket through the bedroom window.
- 5.4.14.4.15 Lockwood later told me that General came back into the house and said that the intruders had come to kidnap him. Lockwood argued that the state of the bedroom suggested that General had stumbled into burglars and went on to "discover" the money outside the window.
- 5.4.14.5 Murder of Jabu Nyaose and wife**
- 5.4.14.5.1 This happened in 1982 after I had left Vlakplaas but Spyker was still on the farm. I was succeeded by Captain Jan Coetzee. David "Spyker" Tshikalanga told me about the incident and I also read about it in the newspaper. The story corroborates so well with my experience and my knowledge of related facts, and contains enough facts that can be verified, for it to ring true to me. I think it is worth repeating here.
- 5.4.14.5.2 When I was border post commander at Oshoek, I already knew about Jabu (alias Petrus) Nyaose, also well known as the man with the six fingers. He had an extra finger on one hand - or was it both hands? Petrus was a wanted ANC member even in those days.
- 5.4.14.5.3 After I had left Vlakplaas, in early January 1982, Paul van Dyk obtained false travel documents for Almond, Joe and Spyker. Spyker's was issued in early January 1982 in the name of Alpheus Mphaphule and is currently in possession of the ANC.
- 5.4.14.5.4 The three of them were sent into Swaziland to do surveillance of the movements of Jabu (Petrus) Nyaose. Spyker's travel document contains a Nersten date stamp that was cancelled. On the same date, at Amsterdam police station, Paul van Dyk has written into the travel document, on the page with the cancelled date stamp, that the expiry date of the passport should read ; and then he gave a correcting date. Paul signed the entry and put

the Amsterdam police office rubber stamp next to his endorsement. Spyker then on the same day entered Swaziland via Oshoek.

- 5.4.14.5.5 The Vlakplaas mission followed Petrus to where he lived at Mobeni Heights flats in Matsapa. They continued to monitor his movements for some time.
- 5.4.14.5.6 At some stage Almond, Joe and Spyker were ordered by Jan Coetzee to return to South Africa. The three, on this mission, used to meet Jan and his colleagues, including one or more Ermelo security people, at the Yen San Chinese hotel where Jan and them stayed free of charge. The managing director of this hotel, Joyce King, had been a very good friend of the South African police for years.
- 5.4.14.5.7 Shortly after Almond, Joe and Spyker had to return from Swaziland, Jabu Nyaose and his wife were blown up one morning when they got into their car. The car, which was parked in front of their flat, was a Ford Grenada, which had been bought at a Swaziland Police auction shortly before the incident. One or two passengers that were getting into the back of the car, survived. Before the Granada, Nyaosi had a yellow car, which might have been a Peugeot and which may be a car that he was using still while being monitored by Almond, Joe and Spyker.
- 5.4.14.6 Murder of taxi occupants by white BMW gang**
- 5.4.14.6.1 I read in the newspapers about an incident where three ANC members were travelling by taxi from Matsapa airport in Swaziland on the Losita Palace Road to Mbabane. On the way they were forced off the road by the occupants of a white BMW and the three passengers were killed. The driver survived to tell the story.
- 5.4.14.6.2 I know from entries in my passport that during 1 to 3 September 1987 I visited Swaziland with two businessmen. They were Paul somebody (the name Moricelli comes to mind) and his partner, whom I will be able to trace in Johannesburg. We booked in at the Yen San Hotel.
- 5.4.14.6.3 At some stage whilst on our way out, we met some old acquaintances of mine in the foyer. They were Major Chris Deetlefs and Warrant Officer Lappies Labuschagne from the Ermelo security police and Warrant Officer Strydom and a Captain from the Pretoria security police. The Captain had recently been transferred from the gold and diamond branch.
- 5.4.14.6.4 My police friends immediately insisted that we went for a drink. This we did and did well in the bar of the Yen San. My business friends were with us.

We talked about the old days and the many operations we were involved in. I remember Chris saying that he visited Colonel Nick van Rensburg while on holiday down in Mossel Bay, that Nick had stopped smoking and was now only an occasional drinker. We carried on in this manner. At one stage Lappies asked me how I liked the job that they had pulled with the ANC guys in the taxi. I told him that when I read the story, I immediately knew that it was them and Vlakplaas.

- 5.4.14.6.5 We stuck together for the rest of the night. From the Yen San we all left to the If Not Why Not disco just down the road at the old Happy Valley Motel. At the disco we drank and played pool. The businessmen later returned to our hotel but Chris and them kept me there saying that they would take me back.
- 5.4.14.6.6 We drove back to the hotel in a grey Star Wagon combi and arrived there at about 04h30, well sozzled. They made another date for that afternoon but I gave them the slip.
- 5.4.14.6.7 At the beginning of April 1990, in exile, I met an informant who amongst other things told me how Major Eugene de Kock in 1987, after a mission in Swaziland, exchanged his white official four door BMW for a dark blue one. He could not give me any particulars about the mission.
- 5.4.14.6.8 Eugene de Kock has since changed cars again and now drives a Toyota Cressida, which he found necessary to hide from the press during their farcical visit to Vlakplaas (see Section 4.5.3.12).
- 5.4.15 Vlakplaas-Nelspruit hit squad operations**
- 5.4.15.1 Murder of Isaac "Ace" Moema**
- 5.4.15.1.1 Isaac "Ace" Moema, a so called "turned terrorist" joined Vlakplaas in 1981 while I was there. He was a quiet, intelligent man that spoke little but obviously was a good observer.
- 5.4.15.1.2 I could see that Isaac's heart was not with us and the policemen remarked about this amongst ourselves. I asked Almond to keep an eye on Moema. Captain Koos Vermeulen insisted that we got rid of Moema before he sold us out to the ANC. I told him that I could also see that Moema was a potential defector but that on the other hand, he was such a decent man. I suggested that we discussed it with Schoon.

- 5.4.15.1.3 Schoon listened to what we had to say and said Koos should do what he thought best. Koos got knock-out drops from Brigadier Lothar Neethling and while working in the Komatipoort- Nelspruit area with Captain Gert Visser of Nelspruit, disposed of Moema. This was done in the usual manner, which is drops, shot and burnt.
- 5.4.15.1.4 Koos returned without Moema in his group and reported to me and then to Schoon that Moema had been taken care of.
- 5.4.15.1.5 In 1981, shortly after this incident, one of the askaris in the group that then worked with Koos, Chris Mnisi, went back to the ANC. I have spoken to Chris Mnisi whilst in exile and learnt that Koos one day left the rest of the group behind and went out with Mnisi and Gert Visser from Nelspruit security. When Koos returned the next day, he was tired and dirty and his arms, eyelashes, brows and hair were scorched. Moema did not return and the group immediately knew that he had been murdered.

5.4.16 Vlakplaas-Komatipoort hit squad operations

5.4.16.1 Poisoning and murder of Selby Mavusu (Vusi) and Peter

- 5.4.16.1.1 Vlakplaas was intimately involved in the planning and execution of the abortive and actual raids into the Matola suburb of Maputu, Mosambique, during early 1981. Luitenant Colonel Buchner, working under Brigadier J J Viktor represented the security police in the planning of the operation with Major Kallie Steyn of Military intelligence. The askaris Stephen Mbanda and Siphon (alias Casper) who used to live in the raided ANC house, accompanied the military on the operation. Finally, the poisoning and murder of two Vlakplaas askaris stemmed from the capturing of prisoners during the raid.
- 5.4.16.1.2 Jack Buchner, Kallie Steyn, Stan Hancock and I shared an office. Jack and Kallie did much of their planning of the Matola raid here. The maps over which they poured were often spread out all over the place. In any event, at that stage we were four - later five - officer's in the entire Section C. We cooperated closely and there were few secrets between us. Moreover, the askaris that participated fell under my command at Vlakplaas. More aspects of the Matola raid and my intimate knowledge thereof are discussed in Sections 4.4.8.3.2 to 4.4.8.3.4.
- 5.4.16.1.3 Three prisoners were taken during the Matola raid. They were the two ANC freedom fighters, Ghost and Selby Mavusu (Vusi) plus a Mosambican citizen whose name I do not know. The three were secretly held at the "Recce"

(special forces) head quarters at Voortrekker Hoogte, Pretoria. After an international uproar over the raid and the known abduction of the three, the South Africans decided to hold the captives officially.

- 5.4.16.1.4 The Mosambican citizen, whom I heard was not entirely sane, was held at the Potgieter Street prison in Pretoria and later released to Mosambique.
- 5.4.16.1.5 Ghost decided to cooperate and was assigned to Vlakplaas. As he did not want anything to do with Vlakplaas, he worked and stayed with Brigadier Viktor who was the divisional commander of the Northern Transvaal security police in Pretoria.
- 5.4.16.1.6 It later became clear that Ghost still sympathized with the ANC. At some stage he was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for the murder of his girl friend. When Viktor paid him a visit in goal he cursed Viktor in a manner that clearly showed his ANC sympathies and his animosity towards the boers. I also later heard that he wrote ANC slogans on his cell wall in Barberton or Bethal - I am not sure which.
- 5.4.16.1.7 Vusi was detained by Viktor at Britz police station. Here he was being interrogated in order to build up a case against him. This failed and Vusi had the expressed attitude of "charge me or shoot me".
- 5.4.16.1.8 Schoon called me in and told me of Vusi's attitude, saying that Viktor wanted us to get rid of Vusi. Their plan was to officially release Vusi, kill him and pretend that he joined Vlakplaas and then deserted. Askaris do not fill in job application forms to join Vlakplaas and this was exploited in Vusi's case. Schoon instructed me to pick up Vusi at Britz police station with whom Viktor would arrange for Vusi's release. I asked Schoon to arrange with Brigadier Neethling that I would fetch some poison from him because I did not have the guts to shoot Vusi. Brigadier Neethling was in charge of the forensic laboratory of the South African police.
- 5.4.16.1.9 We had at Vlakplaas a man called Pieter. He was a student of the ANC but not a member of their military wing. Pieter had studied in Bulgaria. There he managed to get to an embassy and contact the South African authorities. Luitenant Colonel Jack Buchner arranged for his air ticket and after a debriefing, Pieter joined us at Vlakplaas. Pieter was a frail, timid and apologetic figure who was always late and could do nothing right. The askaris could not get on with him and they regularly beat him up, locked him up in a cupboard and generally mistreated him. The general consensus was that Pieter was not "all there".

- 5.4.16.1.10 An informant of mine has a photograph of Pieter if this could help persuade the world that such a man ever existed.
- 5.4.16.1.11 When Schoon instructed me to kill Vusi he said I should use the opportunity to get rid of the unfortunate Pieter as well. Pieter had at that stage written some letter or other to a high authority complaining about some thing or other. I do not recall the exact circumstances.
- 5.4.16.1.12 I went alone to General Lothar Neethling's office. He was at the old forensic laboratory in Jacob Mare Street, a small distance from Paul Kruger Street to the west, on the left and just past a small connecting road to the station. The entrance to the building was in Jacob Mare Street and his office and laboratory were on the ground floor. At the entrance one turned right through a double wooden door. The laboratory was on the left of the passage and his office was about the third one on the right.
- 5.4.16.1.13 His office door was in the south eastern corner. In his office were: a window on the northern side; a big bookshelf on the western wall; a photograph of the Oostelikes Rugby Team in which he played - he was one of the players that stood up on the photo - on the southern wall; and a certificate with a drawing of the Concorde, pronouncing that he was a guest on some introductory flight, on the eastern wall. He sat behind his desk facing the door. His desk was separated from the western wall by a typical police charge office safe with wooden stand.
- 5.4.16.1.14 Brigadier Neethling gave me knock-out drops from the safe in his office. I think this was the first of four or five occasions that I was in his office for either drugs or poison or both. Be that as it may, it was on my first visit to him that he explained how the knock-out drops worked. As I have indicated elsewhere (Section 5.4.8.3.9) the drops essentially have the effect of chloroform. Four drops are sufficient to thoroughly dope a medium sized man and eight drops would probably kill him. He also gave me some poison in powder form and said this was administered in a drink and would cause a heart attack within minutes. According to Neethling, the poison had been tried on sheep and these died within 15 minutes. He could not give me precise timing information on the drops and I undertook to note such details.
- 5.4.16.1.15 Neethling gave me two dosages of the poison, each wrapped in a tiny piece

- of tin foil. I vaguely remember the number 60 in connection with the quantity of a dosage of the powder. At Mauritius I said 60 grams but that is obviously wrong because I would have had to spoon feed it to the victim for breakfast. It must have been 60 mg or some other such scientific jargon. I got an E for science in Matric in 1963.
- 5.4.15.1.16 I decided to carry out this task with Captain Koos Vermeulen at his base on the farm near the Kopfontein border post. The location and nature of this base is described in detail in Section 5.4.12.1.2 to 5.4.12.1.4 under the heading "Attack on Joyce Diphale's house, Gabarone". I do not remember taking Pieter there and it is possible that he was already there with Koos and his group.
- 5.4.15.1.17 I travelled to Brits where I had Vusi officially released. I handcuffed him in the police court yard and made him get onto the back seat of my car. I do not remember whether I went there with release documents or whether it was there ready for me. In any event, such documents would have had to be prepared by Viktor's office and reported to head office.
- 5.4.16.1.18 In Britz we travelled to Zeerust where I contacted the dog handler, Detective Sergeant Willie Mouton. Willie was stationed at Volksrust with me during 1976. I explained to Willie what we were doing and asked if he could transport some old tyres to the base near Kopfontein. He agreed and we went to the municipal dump on the eastern side of the town. Here we filled his police van with old motor car tyres. Vusi witnessed all this activity from the back of the car. He was quiet and never spoke once on the road.
- 5.4.16.1.19 We went to the Kopfontein base, Willie in his van and Vusi and I in my car. We somehow met up with Koos on the farm, away from the house and in some fallow lands. The lands were oriented longitudinally in an east-west direction and at the far eastern end there were Escom power lines, running across in a north-south direction.
- 5.4.16.1.20 We opened drinks. Koos offered Vusi a beer but he said he would rather have a soft drink. Pieter wanted a beer. Willie and I offloaded the tyres while Koos prepared the poisoned cups. I let Vusi sign three blank receipts of the kind that were used for payments to informers. I let him use two different pens. He wanted to know why but I said that he should just sign and not ask questions. He offered to cooperate but we ignored him.

5.4.16.1.21 We cuffed Vusi to Pieter, telling Pieter that he was guarding Vusi. Both of them had drunk the poison but it did not seem to have any effect at all. By now the sun had set and we had lit a fire for a braai. We opened more drinks and added four knock-out drops to Vusi's. We started talking to him so that I could get timing information on the effect of the drops. After fifteen to twenty minutes the man was incoherent and after half an hour his eyes were wide and glazed. He fell over and was very restless, at times staring blankly and making peculiar movements. At stages he was scratching in the soil.

5.4.16.1.22 Vi carried on like this, on and off, for much of the night. By morning he seemed normal again. We had decided that Koos would report to Neethling to find out what was going on. He returned that afternoon with the dosages doubled. He said Neethling could simply not understand this and said it was impossible. We repeated the procedure with the poison, again without results.

5.4.16.1.23 On the third day the Vlakplaas contingent, including the people at the old farm house base that I had avoided, were somehow summonsed to go to Groblersdal. Just outside Groblersdal on the Stoffberg road, were two post war settlements where soldiers were resettled. The settlements, one on either side of the road, were named after battles in Italy.

5.4.16.1.24 We went to the settlement on the left. Koos left Vusi and Pieter in the first house from the turnoff, while the main Vlakplaas contingent stayed on the second small holding. Early on the first Sunday morning after our arrival here, Koos and I went to Brigadier Neethling's house in Pretoria.

5.4.16.1.25 The following instructions will indicate where Brigadier Neethling's house was:- Drive west to east in Lynwood road and turn north into the road that runs along the eastern side of the main campus of the University of Pretoria (Prospect Street?). At the second turnoff to the right, turn east, away from the campus and follow the road past some student ladies' hostels on the right.

5.4.16.1.26 Neethling's house is house diagonally across the road from one of these hostels. It is an old Hatfield house. The garage is close to the street, with the house to the left behind it. The front gate is on the left of the garage. The house has a stoep in front, situated in the middle. The passage runs

straight down the house from the front door and divides the house into two parts. The sitting room is the first room on the right from the front door. His house had boarded floors.

5.4.16.1.27 Neethling had two aggressive Doberman dogs. He spoke German to his family and confirmed to me that he spoke German at home. He was dressed in his long striped pajamas and wore slippers. After putting on shorts and a shirt he went with Koos and I to his laboratory in Jacob Mare Street, still wearing his slippers. Neethling simply could not understand that the poison would not work and started delving in his chemistry books. (There was little I could do to help.) He then tripled the dosage, diluted it in a liquid and drew the liquid into two of my disposable 100 unit insulin syringes. With the plungers still extended, he wrapped the two syringes separately in tin foil.

5.4.16.1.28 We dropped Neethling and set off for Groblersdal. Koos squirted the contents of the syringes into Vusi's and Pieter's drinks and still nothing happened. We then decided that we would have to dope and shoot them.

5.4.16.1.29 The next morning, Koos, Paul van Dyk and I loaded the two victims in my Datsun and drove to Komatipoort. There we met with Major Archie Flemmington and two or three of his men from the Lebombo (Komatipoort) security police. I cannot be sure but somehow vaguely remember them expecting us. We might have arranged with them in advance ourselves or had somebody else do so.

5.4.16.1.30 The whole group of us, with Vusi and Pieter, went to the site of the murder. A short distance before the Mosambique border, the main road from Nelspruit crosses the Komati River. This is just before the junction of the Komati with the Crocodile River. A few yards before the western side of this bridge over the Komati, a small road or tracks turns off the main road to the right (south). We turned down this road through a gate next to the main road. A hundred metres or so further on, the road forks. We took the left hand fork, which ends in a clearing under the trees on the river bank.

5.4.16.1.31 Vi and Pieter were doped. When they fell over, Koos Vermeulen, who fanatically hates "kaffirs", was adamant that he would shoot them. He took Archie Flemmington's Makarov with silencer. In each case he held the victim's head sideways on the ground with his foot and shot him behind the ear.

5.4.16.1.32 In the slightly elevated river bank, there was a dry ditch at the level of the river. In this ditch we prepared the pyre. The Lebombo security policemen used their Land Cruiser to transport logs and tyres for the fire. The bodies were put on the pyre and the next morning all the ashes and remains were shovelled into the river.

5.4.16.1.33 The night while discussing the poison that would not work, Archie told us how Lothar Neethling had poisoned a bottle of whisky for them without breaking the seal. Neethling achieved this with a micro needle through the top. They had sent this bottle with an informer to an ANC get together. Archie said that any one who drank from that bottle, was sure to die.

5.4.16.1.34 For three months after Vusi's murder, his monthly informer fees were handed to Luitenant Colonel Roelf van Rensburg, who was Schoon's then 2-IC in Section C. Roelf went on pension as Brigadier van Rensburg, divisional commander of the Northern Transvaal security police, Pretoria.

5.4.16.1.35 In 1982/1983 while I was stationed at head office recruiting, Schoon called me over to his office and said Vusi's attorney's were becoming a nuisance. He asked me to put in a statement to the effect that Vusi joined us voluntarily at Vlakplaas, worked for us for three months and then just disappeared. This I did. There were never any enquiries about Pieter.

5.4.17 Section A hit squad operations

5.4.17.1 On the white side of the law

5.4.17.1.1 It is not an entirely simple matter to find a respectable distinction between Section A, with its farm Daisy and Section C with its farm Vlakplaas. "Super spy" is often used by the media in Section A context whereas "hit squad" is more popular in Section C matters. The fact of the matter, however, is that both sections spied and both sections performed hit missions.

5.4.17.1.2 I do not have any information on "internal" South African hit missions by Section A, whereas I have provided several examples of "internal" Section C hit missions and will also provide examples of "external" Section A operations. The other popular distinction, therefore, between "internal" and

"external" operations does come to mind but will also not suffice. Section A certainly is not only concerned with people abroad while Section C, as I have shown, is also very much at home abroad.

5.4.17.1.3 It is so much simpler to say that Section C deals with the blacks that are involved in the total onslaught and Section A deals with the whites that threaten our apartheid regime. There are of course exceptions, particularly overseas, but this is the closest fit I can offer. Section C came close to killing the white Marius Schoon in my time but this mission was called off by the chief of security, Luitenant General Johan Coetzee (see Section 5.4.12.2).

5.4.17.2 Super spy Craig Williamson

5.4.17.2.1 The head of Section A was Brigadier Piet Goossen who became well known as a result of unfavourable publicity that he received as head of the security police in Port Elizabeth when Steve Biko died there in detention. His 2-IC was the infamous Craig Williamson who has also been receiving very unfavourable publicity overseas but in the government and pro government media in South Africa is more affectionately known as "super spy" Craig Williamson. He is the prominent figure in the Section A hit squad operations dealt with here. Craig after an unsuccessful bid for parliament in the last white election, was appointed to, and still is a member of the Presidents Council.

5.4.17.2.2 I met Craig in 1980 shortly after my transfer to Vlakplaas. He had just returned from overseas where his cover as an infiltrator at the International University Fund in "Operation Daisy", had been blown. Craig at the time approached me to help him get a crop spraying license in Swaziland for his "source" Peter Cassleton, who was a British subject. I set up a meeting between a Frenchman Louis Espanel who wanted to sell his Swaziland crop spraying enterprise. Craig, Peter and I were flown to Komatipoort in a South African Air Force aeroplane and we met with Louis at Border Gate border post.

5.4.17.2.3 This was a start of a close friendship between the three of us, which lasted until June 1985 when Johan Coetzee turned Craig Williamson against me in my departmental trial. As a result of our close friendship, we had some dealings together and I had intimate knowledge of some of the Section A activities. The following quote is from Craig Williamson said at my departmental trial (10 June 1985, Volume 6, Page 281): "I think I must preface answering that question with a comment, and that is that because of the relationship between Captain Coetzee and I - in other words, we know

each other so well - a lot of the explanation of the cryptic nature of the conversation is due to the fact that there is a very close rapport between us."

5.4.17.3 Daisy

5.4.17.3.1 I learnt from Craig that he and General Johan Coetzee had bought the farm "Daisy" for Section A with R 40 000 that Craig had stolen from the International University Fund. On the farm was a small house and outbuilding. For months they had been struggling with a labourer that Coetzee had provided, to build a lecture hall and amenities. In January 1981 I could no longer face this drawn out process of trying to get one brick on top of another and I offered to help. Brigadier Piet Goosen gave me the green light and I set to work.

5.4.17.3.2 That afternoon at 14h00 I had Brigadier Goosen, the general's staff officer Captain Louis Koekemoer, the then Brigadier Kruger of the Prisons head quarters and another Brigadier, who was in charge of the Prisons building section, together at Daisy. The Prisons people were highly cooperative and brought in an army of specialist prisoners and warders. Within a week they were erecting a luxurious double story building with a lecture room, bedrooms, bath rooms, kitchen and store rooms. The best expertise and labour had congregated here and it was not costing the security police a cent.

5.4.17.3.3 The old farm house that was leaking was fitted with a new roof and electricity generators that responded to press buttons inside the house and lecture room. Koos Schutte and I fetched wood for roof beams and knotty pine strips that I had obtained from a saw mill in the Eastern Transvaal, and so on.

5.4.17.3.4 Vlakplaas provided the daily transport for wardens and prisoners from Leeukop Prison.

5.4.17.4 London bomb blast

5.4.17.4.1 I got to know Craig Williamson and Peter Cassleton very intimately. During our friendship he was trained as an agent with aspects such as surveillance, counter surveillance etc. After training he was sent to London where he set up a network with a view burgling ANC-PAC offices in Europe for information. He had an account on the Isle of Man, through which police funds were channeled. He also started building a yacht for him and Craig. The boat builders were registered as informants and paid out of the security fund.

5.4.17.4.2 At some stage in early 1982, Peter came to South Africa on a holiday with his landlord and landlady and their children. He had to come for a briefing and debriefing. At that stage I was in the police narcotics bureau in Pretoria and Craig arranged with my commanding officer at the time, Colonel Basie Smith, current chief of the security police, to accompany Peter and his guests on a two day holiday to Sun City. All my expenses were paid by the police.

5.4.17.4.3 During Peter's holiday, Peter, Dennis Gordon Lockwood from Swaziland and I had a discussion to start a joint diamond dealing venture. Before Peter left for London as an agent, I had already introduced him and Craig Williamson to Lockwood. Williamson received security information from Lockwood and Peter and I regularly visited Lockwood.

5.4.17.4.4 Lockwood was my wheeler-dealer friend whom I called upon to help kidnap General (see Section 5.4.14.4). He had shares in a diamond mine at Boshoff, he said, and wanted us to smuggle his diamonds to London in the diplomatic bag. This bag was Peter's courier bag between London and South Africa. We agreed and Peter and I discussed it with Craig who consented to putting the parcels that I would provide, in the bag for Peter.

5.4.17.4.5 When I voiced my concern about spot checks of the contents of the diplomatic bag, Peter, in Craig's presence, said that there was nothing to worry about because the Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange, had given instructions that Peter's parcels should not be subjected to inspections. He said that they were smuggling explosives to London in the diplomatic bag to blow up the ANC offices in London. Craig just smiled.

5.4.17.4.6 Peter returned to London. A few months later, Craig's sister Liza died with Peter's dog Liza, named after her, on her lap. She died in a motor vehicle accident on the Pretoria- Krugersdorp highway. She was returning with Captain Tony Smith from a party at Daisy when at the R28 turnoff he drove into the rear of a cattle truck. Craig contacted me early the next morning and I went to his flat to sympathize. He said that they were waiting for confirmation of Peter's travel arrangements before finalizing the funeral arrangements.

5.4.17.4.7 The funeral took place at the Braamfontein crematorium. Here I met Peter again. Her wish was that Peter should cast her ashes over the Hartebeespoort Dam from an aeroplane. She had been busy obtaining some flying license before her death.

- 5.4.17.4.8 Before Peter went back to London he urged me again to keep reminding Lockwood to get going with the diamond smuggling because he was keen to get out of the agent business.
- 5.4.17.4.9 During 1982 Peter blew up the ANC offices in London. When I saw the news on TV, I visited Williamson. He told me how Jerry Raven had been sent to assemble the bomb for Peter. Craig and Captain Eugene de Kock who was with Koevoet at the time, were standing by at strategic places to help Peter escape if something went wrong. For that effort - not Peter's - General Johan Coetzee held a little private, clandestine medal parade to award to Craig and his strategic point colleagues "one of the highest decorations in the SAP", to quote the press.
- 5.4.17.4.10 Special Force Orders just stated the names of the recipients, giving the reason as clandestine operation.
- 5.4.17.4.11 A
few nights before Peter was arrested by Scotland Yard police, he phoned me at home from London and sounded very distressed. He wanted to know what was going on with the Lockwood arrangements because he desperately wanted to get out of that game. Peter's telephone number in London was 09144-48655257.
- 5.4.17.4.12 When Peter was arrested, he immediately admitted to the burglary charges but flatly denied any knowledge of the bomb. He got a four year goal sentence and was released on parole after two years.
- 5.4.17.4.13 Lockwood died in 1983 and Craig and I attended his funeral on 30 September 1983. Craig had arranged an official wreath on behalf of the South African police.
- 5.4.17.4.14 Lat
year in November when I made the hit squad revelations, Interpol issued a warrant of arrest and seized Peter's and Craig's yacht, "The Two Lizas" in the Mediterranean.
- 5.4.17.4.15 Ptr
fled to South Africa where he made contact with my wife Karin. At a dinner appointment he was desperately looking for my telephone number in exile to make contact with me. He said to her that he could not understand how I could do this to him and that he would rot in goal if Scotland Yard got hold

of him. Security police were teeming in the area during this meeting that was being closely monitored by the editor of Vrye Weekblad, Max du Preez and one of his journalists Jacques Paauw.

5.4.17.5 Murder of Ruth First

- 5.4.17.5.1 In 1982, when Ruth First was killed by a letter bomb in Maputo, Craig Williamson in the usual indirect manner made me understand that it was a security police, Section A operation and that the envelope used was one that I had obtained with the burglary of the UN Office for refugees in Swaziland.
- 5.4.17.6 Murder of Jeanette Schoon and child
- 5.4.17.6.1 In exile I learnt that in the early 1980's the British High Commissioner in Botswana called in Marius Schoon to warn him that he had information from the British intelligence service that Marius was on the hit list of the South African security police. He and his family left Botswana soon afterwards.
- 5.4.17.6.2 In 1984, Marius' wife Jeanette and her child were killed in a bomb blast in Angola. When I met Craig some time after that incident, he smugly enquired whether I had seen about Jeanette Schoon. His manner in our "very devious way of talking" (to quote Craig himself, see Section 4.3.2.4) and with our "very intimate rapport with each other" (to quote Craig again, see the same section) made me "understand very well what is going on" (to quote Craig yet again, see the same section). Unless Craig over estimated me in such references to conversations between us (see quotes), I was justified in taking this to mean that his Section A claimed credit for the murder.
- 5.4.18 Lesotho diamond dealer
- 5.4.18.1 During 1981 Almond Nofomela, Joe Mamasela, David "Spyker" Tshikalanga, Ernest Ramatlala and I do not know who else, from Vlakplaas, wanted to borrow R 5 000 from me. They wanted to buy diamonds in Lesotho through a good contact of Ernest Ramatlala, sell it at a profit and be rich.
- 5.4.18.2 To me this sounded like a deserving venture and I was into assisting small business enterprise. I offered to help them sell the diamonds should they have any problem with that.
- 5.4.18.3 I borrowed R 5 000 from my mother in law and off they went in Almond's private Mazda motor car during a free week end. I do not know who all

went to Lesotho. Almond, Joe and Spyker returned to me at my flat, No 15, Lynnwood Lodge, 38 Hibiscus Road, Lynnwood Ridge, Pretoria. There were about 5 tiny uncut diamonds the size of match heads, stained and cracked. A sixth with the form of a rugby ball was light yellow and had a bit of body. Even I could see this must be trash. They had been taken for a ride.

- 5.4.18.4 I immediately chased them back, telling them to return the diamonds and bring back my money. I could see this business was a shambles and told them to drop the whole idea.
- 5.4.18.5 As far as I can remember, the Vlakplaas groups had left for Durban and I had to wait for Almond and Spyker to return so that they could go to Durban with me - Joe would have had to return to Captain Jan Coetzee at Krugersdorp where he was working at that stage. Early that evening, it was probably around 20h00, the threesome arrived with a grey or blue Datsun Laurel that had Lesotho registration plates. I think it was automatic, fairly new, with a chromed caravan hook. They had the diamonds with them and gave these to me, asking me to see how much I could get for them.
- 5.4.18.6 The three told me that they had tricked the dealer into leaving Lesotho with them. They then insisted that he gave them their money back. When he refused they arrested him and took him to a eucalyptus bush near Lindley. They said that Joe and Almond went in the diamond dealer's car with him, while Spyker followed in Almond's official bakkie.
- 5.4.18.7 The main road from Lady Brandt passes around Lindley and up a small rise. At the top of the rise a dirt road turns off to the left. It is at this turn off, they told me, that Almond and Joe waved Spyker on while they turned left with the diamond dealer. They took him some distance down this dirt road into a eucalyptus bush on the left and shot him. They left him there and this is where I later returned with Almond and Spyker to fetch the body.
- 5.4.18.8 It was on the same little stretch of road around Lindley, that not long before - it may have been as recent as one month - Almond Nofomela, Joe Mamesela and I had a wild adventure. I see that under Almond's cross examination, Advocate Maritz on behalf of the police and the individual policemen, put it to Almond that he had statements under oath from Joe Mamasela and the now Colonel Jan Coetzee, in which they deny that Joe ever came to Vlakplaas before February 1982 and that Almond and I could not have known Joe during my stay at Vlakplaas. The wild adventure that I am about to relate, left much evidence that could still be traced and prove that Jan Coetzee and Joe Mamasela were lying under oath; to cover up something, we have to assume.

- 5.4.18.9 On the previous occasion the Vlakplaas groups were called from the Lesotho border near Lady Brandt to go to Middleburg, Transvaal. We had to go and assist in a search for an ANC member who allegedly had shot and killed two white people in a caravan near Ogies in the Eastern Transvaal. I was approaching Lindley in my official car with Almond and Joe following in Almond's bakkie.
- 5.4.18.10 As we drove down a slope towards the town of Lindley, a light blue and white two-door Ford Escort entered the main road in front of us and drove in the direction that we were travelling. The car was swerving wildly and the driver was waving a fistful of money out the window. I started the siren and tried to pull them off the road, just as we started going up the rise beyond Lindley. There were five obviously drunken black people in the car. They were driving dangerously and I kept to the right in order to force them to the left and stop them before they could cause a head-on collision.
- 5.4.18.11 The drunkards refused to stop. Suddenly I heard shots. Glass from the Escort next to me was flying into my car. I looked over my shoulder and saw Joe hanging out of the chasing bakkie with his door open. He was leaning on the door and emptying his Tokarev pistol at the Escort. I kept out of the line of fire and at the turnoff at the top of the rise, the Escort swerved left into the dirt road and stopped (I later learnt that the front passenger's nerves could take it no longer and he had plucked up the hand brake). Joe and Almond were onto them, kicking as only Joe can, as the bewildered drunkards stumbled out of their car. This was war.
- 5.4.18.12 An old dominee (parson) and his wife - I think from Reitz - stopped next to me and in sharp contrast to the chaos on my other side, gently asked me whether I needed help. I told him I was from the police and that everything was under control. A few moments later I made this true and stopped the one-sided war. We collected as many of the Joe's Tokarev shells as we could find. Almond fired some shots into the soil with my service pistol. We would have to conceal Joe's involvement in the shooting and the incident in general, because he was an informer/askari with no police powers. Moreover, the Russian Tokarev that he always carried was illegal.
- 5.4.18.13 I got the whole circus to the Lindley Police station and had a blood sample taken from the driver by the district surgeon, whose consulting room was in Lindley's main street. He also attended to the injured and called an ambulance for the passenger who sat in the centre at the back. He had a bullet wound in his back and was taken to Bethlehem hospital. Two other occupants had light bullet grazes on their necks.

- 5.4.18.14 I phoned Brigadier Schoon from Lindley police station and it was agreed that Almond would stand in for the shooting and the rest to keep Joe out of this. We registered a case and I wrote out a statement for Almond and one for myself.
- 5.4.18.15 In early 1982 the Attorney General of the Orange Free State decided that Almond had to be charged as he should have been more judicious with his shooting. At that stage there was friction between Almond and Joe and Almond told Joe that he was not going to take the rap for Joe. I had by then been transferred from Vlakplaas to the drug squad and Jan had succeeded me. As a result, Joe had replaced Almond as the main man there.
- 5.4.18.16 Brigadiers Jan du Preez and Willem Schoon from security head office told the divisional CID officer at Welkom the true story. I cannot remember the divisional commander's name but will be able to identify him and should recognize his name when I hear it. He was a slender old sour puss Brigadier. Schoon told me when he summonsed me that this Brigadier was on a good footing with the Orange Free State Attorney General. Lindley, where the incident happened, fell under the Welkom division and the Brigadier. I also talked to Brigadier Jan du Preez.
- 5.4.18.17 Schoon told me to report to the said brigadier at Welkom. There, we had a meeting attended by the brigadier, me, Joe Mamasela, Almond Nofomela, Warrant Officer Heath who was the Lindley station commander, and there may have been others. We embellished on the true story in a manner that would provide a reasonable explanation for Joe's role and that gave it an air of secrecy with an appropriate "terrorist" angle. I can't remember the finer details.
- 5.4.18.18 The bottom line was that the case was not further pursued, and the police settled a civil claim for R1500 by the man that was shot in the back.
- 5.4.18.19 I have digressed elaborately from the diamond dealer incident to refute the claims that Joe could not know Almond and I during 1981; and now return to the moment when Joe and Almond, in 1981, left the body in the eucalyptus plantation and arrived at my flat in Lynnwood Ridge, to tell me of their second excursion.
- 5.4.18.20 Joe, Almond, Spyker and I went to Sergeant Koos Schutte's house in Rietfontein, Pretoria, where I filled him in on the story and the victim's car was parked in his garage. He stripped the car of anything that could identify it as the victim's and replaced the expensive radio with a cheaper one.

- 5.4.18.21 Almond, Spyker and I drove back to Lindley after first dropping Joe off at Vlakplaas. Almond took us to the place in the bush where the body was. He and Spyker came running out of the bush, dragging the corpse behind them. We bundled the body into a thick white plastic bag used by the mortuary to transport bodies. I kept a supply of these in the boot of my car. We loaded the body into the boot and left for Durban via Bethlehem.
- 5.4.18.22 That night we refueled at Bethlehem where I signed the petrol book. We arrived in Durban after sunrise that morning. I reported to Van der Hoven and told him the story. I also told him that Captain Koos Vermeulen, Paul and I would be leaving for Swaziland to get rid of the body. We would therefore be out of town till the next day. I often operated for days on end with very little sleep.
- 5.4.18.23 The three of us, with the corpse, drove to the Swaziland border just south of Houtkop border post. We went to behind the ruins of an old farm house, close to the border fence. While Koos and I waited there, Paul went to see an old Swaziland acquaintance of Paul and me, Fred Hails. Fred worked at a garage in Piet Retief and he and his wife, Rina, lived in Amsterdam, Eastern Transvaal. Paul got old motor car tyres from Fred. I vaguely remember Fred providing a bakkie to transport the tyres and Paul then returning the bakkie and collecting my Datsun, but of this I am not quite sure.
- 5.4.18.24 During his 1989 birthday I visited Fred in Amsterdam. He and Rina had arranged for a camp from the veld school where we had a party that lasted all week end. Fred's telephone number at home is 013421-450 and Rina's number at work (the Veld School) is 013421-235. Fred's telephone number at work is 01343-2231.
- 5.4.18.25 We burnt the body there at the ruins that night and because the plastic bag had torn on the armoury in my car's boot, had to burn the stained carpet from the boot as well.
- 5.4.18.26 The next morning we went back to Durban and I told Van der Hoven that we had disposed of the body. I arranged to sell the car for R5000 to an Indian chap in Durban. I had met him during my stay at Oshoek. His name is Ebrahim Latif and his phone number at the time was 031-67213 at home and 031-312835 at work. He is also well known to Paul van Dyk who went with me when I visited Ebrahim. Ebrahim wanted to know whether the car was "hot". I said it was red hot and he should not even keep it in Swaziland. He then said that the car would be shipped to Portugal.

- 5.4.18.27 Next, I handed Ebrahim the diamonds and asked him what they were worth. He did not want the small ones and said I could throw them away. For the other diamond, which he called "canary yellow" he gave me R400 or R600 - I am not sure. I handed the money and the small diamonds back to either Almond or Almond and Spyker, I am not sure which. Paul was with me all the time, so perhaps he might care to help remember.
- 5.4.18.28 I phoned Schoon, briefed him on the story and asked whether Koos Schutte could bring the car to Golella border post. Schoon agreed to this. I phoned Koos Schutte, asking him to fit the car with false registration plates, license and third party disk. Paul van Dyk, Koos Vermeulen and I set off to Golella border post and waited some distance before the border for Koos Schutte from Pretoria, and Ebrahim and a friend, from Durban, to arrive.
- 5.4.18.29 When everyone was there, Ebrahim handed me R5000 cash and he and his friend left for Swaziland with the two cars. I repaid my mother in law with the R5000.
- 5.4.18.30 The Lesotho diamond dealer's car radio was fitted by Sergeant Koos Schutte into Brigadier Willem Schoon's official Ford Cortina car (see Section 5.4.6.9 and 5.4.6.10 where this radio is also mentioned).
- 5.4.18.31 I see that during Almond's cross examination before the Harms Commission, Advocate Maritz for the police and policemen, said that the police had made every effort to trace this diamond dealer's existence but without success. He therefore claimed that Almond was lying and making up a story.
- 5.4.18.32 I want to say to the Chairman of the Commission, it is absolutely impossible that the top detectives in South Africa could be so utterly incompetent as to not be able to trace the identity of this victim. This is outrageous in the extreme. I am sure I can solve this mystery for them with Almond's help within an hour after setting foot in Lesotho. Almond happens to be available for the police but Spyker could also help me. Should I succeed, I should thereby dispose of any doubt that may still exist, that the Commission is being grossly misled by the police.
- 5.4.19 The beginning of the end**
- 5.4.19.1 Towards the end of each year, a list of transfers of security police officers with effect from January the following year, is circulated. My name appeared on the list circulated towards the end of 1981. I was to transfer to West Rand security police in Krugersdorp, while Captain Jan Coetzee whom I would replace, was transferred to Section C1 (Vlakplaas). This transfer

- came directly from Luitenant General Johan Coetzee despite the fact that it was strongly opposed by Brigadier Jan du Preez. Johan Coetzee and I just weren't meant to live in harmony.
- 5.4.19.2 During such a transfer, one is compelled to move your household to the your new base. Shortly before the transfer, I met Jan Coetzee in the passage on the sixth floor. He told me he had just received permission from Johan Coetzee to leave his household in Krugersdorp. The reasons he had given were that he was settled in Krugersdorp, had his own house there, his wife had health problems and his daughter would be in matric the following year. He did not want his daughter to change schools in the matric year.
- 5.4.19.3 Jan knew that I had been transferred to Pretoria, Vlakplaas because of my then one year old child being a diabetic. Jan also knew that my wife was not healthy and that I had just moved into a new flat, which we had bought and furnished and where we were happy. I told Jan there that my wife would do her nut if we were to leave Pretoria, especially since there was so much trauma to get me to Pretoria in the first place.
- 5.4.19.4 Jan suggested that I do what he did and apply to keep my household in Pretoria. He added that if we both applied to keep our households where they were, Johan Coetzee may even cancel the transfers.
- 5.4.19.5 On the same day, I submitted an application similar to Jan's and on the same day Johan Coetzee turned my application down. Johan went further and cancelled my transfer to the security police in Krugersdorp. Instead he transferred me out of the security police and into the uniform branch, to the firearms section at police headquarters.
- 5.4.19.6 My guardian, Brigadier Jan du Preez, then phoned Luitenant General Zietsman, the CID chief, and told him that Johan Coetzee is throwing me to the dogs and could Zietsman help. This was told to me by Brigadier Jan du Preez. Soon after this, Colonel Basie Smith came to fetch me and we walked over to General Zietsman's office. On the way Basie said that I must start the same kind of squad that I had at Vlakplaas to fix the big drug smugglers and referred to the Mxenge case in Durban to illustrate what he meant.
- 5.4.19.7 In General Zietsman's office, it was confirmed that I would start a special investigation squad in narcotics based in Kempton Park; and concentrate on big drug traffickers. Nothing was said in Zietsman's office about any eliminations. I asked Zietsman whether I could leave my household in Pretoria, since I would be out most of the time and told him about the

**6. MY LAST YEARS IN THE POLICE FORCE
(January 1982 to November 1984)**

6.1 Drug squad

- 6.1.1 I started at the Pretoria narcotics branch in January 1982 as arranged. Major Chris Mulder was in charge at the Pretoria branch and Luitenant Johan Fourie and I reported to him.
- 6.1.2 Johan Fourie was highly competent and still is, as I can tell from having casually followed his career in the press over the years. He is today a major in charge of SANAP (South African narcotics bureau). Johan was managing fine and when I started there it was really only a kindly attempt on the part of the CID to accommodate me. I was ostensibly concentrating on liquor, gambling and immorality offenses.
- 6.1.3 I had problems functioning as an ordinary detective. For years my main priority was state security with the ordinary criminals my principal allies. Now I was supposed to persecute my former underworld friends who had been my main sources of information. I was disillusioned and demotivated. It made no sense that the same police force could have such diverse attitudes towards crime. At Vlakplaas I had kept in my car a bag of dagga that the askaris had found at shebeens. When we had finished working for the day or week, I would let them help themselves to the dagga. Now I was to hunt down people smoking and trading dagga.
- 6.1.4 I would uncover the odd shebeen here, and a dagga pill or a few mandrax tablets there, while Johan was enthusiastically and successfully fighting the enemies of the narcotics bureau, when one day Colonel Basie Smith asked me why I was not delivering the goods. I suggested to Basie that he gave me a good trapping policeman and I would show him what I could do. I explained that I would coordinate the detective work without revealing my identity to the underworld. In this way I would not be tying my hands should I one day get the opportunity to return to the security police.
- 6.1.5 Basie cleared this with Brigadier Hannes Erasmus, who for years had been in command of the branch dealing with gold and diamond offences and had at that stage recently acquired responsibility also for the stolen vehicle section and the drug squad (ANAP).
- 6.1.6 Hannes Erasmus brought Warrant Officer Trevor Richardson ("Mac") to Pretoria to work with me. Mac, who was Hannes' blue eyed boy, was a "diamond detective" from Kimberly. His appearance and manner made him

the perfect man for the job. The trafficking underworld gulped him up hook, line and sinker. I introduced him to Dennis Lockwood and explained my low profile involvement and why. Lockwood took Mac to Swaziland and helped him to infiltrate a stolen vehicle and Mandrax network whose operations extended into South Africa. Lockwood introduced Mac to the people in the network.

- 6.1.7 The investigation was highly successful and when the time to strike arrived, I got Luitenant Fourie to make the arrests. Large quantities of Mandrax were found. The ring was also involved with expensive stolen vehicles being traded across borders and a large number of stolen vehicles were found. The Swaziland investigation had led to a Botswana mandrax ring with South African tenets and again an enormous quantity of Mandrax was found.
- 6.1.8 The Swaziland and Botswana rings in turn led to a woman in Zambia, known as "The Queen". She smuggled hundreds of thousands of Mandrax tablets into South Africa via Swaziland and Botswana. I suggested that we pursue the new leads into Zambia but our superiors were not in favour of the drug squad venturing that far abroad.
- 6.1.9 The operation with Mac went on roughly over the period April to June 1982. Lockwood met Hannes Erasmus personally and on 10 September 1982 I was present in the office when Hannes paid lockwood R5000 for assisting us in the successful Swaziland and Botswana operations. Lockwood was disgusted. He could not believe the ridiculously small award in relation to value of contraband seized.
- 6.1.10 There was another problem at the drug squad. My commanding officer, Major Chris Mulder and one of the people reporting to me, Mike Jansen, were good friends, and I was dissatisfied with Mike's work. Mike who had been in the drug squad for years and was receiving many presents from the public, was not doing much work. When Chris Mulder at some stage went on leave I took his cases register and made out a case to transfer him because of his low productivity.
- 6.1.11 I was not in charge during Mulder's absence because I had asked Major Mulder to arrange with head office to let Johan Fourie, who was my junior in rank, act as commander during Mulder's leave. This was because Johan was competent, motivated and by far the more experienced in that environment. I therefore asked Johan whether he had any objection to making out a case for Mike's transfer. When Johan did not object I gave him the case for a transfer that I had prepared, to sign.

Major Chris Mulder and Colonel Basie Smith were very unhappy with what I had done. The drug squad was Basie's elite unit and he did not like the unfavourable image created by the case I had made out. It was August 1982 that my superiors seemed to suddenly realize that there was indeed not really much for me to do at the drug squad. The next thing I knew was that I had to report to the senior staff officer, Major General Loubser, who gave me a choice between two transfers from the drug squad. I could go to a police station or to head office. I chose head office and landed at recruitment.

6.2 Head Office Recruitment

- 6.2.1 Around August 1982 I started with head office recruitment. Brigadier Van der Westhuizen was in charge of this department and his 2-IC was Colonel Tinie Pretorius. They presided over three sections. I was in charge of recruiting white members for the police force, a Captain Fourie was in charge of recruiting non-white policemen and Luitenant Vlotman - no, those were the only racial distinctions at recruitment - was in charge of re-appointments of former police force members.
- 6.2.2 I was demotivated already and to make matters worse, I simply could not get along with Tinie Pretorius. He was pathetic and had been sitting all his life in an office with nothing better to do than being absurdly fastidious about writing. I was used to businesslike no nonsense action and now had to contend with this inferior character that knew nothing about the world outside.
- 6.2.3 I was supposed to prepare ministerial letters concerning the recruitment of white policemen for the minister's office but Tinie was forever changing them. I would have the letters retyped with his changes, only to have him change the retyped letter and in this manner sometimes had to have a letter retyped as many as three times.
- 6.2.4 After about one year and four months of this nonsense - it must have been towards the end of 1983 - I had enough. I suggested to Tinie that he write his own letters from the outset but he simply carried on as before. I then one day went to Tinie and lied to him that the brigadier wanted to see the two of us. We went to Brigadier Van der Westhuizen and I told the brigadier that I had something to tell him and that I wanted to do it with Tinie present.
- 6.2.5 I then turned to Tinie and told him he was now obviously looking for shit and should lift up his hands to defend himself as I was going to beat him up in front of the brigadier. Tinie's seniors knew him to be guilty of the things I was saying and Brigadier Van der Westhuizen stopped me. He asked Tinie to leave so that he could have a word with me in private.

- 6.2.6 Brigadier Van der Westhuizen then told me that everybody knew what Tinie was like and that he understood my problem. I then wanted to know why we should continue to put up with Tinie's nonsense and the brigadier's reply was that we should accept Tinie as he was. I told the brigadier that in that case I wished to leave and wanted to speak to General Loubser. When he still could not change my mind, he gave me permission to ask the staff officer, General Loubser for a transfer.
- 6.2.7 I repeated my story to General Loubser who called Brigadier Van der Westhuizen, saying that the brigadier should listen to the allegations I was making about one of his senior officers. The brigadier's reply was that the General knew well what Tinie was like and that I was right. Loubser was at a loss and said they would have to talk about Tinie.
- 6.2.8 It seems to me that they could not have talked about Tinie very seriously because Tinie is a brigadier today. I got a transfer to the divisional commissioner for Northern Transvaal, towards the end of 1983.
- 6.2.9 During 1983 I had entered and passed English, Afrikaans and Latin for the first year B Iurus. I got distinctions in Afrikaans and Latin.
- ## 6.3 Northern Transvaal Divisional Headquarters
- 6.3.1 I started with Brigadier Van Lill as his number four staff officer and stayed there until the end of May 1984. My duties included police housing matters and other nonsense that I could not be bothered to try and remember. It was certainly nothing that would interest the commission.
- 6.3.2 During May 1984 I asked Brigadier Van Lill for a transfer as staff officer at radio control (flying squad). He obliged.
- 6.3.3 It is becoming quite obvious here how my police career was falling apart.
- ## 6.4 Flying squad again
- 6.4.1 In May 1984 I started with the flying squad, crawling the streets by night, attending police accidents and preparing reports and statements on shooting incidents. I had to play policeman over policemen, visiting patrol cars on duty and visiting police stations. This was not exactly my cup of soup.

- 6.4.2 I felt I was back to square one in 1972 when I started working in Marabastat. However, now I was an officer and therefore without a dog. In 1972 I at least had a dog that could tackle well. Now I did not even have a dog.

6.5 Study leave

- 6.5.1 On 14 June 1984 I applied for leave to study second year B Iurus. This leave stretched from 27 June 1984 to 11 November 1984. First there was a period of "preparatory leave", which was the so called "50:50 leave". For each day of vacation leave sacrificed, one day of special leave was granted. After this one was required to perform duty for one day before special leave for writing examinations could be granted. Two days of leave were granted for each subject written.
- 6.5.2 It was during this period of special leave that I decided that it was time to leave the police force as medically unfit. I had also become disillusioned with the circus which was the legal profession. I, who knew how the police batter confessions out of people, would now have had to try and prove this in court in order to get a client off the hook. I was still in the same old circus but just as a different clown. It was the old story of the protection I used to enjoy before, now becoming a liability.
- 6.5.3 To blazes with all this, I thought.

6.6 Sick leave

- 6.6.1 I went to see my house doctor, Dr Phillips. On 25 September 1984, he, on an SAP 24 Clinical Report, declared me unfit for continued police duty as a result of my uncontrolled diabetic condition. I handed this report to my commander at Radio Control, Colonel Thys Roux. I then decided to use my study leave privileges to the full. Perhaps I should say I decided to use it up, because I was not studying.
- 6.6.2 On 11 October 1984 when I was to report for one day of duty in between the two types of study leave, I intended handing in a sick leave application for that day as I had confirmation from my doctor that I was medically unfit for continued police duty. I would not require a medical certificate for the day as this was only necessary when the illness lasted longer than three days.
- 6.6.2 I was to report for duty again on 12 November 1984, so, instead, I started applying for sick leave with effect from that date, attaching supporting medical certificates. Such leave was granted for one month at a time and had to be renewed monthly until the medical board of enquiry finalized my medical discharge.
- 6.6.3 Warrant Officer Flip Le Roux, who was clerk to the station commanders, came to my house to get a supply of signed "SAP 26" leave forms. To these

he would attach the medical certificates as they became available, until such time as the medical board of enquiry have reached a decision. I signed five such forms for Flip.

- 6.6.4 The leave application form for 11 October was still due but this escaped the attention of both Flip and myself, as we dealt with all the formalities. Had Flip noticed he would have asked me to complete a form. He could also have used one of the blank signed forms, had he noticed. There are probably still three or four such signed blank forms that never got used, on my station file.
- 6.6.5 While waiting for the medical board to consider my case, I was suspended from the police force. The police stalled on the medical board issue until after five months I wanted to get a court order for the lifting of my suspension in order that the medical board may proceed.

7. THE ABANDONED POLICEMAN

7.1 Suspension

7.1.1 My friends Whelpton and Blaauw

7.1.1.1 The story of my suspension and subsequent prosecution by the police, started with the friendship between Frans Whelpton and I. We met in 1983 when we both attended Saturday morning Latin lectures for UNISA (University of South Africa) students. The private Latin lectures were given by Dr Nick van der Merwe who was the head of justice training at the government Justice Department.

7.1.1.2 Frans was a business partner of ex South African Air Force pilot, Brigadier Jan Blaauw. Prior to this partnership, Frans for 12 years had been private secretary to Minister Fanie Botha, at one stage the most senior member of the South African cabinet. During Frans' term here, Fanie had occupied many portfolios, including that of Mineral and Energy Affairs. Brigadier Jan Blaauw was a friend of Fanie's and that is how Frans and Brigadier Blaauw got to know one another.

7.1.1.3 After the 1983 Latin studies I somewhat lost contact with Frans for a while. I did during this time learn from newspaper reports that Whelpton and Blaauw were involved in some controversial issue regarding oil transactions. One day in February 1984 I bumped into Frans at a shopping centre. We chatted and he invited me to come and visit him. After that I regularly phoned him and we had regular contact.

7.1.2 The system versus Whelpton and Blaauw

7.1.2.1 Appendix "H" of my internal trial, documents in great detail how I discovered that Whelpton's telephone was being tapped and why. I learnt from Captain Bruce Smith, who was a friend of mine and attached to the Northern Transvaal security police, that a friend of his whom I also knew well, had been assigned to security head office for a special project. The person thus assigned was Major Dries van der Merwe.

7.1.2.2 The interesting thing about this casual remark, was that the investigation concerned oil and diamond concessions and that it was aimed against Frans Whelpton and Brigadier Blaauw. He knew that the investigation involved the

tapping of telephone conversations between Blaauw and Whelpton, but that was all he could tell me.

- 7.1.2.3 I then went and spoke to Colonel Roelf van Rensburg, divisional commander of the Northern Transvaal security police. I knew him well since we both worked at security head office in 1981. He told me in the strictest confidence that: there was an investigation against Whelpton and Blaauw; that he originally led the investigation; that the investigation involved telephone tapping; that the investigation was authorized personally by the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange and the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee; that the investigation stemmed from a visit by General Johan Coetzee and Minister Fanie Botha to security head office; that the investigation was taken out of Roelf van Rensburg's hands at an early stage and given to Brigadier J de V Joubert at head office security; that Major Dries van der Merwe had been seconded to head office to transcribe the taped conversations between Blaauw and Whelpton.
- 7.1.2.4 I asked Colonel Van Rensburg whether Whelpton and Blaauw's actions had security implications that justified telephone tapping in terms of Article 118(A) of the Postal Act. He said no and assured me that it involved allegations by Minister Fanie Botha that Whelpton and Blaauw were guilty of black mail, bribery and corruption in order to obtain diamond concessions for Brigadier Blaauw. These concessions eventually led to the resignation of Minister Fanie Botha.
- 7.1.2.5 Colonel Roelf van Rensburg told me that the telephone tapping had been going on since 1983 and advised me to cool my friendship with Whelpton until the dust had settled. He said he did not have first hand information on the latest developments but expected the investigation to be completed quite soon.
- 7.1.2.6 Next I contacted another friend of mine from security head office. He was Captain W A L du Toit who was a close friend of Captain Koos Moolman, who in turn operated and maintained the apparatus for telephone tapping on the seventh floor of head office security.
- 7.1.2.7 Soon afterwards Captain du Toit confirmed to me that Whelpton and Blaauw's telephones were being tapped and that as a result Major Dries van der Merwe was aware of my contact with Whelpton. Koos had sent the warning that I should be careful. I asked Captain du Toit to keep me posted.
- 7.1.2.8 Shortly after this, Captain Du Toit warned me that Brigadier J de V Joubert, who led the investigation, had called in the help of Brigadier Hannes Erasmus who headed the gold and diamond branch, to lure Whelpton into an illegal diamond transaction and trap him. In this manner Whelpton could be

discredited as chief witness of Brigadier Blaauw in the diamond concession case. Informers of Major Craig Williamson would be used to trick Whelpton.

7.1.3 I side with Whelpton and Blaauw

- 7.1.3.1 I immediately relayed the warning to Whelpton. I was particularly concerned about the possibility that even if Whelpton refused to buy illegal diamonds, he could still be framed and would be alone against state witnesses. I cannot substantiate this claim but when you are convinced that a friend is in danger you do not require convictions in court. Moreover, I became aware of such danger from confidential conversations in the police force.
- 7.1.3.2 I was particularly concerned to learn that people had already tried to do discuss diamond transactions with him.
- 7.1.4 **The system against Dirk Coetzee**
- 7.1.4.1 Shortly afterwards I received another warning from Koos Vermeulen via W A L du Toit, that Brigadier Hannes Erasmus wanted to "grind" me. I assumed that it was because Whelpton now wanted nothing to do with any diamond dealings.
- 7.1.4.2 In May 1984 Captain Wahl du Toit told me that he had been questioned by Brigadier J de V Joubert because it was becoming clear from telephone conversations between Whelpton and me that we knew we were being taped. Joubert wanted to know from Du Toit whether he had said something about the tapping to me. Du Toit had said no and Koos Moolman had told Du Toit he wanted nothing further to do with the matter. He did, however, warn Du Toit to be careful in future.
- 7.1.5 **Craig tips me off**
- 7.1.5.1 During July 1984 I was approached by a friend to bring \$ 150 000 (US) into the South Africa at a commission. I went to Craig Williamson for help since Peter Cassleton and Craig could exchange parcels that were not screened, via the South African diplomatic bag to and from London (see Section 5.4.17.4.5).
- 7.1.5.2 Craig, however, seriously warned me to lie low for a few months. I should sit tight, leave everything and not do a thing. He said to me that his help with

the investigation had been solicited but he had told them that he had enough enemies in the ANC.

7.1.5.3 Craig reminded me of a warning from him in 1981 when he said that Brigadier "Biko" Goosen was gossiping with General Johan Coetzee about me; and how soon afterwards his warning was vindicated, when I was transferred from security head office despite strong opposition from General Johan Coetzee's 2-IC, Brigadier Jan du Preez.

7.1.5.4 Craig greeted me with a final big eyed "pasop!!" (be careful!!) and from then on I stopped all telephonic contact with Captain Du Toit and Frans Whelpton.

7.1.6 Captain Du Toit sees the danger signs

7.1.6.1 Captain W A L du Toit at some stage told me that he was detecting something of an antagonism towards him from General Johan Coetzee, the Commissioner of Police; Brigadier Johan van der Merwe, 2-IC to the chief of security and responsible for the authorization of telephone tapping; Brigadier J de V Joubert, who was conducting the investigation; and Koos Moolman who attended to the recording apparatus.

7.1.6.2 I learnt from Captain du Toit about all sorts of changes and activity at security head office, indicating concern about the leaking of information on telephone tapping.

7.1.7 I recruit another leak

7.1.7.1 Captain Bruce Smith, who has a way with women - numerous women - had told me he had an adulterous affair with Rina, wife of Major Dries van der Merwe who transcribed the tapped conversations in this case - I hope this does not start another civil suit.

7.1.7.2 I asked him to coopt Rina into providing inside information on the telephone tapping. This she did and in corroborating her information I discovered from Whelpton that he had a third telephone that I had been unaware of. I got numerous other details as documented in Annexures H and J of the proceedings of my internal trial.

7.1.8 The harassment starts

7.1.8.1 By now I was being followed almost daily by the CID chief Luitenant General Kleinjan Grobler and by Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert. It was quite comical, eg, to see how Kleinjan, a small man, had to jump up and down in a parking lot at the Menlin Hyperama to keep track of me; and how Jaap shied when I pointed at him, where he was sitting in a parked police car, to identify him to my wife and bystanders.

7.1.8.2 Captain W A L du Toit, also during this period, was being questioned about my drinking habits, sex life and the like.

7.1.8.3 From 5 to 14 October, including traveling time, I was on leave with my family in Plettenberg Bay when my neighbours witnessed how the two comical cops were trespassing on my premises.

7.1.8.4 My neighbour Bettie Esterhuisen and her son Emile saw how, on 12 October 1984, Kleinjan Grobler and Jaap went into the town house complex area, up to my duplex flat, drove out again, parked and then come walking back. They entered my premises and Jaap, stooping, started fiddling with the door in the back entrance of my garage.

7.1.8.5 Kleinjan stood watching and the boy Emile, who was in Standard 5, greeted him. My neighbour, Luitenant Leon Esterhuisen did not want to get involved and I later could not call on his wife and child as witnesses. However, later, at the civil hearing, Kleinjan admitted to Judge P Roux that he had been on my premises. He kept denying that he had burgled my garage.

7.1.8.6 The key to my garage back entrance was in the door, on the inside. I had a piece of string tied to it and to the door handle, so that if a burglar pushed it out, it would not drop onto the floor to be swept outside under the door. In addition I would ensure that the key was turned. I remember my family waiting for me in the car when we went on leave, while I did these checks as a last thing before we left.

7.1.8.7 When I returned from leave on Sunday 14 October, my neighbour told me what they had seen. I checked and found that the key was hanging vertically from the key hole, by its unlocking protrusion and that the string had been separated from the door handle. I handed in photos of this at the civil hearing.

7.1.8.8 Shortly afterwards I was travelling on my Honda V400F motor cycle on the freeway. As I gently touched the front brake lever I noticed something wrong and used the back brake to bring the motor cycle to a stop. A crucial bolt in my front braking and suspension mechanism was gone. Had I applied the brakes hard, the front wheel would have locked, causing me to fall.

- 7.1.8.9 According to the Honda agents this crucial bolt was fixed with "lock nut" at the factory, precisely to ensure that it could not come out. But according to the police consultants, after I had registered a complaint, it was possible for the bolt to come out and that my complaint was unfounded.

7.1.5 I fight back

- 7.1.9.1 Appendix H to the proceedings of my internal trial is a sworn affidavit by me, detailing the information that I had on illegal telephone tapping. This was confiscated from Frans Whelpton by the police, together with other documents in the same envelope. The documents were intended for Dr Lapa Munnik, a cabinet minister with whom Frans was communicating about the issue.

7.1.10 Suspended

- 7.1.10.1 I was on sick leave until 3 December 1984 when Colonel Basie Smith arrived at my flat to tell me that General Johan Coetzee wanted to see me. The general, according to Basie, said I was obstructing him. I asked Basie whether this was voluntarily or whether I was under arrest. Basie said it was voluntarily to which I said that I was on sick leave and if the general wanted to see me, he could come and do so at my home. I also said that Johan Coetzee knew what was really going on and I knew what was really going on and we had nothing to say to one another.
- 7.1.10.2 Basie asked me whether I was prepared to give this to him in writing. I said I would and Basie wrote out a statement for me to sign. I did so and this version of my response is documented as Annexure V to the proceedings of my internal trial.
- 7.1.10.3 On 4 December 1984 my commanding officer informed me that I had been suspended from duty. I asked what the reason for the suspension was but no one could give me an answer. A war as intense as the current one was in full swing.

7.2 Departmental trial

7.2.1 To whom can I turn for help, if not the police?

- 7.2.1.1 The might of the police force was being mustered in a vindictive campaign against me. I had dared to defy the Commissioner. I could not run to the police for help.
- 7.2.1.2 I drew up a document explaining the details of the telephone tapping, the reasons as I saw them and the campaign against me. This I handed to the Nationalist Party Member of Parliament for the Randburg constituency. He

was a personal friend of Frans Whelpton's. He said that he had given it to Minister Chris Heunis and was waiting for a response.

- 7.2.1.3 When I saw nothing was forthcoming from Wynand, I went to Koos van der Merwe who is currently a prominent figure in the South African Conservative Party. Koos gave it to Andries Treurnicht who is the current leader of the Conservative Party.
- 7.2.1.4 Still nothing happened and on 22 January 1985 I wrote a letter to Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, who was the leader of the Progressive Federal Party in South Africa. Dr Slabbert sent Member of Parliament Tiaan van der Merwe to come and see me. For two days I briefed Tiaan on the events.
- 7.2.1.5 Tiaan went back to parliament and started the laborious proceedings of putting questions to the minister. It seems Johan Coetzee and company had no problem in dealing with the questions from their Minister Louis Le Grange. Tiaan's feedback was that we were fighting a losing battle.

7.2.2 Application for reinstatement

- 7.2.2.1 As a result of my suspension, I could not expect my application to the medical board to be considered. On 4 March 1985, my attorney, Brian Currin instructed counsel, advocate Hans J Fabricius to apply for my reinstatement so that the medical council could proceed. I had as yet not been informed of the reasons for my suspension.

7.2.3 A storm breaks

- 7.2.3.1 Paper and mishaps, if not shit, started pouring over me. On 7 March 1985 I had to sign an acknowledgement that Captain W C Smith was investigating seven allegations against me. This acknowledgement forms Appendix K at my internal trial.
- 7.2.3.2 I had seven days to respond to these allegations, which I did in a document dated 14 March 1985. This document forms Annexure M to the proceedings of my internal trial. In this document, amongst other things, I refused to be tried by a police officer since I could not possibly expect a fair trial.

7.2.4 All trials are fair in love and war

- 7.2.4.1 On 19 March 1985, Minister Louis Le Grange, the Minister of Law and Order, personally signed a letter appointing the president of the regional court in Pretoria, as Chairman, to preside over the hearing in an internal police trial. Major General E S J van Rensburg was appointed as member of this board of enquiry to assist the Chairman. This letter of appointment, formed Annexure A of the proceedings of my internal trial.
- 7.2.4.2 General Johan Coetzee appointed a professor in law from the University of Pretoria, who had done his compulsory National Service with the Police and was then back at the University, to act as prosecutor. This prosecutor was Major (Professor) P J Visser. His letter of appointment, dated 29 March 1985 and signed by General Johan Coetzee personally, formed Annexure B of the proceedings at my internal trial.
- 7.2.4.3 General Coetzee further appointed Captain W C Smith to assist the prosecutor P J Visser. This letter of appointment, undated and signed by General Coetzee personally, formed Annexure D of the proceedings of my internal trial.
- 7.2.4.4 On 12 June 1985 at 14h00, the prosecutor handed in a letter of authority by General Johan Coetzee, authorizing Brigadier J de V Joubert to join the prosecutor's team.
- 7.2.4.5 The prosecutor himself (Page 830, Volume 14 of the proceedings of my internal trial) stated that this is one of the only cases that he knew of, where disciplinary action against an officer had led to such a drawn out battle and whereby such senior members of the council were involved.
- 7.2.4.6 As discussed on pages 5 and 6 of Volume 1 of my internal trial, the prosecutor argued and the chairman ruled that the proceedings would be held in camera and would not be published.
- 7.2.4.7 The entire buildup and trial resulted from my campaign against illegal telephone tapping. However, a document signed personally by Minister Louis Le Grange, Minister of Law and Order and dated 25 March 1985, prohibited that anything concerning telephone tapping whatsoever could be discussed at the trial, since in the Minister's judgement this affected the security of the South African state. This document was kept from my defence until the fourth day of the trial on 7 June 1985 when he produced it at the proceedings in response to effective defence on my part.
- 7.2.4.8 On one of my many private visits to my ex guardian in the security police, Brigadier Jan du Preez, he told me that Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert had been to see him to ask whether I would not embarrass the authorities by

exposing the Mxenge murder, should they charge me departmentally. Du Preez' reply was that I could not because I was involved myself.

- 7.2.4.9 On another visit to Brigadier Jan du Preez, by my attorney Brian Currin, advocate Hennie de Vos and I, he told us that we have made the biggest mistake not to be tried by a police officer. Du Preez said the security police always arranged with the Judge President of the Transvaal to appoint Willem Krugel "for us" when there was a judicial commission of enquiry about security police activities in South West Africa. Krugel then used to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us. I then knew I had lost before I started.
- 7.2.4.10 The chairman Krugel was so under the impression of this trial that he requested special permission from the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, to be allowed to keep a copy of the trial proceedings as a souvenir.
- 7.2.5 More rain**
- 7.2.5.1 Before my trial began, and in the same stormy March, I received two summonses regarding civil proceedings that were being instituted against me. The two summonses, issued on 22 March 1985 and served on me on and near 25 March 1985, were in response to claims of R 10 000 each from Major Dries van der Merwe from the investigating team and his unfaithful wife Rina because I had in a statement intercepted by the police, mentioned that Rina had an affair with Captain Bruce Smith (see Section 7.1.7.1 of this testimony).
- 7.2.5.2 Another frustrating incident happened one weekday afternoon while I was visiting my attorney in the Standard Bank Building in Pretorius Street, diagonally across the street from the police headquarters, Wachthuis. I had parked my motor cycle at a motor cycle area in the busy street, deposited two five cents pieces, which gave me 120 minutes and went to see the attorney, Brian Currin.
- 7.2.5.3 When I returned 20 minutes later, the meter showed my time had expired and there was a parking ticket on the bike. In addition, the petrol tank and saddle had been sprayed white, seemingly with an aerosol spray can.
- 7.2.5.4 I took the number of the parking meter and went to the bus shed in Boom Street where the municipal parking metre maintenance section is based. There I had a talk with the head of the section (his name may be obtained from my internal trial proceedings). He had the parking meter mechanism removed for me and tested. The test revealed nothing wrong with the mechanism.

- 7.2.5.5 I reported the incident to the Pretoria Central Police Station where I laid a charge about the burglary of my garage and the incident with the motor cycle. Ernst Schuurman, an old school friend of mine had my motorcycle cleaned at their panel beating business. He used thinners to carefully wipe off the cheap spray paint from the sealed surface of the durable motor cycle paint.
- 7.2.5.6 The dossier at the police station was entrusted to a young sergeant for investigation. He went to two motor cycle dealers who told the sergeant that it was possible that the bolt could get out without an act of sabotage. The case was closed as unfounded.
- 7.2.5.7 The station commander of Pretoria Central Police Station, Luitenant Colonel Huyser made a photostatic copy of the entire dossier for me.
- 7.2.5.8 During the trial itself my lawyer had the chairman note for the record that my file had disappeared for some days from his table. The file disappeared on the night of 6 to 7 June and reappeared again on my lawyer's desk on 12 June. This caused considerable merriment with the chairman and others present.
- 7.2.6 Charge 1 - proposed money smuggling**
- 7.2.6.1 The first charge was that I contravened Regulation 58(40) by unlawful improper conduct or conduct unbecoming to a member of my rank. I had namely requested Major Craig Williamson in Pretoria during July 1984 to help me bring 150 000 US dollars into South Africa in an illegal manner.
- 7.2.6.2 I was found guilty of contravening this regulation, which is colloquially known as the "barbed wire regulation". Mine was one of the more serious cases of contravening this regulation, which is also used against a policeman when his hair is too long or when he smokes in uniform.
- 7.2.6.3 I did in fact ask Craig to help me in the alleged manner but I had every reason to believe that Craig would not cringe from this behaviour of mine. I believed this because Craig knew and I knew and I knew that he knew and he knew that I knew (see Section 5.4.17): that the builders of his and Peter Cassleton's yacht "The Two Lisas" were registered as police informers and paid out of the security fund for their boat building activities; that not all of the funds that he and Johan Coetzee stole from the International University Fund was used to buy the Section A security police farm Daisy; that Craig helped Peter bypass customs with an illegal blue video movie on Peter's first de-briefing visit to South Africa; and that Craig was happy to assist Peter Cassleton and myself to smuggle diamonds in a diplomatic bag.

- 7.2.6.4 In fact, Craig and I both full well knew that such unbecoming behaviour was one of the major perks of our profession.
- 7.2.6.5 I documented this offence of mine in explaining the story of the illegal telephone tapping (see Section 7.1.9 and 7.2.1). These documents were later intercepted by the police. Unbeknown to me Craig had in July 1984 (see Section 7.1.5) recorded my unbecoming request and reported it to Colonel Basie Smith, Brigadier Herman Stadler and Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert (see trial proceedings). Craig had done this because he knew my phone was being tapped.
- 7.2.6.6 Almost a year later, on the third day of my trial, the prosecution were having difficulty with me, particularly with Charges 2,3,5 and 6. They had not come to Charge 1 yet. On the night of this third day, Thursday 6 June 1985, the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, flew from Cape Town to Pretoria. That same night, General Johan Coetzee, Craig Williamson and the prosecutor's one assistant, Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert, had dinner together. Craig gave them the tape recording.
- 7.2.6.7 The recording was delivered at the forensic laboratory, Colonel Jansen, after 17h00 on Friday 7 June 1985 for transcription. The transcription was sworn to on Monday 10 June 1985 and used in the proceedings on that same day (see Appendix N of the proceedings). My knowledge of this sequence of events was partly obtained from Captain Tony Smith. Tony was from security police Section A and a close friend of Craig, Peter and myself. (Craig's sister Lisa was with Tony during her fatal accident and Tony and I drove to her funeral service together - see Section 5.4.17.4.6 and 5.4.17.4.7. Tony also went to Sun City with Peter Cassleton, me and other guests on the expenses paid excursion mentioned in Section 5.4.17.4.2.)
- 7.2.6.8 My friend Craig Williamson had betrayed me to his godfather and master, General Johan Coetzee. Betrayal of friends has never been much of a problem to Craig who could be close friends with the exiled Ruth First and the Schoon family when Craig returned to South Africa to plan their murders. This reminds me of the following self analysis by Craig: "To an extent, you've got to be what I always call - I'm probably cutting my own throat here - a controlled schizophrenic." (from Sunday Times Magazine, London, according to Julie Frederikse on Page 121 of her book "South Africa - a different kind of war", 1986, Raven Press, Johannesburg).
- 7.2.7 **Charge 2 - obtaining information to which I am not entitled**

- 7.2.7.1 This was another contravention of the "barbed wire regulation" 58(40). This time, the original charge was that I used false pretences to obtain information to which I was not entitled in a manner that was illegal and unbecoming to a member of my rank.
- 7.2.7.2 The verdict made no mention of the false pretences but did find me guilty of obtaining information to which I was not entitled and in an unbecoming manner. The verdict stipulated that the original charges be amended to be in accordance with the testimony and findings.
- 7.2.7.3 So much for legal niceties. What really happened was that I begged an old friend to help me obtain evidence of unauthorized telephone tapping by the police. I would need all the evidence I could find, to take this matter further as I had every reason to suspect high level involvement of authorities.
- 7.2.7.4 It was the task of Post Office technician Len Carver to make the necessary Post Office connections for telephone tapping by the Security Police, Military Intelligence and National Intelligence, in the Pretoria area. His police contact was Captain Koos Moolman of the technical division at the security police head office and Koos was a good friend of mine. Koos, who is today a Major, obtained his matric certificate in a most unorthodox manner. It was something like a dishonorary matric, not unlike the honorary doctorates. Captain Wahl du Toit, Koos' hunting partner and also my friend since the 1975 officers' course and the Swaziland and Vlakplaas escapades, was still in the security police technical division.
- 7.2.7.5 Len's National Intelligence contact was Pikkie Bothma. Len was registered - I cannot say under which name - as an informer and paid R400 per month by the security police for his cooperation. This was a clandestine operation and had to be; if for no other reason, the police were not allowed to pay a civil servant out of security funds, for doing his job. He also received money from National Intelligence.
- 7.2.7.6 The Post Office kept an official register of telephones linked for tapping purposes. Len, in addition, kept an unofficial register with technical details required by himself. I wanted this latter register so that I could later point out the unauthorized telephone taps. This was the information to which I was not entitled and which was referred to in the charge.
- 7.2.7.7 With Len Carver in the office was another technician, Piet Bothma. Piet had two brothers. The one brother, Pikkie Bothma was Len Carver's aforementioned contact at National Intelligence. The other brother was Dirk Bothma, a friend of mine for 21 years. Needless to say, therefore, I had eyes and ears in the Post Office and security police telephone tapping sections.

- 7.2.7.8 The police head quarters telephone cables, ran underground from the Post Office central exchange in a north-south direction in Paul Kruger Street and west-east in Schoeman Street, to branch out onto a huge frame directly behind the lifts at ground level at the security entrance to police headquarters ("COMPOL X302 entrance" - referring to the private post bag number of security police head quarters). A 100 pairs of cables did not go onto this frame but went straight up to the seventh floor of the technical division tape room.
- 7.2.7.9 Len Carver had provided Captain Koos Moolman of the security police with a supply of female telephone plugs used at clients' sites. These were converted by Captain Wahl du Toit for room bugging on the clients' post office lines. Len would let the client's telephone go "out of order" and when the client complained would have the female plug replaced with the bugging device. The the phone was then "fixed" again. This put the security police right inside your house, be it in the bed room or otherwise.
- 7.2.7.10 To further illustrate my rapport with Dirk Bothma, I should add that we played rugby together for the Post Office. Dirk played in the front row and I was centre three-quarter. Dirk assisted us for long dreary hours during our campaigns against public telephone abuses. When Colonel Boesman Basson, who was on the management of the police rugby club, needed a phone for springbok fly-half Naas Botha and springbok eight-man Thys Burger, he came to see me. Thanks to Dirk Bothma and my other Post Office connections, it took less than 5 hours from the moment that Colonel Boesman spoke to me, until the phone rang in both rugby players' police flats in Hennops Park, Pretoria. The Post Office chaps told me this was an all time record to illustrate to me how much of a nuisance I was.
- 7.2.7.11 Piet Bothma provided Dirk Bothma, who provided me, who provided Captain Wahl du Toit with the number of the key to Len Carver's locker. Wahl made a key and after failing to provide me with a portable photostatic copying machine, lent me a police camera with which to photograph Len's private register that he kept in his locker.
- 7.2.7.12 With all these arrangements the police somehow got to know about the operation. On arrival at Dirk Bothma's home to go and copy the document, Dirk told me he had been tipped off by a Post Office colleague that the police would be waiting for us at Len's office.
- 7.2.7.13 The Post Office had burglar bars fixed to Len's office complex early the very next morning. This complex used to be a garage - I think it was called Farris

- Motors - on the north-Eastern corner of Proes and Bosman Streets. Len has since been moved to Somerset House in Vermeulen Street.
- 7.2.7.14 Suffice it to conclude this account by mentioning that the police destroyed Dirk Bothma's nerves, Post Office career and marriage as they forced him to pretend that I came to him under false pretexts. But the police as always got their man.
- 7.2.8 Charge 3 - disclosing official information**
- 7.2.8.1 According to this charge I acted unlawfully and in contravention of Standing Order 123(1) that was issued under Regulation 6 when I contravened Regulation 58(1), on or near 22 September 1984 and in Pretoria. What all this legal crap means, is that I let Frans Whelpton have information on illegal telephone tapping to show to Dr Lapa Munnik in order to persuade Dr Munnik to let me have an interview with him about the matter (see Section 7.1.9).
- 7.2.8.2 The board found me guilty of wrongfully disclosing official information.
- 7.2.8.2 The only other interesting thing about this charge is that it was poorly formulated and motivated. It concerned three items of official information that I so unlawfully divulged. First I mentioned in the document the existence of an investigation concerning an oil concession and the gentlemen Whelpton and Blaauw. This information was common knowledge via the news media and questions in parliament. The other official information referred to non existent entities.
- 7.2.9 Charge 4 - suggesting that the police force was capable of framing**
- 7.2.9.1 An equally verbose charge took exception to the fact that I could suggest that policemen were capable of framing people. This charge and its alternative charge were simply dropped without explanation.
- 7.2.9.2 The charge stems from the contents of the document mentioned in Section 7.2.8 and Section 7.1.9. The background to this suggestion by me is touched upon in Section 7.1.3.
- 7.2.9.3 I will elaborate somewhat here. Captain Wahl du Toit at some stage was called in, after hours, by Brigadier Hannes Erasmus to tap his secretary's office telephone. Erasmus had an affair with his secretary and suspected her of being unfaithful with one of Erasmus' subordinate officers.

- 7.2.9.4 Whilst tapping this telephone, Wahl learnt from Erasmus that Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert had asked Erasmus to trap Whelpton in an illegal diamond transaction. The idea was to discredit Whelpton as a witness in the State vendetta against Whelpton and Blaauw. Wahl told this to me. I had the nerve to warn Frans, suggesting that he be particularly careful as I did not put it past Erasmus to frame Frans.
- 7.2.9.5 This charge against me was dropped during the trial. I think it might have had something to do with proof of Erasmus not being an angel. Some time after the trial, Erasmus had to quietly pay admissions of guilt amounting to over R6000 on a variety of charges concerning contraventions of the diamond act. He was first transferred from the diamond branch but preferred to go on pension.

7.2.10 Charge 5 - false accusations of adultery

- 7.2.10.1 The police took exception to my saying that the wife Rina, of Major (currently Colonel) Dries van der Merwe had an affair with the big womanizer, Captain Bruce Smith (see Section 7.2.5.1).
- 7.2.10.2 My council objected that summonses for civil hearing in this regard had already been issued and that the case was therefore sub judicæ. After a brief consultation between the Chairman and his assessor, they were in agreement that as the hearing was in camera, the only person at the civil hearing with knowledge of this case, would be I. They decided to proceed.
- 7.2.10.3 As it happened, in our dear beloved and sunny banana republic (as some publishers preferred to call South Africa when commenting on the value of this publication), one of the first documents produced at the pre-trial arrangements and lying in front of the claimants at the civil hearing, was the proceedings of my in camera internal trial. Moreover, Brigadier Jaap de Villiers Joubert, chief investigator and assistant prosecutor at my internal trial, featured as the chief organizer for the claimants and their police contingent, at the subsequent civil hearing.
- 7.2.10.4 When at the civil hearing I objected to Judge Pierre Roux about the publication of the proceedings of my internal trial, his answer was that nothing is a secret from the Supreme Court. When attorney Brian Currin phoned Krugel who presided over my internal trial, the latter's response was that the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, must have given special permission.
- 7.2.10.5 Bruce, to no one's surprise, denied this allegation and I was found guilty. His attempts at pretending that he and I were mere colleagues rather than friends failed dismally when I produced numerous photographs to the contrary but, of course, this did not affect the verdict. All trials are fair in love and war.
- 7.2.10.6 I did not, in order to demonstrate our long standing friendship, mention at the trial, events around the rapp I once took for Bruce's blue movie (see Section 5.2.8).
- #### 7.2.11 Charge 6 - absence without leave
- 7.2.11.1 In Section 6.6.4, I explained how, owing to a mere oversight, when dealing with various leave formalities, both the clerk for the station commander, Warrant Officer Flip Le Roux, and I, missed one day for which no sick leave application form was completed. The station commander himself, Thys Roux,

missed this omission at the time. This technicality nevertheless resulted in me being found guilty of absence without leave - with due legal pomp, of course.

7.2.11.2 The long winded alternative charge was that I failed to notify Luitenant Colonel Thys Roux, my commander, that I would not be reporting for duty owing to illness. Le Roux had to acknowledge that I handed in a medical disability certificate long before this absence of one day.

7.2.12 Charge 7 - disrespect towards a superior

7.2.12.1 This charge alleged that I contravened Regulation 58(3) by displaying all sorts of disrespectful behaviour towards Colonel Basie Smith when he came to tell me that General Johan Coetzee wanted to see me (see Section 7.1.10). The allegation is based on the fact that during this visit I said - and I translate - "You don't take me out of my milieu to go and trample me at head office. I'll (bliksem - harsh untranslatable word for bash) to death Kleinjan Grobbelaar. Jesus, God! Is there no justice".

7.2.12.2 After listening to Captain W C Smith's own admission that I was actually polite to Basie for whom I had high regard, the charge was dropped. W C ("Varkkop") Smith was present at this incident.

7.2.13 The verdict

7.2.13.1 On 2 September 1985 I signed a document in which I acknowledged the findings and recommendations of the board of enquiry and in which I gave certain undertakings.

7.2.13.2 I acknowledged that I had been informed of being found guilty on five charges of misconduct. I also acknowledged that the board would recommend to the Minister of Law and Order that I was no longer fit to stay in the Police Force and that as a gesture of mercy and in view of mitigating circumstances, my salary be reduced by two notches before I be allowed to retire on pension as medically unfit on the recommendation of a medical board of enquiry.

7.2.13.3 I undertook, by signing this document, to accept whatever decision the minister might take in response to the recommendations and not to withdraw my application to retire as medically unfit.

7.2.13.4 After signing this document, I made it clear over my tapped telephone that I thought the trial was a farce and that I intended to appeal. At this stage my

trial had cost me R38000 and I could not find a sponsor to enable me to appeal.

7.2.13.5 I heard nothing of the recommendations to the minister but learnt via the grape vine, that the approval of the recommendations was being held back and that 35 new charges of using vulgar language over the phone, were being prepared. I did of course use such language over my phone, which I knew was being tapped. I used this language as I felt exasperated and swearing was a conventional and relatively harmless way of being unconventional and thus giving vent to my exasperated feelings.

7.2.13.6 My new lawyer, Chris Petty, persuaded me to give up this one-sided fight. On 11 December 1985 he sent a letter by hand to the Commissioner of Police, re-affirming my acceptance and undertakings of 2 September 1985. On 12 December 1985 the Minister of Law and Order approved the recommendations of the document dated 2 September 1985.

7.3 Civil Trial

7.3.1 Details of the claim against me and of how this case was prejudiced while sub-judicae, are provided in Section 7.2.10 of this statement. The section describes the fifth charge of my internal trial.

7.3.2 I had no more money and applied for legal aid from the Legal Aid Board. This I obtained and my legal representatives and I started preparations for the hearing.

7.3.3 On the day before the hearing I learnt that my legal representatives had to withdraw since my legal aid had been withdrawn. The sequence of events that led to this is best explained with reference to a number of telephone call charges on the taxed statement of legal costs that I later received from the successful claimants:

(a) Luitenant Colonel Dries van der Merwe, one of the claimants, made a call to his attorney, ex-Major Piet Niemand, to inform him that I had an income from piecemeal work and that I was not entitled to legal help. I did in fact have such work and Dries, who was involved in telephone tapping at security head office had come to know of this by monitoring my private telephone conversations.

(b) The next entry on the statement was for a telephone call by Magor Piet Niemand to Mr Klingenberg of the Legal Aid Board to relay the information received from Dries.

(c) Then there was a call from my attorneys to Piet Niemand to advise that they were withdrawing as a result of my legal aid being suspended.

7.3.4 I arrived at the hearing the next day without legal representation. When I wanted to tell my story the judge would not listen to it as I had not complied with certain pre-hearing technicalities that went with a civil trial. I as a layman had come up against a wall and could not state my case.

7.3.5 In addition, the whole police line-up from the Whelpton and Blaauw investigation and from my internal trial were there, conspiring and briefing witnesses to avoid embarrassing contradictions on key points that I had brought up.

7.3.6 On the third day of the hearing I threw in the towel. I signed a document falsely admitting that my accusations of adultery were untrue. I undertook to pay each of the claimants R100 (brought down from R10000 each) and to pay their legal costs. These legal costs amounted to approximately R20000.

7.3.7 I did not have the money or other assets and as a result was sequestered a month or two later.

7.4 Medical board and pensioning

7.4.1 Shortly after the Minister of Law and Order approved the recommendations of the disciplinary board of enquiry, I appeared before a medical board of enquiry.

7.4.2 I handed in a report by Dr Marquard de Villiers, an internal disease specialist. The report stated that I, being a diabetic, could not be subjected to the rigors of police field work. Moreover, the frustration of confining an outdoor person like me between office walls would aggravate my condition.

7.4.3 The board declared me medically unfit for police work, and I went on pension with retention of my rank and medical benefits and with effect from 1 February 1986.

7.5 The outcast

7.5.1 Certificate of discharge

7.5.1.1 My certificate of discharge from the police, signed by the commissioner himself, is unusual in that there is no entry whatsoever under the heading "remarks". This in itself is quite enough to raise questions - questions that I have always been prepared to answer in full, omitting only sensitive details such as our security police operations.

7.5.1.2 However, the commissioner and his staff have always managed to add to what I might have to say and to frustrate all my efforts to secure an honest living in civilian life, for me and my family.

7.5.2 The Commissioner of Police intervenes at Santam

7.5.2.1 Mr Corrie Cornelius, a manager at Santam insurance company, offered me a job as specialized investigator into insurance fraud. This involved solving cases that the Police and insurance assessors could not crack.

7.5.2.2 Corrie was brother in law of my friend Frans Whelpton (see Section 7.1) and knew the whole history of my feud with the Police. I had gotten to know him very well personally and had nothing to hide from him.

7.5.2.3 The job offered a good salary, car and 4 per cent housing loan, which would have been a welcome supplement to my meagre police pension. Corrie helped me to complete the application and sent the application documents from Pretoria to the managing director, C J Oosthuizen in Cape Town.

7.5.2.4 Some time later Corrie told me that despite personal discussions between him and Oosthuizen, the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, had managed to convince Oosthuizen that he should not employ me.

7.5.2.5 Corrie then gave me freelance investigation work of the specialist kind and I solved each and every case. Unfortunately the piecemeal and somewhat underhand nature of these assignments rendered it unsuitable as a permanent profession.

7.5.3 The police intervene at Saambou

- 7.5.3.1 Ben van den Berg was chief security officer at the head office of the Saambou building society in Pretoria. His brother was my friend Sergeant Andre van den Berg from Oshoek and he also knew the history of the friction between the police force and me.
- 7.5.3.2 Ben had just qualified as a pastor and was about to leave Saambou when he offered me his job. His superior, Strydom, was very impressed with my qualifications and background. Strydom was a friend of Basie Smith who was closely involved in the police actions against me. Ben, however, informed me the day after I had spoken to Strydom, that the police had advised Strydom not to touch me. I had lost the opportunity.
- 7.5.3.3 It is ironical that part of the rehabilitation of criminals discharged from goal, is to assist them in finding a job and resettling in society. I had no criminal record and therefore did not qualify for such consideration.

7.5.4 Someone intervenes yet again

- 7.5.4.1 The Pretoria North sheriff, Nick Vlok, is the brother of the current Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok. He advertised a junior job as messenger of the court at the low salary of R1500 per month.
- 7.5.4.2 I was more than qualified for the job and applied. At the subsequent interview I was frank about my past and he was entirely satisfied with me. Four days later his secretary phoned me to tell me that my application had been unsuccessful.

7.5.5 Bread of charity

- 7.5.5.1 I decided to become a casual labourer and the jobs thus found were mostly bread of charity from family and friends. I was at various stages general handy man at a relative, Oubaas Venter's business, A M & H Engineering; my father's cousin, Dirk Coetzee's business, E J Coetzee Quarries; and at Motor Racing Enterprises, Kyalami where I put out and collected posters to advertise racing events. My well doers at the latter business were Dave McGreggor, Piet Swanepoel and Andrew le Roux, all of whom are still loyal and treasured friends.

- 7.5.5.2 The casual labour at Kyalami was only available for the nine annual racing events and was still my only employment at the time when I fled the country.

7.5.6 New venture to trace stolen car owners

- 7.5.6.1 The police sells large numbers of recovered stolen vehicles of which the owners cannot be traced. I am convinced that each vehicle, like a human, is unique and it must be possible to identify it and trace its owner.
- 7.5.6.2 I have know General Kobus Visser and his son Nico since 1970 and they were well informed of my qualifications, capabilities and quarrels with the police. General Visser had retired as police CID chief when I approached him with a scheme to trace the owners of recovered stolen vehicles for insurance companies.
- 7.5.6.3 General Visser and I went to see Mr Rodney Schneeberger, who is chairman of the South African Insurance Association. We discussed the scheme with him and presented him with a written proposal. He was very enthusiastic and a week after I had fled South Africa, I learnt that the scheme had been approved and Nico and I could proceed with the venture.
- 7.5.6.4 We would have had to cooperate closely with the police and General Visser therefore had gone to Major General Basie Smith to discuss the venture and my involvement. General Basie Smith was the chief of the security police and was generally regarded as the next Commissioner of Police.
- 7.5.6.5 Basie Smith told General Visser that he had nothing against me personally but advised that I steer clear of the "leftists". He was referring to telephonic conversations between me and the General Secretary for the South African human rights society, attorney Brian Currin, whose telephone was being tapped.
- 7.5.6.6 The conversations referred to were two recent occasions on which Brian wanted to employ me to investigate unsolved political assassinations. I had declined Brian's offer because of my personal involvement in several such murders and my knowledge of what Brian was up against.
- ### 7.6 Nofomela talks
- 7.6.1 On 19 October 1989, on the eve of his execution, my former colleague Nofomela spilled the beans on hit operations by the police. The day I had dreaded, particularly after falling in disfavour with the police, and more

particularly after Nofomela was arrested for a private murder, had finally and inevitably arrived.

- 7.6.2 For years I have been haunted by the possibility of the hit operations being exposed and by a feeling of guilt for having been part of it. It was difficult to live with this stress but I could see no way out of it.
- 7.6.3 Now, as indicated in Section 4.5.2, I was confronted with a choice. I could join in the cover up and discrediting of Nofomela but at the risk of being isolated with Nofomela. There were strong indications that the latter would happen. Should the police turn against me I had no hope of being believed as had been proven on several occasions. The legal costs would be impossible as I was a sequestered man.
- 7.6.4 It seemed that the moment for getting it all out in the open and making piece with my past, had arrived. But I had every reason to assume that there was no way in which I could make the full story public in South Africa. There are too many legal technicalities that could, as in the past, be exploited to hide the truth. The South African police have the knack of holding embarrassing hearings in camera, ostensibly for security reasons. Moreover, the very nature of our operations, leaving no record of instructions by superiors and the practice of concerted cover ups by accomplices, made it virtually impossible to prove in court.
- 7.6.5 If I was going to expose, it had to be the full story and it had to be fully public. Any attempt to disguise facts or protect people would be exploited to weave a net of isolation around me.
- 7.6.6 If I fled the country and exposed the hit operations, I might have had to flee for the rest of my life from the South African Police and from the African National Congress, both of whom I knew had tenets all over the world. There was also a strong possibility that no one would believe my incredible story.
- 7.6.7 The solution was to take a calculated risk and walk straight into the lion's mouth, the enemy, the African National Congress, tell them of my involvement in the atrocities against them, and hope to heaven they would forgive me as a victim of the Apartheid System and a fighter in a dirty unconventional war. The ANC, moreover, was the only body other than the South African regime, who had the intelligence capabilities to verify my story. Finally, by going to the ANC and assisting them, I might to some extent be able to make good for what I had done to their supporters and their families.
- 7.6.8 I made contact with the ANC via a South African connection and negotiated a deal that they would listen to my story. If they found me unacceptable, they

would assist me for a period of four months to find political asylum and a job in exile.

- 7.6.9 After consulting with my family and brother, I left the country for Mauritius with Vrye Weekblad friend and reporter Jacques Paauw. I was a nervous wreck and in Mauritius, amidst frantic arrangements, rushing around and uncertainty about my future, I rattled off my story to Jacques Paauw, as best as I could remember on the spur of the moment and in my confused and worried state.
- 7.6.10 On 8 November 1989, at 16h10, I left on a British Air flight for London to meet the African National Congress.

8. THE ANC EXPERIENCE

8.1 The London debriefing

- 8.1.1 At 10h00 on 9 November 1989, in London, I came face to face with the dreaded "enemy". Instead of the brutal savages about whom we were taught by the South African regime, I found highly intelligent, extremely well informed and civilized gentlemen for whom I soon felt nothing but admiration and respect.
- 8.1.2 I decided not to go about matters in a half-hearted manner and opened up completely. As I spluttered and stuttered to relate the series of brutal murders and atrocities that I helped to perpetrate, I began to sense an atmosphere of understanding, sympathy and pity. This lasted throughout the four day long debriefing. My audience listened intently and patiently, never pressing for information, never bombarding me with questions and hardly ever speaking other than to enquire about my comfort and needs.
- 8.1.3 After the second day it became clear to me that I was being accepted and my original contact who was to stay with me to put me at ease while the ANC made up their minds about me, was allowed to leave.
- 8.1.4 I soon realized that I was not making any dramatic contribution to the ANC's knowledge about South African security operations. They were extremely well informed and could corroborate everything I told them. I also came to realize that they knew a great deal more about me and my involvement in past security operations than I had anticipated. They were quite obviously being grossly underestimated by the South African security forces.
- 8.1.5 After six days I left for Africa, where a team of ANC intelligence experts recorded my information.

8.2 The ANC culture

- 8.2.1 Working closely with the ANC is a spiritually rewarding experience. Every member radiates an advanced and mature culture. ANC members are absolutely clear about their history, principles and objectives. These can be logically justified anywhere in the world and in any company.
- 8.2.2 The ANC want a new and just South Africa where the interests and culture of every reasonable person will be respected as a matter of grave principle. Freedom of expression and democracy are held in the highest regard.

Members in exile conduct their daily affairs by this creed. They belong to diverse cultures and live harmoniously by their serious and tested blueprint for a new South Africa.

- 8.2.3 ANC belief in the inevitability of the success of their struggle is indefatigable and they work patiently and relentlessly to this end. For this they have made and continue to make great sacrifices. Members in exile live in the most modest conditions where they proudly apply themselves to their tasks. Most have suffered gross injustice, physical abuse and humiliation under the system of apartheid. Many have dear ones that are still suffering and dying in this manner and many have lost dear ones in the armed struggle. Some have been injured and maimed in battle.
- 8.2.4 Despite these hardships and sacrifices, there is an amazing lack of bitterness and a firm tradition of forgiveness that auger well for the future of our country. If the ANC believe that it is necessary to shoot they will say so and they will do so and if the ANC believe that undertakings are justified they will make them and honour them. The leadership is honourable and may be taken at their word without any need for formalities and signatures.

9. THE HARMS COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

- 9.1 This statement was meant to be presented to the Harms Commission of Enquiry into politically motivated murders and atrocities. It was meant to break through the web of lies that have been weaved and is being maintained by the South African authorities.
- 9.2 Legal requirements, procedures and politics prevented me from completing the document in time and from presenting it to the commission in its current form.
- 9.3 In the meantime the commission has listened to my story as it struggled to unfold in the proud tradition of the legal profession. When I told the truth, the council for the police managed to make nonsense of it. When I told the truth, Judge Harms declared it to be lies. When I struggled against attempts to distort and cover up, Judge Harms assisted in the onslaught against me in the most prejudiced manner. I never succeeded in placing discrediting incidents and my life in proper perspective. It was like playing a game of rugby in a squash court.
- 9.4 The Harms Commission, in my opinion, was a massive farce at great expense to the tax payer. But I have no doubt that in my case enough has been done and will be done, even in legal parlours, for the truth to triumph. As for myself, I will strive to live and forgive in the proud tradition, and in a manner worthy of a member, of the African National Congress.

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