

A SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS IT PRACTICABLE?

By Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Co-director, Institute for Defence Policy *

BACKGROUND

As its special name implies, the idea of a South African Peacekeeping Force is distinct from that of a blue-beret International Peacekeeping Force. The South African Force was originally proposed by the churches (particularly Bishop Stanley Mogoba). More recently it has been taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights and has subsequently become part of the ANC's negotiation position. Until recently the Government was at best ambivalent about the idea. The creation of a Peacekeeping Force has now been suggested by the Technical Committee on Violence in its Fourth Report to the multiparty negotiation forum at the World Trade Centre. This recommendation reads as follows

The Committee proposes the establishment of an independent peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its functions thereafter should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, should be constituted in such a way as to have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.

The requirement for a South African Peacekeeping Force arose from the following considerations:

- the legitimacy crisis confronting the SA Police and SADF in the townships, the level of distrust and mistrust of these forces at a political level, and therefore the requirement for a non-partisan force in the run-up to elections;
- the fact that such a force will not be provided by the international community;
- as a compromise, obviating the requirement for full multi-party control of the Security Forces (the SADF in particular) by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC);
- as either an alternative to or as a preparatory step towards the direct integration of forces, thereby obviating the requirement for immediate integration.

The consensus that appears to be developing between the major negotiating parties on the question of a Peacekeeping Force appears to be based on short-term political expediency rather than on a deliberate, strategic vision. Should a decision be taken to establish such a Force, it should be done on the clear understanding that South Africans are establishing a third permanent component in their formal security structures, i.e. one apart from the police and military.

In this document an attempt is made to quantify, in broad terms, the proposal by the Technical Committee on Violence to establish a South African Peacekeeping Force. The subject is discussed in terms of the following headings:

- size requirement;
- estimated costs;

* Thanks to Paul-Bolko Mertz, Bill Sass and Marius Reichardt.

- time schedule/training; and
- sources of personnel.

The article concludes with some suggestions regarding alternative or additional steps.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

THE ESTIMATED SIZE OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE

According to the proposal by the Technical Committee on Violence, the Peacekeeping Force is to be the primary peacekeeping force for the elections, that is, the SA Police should play a secondary role. As a minimum the Peacekeeping Force should replace the SADF during this time. *Vide* the view of the Technical Committee on Violence that '... various armies play no role in the election process, unlike the various police forces which will be required to fulfill ongoing law and order functions.' (par. 5.2.2)

The SADF normally has about 7 000 men deployed in support of the SA Police, although this number may be increased through call-ups, temporary re-deployment of units from elsewhere, and so on, when the need arises.

Some simple guidelines are required in calculating the required size of a Peacekeeping Force.

- To keep one man on the ground for 24 hr's, you need at least 3 people, each working 8 hour shifts. If you want to do this for some months, you probably need 4 persons since you have to cater for rest, recuperation, sickness, retraining, leave, etc. Although persons can work double shifts for a short period, it is not practical for any length of time.
- Since the Peacekeeping Force would be a separate organisation, a considerable additional 'tail' will be added to the operational deployable manpower, i.e., persons to deal with logistics, personnel administration, general administration, finances, command and control, etc. (Admittedly the logistics for this operation are fairly simple.) At a rough estimate, to keep one person on the ground around the clock for some months, you probably need a total of about 5 people in the system. Bear in mind that the SADF (and the SA Police) has existing logistic-, command and control-, technical maintenance-, computerized pay-, and personnel systems already in place, either through the commando system, group headquarters or command headquarters, or police stations in the case of the SA Police. These are nationwide systems, replete with stores, etc.
- The 7 000 SADF personnel which are deployed in the townships at any one time does not, therefore, include any 'additional' logistic tail. It can theoretically keep about 2 330 soldiers (7 000 divided by 3) deployed around the clock. To keep 2 330 persons on the ground as part of a new organisation, would require five times the 2 330, or about 11 650.

To get the SADF out of the townships then, would require a Peacekeeping Force of roughly 12 000 persons strong.

There is a concerted fear that violence will increase in the run-up to elections as political competition intensifies and as political tensions rise. As a result it could be argued that **the requirement for the deployment of forces will increase rather than decrease.** To illustrate:

- Should the total force (of 12 000) be deployed in a township of 3 million residents for one month, there will be fewer than one Peace Keeper per 1 000 residents.
- Given the estimate of 7 000 ballot boxes at the time of elections, this does not equate to even one Peace Keeper per ballot box.

These considerations suggest that, a Peacekeeping Force of 12 000 strong would be inadequate to deal with escalating violence in the absence of the SADF. There is little prospect of such a force taking over the primary responsibility for stability in the run-up to elections from the SA Police, or of it replacing the SADF.

It is important to bear in mind that the SADF has a massive reserve system (Citizen Force and Commandos) which it can call upon to bolster its numbers within a matter of days in the event of a crisis. This will not be the case with a Peacekeeping Force. All that it could do is shift resources from one area to another.

In a press statement dated 19 June 1993, the ANC calls for a Peacekeeping Force of 10 000 strong. If the ANC want a force of 10 000 men deployed at any one time, the size of the total Peacekeeping Force would be 50 000 (10 000 multiplied by 5). If the figure of 10 000 represents the total size of the Peacekeeping Force, it would provide only around 2 000 (10 000 divided by 5) persons on the ground around the clock. The latter would perhaps be able to take over all law and order duties in one or two of the larger townships in the PWV area.

AN ESTIMATE OF COSTS

The table below provides some indication of the costs involved in establishing such a force for one year. **Very conservatively, it assumes a total Peacekeeping Force 20 000 strong, of whom 16 000 are 'troopies' and 4 000 administrators, commanders, etc.**

The establishment of a Peacekeeping Force to replace the SADF presently deployed would, therefore, conservatively cost R1 bn. This budget is for one year. It does not cover severance pay, and/or demobilisation/recruitment costs.

There are two potential sources of funding. Monies could be transferred from the budgets of the SADF and SA Police or foreign funding could be sought. The latter could be in the form of grants or loans.

COST ESTIMATE FOR PEACEKEEPING FORCE: ONE YEAR

SER. NO	DESCRIPTION	UNIT COST (R)	NUMBER	SUB-TOTAL (R)	REMARKS
1	Basic salary of majority	1,500.00	16,000	288,000,000.00	
2	Average salary of rest	4,000.00	4,000	192,000,000.00	leadership, admin, logistics
3	Basic equipment of each pers	4,000.00	15,000	60,000,000.00	
4	Vehicles, radios, etc.	50,000,000.00	4	200,000,000.00	R50 mil per 1000 men
5	Running costs	R25 pp/day/365 days	20,000	176,000,000.00	Water, lights, food. Excl. base costs. Use SADF bases.
6	Training costs	10,000,000.00	2	20,000,000.00	Two cycles
	TOTAL			937,000,000.00	

NOTES TO TABLE:

A minimum educational level of standard 8 has been assumed (since members may be required to appear in court, etc.). Further, it has been assumed that remuneration for a Peace Keeper would be somewhere between that of a conscript and the salary of a private sector security guard. This implies an average salary of roughly R1 500 per month.

Other costs are those relating to clothing, weapons, vehicles, radio's, riot control gear, tents, water, food, etc. It would cost at least R4 000 per person to equip each of the 20 000 with personal items plus weapons, protective apparel, etc. for one year.

Training is divided into two cycles, each costing R10 million. This is an educated guess.

Even given these costs, if the Peacekeeping Force work under conditions of employment similar to that of a policeman or soldier, there will be some open-ended costs not included in the table such as medical aid, paid leave, danger pay/special allowance, personal insurance, perhaps overtime, possibly pension provisions.

TIME SCHEDULE AND TRAINING

If elections do indeed occur by the end of April 1994, ten months remain. Allow a month for slippage before the wheels are set in motion to start with the establishment of the Peacekeeping Force.

For the SA Police and the SADF, who are used to such duties, a period of at least an additional month can be expected before training of such a force commences. The Peacekeeping Force may then use the existing facilities, equipment, etc. of the SADF and/or SA Police.

In order to avoid a 'kitskonstabel' problem (as a result of inadequate and inappropriate training) an estimated basic training period lasting at least 3 months and covering areas such as conflict resolution, crowd control, dispersion, patrols, mediation skills, basic law, discipline, weapons training, etc., would be required. This would only be possible if the recruits already possessed at least a modicum of military knowledge and skills, i.e. they are drawn from existing organisations. In this case additional 'confidence building' time and effort will be required.

The first group of trained Peace Keepers (10 000 strong) could be on the street in about 5-6 months from now (December 1993 to January 1994), and the second three months later. Theoretically the SADF could withdraw from the townships after the first group is deployed, sometime early in 1994, the level of violence allowing. Whether this would in fact happen and whether such training is possible in this short period of time, is, of course, not at all certain. Bear in mind that the SADF annual intake of white conscripts is only slightly more than double the figure of 10 000, at around 24 000.

An additional constraint is that of providing comprehensive junior leadership training in such a short period of time. Such training would require at least 6 months.

SOURCES OF PERSONNEL

In the interests of balance and legitimacy, the Peacekeeping Force is proposed as a multi-party body. It would be made up of members of various organisations. This would require a considerable additional period of negotiation to reach agreement on the criteria, selection, confidence building, and possibly conversion training of prospective members prior to integration. **Allowing indiscriminate recruitment into a Peacekeeping Force would be counter-productive.**

The following potential sources of recruits exist: the SADF, MK, TBVC armed forces, SA Police (including the Internal Stability Division), police forces of the homelands, persons that have previously served in any of these organisations, community marshals, members of Self-Defence Units and new recruits (persons that have not previously served in any of the forces listed but meet the minimum entry requirements).

Still, the nature of the task expected of the Peacekeeping Force is police- rather than military-orientated. **The most obvious practical building block around which such a force could be structured would be the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police.** Whether this is politically acceptable is, of course, another matter. Should the Internal Stability Unit not be incorporated into the Peacekeeping Force, considerable care would have to be taken regarding command and control liaison between these two forces.

Another problem is that of excising the appropriate chunks of the respective budgets of the original mother organisation (bar those of the guerrilla armies, of course) and lumping this together. Alternatively the mother organisations could continue paying their people. Those members of the SADF who are transferred to the Peacekeeping Force, for example, could remain on the payroll of the SADF.

The major practical problem would, however, be that of leadership. **Without a clear longer term career prospect, people of calibre and skill will not join a Peacekeeping Force.** While junior leadership could possibly be trained within a period of six months, more advanced leadership skills would be difficult to obtain except from the Security Forces and former members of these Forces. Once again the political acceptability of such a choice may be problematic.

THE ALTERNATIVES

Given the political will and substantial foreign assistance the hurdles discussed above can be overcome. At the same time, however, even the best short-term solution will be very expensive, complex, messy and time-consuming. The implications in terms of service regulations are considerable. Since the Peacekeeping Force would have to have powers of arrest, and so on, the Force would have to be formally constituted through an act of parliament, or form part of the existing Security Forces. At present the latter appears the more feasible.

The combined effect of these complications would mean a drawn-out process lasting considerably longer than planned. Even after all of these efforts, the SADF will still be in the townships, since the Peacekeeping Force would not be of sufficient strength, and would have no reserve of manpower to deal with crises. In addition the Peacekeeping Force would probably be deployable only under supervision.

Security costs money. It is never cheap. There can be little doubt that the creation of a Peacekeeping Force will cost considerably more money than the use of the existing Security Forces.

At the same time, the present deployment of the SADF and SA Police is unacceptable to parties such as the ANC and PAC under the existing circumstances. The degree of mistrust with which these organisations are viewed, both by large sections of the community, as well as at a political level, clearly requires dramatic steps.

The preceding analysis indicates that there is little chance of establishing a South African Peacekeeping Force in good time large enough and of sufficient training without substantial assistance, probably from the international community. There are some doubts as to whether such levels of assistance are obtainable at such short notice - and whether the international community would be prepared to assist in this matter at all. Without necessarily replacing a future South African Peacekeeping Force, it may be more practical to:

- **Establish full and complete multi-party control over the Security Forces by the Sub-Councils of Defence and Law and Order of the Transitional Executive Council.** This would make parties such as the ANC co-responsible for law and order whilst removing the Security Forces from the party-political struggle;
- **Insert international monitors into the command and control structures of those SADF forces deployed in support of law and order duties and the SA Police.** These persons should have a monitoring function only, and report to the National Peace Accord structures.

Should it be decided to establish a Peacekeeping Force, the following recommendations are made:

- Minimum entry standards have to be laid down regarding age for rank, educational, physical and other requirements. This may exclude large sections of the guerrilla armies. What will happen to them?
- Persons wishing to join the Force should resign from their present organisation or positions, and join the Force. In this process some provision for the transfer of benefits to the Force could be made.
- International funding and training assistance should be sought prior to embarking on this venture.
- The Peacekeeping Force should be built up around the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police and it should be built up fairly slowly and deliberately.

Most important of all, **a Peacekeeping Force should be constituted as a permanent organisation and not as a temporary, stop-gap force.**

CONCLUSION

While this paper does not represent a comprehensive investigation of the feasibility of the Peacekeeping Force, it is intended to stimulate debate about the practical requirements and long-term implications of the establishment of such a force. The paper is not a rejection of the notion of a Peacekeeping Force, either. However, the expectation that such a force be the primary peacekeeping force during the elections does not seem reasonable. Similarly, the limited objective implied in the report of the Technical Committee on violence, that the Peacekeeping Force replace the SADF in the townships, also appears unrealistic.



Notes on National PKF. Notes taken by Craig Mills, UWC.

Stanley Makhoba

- high incidence of violence = failure of police to keep peace
 " " " " " " " " " " community - " " " "
 = need for PKF. (Peace Keeping Force).
- number of armed forces with unsubordinated by command system = recipe for disaster & instability.
- need to challenge those involved in peacekeeping - what are they doing?
 (they need to be made part of wide PK process).
- creation of new force allows existence of other units thus preventing threat of isolation/exclusion. PKF to be made up of manpower from other security wings. Need for independent command & distinct uniforms, vehicles etc. Heterogeneous ^{composition/} nature grants it validity/credibility & security against attack.
- Joint control to follow only after establishment of composite PKF; will prevent re-occurrence of Somali-type situation.

Aubrey Lekwame, lawyer for African People

- prevent/reduce violence through strengthening/creating 'powers of enforcement' for the National Peace Accord. Will create acceptance of NPA & its authorities. Participation could be strengthened through involvement in grassroots 'Peace Corps'.

1934-1984



PKF
②

- PKF needs powers for itself etc
 - PKF composition - existing or new??
 - ^{with} existing faces impracticable; creation of new face should be given serious consideration.
 - should use ISU (Internal Stability Unit) of SAP as the building block of this new PKF. - esp. given the ISU's skills, training etc. ISU must then be removed/detached from Command + Control of SAP. Require international participation in command structure.
 - size should be determined by functions/demands.
Recommended force of $\pm 20-40,000$. Motivate inclusion of members of SAP, SOU's, IBUC police, homeland police etc.
 - Selection panel req'd with international participation.
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- Urge Goldstone to make appropriate recommendation on PKF. Time of the essence!
 - PKF to be guided by principle of minimum force
 - Reserve Corps / PKF need to be made distinct. Military role functions to be determined.

Colin Kahn (MK/MRG)

- need to place formation of PKF in domestic political context
- elections necessary if not free from intimidation, + free & fair.
- SA govt security forces seen as part of problem - cannot fulfil



3

role of Peace-keeping.

- international community will not contribute more than men - not sufficient.

- PKF - need to be imposed & be able to be dealt effectively with violence. Consent of all elements party to the negotiation process. Need to create a force acceptable to the majority of the population. Under authority of International Executive Council (IEC)

- need for international & local experts on committee established by the IEC to advise on composition, deployment and activities of the PKF. Known as the "Peace-keeping Committee". This will also establish guidelines for recruitment, behaviour etc about the PKF.

- PKF to be established through legislation passed by transitional authority.

- PKF separate from SANDF (conventional brief) & SAP (law & order).

- PKF Composition. Single individual at its head. Appointed by IEC in consultation with int^l community.

- Command element structure appointed in line

= force of between 7,000 → 10,000.



PKF

- training to be established. Be carried out ASAP.

- ~~resources~~ resources to be acquired from participants.

- there are difficulties ahead, but PKF only realistic solution to the problems facing the democratic trend.

within others, IDP.

- are ideals taking the place of reality?

- are we teaching for a repetition of the hitler-stalin experiment.

- while accepted by the negotiating forum that a PKF will be established as the primary PKF, a number of problems are inherent in this process.

- Is the PKF not linked on short-term political expediency as SA is in this process creating a permanent third force parallel to the SADF & SAP.

But: ① To remove SADF (7,000 in townships) requires PKF in this function alone of 12,000. Even more as violence is expected to increase rather than decrease in the run-up to elections.

② SADF has reserves for "force-up"; PKF will not.

③ For a force of 5,000 people on the ground, cost over R10m per annum.



⑤ PKF

- ④ require 3-6 month basic training. First cadre of PKF then only likely at start of 1994.
- ⑤ require minimum criteria for recruitment - exclusion of some units as a result?
- ⑥ SAP's ISU most likely building block - but if they are not to take this function job, then ability to police of the PKF debatable.
- ⑦ Leadership dubious without long-term career prospects.

Alternatives? What is likely?

- ① SADF still in the townships - even with PKF as PKF will not have sufficient resources a time before elections.
- ② ^{some} international assistance on with funding & training - this is unlikely.

Alternatives?

- establish instead full multi-party control.
- insert intⁿ monitors, reporting to National Peace Accord, in command & control of SADF & SAP.

PKF, ^{is to be formed} some recommendations?

- ① Minimum entry requirements - exclusion of guerrilla armies
- ② Permanent etc etc

Conclusion:

Conclusion to expect PKF to be the primary peace-keeping force in the run-up to the elections.



① PKF

Rocky Williams, MRG

- support for PKF.

as levels of output

- 1- What do these concepts / roles mean.
- 2- Strategic desirability of PKF.
- 3- Problems & Prospects of PKF.

1) Distinguish Peace Corps (socio-economic function) from PKF & peace monitors, & from Development Brigades, & from civic action, ^{& from} involvement in community policing.

- must then have exact clarity of the function / role of these different proposals.

2) long-term advantages of PKF envisaged.

- withdraw police from non-control function towards community policing
- need to withdraw defense force from townships to redirect their role to the traditional function of protecting the nation's sovereignty.

3) Need to strong unit / instrumental loyalty to overcome political difference. Need intensive training. Caution over use of SAP's ISU - but can conceivably be used.

- keep PKF as third line under Dept. of Internal Affairs.
- Small, tactical intelligence function.

⑦ PKF



- Q2
- 1) lack of public involvement - yet another military organisation?
 - 2) What are functional options in heterogeneous forces PKF facing a variety of opponents? How can one avoid a taking of sides? Newly integrated force can easily break apart - Zimbabwe experience. Will operation be peace-keeping (which signals end of hostilities) or peace enforcement (à la Bosnia, Somalia) which is far more difficult.
 - 3) Role of MK soldiers in PKF? Re-training possibilities.
 - 4) Does SA want an army? a PKF? what are the effects on demilitarisation?

Nabokov

- public involvement & support multi-faceted. Dependent also on shape & success of PKF.

Tobias - principled agreement exists re the creation of a PKF.
- fear of ~~the~~ division btr. populace & third force/PKF.

Anthony - ^{SAP} ISU - distinct from SAP command. ± 15,000 strong.

Glenn - cannot overnight change ethos of ISU - can use facilities etc of ISU.
- must be guided by ^{rather by} joint control - PKF good experience with integration possibilities/permutations/problems with future integrated SANDF.

Ricky - do we need an army? Take into consideration question of disarmament &

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demilitarisation -

- army will be downsized according to national policy ultimately -
- will be a requirement regionally & nationally.
- based on threat assessment - is there one?
- short-term - trigger defence force then situation demands to maintain stability - potentially disruptive if demobilised before integration & immediately after elections.
- use training facilities of SADF, then demobilisation
- Defence Force can serve as symbol of national unity - sentimentality.
- diplomatic function of military.
- rationalise Navy into super-carrier based. Most effective navy.
- Regionally - humanitarian, sea assistance - Air Force (Naval role).
- regional instability even if there is stability inside SA.
- Voluntary Defence Force - ensures wider support, transparency & accountability more than before.

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Given later possible to make it.

Jeremy Cronin : Chair.

Joe Hanlon : Author of Who Calls the Shots. & article in W.I.P about The World Bank

Albie Sachs.

Joe Hanlon: It's recognising regions out of there - that there are lessons in history that we can look back on.

The S.A.D. it has learnt well from the regions (of Southern Africa) & the 3rd force etc.

Elective in Angola - can't be transported direct into S.A. but there are some lessons

Involvement of 35 election observers. - based in OAMBU - RENITA

A spirit of reconciliation was est on the ground & really believing & voting for democracy.

Not the voters who determine it

2 day period, one vote for president & one for parliament

prep. rep.

photo registration = photo id cards - national basis you could vote where you like.

high illiteracy

18 candidates - president

> relatively high no of spoilt ballot.

22 parties

Votes were secretive no one allowed in the booths to assist despite possibility of spoilt ballots - This gave security to pt who believed

Registration 90% & 90% turn out of those registered.

2 comments on election process:

1. Monitors from all parties at the ballot station - after not local pt.
 - then was check on misconduct by party monitors.
 - then international monitors.

International pl - were then more a threat of an outside record.

There was discussion between polling monitors.

2. In Angola whole election process transparent - 3 nights sleeping in the ballot boxes from the beginning until the end of the poll. - makes people very much a part of the process.

PL who involved in the polling process

3 UNITA got $\frac{1}{3}$ of votes & had the process been allowed to continue UNITA would have had a forceful opposition had they chosen that route.

What went wrong (1) Not the voters who determined the outcome of the election it was the military people

(1) Go back to their Peace Accord - the U.N. where to be monitors & the 2 sides would move into a single area ^{assembly points} & a new army would be created. UNITA didn't go to assembly point & started stock piling arms

UNITA didn't allow MPPA into KUANOA KUBANG.

Role of U.N + Margaret Anstey:

Anstey made a choice to say we can either blow the whistle or go ahead with the election.

Everybody presumed UNITA would win. Why didn't they win.

(1) UNITA ran a divisive campaign.

(2) MPPA - ran a campaign of reconciliation.

Anstey argued - let election go ahead coz they going to win the election anyway & so the problem was the watch dog of the U.N. didn't bark.

As the demobilisation stopped the MPPA stopped & put their men into a very effective riot control. As late as 2-3 days before election UNITA still passing out arms.

So when the outcome not as expected the military moved in UNITA turned things into Somalia.

What happened afterwards: After election the outcome could be enforced but PPK visited & said don't accept the outcome - so did

the U.S. UNCTA's long term backers encouraged them to go back to the bush.

If the military is not disarmed, the historic backers come into play & this then makes enforcing the election impossible. So prior to elections we need to disarm as many pl as possible.

Albie Sachs : As a result of the desparosa - the exiles have a strong regional understanding.

Part of understanding of the elections can be understood in 2 theories.

(1) ~~lack~~ ^{lack} on the part of the pl for peace.

(2) extreme instability on the other.

The cold war played a devastating effect causing a civil war of unmanageable proportions, became an international battle field.

ZAIRI was one of the players & it is still there.

Our situation in S.A. is very different.

Something else happened - how is it that UNWITA which had so little to offer the pl could even get $\frac{1}{3}$ of the vote. We need to look at the failures of the M.P.L.A & this self examination is NB for us as well.

1. Short inexperience in govt (even colonised govt underdopd).
2. Factionalism & lack of UNITY in MPLA which came about for diffat reasons had disastrous consequences. Open factionalism was very damaging.
 - a lot of the best intellectuals lost, poor struggles destroyed integrity.
 - UNITY not as blind obedience, but ~~openness~~ ^{openness} is very NB, don't homogenise, currents need to be recognised & dealt with.
 - FRENCH was more successful but at quite a heavy price - ~~economically~~ ^{ekonomically} & socially.
3. Role of civil society - it was almost destroyed, ~~economically~~ ^{ekonomically} & socially. mistakes were destroying existing things that might have worked but because they were seen as counter-revolutionary & so they were undermined. without the revolution being able to deliver the goods immediately this meant the state / military played a very NB role which was able to undermine the election outcome.

Why did NAMIBIA have successful elections partly because so many nations & internal groupings had a stake in what was happening.

In S.A. the major contending pol. parties having been working together for a longer period of time & this is not a winner takes all system.

Agreed on certain constitutional & structural policies in advance.

A govt of National Unity means whatever the consequence of elections the diff. pol. parties will still have a say ^{with certain guarantees} & ^{privileges}.

This means in S.A. the run up to the election will not be as fierce as in S.A. as Angola. i.e. ppl struggling for the outcome.

The capacity of the military acting on its own however can be very destructive so we need to find pol. mechanisms which will find means of changing the structure.

How can you have peoples rights without thinking that if you get peoples govt you will solve all the problems of the pol.

OPEN SESSION

What was the essence of some of the Angolan P. Accord?
Angola & Mozambique there was a call for total demobilisation of both sides & creation of a national army by the time of election. This was partially created which meant that there were 3 armies instead of 2 in Angola.

Can the problem be solved in Angola? What price is the ANC prepared to pay for regionalisation?

^{South} The S.A. govt interest in the region is not cold war related - argument that a black govt leads to chaos. This is still on the Agenda for the NATS as multiparty democracy doesn't work & so it's in their interests to continue to destabilise. The 3rd Force is critically ^{not} coz you must be able to say black pl cannot govern the township.

No hope for a settlement in Angola now. There need in S.A. to be a looking beyond the elections. What place for Buthezi in the new system - we need to think what happens to the losers.

The Peace Committees have not been able to control peace in the townships. What are civil society going to be able to do about military take over.

What regional vision. Albie - in S.A. looking at this situation then. The new S.A. will be so concerned. Our problem must be able to help materially. What can we offer?

1. End to destabilisation
2. Normalisation of relationships at every level
3. At good neighbourliness
4. Est. regional framework for socio/economic/cultural purposes.

Joe: We all talk about Angola. but there have been other successful regional elections. ^{ZAMBIA} ~~BOZITANA~~ MAHAWI, LESOTHO, ZIMBABWE. Angola needs to be what we about want to happen.

1. What was the role of UN ~~TA~~, the independent monitors & the political monitors.
2. How are we going to disarm people before the elections.
3. What provisions was made for misconduct.

Joe: Angola didn't have a neutral national force which was p'bly a mistake - Only had international monitors & party monitors. The response to the disarming - the SANDF has to be disarmed, as have to be all other sides - some mechanism has to be devised to do this. ^{Uglike Albie} I'm pessimistic about elections in April. In S.A. there are too many guns.

There needs to be a major voter education both nationally & also by pol parties - so you need to know what the ballot paper looks like months before.

Albie: If the ANC loses it's because of fraud is not a helpful way of thinking - There is no connection between illiteracy & stupidity. In terms of disarming - there is the pblm of whites having private arms.

Battle for the regions also needs to be debated. Constitutional debate & struggle has been over this. Many NB's political debate.

Finally: What should we do about ANGOA?

^{must} We have been remarkably placid about this massive war, what are we going to do about the continuing privatised SADF & the govt. continuing regional destabilisation.

There needs to be a campaign of solidarity support for Angola.

No aeroplane can fly to Angola & back without it being traced on radar by SADF, this ^{flight} record needs to be made available to the transitional executive & this information can then be accessed - the repetition of the process can then be stopped.

Albie: There can be no no-go areas in the election process.

Needs to be a peaceful election committee.

We need to get from the agreement in principle down to the actualization.

As far as

the ANGOA there is a lack of transparency

We need to have more campaigning around for freedom + Peace for the Angolan govt.

Return to Nick

①

Military Intelligence

Hargreaves

Mojo, Roddy Williams

William Steenkamp

1) What.

2) elections

3) integration & disclosure.

4) Future

IS-mil intelligence ; weather, Enemy, terrain.

① openness should be institutionalised

- what is ideal role

- how to transform it.

② strategic intelligence & tactical intelligence. (5 structures)

- chief of staff intelligence.

(7 Now)

fact day to day intelligence.

- role should be taken into account ; balance of power within family.

- its degree of autonomy of MI.

- role should ideally be tactically orientated.

- civilians should analyse politics and economics not the mil.

MI - involved in hit squads etc

How did they get so powerful?

- were deployed in townships

- saw enemy as ALL black sash etc

- started removing them, even civilian activists - involved in trade unions were assassinated.

②

- code the line of protecting NP not the res
- code as legal oversight.

Future

- no threat ^{oo} no need for a large MI.
 ↳ int
 ↳ ext

- need a committee to investigate MI.
- code of conduct.
- needs a moral background.

Willen

- probs - degree of autonomy - they are clandestine (need to know basis)
- power corrupts → immunity of prosecution corrupts
- too much autonomy corrupts, (Israel, CIA)
- accountability - can you tell a politician what you are doing, (they don't want to know) who is accountable.
- There has been too much secrecy but in mind - need to know but where is line?

Soldiers are to defend countries against enemies, not their tasks to be deployed internally.

should be

- A joint internal intelligence service.
- 1 external " "
- 1 M-I.

} interlinked to a certain degree (try to base)

Mojib
Intelligence
Do
- 40
he

Moje

Intelligence focused in SA.

- Do we need it = yes. (needed to survive)
- How it is used is imp.

here prob started in role of SADF, it was up to MI to supply the intelligence to SADF so they could fulfil their role, and their role was not defined properly

- not be used violently.

Do we want to create such instruments with this power Intel does have a good tactical role.

but its strategic. thats the prob
 prob - they eventually run the country
 - need checks & balances

Its place in Defence Force.

Q:- Intelligence services should never be allowed to intervene?
 Intelligence could do a better job publicly than secretly, proven academics could be more accurate

FW - NIS - No other backing (deeply divided state)

Final session: Sunday 15th July
Chair: Sheena J.

1. Overview by Richard.

Content largely educational - also included international experience - in Southern Africa and wider world - Bosnia, Cambodia.

- Dangers of the military determining the results of the election (Angola)

- Need for the issues of peace & demilitarisation to be carried forward

Also empowerment to individuals.

2. Issues to be followed up:

- Restitution by the

- Demilitarisation - org. to

- Elections

- Civil control of the military

- Angola

- Demilitarising our minds

- Actively promoting peace (?)

- Integration of the armed forces (abolition of the armed forces).

- Creation of a nuclear weapons free

- Near male conscription

- Withdrawing the media

- Civilian youth service

3. ECC's follow-up.

To record all the proceedings to be sent to participants & to key people concerned

4. Report from the group discussing a new anti-militarist movement - Mandy Taylor.

Two main questions from the discussion

① Do we need an army

② No-one dealing with broad anti-militarisation issues

- Proposal. ① start a consultative process with the orgs already working in this area. Volunteers needed from all regions

② Call for volunteers to take up the issue of Angola

Jackie Cook. Mobilisation and a consultation.

(Supported by Mandy) Could Angola be the mobilising issue?
Mandy agrees on the importance of a mobilising issue (not necessarily Angola)

Hartmut. Suggests other issues need to be looked at short-term. Can start groups now

Laurie. Need for urgency now because of the institutions now being re-shaped.

Volunteers:

Sarah McKeown, Jonathan Green, Karen Kollman (Glan), Michael (Obn) ^{Good}, Patrick Thapali, Keith Green, Carrie Nathan (KT), Tonnale Weideman, Jackie Cook, Janet Cherry (PE), Colin Bourne (EC), Doug Tor, Rob Thomas, Adele

⑤ Highlights. Speakers - Nelson Mandela, Maggie O'Kear, Joe Hinton

Workshop on Angola.

Seeing old friends.

The display & archive material.

The printed programme. Tonight's job at Rockley St

⑥ Thanks by Chris

Let's get the show published & distributed from the end of

DEMOBILISATION AND INTEGRATION*

Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Director, Institute for Defence Policy

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This document briefly comments upon the following:

- a South African peacekeeping force;
- demobilisation; and
- integration.

A SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE

As its special name implies, the idea of a South African Peacekeeping Force is distinct from that of a blue-beret International Peacekeeping Force. In the interests of balance and legitimacy, the Peacekeeping Force is proposed as a multi-party body, made up of members of various organisations. The following potential sources of recruits exist: the SADF, MK, TBVC armed forces, SA Police (including the Internal Stability Division), police forces of the homelands, persons that have previously served in any of these organisations, community marshals, members of Self-Defence Units and new recruits (persons that have not previously served in any of the forces listed but meet the minimum entry requirements). But simply allowing indiscriminate recruitment into a Peacekeeping Force would be counter-productive.

The South African Force was originally proposed by the churches (particularly Bishop Stanley Mogoba). More recently it has been taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights and has subsequently become part of the ANC's negotiation position. Until recently the Government was at best ambivalent about the idea. The creation of a Peacekeeping Force has now been suggested by the Technical Committee on Violence in its Fourth Report to the multiparty negotiation forum at the World Trade Centre, and agreed to by all parties. This recommendation reads as follows

* Talk delivered at the ECC 1993 Peace Festival, University of the Witwatersrand, 17 July 1993.

The Committee proposes the establishment of an independent peacekeeping force with a multi-party composition to function as the primary peacekeeping force for the election. Its functions thereafter should be determined by the elected Government in consultation with relevant parties. The force should be specially trained, should be constituted in such a way as to have legitimacy across the political spectrum and should fall under the control of either the Independent Electoral Commission or under multi-party executive control.

The requirement for a South African Peacekeeping Force arose from the following considerations:

- the legitimacy crisis confronting the SA Police and SADF in the townships, the level of distrust and mistrust of these forces at a political level, and therefore the requirement for a non-partisan force in the run-up to elections;
- the desire to remove the various armies, the SADF in particular, from their present role in support of the police in law and order duties, particularly in the run-up to elections;
- the fact that such a force will not be provided by the international community;
- as a compromise, obviating the requirement for full multi-party control of the Security Forces (the SADF in particular) by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC);
- as either an alternative to or as a preparatory step towards the direct integration of forces, thereby obviating the requirement for immediate integration.

Unfortunately it would appear that South Africans would have to brace themselves for as yet unprecedented levels of instability and violence in the period preceding elections. This is not only the result of possible political instability, but a reflection of the degree of social disintegration in our society and concomitant economic decline.

Should a decision be taken to establish such a Force, it should be done on the clear understanding that South Africans are establishing a third permanent organisation outside of the Police and military. But the consensus that appears to be developing between the major negotiating parties on the question of a

Peacekeeping Force appears to be based on short-term political expediency rather than on a deliberate, strategic vision.

Approaching the establishment of a Peacekeeping Force as an interim measure only, is problematic. Such an approach would require the massive further strengthening of the Police in the near future or the return of the military to its present duties inside the country in support of the Police, or simply some reduction in the role of the military internally but not the elimination of that role. In the case of the latter, the Peacekeeping Force is simply an additional reservoir of manpower which is (only able to be) deployed to strengthen the inadequate numbers of police and soldiers. This would run the risk of repeating the experience of inadequately trained 'kitskonstables'.

The nature of the task expected of the Peacekeeping Force is police- rather than military-orientated. The most obvious practical building block around which such a force could be structured would be the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police. Whether this is politically acceptable is, of course, another matter. Should the Internal Stability Unit not be incorporated into the Peacekeeping Force, considerable care would have to be taken regarding command and control liaison between these two forces.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Following an analysis done by my Institute considerable hurdles appear on the road to the establishment of such a Peacekeeping Force. Security costs money. It is never cheap. There can be little doubt that the creation of a Peacekeeping Force will cost considerably more money than the use of the existing Security Forces.

Even the best short-term solution to the creation of such a force will be very expensive, complex, messy and time-consuming. The implications in terms of service regulations are considerable. Since the Peacekeeping Force would have to have powers of arrest, and so on, the Force would have to be formally constituted through an act of parliament, or form part of the existing Security Forces. At present the latter appears the more feasible.

The combined effect of the various complications would mean a drawn-out process lasting considerably longer than planned. Even after all of these efforts, the SADF will still be in the

July 17, 1993

townships, since the Peacekeeping Force would not be of sufficient strength, and would have no reserve of manpower to deal with crises. In addition the Peacekeeping Force would probably be deployable only under supervision.

At the same time, the present deployment of the SADF and SA Police is unacceptable to parties such as the ANC and PAC under the existing circumstances. The degree of mistrust with which these organisations are viewed, both by large sections of the community, as well as at a political level, clearly requires dramatic steps.

ALTERNATIVES

As I have argued elsewhere, the expectation that a South African Peacekeeping Force could be the primary peacekeeping force during the elections does not seem reasonable. Similarly, the limited objective implied in the report of the Technical Committee on violence, that the Peacekeeping Force replace the SADF in the townships, also appears unrealistic.

There is also little chance of establishing a South African Peacekeeping Force in good time large enough and of sufficient training without substantial assistance, probably from the international community. There are some doubts as to whether such levels of assistance are obtainable at such short notice - and whether the international community would be prepared to assist in this matter at all. Without necessarily replacing a future South African Peacekeeping Force, it may be more practical to:

- Establish full and complete multi-party control over the Security Forces by the Sub-Councils of Defence and Law and Order of the Transitional Executive Council. This would make parties such as the ANC co-responsible for law and order whilst removing the Security Forces from the party-political struggle;
- Insert international monitors into the command and control structures of those SADF forces deployed in support of law and order duties and the SA Police. These persons should have a monitoring function only, and report to the National Peace Accord structures.

Should it be decided to establish a Peacekeeping Force, the following recommendations are made:

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- Minimum entry standards have to be laid down regarding age for rank, educational, physical and other requirements. This may exclude large sections of the guerilla armies. What will happen to them?
- Persons wishing to join the Force should resign from their present organisation or positions, and join the Force. In this process some provision for the transfer of benefits to the Force could be made.
- International funding and training assistance should be sought prior to embarking on this venture.
- The Peacekeeping Force should be built up around the Internal Stability Division of the SA Police and it should be built up fairly slowly and deliberately.

Most important of all, a Peacekeeping Force should be constituted as a permanent organisation and not as a temporary, stop-gap force.

INTEGRATION

What is meant by integration? In brief, integration is the amalgamation of previously opposing military forces. It is not, as many suppose, a single event, but a process that will occur over some months and involving a number of sequential steps, culminating in the amalgamation of forces into a single organisation. Integration cannot be discussed in isolation. In particular, we need to discuss integration and demobilisation as two sides of the same coin.

South Africa cannot afford, nor does it need all of the armed forces which will result from the amalgamation of MK, the SADF and the TBVC armed forces. The situation that has to be avoided is simply to open the doors to the absorption into the military of the sum of all the armed formations in the country and then try to demobilise some afterwards. This will not only be extremely complicated, expensive and messy, but also require constant special dispensations in terms of the public service regulations. South Africans should be extremely circumspect about integrating persons into the military who will inevitably have to be demobilised. As a result the demobilisation of members of the various armed forces should occur directly from these forces, prior to any amalgamation or integration.

THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

The amalgamation process would entail the following sequential steps:

- What is there? An audit will have to be performed and the result would have to be verified independently.
- What do we need - the requirement? This is essentially a political decision which has to take into consideration the demands which will be placed upon the armed forces as well as the availability of resources (including international support).
- Where is the money going to come from for integration? Either the defence budget money will have to be increased for integration or, if integration has to occur within the existing budget. While there is some money that could potentially be saved by restructuring the Defence Force for future requirements, this is a massively complicated problem which will require substantial research and not deliver quick results.
- Determining who is interested or wants to join a new Defence Force?
- Determining who qualifies (i.e. meets minimum criteria) and of those that qualify, for who is there room if the number that qualify exceed the requirement.
- Having determined who will join the future Defence Force, these persons will probably have to go on additional training programmes in accordance with the job they will be doing.
- After some initial separate training, the final act of integration into mixed units will occur, followed by further training to hone the disparate groups into cohesive structures. This step, there is common agreement, would only occur after elections.

AN AUDIT AND ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY

In a recent submission to the Multiparty Negotiations, our Institute recently proposed that a system of control points be established countrywide, manned by the ANC/MK and PAC/APLA but with permanent representation (in a monitoring capacity only) by the Government and the international community. That the purpose of these control points be to establish a system of control and accountability of the guerrilla armies by the

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