

CONCLUSION ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

We have dealt with 23 areas where violence flared in South Africa in 1984 and 1985. There were more areas initially but for lack of proof of UDF involvement the evidence pertaining to them was struck out at the end of the state case. To these 23 areas can be added the Vaal Triangle.

It is evident that the unrest which flared in the period 1984 to 1985 in South Africa was not sporadic haphazard violence as can be associated with frustration borne from unemployment or low living standards. The unrest was preceded by a propaganda campaign of vast magnitude which not only attacked the new constitution and the exclusion of Blacks therefrom, but also encompassed the Black education system and the Black local authorities. Every grievance was linked by the UDF and its cohorts to apartheid and it is not surprising that the schoolchildren became highly politicised.

The school boycott called by COSAS in August 1984 which used local school issues to get off the ground was intended to coincide with the elections for the Coloured and Indian houses of parliament. It does not need much insight to see that hordes of bored and politicised children loose on the streets could only lead to disruption, clashes with the police, violence and rioting.

It is further evident that the violence was well directed at specific targets. Petrolbombs were ready when needed.

We bear in mind that even legitimate propaganda may raise political temperatures (as it is often intended to do) and that the mere fact that the UDF waged their propaganda campaign cannot make it responsible for the actions of irresponsible hotheads. The evidence goes further however. Once it is clear that the mass violence was organised and directed at specific targets the involvement of an organisation is an indispensable element. Such an organisation would not be able to operate clandestinely, totally unknown to all state and defence witnesses. We are not dealing with isolated bombing incidents. These were mass attacks by hundreds or thousands. Such mobs are not led by unknown strangers. Only recognised leaders will be followed. They belong to well-known organisations. A loner cannot lead a mob.

This disposes of the tongue in cheek argument of the defence that ascribes all violence to incognito ANC cadres operating outside the known organisations. It is significant that no witness in this case even suggested this. If the defence case of unpremeditated uncontrolled violence fails, as it does, the finger points inexorably at the most active, most politicised, most radical local organisation, when a culprit for the violence is sought.

In the 17 areas where violence was directed at the councillors and the property of the Black local authorities and the Development Board there had been campaigns against the councillors and Black local authority waged by the local affiliate of the UDF or an organisation actively supporting the UDF. Often that civic organisation could not be linked directly to the violence but the finger pointed directly or by inference to the local youth organisation which had close links with the civic. In most cases the UDF itself had close links with both.

In some instances the UDF could be directly connected with the violence as in Somerset East and with revolutionaries as in Mankweng. Most frequently the youth organisation involved in the violence was COSAS, the UDF's revolutionary affiliate for school going youth. Often there were affiliated youth congresses involved. They were for non-school going youth. Always the UDF gave them its full support and never, to our knowledge, did the UDF dissociate itself from their path of violence. Where UDF speakers addressed the youth they were referred to their role in the liberation struggle and often the 1976 revolt was held forth as a shining example.

We conclude that the UDF leadership as a whole held the view that the end justified the means as far as the destruction of the Black local authority system was concerned. Violence was an accepted and effective option.

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that at no stage was it ever considered to terminate the affiliation to the UDF of its revolutionary youth wing COSAS - or any of the youth congresses.

The demise of the Black local authorities through the murder of the councillors or their intimidation into resignation by arson and assault, was proudly held up by the UDF as a great victory.

DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985-1989

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