

concentrate primarily on the question of national oppression.

The attempt to modernise the syllabus, and to make it more efficient in contributing to economic growth, led to the technocratic concern of reformers (like those whose views were expressed in the De Lange Commission of 1980) with an education that fitted in neatly with the demands of international capital. This view of the content of education was quite at odds with the development of oppositional ideas within the trade unions, the community organisations, the student movement and the units of the ANC underground. The mismatch between the new ideas about curriculum and the aspirations of the mass democratic movement contributed to the development of demands for a wholly new kind of education, people's education in the service of national liberation, an education for people's power. These demands were crystallised in the resolutions on people's education at the NECC conferences of 1985-86.

### Reminders of Oppression

While many of the failures of bantu education as an instrument of oppression were inherent in its early successes, the seeds of failure lay within the very notion of a segregated education system. Residential areas in South Africa were segregated; segregated schools and universities replicated, in the poverty or wealth of their facilities, the degrees of oppression of the population. This meant there was no way Black children at school or students at university could fail to be reminded of the conditions of national oppression, the poverty and struggle of their parents and community. These facts were made sharply and painfully apparent to them every day. With this awareness, it was no accident that the student movement easily and naturally made contact, and worked, with the other organisations of the mass democratic movement.

Secondly, the regime itself, from the 1950s on, propounded the doctrine of separate development, of which the growing Department of Bantu Education was one manifestation. To protect and advance

separate development, it was necessary to allow some space for the Black population to develop separately, with institutions having a limited degree of what was termed community control. Within this space, the education system became a relatively protected sphere, where, given the severe repression of the 1960s, ideas and organisations of opposition could continue to flourish.

It appears to me that it was the failure of bantu education as an instrument of repression that led to the very severe attack by the regime on the educational organisations of opposition. In the period from 1984 to the present, students, schools, universities and educational organisations have been attacked by detentions, bannings of organisations, murder of leaders, outlawing of activities, the presence of the military in schools and on campuses. Many of the terms of the emergency regulations apply specifically to control on schools.

This leads to the second question I posed. Do the problems for the regime in using bantu education as an instrument of coercion still exist? Put another way, will the education struggle continue to progress despite the present repression?

### Black Education Expands

What are the conditions of the regime at present? To mention a few — the downturn of the economy is long-term and structural. South Africa is heavily indebted to foreign banks, sanctions are causing a drastic reduction in foreign investment, and high interest rates in many countries mean falling gold prices. The regime and its supporters now accept that economic growth cannot occur, and cannot be the engine of 'political stability,' but they continue to hope that the creation of a Black middle class with an economic stake in the continuation of the present system will form a brake on demands for political change. This means that there is a continued commitment to the expansion of Black education, believed to be the most important instrument for the creation of that class.

However, the regime faces a considerable fiscal crisis, because of the heavy cost

of the war, both beyond the borders of the country and within them, against the South African people, and because of the falling rate of wages, which means a smaller revenue base. These shortfalls have to be reconciled with the growth of the largely state-financed service sector, the sector that has to expand if a Black middle class is to be kept in employment. Because of its fiscal crisis, the regime is trying to shift to the private sector the costs of many social services, of which education is one.

A third problem for the regime is that, despite the unprecedented level of repression in the country, it has been unable to extinguish the opposition forces of the mass democratic movement, the trade unions and the ANC underground. Partly this is because of the desire of the regime to retain some degree of international credibility in a period when there is concern among all the major powers to see some form of end to apartheid. Partly it is because the organisations of opposition have become deeply embedded in local communities, both ideologically and organisationally, and even the detention of leaders and the banning of certain organisations is unable to dislodge this mobilisation.

### Strategy of the Regime

Given these conditions of the regime, what is its strategy in education? It appears to be attempting to divide and co-opt teachers even more extensively than before. Teachers known for their commitment to the mass democratic movement have been suspended or detained; other teachers have generous pensions to look forward to, assistance with buying the leases on their houses, and equal pay with White teachers according to qualification.

The regime is trying to divide schools. Some schools in Soweto and Tembisa, known for their radical student population, have been closed down in recent weeks.

The regime is also trying to shift the costs of education to big business, encouraging the growth of private schools, many overtly non-racial but clearly elitist, in luxurious buildings and attractive surroundings.

Lastly, the regime is trying to co-opt the

concept of people's education, trying to use elements of Black history and popular culture in its school syllabuses in an attempt to rob the concept of its radical trajectory, and uncouple it from the concept of people's power. In many of the new non-racial private schools, there is a similar concern with using more popularly acceptable curricula.

### Liberation of Education

All these policies have inherent dangers for the regime, and may backfire, but their success or failure depends crucially on the condition of the forces in opposition. On an assessment of the limited material available from the press, it appears there are some problems within the education organisations of the opposition. While demonstrations and school boycotts continue, and underground organisations are clearly managing to survive, these struggles appear more fragmented than before, less able to survive on a national basis.

While there are important initiatives in building up people's education in institutions like UWC, the mass-based structures of the NECC had hardly any time to establish themselves before the organisation was banned, and they still exist on a very precarious basis. It appears there is a lack of national strategy in the education struggle, partly because the leadership continues in detention, and the organisations now banned are still struggling to re-establish themselves. Moreover, while important initiatives have been taken by the trade union movement in developing worker education, this seems to be running at a tangent to the work of the educational organisations, and important collaborative work does not seem to be taking place on a large scale.

Thus, while conditions within the ruling bloc mean that fruitful ground for struggle continues to exist, there is a great need for the ANC and the mass democratic movement to formulate a creative strategy that can exploit the weaknesses and contradictions in the position of the regime, and advance the struggle for people's education for people's power.

# TODAY'S GENERATION THE UDF TREASON TRIALISTS

By N Mosikare

The Pretoria regime tells the world that it is reforming. It has released Harry Gwala and Zeph Mothopeng; it 'released' Govan Mbeki, only to place him under restrictions, and has transferred Nelson Mandela from prison to the isolation of a prison house. At the same time, it has gaoled four of the leaders of today — those whom its courts found guilty in the UDF treason trial. This fact further exposes the worthlessness of the claims at 'reform.'

*"We are the generation spawned by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. No price that we are called upon to pay can be above the value of our freedom."*

Patrick 'Terror' Lekota, formerly national publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front, spoke these words in court, as the prosecution began to summarise its argument.

The apartheid regime argued that Lekota, his comrades of the UDF, and 15 of their 16 co-accused were responsible for bringing South Africa to a state of insurrection, under the auspices of the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party.

The court found four of the accused guilty of treason — Lekota, aged 40; Popo Molefe, 36, formerly general secretary of the UDF; Moss Chikane, 40, formerly Transvaal secretary; and Soweto church worker, Tom Manthata, 48. It found that seven co-accused had committed acts of 'terrorism.' Long before this verdict, though, the Delmas trialists had been prepared for their dynamic role in the struggle, one that might lead them even unto death.

Lekota, Molefe and Chikane had been in prison for three and a half years by the time they were convicted and sentenced to 12 more years away from their families and

their organisations. Even when the death penalty still seemed appealing to the Broederbond judge, Van Dijkhorst, and his Broederbond assessor, Krugel, the defendants showed only strength, dignity, compassion and wit.

Lekota seemed to regard appearances in the dock as simply a different way of doing his job. He continued to reassure everyone outside, spread the word about the irresistible nature of the struggle, and worried about where momentum was lacking. His message to the world was:

*"We carry no regrets nor bitterness for those who choose to be the obstacles on our path to liberty."*

Of course, if truth or justice or greatness of spirit retained any currency under apartheid, the Delmas trialists, the 911 others named as co-conspirators, and the Rivonia trialists, who sat in the same courtroom in the Palace of Justice in Pretoria in 1964, would have had no occasion to oppose the regime. However, the extreme prejudice of the judge, who saw the UDF Three and all who associated with them as personal enemies, was an extra burden.

## Biased Bench

"This is a very terrible judge; the man real-

ly hates us," Jerry Thlopane, a Sebokeng activist the state could find no evidence against, said during the trial. Thlopane's expected acquittal could scarcely raise his spirits, while he watched a bungling prosecution suggest that the efforts of the UDF and the Vaal Civic Association and other bodies to mobilise township residents against unfair rent increases and poverty was part of a Communist-inspired plot to reduce South Africa to chaos. The state held that the campaign 'People's Education for People's Power' was not a programme to enable Black people to acquire educational skills to equip them to contribute in a free South Africa, but was rather a recipe for violent revolution.

No violence could be proved on the part of the accused, and the judge in the Moses Mayekiso trial had just ruled violence a precondition of a conviction for high treason. That didn't deter Van Dijkhorst, even after the prosecution had finished summing up. He frequently interrupted defence counsel summing up for the defence, to make points or ask questions the prosecution had forgotten or ignored.

All those on trial sustained the tribulations they faced in or out of court with courage and goodwill. The 16 on bail had been forced to live away from home, travel to Pretoria every day the court was in session, report to the police twice a day on other occasions and restrict their activities to those approved by Van Dijkhorst.

For most, this meant separation from their families, no chance of a job, and financial reliance on Dependents' Conference and well-wishers — a hard transition for those used to leading and supporting others. But the trial has opened up other possibilities — several trialists are studying law with the University of South Africa as a direct result of the need to unravel the legal complexities of the case. In terms of documentation, this was the longest trial in South African history — 25 000 pages of documents and 14 000 exhibits were presented. Defence counsel had to work twice as hard as would have been necessary if there had been a jury and an honest prosecution. However, counsel like George Bizos are used to this — his background is the treason trial of the 1950s, and the Rivonia trial, among others.

"He is an important part of our history," says Lekota.

## Ban the Regime

The defence gave the judge a few headaches and the defendants some cause to smile. For instance, on the question of furthering the aims of the ANC, Arthur Chaskalson pointed out that sharing the attitudes of another body was not the same as sharing its objects; if it was, then similarities between the Conservative Party and the "hypothetical" ultra-right-wing paramilitary group that likes to dress up in neo-Nazi uniform and bomb non-racial restaurants would mean that the banning of one should dictate the banning of the other. Van Dijkhorst buried his face in his hands as Chaskalson said that, if the judge wanted to apply the logic of similar attitudes, the desire for racial segregation put the Nationalist government in the same camp as the neo-Nazis, and it must also be banned.

The judge had presided over a trial that had lasted more than three and a half years, and yet he set a deadline on oral defence argument. Prejudice and injustice aside, this was what most distressed the accused. When Terror Lekota heard the judge rule that the defence of 19 people must be summarised in 15½ days, he said, "We are not at all happy about this ... we shall lose the persuasion element which is such an integral part of the debate."

## Political Verdict

The accused devoted much time to analysing the external political factors which would influence the outcome of the trial. They noted drily that the judge had "lost no opportunity to remind us of his eagerness to take his seven months' leave," but objectively assessed all other reasons for a hurried end to the trial — the impact of the municipal elections, the need to give signs to the South African and international communities that the regime was in control but was reforming.

Lekota managed to keep sight of the extreme possibilities of the conviction and ex-

execution of the UDF leaders, or their release to win 'goodwill.' Whatever the outcome, the Delmas 19 had prepared themselves for it, and the UDF Three typified the group's concern for all but themselves.

*"It would be good for our families and our organisations if we could be released. But that is no longer our immediate concern. Our determination is to see our people take part in the government of our country. It is irrelevant whether we are in or out, we shall just keep relentlessly pushing for victory. There can now be no interest, task or obligation which can or will be allowed to supersede this one goal."*

While Lekota, Molefe and Chikane showed themselves ready to sacrifice, they did not want martyrdom, seeing their removal from their communities as a waste for everyone. In a letter written towards the end of the trial, they said:

*"It brings us little comfort to go on sitting here all the time. We are losing golden opportunities to help advance the struggle ... When this witch-hunt has passed, we shall re-start like turbo-charged engines."*

The sentences were declared in the media to be 'lenient,' much lower than expected, as if one should be grateful for liberal thinking and an 'independent' judiciary. The kind of thinking that asserts 'it could have been worse' obscured realisation of the completeness of this travesty of justice; in between the 11 individuals deprived of their liberty and the millions of South Africans deprived of their rightful leaders are the hundreds of people whose lives have been swallowed into this trial.

There are the families of the convicted — Popo Molefe's wife gave birth to their daughter just a month before his arrest, yet the family has hardly seen each other. Moss Chikane's wife and Cynthia Lekota both had children after their husbands were charged. Cynthia maintained her teaching job and her family in Durban, using all her leave days to visit her husband. She is a resourceful woman but she is tired.

There are the attorneys, their assistants and their families, who have eaten, drunk and slept of Delmas these past years. "Don't ask me what's happening in South

Africa," said one attorney. "All I know about is this trial." (In a sense it's the same thing.) One young woman immersed herself in the case at the expense of the variety of legal experience vital to her law exams. And of course there are the activists who keep the organisations going.

## Human Energy Wasted

At the trial, it was this paralysis of human resources that could otherwise be building a free South Africa which seemed so tragic. No one gave up or was destroyed. Most made medicine out of poison — whether it was Simon Nkoli winning half-marathon medals while out on bail, or Jacob Hlanyane feeding the Pretoria pigeons with the leftovers of the trialists' Black Sash lunches, or Jerry Thlopane using his free evenings to collect details of street children in Johannesburg, or all the bailed trialists taking on their legal team in football matches

It is a tragedy that so much energy is forced out of the struggle, yet it is a victory that cannot be destroyed. Terror Lekota said at the end of the trial that the prosecution simply couldn't understand the depth of the 'Delmas type' of commitment. Perhaps that is why he is still able to look at reconciliation with Afrikanerdom, to try to remove the ignorance of the oppressors.

After the injustices of this trial, such absence of malice, such concern as the trialists showed for their own righteousness in the face of bigotry and bias, is rare. Before the verdict was delivered, one of the attorneys confided:

*"There should be another Nuremburg when this is all over. And I would like to be on the prosecution team, calling for the death penalty. For the people who preside over this evil system deserve to hang."*

So 1989 has begun, with another 11 South Africans gaoled for their efforts to bring peaceful change. And the apartheid regime has begun another year apparently ignorant that it is cutting off every hand that could bring such change about. But, as another attorney said wearily as he left the court after the summing up: "They learn nothing; they forget nothing."

# LETTER TO THE EDITOR THE SEIZURE OF POWER

The Editor  
Sechaba

Dear Comrade Editor

What has the Botha regime to show except puppets and collaborators wrestling among themselves for power and loot? In the most recent nation-wide municipality elections, Umkhonto We Sizwe, our people's army, demonstrated that it is well and alive; our people boycotted the elections, once more sending a message to the regime that nothing short of people's power will satisfy them.

This is the time for the liberation movement to consolidate its political superiority, and creatively lead our people in a new era of heightened armed struggle towards the cherished goal of our revolution, the seizure of political power in South Africa. Our position on armed struggle and talks is clear, and whether we enter Pretoria with tanks, mortars and bazookas, or whether it is done via a negotiated settlement, the option is left to the enemy to decide.

While continuing to isolate the regime at home and abroad, calling for increased international pressure, sharpening our ideological weapons and equipping ourselves with the skills for waging an underground struggle, the liberation movement must gather the total of its forces for war.

■ There must be enthusiastic discussion at all levels of the liberation movement at home and abroad, on the revolutionary army and escalating the people's war for the seizure of power. This discussion must be characterised by openness and frankness concerning the expectations, responsibilities and tasks of the liberation movement at home and in exile. Differences, misconceptions and problems must be sorted out.

■ The arming of the liberation forces inside the country is long overdue. They must be capable of defending their ad-

vances and their superior political positions against the murder squads, tribal impis, vigilantes and kitskonstabels of the regime. The enemy has exploited this weakness for too long.

■ The South African working class must take its leading role in our armed struggle. It has demonstrated its revolutionary potential, and its willingness to engage the enemy at whatever cost. A significant proportion of our people's revolutionary army has to be based in the factories, hostels, and townships, where the history-makers of our country live and work.

■ Farm workers should be drawn in. The rural areas must also constitute revolutionary zones, so that the enemy forces can be stretched between the urban and rural revolutionary bases.

■ The propaganda organs of the liberation movement should be co-ordinated, to give concrete and creative guidance, with data, strategies and slogans. Organs of the movement must share information without undermining security, keeping our cadres, both at home and in exile, well informed.

■ The wrath of our people's war must be directed at the personnel of the enemy. Collaborators, puppets, informers and enemy personnel must not be spared the wrath of the people. Let them pay dearly for the blood of our combatants and patriots on death row.

■ The skills of underground cadres should be strengthened. They must be able to address a meeting, lead a demonstration, raise our revolutionary banners, attack known collaborators in the daytime.

■ Planning and strategy must be outlined, so that all sectors can be clear about their tasks and responsibilities. Lagging sectors should stand out clearly, so that attention can be directed towards finding solutions.


Yours in the struggle  
Pascal Vivani

Harare

0936

# REVIEW ARTICLES

## ECONOMIC FUTURE



John Suckling and Landeg White (Ed), *After Apartheid: Renewal of the South African Economy* James Currey, London, 1988, £8.95.

The wide range of articles here seeks to emphatically place on the agenda of the liberation movement the issue of a post-apartheid economy in South Africa. The contributors have focused on a broad spectrum of issues covering land distribution, agricultural policies, the position of African women in the economy, the socialist alternative, the economic clauses of the Freedom Charter, and so on. The articles also draw lessons from the experience of countries in Latin America and in Southern Africa, thus enabling the authors to arrive at an informed conclusion in their analysis of the South African economy.

The first part of the book examines aspects of the current economic crisis in South Africa, the response of the regime and the measures it has adopted in an at-

tempt to rescue the economy. The articles also demonstrate how structural changes have exacerbated the crisis.

The book shows how government subsidies to farmers led to increased mechanisation, and thus displacement of thousands of workers; it also reflects on the state of resistance within the rural areas. For instance in Transkei, people in some villages have started self-help projects in defiance of the Bantustan authorities.

The introduction indicates what the editors consider a fundamental economic problem which a post-apartheid government will face, namely that popular demands on that government will exceed the resources available to it. It states:

*"In making immediate decisions under extreme pressure to alleviate equally immediate needs, the (post-apartheid) Government will be setting precedents and establishing institutions perhaps contradictory to its long-term aims." (p.x)*

This view seems to be influenced by experiences from the failure of the different economic strategies adopted by the nationalist movements in post-independent Central American and Southern African countries, where, as the editors put it, hard political decisions often had to be made which popularly elected politicians would rather avoid.

Terence Moll contrasts monetarist arguments with structuralist strategies in Latin America. The monetarists, he says, argue that lack of monetary restraint and, in particular, government budget deficits often financed by foreign loans or printing new money, led directly to inflation and balance of payments deficits which served to prevent economic development. Hence the assertion that strict control over the money supply, domestic credit and government expenditure would best control inflation. On the other hand, it is argued that devaluation, lower real wages and fewer controls would improve the structure of relative prices and balance of payment.

Underlying this argument is the assumption that the economy has a dynamic of its own. However, the truth is that where some of these measures have been implemented without regard to social factors, the results have been disastrous.

The basic structuralist argument, on the other hand, as Moll put it, was that economies were far more complex than the monetarists tend to suggest. In the case of South Africa, according to Fuad Cassim, the economic managers of the state expected that liberalisation of the domestic financial market, accompanied by gradual opening of finance to the external sector, would lead to an increase in saving and investment. The reverse has been true. The financial reforms, argues Cassim, are at the heart of the subsequent crisis.

A number of factors have been identified with respect to Latin American economies, which, as many writers argue, led to slow growth, inflation and balance of payment disequilibrium, via 'structural' channels which 'freer' markets could not remedy. Some of these factors may be detected in the South African economy; for example, large farms left idle might have to be taken by the state and redistributed among the

peasants with state help.

Current trends suggest that should a new government take power tomorrow in South Africa, it would inherit a declining economy. Cassim's article suggests that the economic strategies of the regime have so far failed to bring positive results. Attempts to (a) control money supply with the aims of reducing inflation, and (b) control government expenditure to reduce the deficit before borrowing, have failed. Instead, he argues, reducing the growth of the money raises the cost of borrowing. The bank rates increased from 9.5% to 17% during the course of 1981, rose immediately to 18% and subsequently to 20% through most of 1982, reaching an unprecedented rate of 25% in August 1985.

This has affected many companies that could not cope with the impact of interest rate increases. Among other things, companies faced wage and salary costs that affected profits. The result was mergers, and a rise in speculative activity. Recent mergers have enhanced monopoly in the South African economy, making even more complex the economic structure a new government will inherit.

Examining what might happen in the mining industry, Peter Robbins looks at the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe after independence, and concludes that:

*"... any country which is determined to bring its mining industry under the control of its government will face three main problems: subversive activity from the multinationals; finding the necessary quantity and quality of skilled engineers and managers, loyal to the cause of independence; and corruption."*

Robbins' assertion implies that if an ANC government considers nationalisation of the mining industry in the future it may not be in a position to escape these problems.

According to Stoneman, half or more of the wage and salary bill in South Africa is the costs of skilled labour and professionals at near-international rates, and the benefit to capitalists of even the cheapest of unskilled labour is marginal. These factors, plus the Latin American experience and the experience of countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique in Southern Africa, lead

him to the conclusion that unless all employment costs are kept down, capital intensity is forced even higher, and the mass of the population becomes permanently excluded from the job market.

If this were to prove true in post-apartheid South Africa, the workers would feel independence had brought them only misery instead of freedom. However, some assumptions underlying the arguments raised here need careful examination:

- The assumption that there will be a peaceful transition with fewer disruptions in the economy that a post-apartheid government will inherit.

- The assumption that western industrialised countries, upon which the economy largely depends, will support the economic strategies of the post-apartheid government.

However, experience of other Third World countries tells us that economic support is dependent on the ideological orientation of the incumbent government in the country concerned. If a post-apartheid government in South Africa pursues the socialist path of development, as the book seems to suggest, there is every reason to believe that there will be economic pressures from western countries. Analysis of what such an economic squeeze might do may be essential for a future government. Failure to acknowledge the devastating ef-

fects of western pressures on the economies of newly independent countries often leads analysts to place the blame for the post-independence economic crisis on the policies of the new government.

The other weakness of the contributors to this book is that they tend to centre their arguments around the major contending classes, the capitalists and the working class. There is little analysis of the different social groupings and the institutional framework upon which the economy is structured. Failure to analyse the state institutions which are an expression of capitalist culture and defenders of the system makes this collection of articles lean more towards an economic approach. The book does not fully analyse the different forces seeking to transform the society.

However, this book remains significant, as it raises fundamental economic issues which the liberation movement and the entire democratic mass movement can only ignore to the detriment of the future of our country, and helps to provoke more discussion on these issues. But it would be dangerous if the discussion were to ignore analysis of the process by which freedom might be achieved, and a careful analysis of the social and economic costs of redressing the inequalities created by the apartheid state and how this might affect a post-apartheid government.

Thozamile Botha

## A SORT OF THEOLOGICAL MK

Albert Nolan, *God in South Africa*, David Phillip, Cape Town; Wm B Berdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Mambo Press, Gweru; CIIR, London.

The liberation of religion is part of our struggle. When a social transformation occurs in which a people are freeing themselves from oppression in an inhuman system,

every aspect is brought under review, including politics, economics, the law, procedures of government — and belief and behaviour. This is particularly necessary in South Africa, where the apartheid system is promoted as 'defending Christian civilisation,' and acceptance of the ruling power is demanded as a sign of religious orthodoxy.

The ability of human beings to transcend

their contextual circumstances is an essential element in any revolution (whether expressed in theistic or agnostic terms) and our struggle has never accepted it when religion acquiesces with oppression. Whatever our religious bent, we rejected any notion that God in South Africa could support the system or keep quiet in the face of it. We felt in our guts that God was part of the struggle, that the church should go beyond tut-tutting into proclaiming a thrusting revolutionary faith that would set us all on fire. But it didn't, and lacking the theological skills to do it for ourselves many of us drifted away from the church because the church seemed to have drifted away from faith, though we couldn't quite put a finger on it.

Nolan can. In recent years, skilled people have started doing theology from inside the struggle, and one of them is Albert Nolan. He was born to White working class parents in a mixed area of Cape Town, became a priest, scholar, student, pastor, and widely travelled political and theological observer, but turned down a high post in the Vatican to continue his work in the struggle in Soweto. He is now engaged at the Institute of Contextual Theology, which helped produce the Kairos Document.

Bringing these influences together in *God and South Africa* produces a manual for Christian revolutionaries, a sort of theological MK, demolishing the symbols and systems of the oppressor, and revealing the liberating God in the heart of the people's struggle.

*"The youth of the townships have lost patience with the Churches and with all the confused and contorted interpretations of the gospel ... it is out of the purifying fires of this challenge that a new understanding of the gospel is emerging — an understanding that is more faithful to Jesus Christ."*

Nolan's book is a scholarly work, yet he writes:

*"I have learnt more about what it means to be a Christian from the people of my country, and especially from the youth in the townships, that I have ever learnt from books."*

His basic thesis is that something stupen-

dous in world history is happening in South Africa right now. Within all the suffering and struggle, liberation is coming. This is the Good News, the gospel of God in South Africa, that the time is ripe for liberation, and we have to seize that time and take it.

The gospel is about the meaning of the present, not a set of ethics from the past:

*"The gospel for us today is what God is doing in South Africa today in the light of what God has done in the past."*

Theological reflection is a rotating involvement in which practical action (what God is doing now) meshes with historical and scriptural study (what God was doing in the past), and each helps the other in discovering "the role of God in the situation."

*"The gospel is the news about our time and country that God is revealing to us today through the signs of our times, but this subjective experience ... is shaped by all that is revealed about God in the Bible ... the anger of God has become visible for all to see, in the anger of the people."*


You can start at either end, but Nolan starts by examining several key biblical concepts, and then interprets them in terms of the struggle. Gospel, sin and salvation are evaluated in a highly relevant and enlightening fashion, and then examined in terms of the recent political history of the struggle. The meaning of sin and salvation in South Africa reveals a crucified people, unmasks the system of what he calls 'racial capitalism' and leads to salvation, and hope.

*"I remember a Mass in Sebokeng ... at the height of repression in that township in 1985 ... the people presented to their bishops the instruments of their repression: rubber bullets, teargas canisters, rent bills and chains ... the modern crosses, the symbols of repression that were being transformed like the cross into sacred symbols of our hope and liberation."*


Much of the book is:

*"an attempt to liberate people from the alienating forms of religion or Christianity that are an obstacle in the way of God's plans and purposes for peace in South Africa."*

# RELEASE THE DETAINEES




HAN HANSEN



The hunger strikers: they turned the prisons into theatres of struggle, and used the only weapon available.

# RELEASE THE DETAINEES



**SECHARRA**  
 official organ of the african  
 national congress south africa

363

APRIL 1989

# SECHABA

Volume 23 No 4

ISSN:0037-0509

## EDITORIAL

# THE RACISTS HAVE PROBLEMS

### CONTENTS:

**EDITORIAL**  
The Racists Have Problems ..... 1

**ANC STATEMENTS**  
Mandela Football Club—Mission That Failed—ICAAS and SANROC ..... 2

**JOURNALISTS IN THE FRONT LINE**  
By Brian Bunting ..... 8

**CENTRE PAGE**  
The Name of a Hero ..... 16

**BIRTH OF THE FEDERATION**  
By Sara ..... 18

**ANC INTERNATIONAL**  
Nicaragua—London—West Berlin—Pioneers ..... 22

**REVOLUTION OR NEGOTIATIONS?**  
By Neil Zumana ..... 26

**OBITUARIES**  
Hector Sikhumbuzo Nkula ..... 30

Graphic design by Hylton Alcock

### LISTEN TO RADIO FREEDOM

Voice of the African National Congress  
And Umkhonto We Sizwe, the People's Army

**Radio Lusaka**  
Daily 7.00 pm:  
Wednesday 10.15-10.45 pm:  
Thursday 9.30-10.00 pm:  
Friday 10.15-10.45 pm:  
Short wave 31mb 9505 KHz  
Sunday 8.00-8.45 am:  
Short wave 25mb 11880 KHz

**Radio Luanda**  
Monday-Saturday 7.30 pm:  
Sunday 8.30 pm:  
Short wave 31mb 9535 KHz  
and 25 mb

**Radio Madagascar**  
Monday-Saturday 7.00-9.00 pm:  
Sunday 7.00-8.00 pm:  
Short wave 49mb 6135 KHz

**Radio Ethiopia**  
Daily, 9.30-10.00 pm:  
Short wave 31mb 9595 KHz

**Radio Tanzania**  
Monday Wednesday Friday 8.15 pm:  
Tuesday Thursday Saturday 6.15 am:  
Short wave 31mb 9750 KHz

The above are South African times

The apartheid regime is in disarray, and pulling in different directions. The racists don't want to relinquish their privileges, but can't agree on how to cling to them. The followers don't know what leader to follow, with P W Botha refusing to go, and Heunis, De Klerk and others taking their turn to talk of 'reforms.' While White local councils are segregating amenities and putting up 'Whites Only' signs, Heunis says he wants to repeal petty apartheid legislation, and take the 'Whites Only' signs down.

When they speak to their followers, it seems that not Botha, not De Klerk, not Heunis, dare address the real problems looming behind their 'leadership crisis' and their confusion. They don't talk about their defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. They are quiet about their attitude to the elections in Namibia. They avoid mentioning the corruption in their own corridors of power; in the Department of Education and Training, for example, and in their bantustan governments. They don't comment when their own courts find the system of rents in Soweto to be illegal. They keep off the subject of the economy — profits are slowing down, interest rates are going up, and the time is approaching when foreign loans must be repaid.

The regime goes on passing repressive laws, like the law to control overseas funding of South African organisations, and the law against school 'disruptors.' The police continue to break up student meetings. The killing in Natal hasn't stopped, and Inkatha still follows no laws but its own. Lives are still being wrecked by forced removals. Profit is still valued above human life; three years after the disaster at Kinross, the regime has still failed to enforce any regula-

tions against the use of inflammable materials down the mines, and there has been another fire fed by polyurethane. The realities of exploitation are still there. Political opponents of the regime are still arrested, detained, tried and sentenced.

The oppressed people of South Africa know these realities, and are never deceived by the double-talk of the racists. Today, the country is alive with political activity and political struggle.

On our cover this month we salute the detainees who went on hunger strike. They knew what they wanted: they wanted to be free. They declared that nothing could be worse than the life they were leading, and they were prepared for death. They were in prison, so they turned the prisons into theatres of struggle, and they used the only weapon available to them. Their action was planned, disciplined and united.

They typify the majority of the South African people today. Everywhere in the land the fight for freedom goes on. Wherever our people are becomes a theatre of struggle, and in resistance they use what weapons they have. Students are taking the police to court for assault; women fast for 24 hours in front of the cathedral in Johannesburg; White mothers unite to oppose conscription; the residents of Carletonville conduct a consumer boycott that paralyses the town; workers go on strike, or negotiate better agreements, or work for greater trade union unity.

There is no confusion here; only political clarity, planning, discipline, and a determination to be free. It is the democratic forces that hold in their hands the future of our country; and that is the racists' most serious problem of all.

# ANC STATEMENTS

## THE MANDELA FOOTBALL CLUB

Recently there have been serious developments pertaining to the activities of the group known as the Mandela Football Club which have raised great concern within the mass democratic movement and struggling people as a whole. The ANC shares the concern of the people, and has, all the time, tried to intervene to find an amicable solution to the problem.

In the light of reports about its activities in the recent past, our organisation, complementing the initiatives of leading personalities of the Mass Democratic Movement, tried to use its influence to bring about the disbanding of the group. Unfortunately our counsel was not heeded by Comrade Winnie Mandela. The situation has been further complicated by the fact that she did not belong to any structures and therefore did not benefit from the discipline, counselling and collectivity of the Mass Democratic Movement.

Under these circumstances she was left open and vulnerable to committing mistakes which the enemy exploited. One such instance relates to the so-called Mandela Football Club. In the course of time, the club engaged in unbecoming activities which have angered the community. We fully understand the anger of the people and their organisations towards this club. We have every reason to believe that the club was infiltrated by the enemy, and that most of its activities were guided by the hand of the enemy for the purposes of causing disunity within the community and discrediting the name of Nelson Mandela and the organisation of which he is the leader.

Our people should not allow this. The ANC calls on our people to close ranks and exercise maximum vigilance against the vile machinations of the enemy.

Our position is that the problem arising

from the activities of the Mandela Football Club can and must be resolved within the ambit of the democratic movement as a whole, both at local and national levels. This must be done in the shortest possible time.

To realise this, it is necessary that Comrade Winnie Mandela is helped to find her way into the structures and discipline of the Mass Democratic Movement. It will be of paramount importance that she cooperates with all those involved in the resolution of the problem.

We are confident that the Mass Democratic Movement will open its doors to her in the interest of our people and the struggle. There is a need to create a climate in which all problems facing the community, including the unfortunate death of Stompie Moeketsi Seipei (a committed young lion who has made an immense contribution in the mobilisation of our youth and people in the struggle) will be discussed to foster unity rather than let the enemy use them to achieve its ends.

The ANC takes this opportunity to convey its heartfelt condolences to the parents, relatives and community of Stompie Moeketsi Seipei.

It is with a feeling of terrible sadness that we consider it necessary to express our reservations about Winnie Mandela's judgment in relation to the Mandela Football Club. But we should not forget what Comrade Winnie Mandela has gone through and her immense contribution to the liberation struggle. She has not only suffered the anguish of over a quarter of a century of separation from her husband, but has also experienced unending persecution at the hands of the regime, such as banishment, imprisonment, torture and sustained harassment over a period of more than two decades. Bearing the name of Mandela, and in her own right, she increasingly became one of the symbols of resistance to racist tyranny both at home and abroad.

We firmly believe, without prejudging all the issues which have been raised in relation to the problem, that whatever mistakes were made should be viewed against the background of her overall contribution on the one hand, and the activities of the enemy on the other. Viewed in this light, we consider it important that the movement as a whole should adopt a balanced ap-

proach to the problems that have arisen. The ANC, for its part, will continue to work for the unity of our people, and we have no doubt that all those who have participated in attempting to solve this problem have done so in the best interests of our struggle.

ANC, Lusaka, February 18th 1989

## OLIVIA FORSYTH A MISSION THAT FAILED

What is the real truth about the Olivia Forsyth saga? The facts speak for themselves, and show quite clearly that her mission to infiltrate the ANC was a pathetic flop. The so-called 'master minds' of the South African security police spent many months conjuring up an elaborate plan to penetrate the ANC and the Front Line States, and failed dismally.

The scheme was foiled before it had even got off the ground, when Forsyth was unmasked by the ANC in February 1986 in Harare. She was confronted by our then Chief Representative, who had, unknown to her, been our national chief of security before being appointed to head our mission in Zimbabwe. Cracking under the pressure of his questions, she confessed to being a security police lieutenant on an undercover mission to infiltrate our organisation and establish an espionage network in the Front Line States. She was taken to Lusaka for debriefing, and claimed that she could no longer reconcile herself to working for the racist regime.

The ANC is not that naive to fall for such a 'conversion,' but it suited us to send her back to Pretoria and test whether she would provide us with sensitive information from security police headquarters. This is standard practice world-wide in such cases. The ANC had nothing to lose in this regard but a great deal to gain. Without her knowledge, we had the means to carefully monitor her actions. The spy

was sent to spy on her masters.

Her return to South Africa was viewed with consternation by the authors of the infiltration plan, for it spelt nothing but failure. Her cover had been blown, and the vast resources, time and energy expended on her mission had proved valueless. The ANC, by sending her back to South Africa, had confounded their attempts to base her in the Front Line States. Consequently, by June 1986, after many sleepless days and nights of scheming and plotting, Forsyth's handlers sent her to Lusaka in a reckless attempt to inject new life into a plan that just was not getting off the ground. It was hoped that Forsyth would somehow get the ANC to send her for military training, and thereafter obtain a strategic position at our headquarters in the Department of Information and Publicity.

### The Spy in Detention

Forsyth's failure to carry out the assignment given to her by the ANC was conclusive proof that we could expect to gain nothing more from the exercise. Instead of going for training, she found herself promptly despatched to our top security detention centre in Angola.

She spent the next 22 months in detention of one kind or another, always a prisoner and always under guard. She was never trusted, and was lucky to escape with the assistance of the British government. It is quite clear that only the gullible, and the fervent supporters of the racist regime, can believe anything other than that her mission failed miserably.

Since her return to South Africa, the security police have sought to stage a spec-



365  
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tacular press event in an effort to cover up their bungled operation. They have invented a preposterous story claiming that Forsyth's confession to the ANC was a brilliant ploy pre-planned by their top brains in order to penetrate our organisation to the highest levels. Stretching incredulity to the limits, the astonishing claim is made that even her imprisonment was sought after by her handlers. This is in the nature of the Hitler technique — the bigger the lie the more readily it will be believed.

The terms the police are using to characterise Forsyth's role, such as "false defector" and "double and triple agent," are dubious words in the world of intelligence. Such individuals, as everyone knows, are always regarded with deep scepticism, and are never trusted. The false version of how she became a prisoner, trusted by the ANC and thus able to gather sensitive information, is nothing more than a desperate attempt to turn a disastrous and embarrassing mission into a glorious triumph for the apartheid regime.

### Pretoria's Errand Girl

This bizarre story, made up of the juicy ingredients of the spy tales that are currently so popular, is meant to distract public and press attention from the stupendous degree of bungling and incompetence all the more unexpected from a state body with enormous financial resources and boasting a high level of professionalism. Apart from covering up a botched operation, this version seeks to spread lies and disinformation about the ANC whilst attempting to undermine the value of the vast information provided to us by Pretoria's little errand girl.

Forsyth's allegations that the ANC is divided by tribal and personal power struggles, that there is demoralisation within our ranks, that we are ambivalent about the release of Nelson Mandela, and so on, is nothing but the stale stories that have been circulated by Pretoria's disinformation machine for many years. This old garbage is being paraded as proof of Forsyth's successful mission. Anyone but unmitigated

racists will reject this with the contempt it deserves.

Once Forsyth had been debriefed, her only value to us was in a prisoner exchange. She was moved from our detention centre to a security house in Luanda, not because she had passed a test of trustworthiness but because at that point the handful of women prisoners who were there were all being transferred.

Pretoria's claims that she was able to obtain sensitive information are laughable, the figment of the imagination of her handlers. Her value to her masters whilst in ANC detention has been negligible. Her tasks, according to her press statement, included:

*"investigating specific aspects SACP/ANC alliance; the internal leadership conflict; the disillusionment of cadres wishing to return to South Africa; ANC installations and facilities in the neighbouring states; making contact with other police agents in order to activate sleepers; to undergo political and military training; to investigate conditions in the camps; to recruit principal agents; to spread disinformation ..."*

Detention is hardly the place for the accomplishment of such elaborate tasks. Yet the police persist in their fiction that Forsyth was successful in her mission, that she was able to successfully report on all the above tasks and many more besides, even to the extent of learning about ANC underground structures and units inside South Africa.

Obviously the long list of her 'achievements' has been invented for publication by her police masters. Forsyth was simply not free to do any of these things. She was being prepared for a possible prisoner exchange. This makes the claim that she was able to obtain sensitive information from senior ANC officials quite ludicrous. She was given some work to keep her occupied, such as translating Afrikaans articles and making newspaper cuttings. This was what is now being theatrically described as "sensitive work for a senior security officer."

The only information detainees are able to provide is about their own detention, and

in this regard Forsyth is spewing out a tissue of lies about alleged ANC brutality. Her state of good health when she presented herself at the British Embassy in Luanda is proof of this. In fact, at the time when the story was put out by some British newspapers and the BBC that she had been subject to harrowing torture, she issued a statement through an official of the British embassy in Luanda, denying this. Forsyth was satisfactorily treated by us. She was never beaten as she claims.

### Forsyth Talks About the Police

The extensive information Forsyth supplied to the ANC in her confessions has been a major setback to the apartheid security police as well as a serious embarrassment. They have therefore gone to extraordinary lengths to distort the truth and pretend that the ANC has been provided with deliberate misinformation. Forsyth betrayed many of her close colleagues, such as Joy Harnden, Billy van Zyl, Patricia and John Adams, who are based in Brussels, Gilbert Strauss, James Smith, Gawie Vorster, Andrew Hockley, John Handan, Janet Knight, Louise Vincent and so on. Billy van Zyl, thanks to Forsyth, has been in ANC custody since 1986.

She has also given intimate details of the inner workings of the South African security apparatus with all its incompetence and rivalries. These rivalries include those between police and military and between government leaders and the security establishment. Lengthy profiles of scores of police officers from the lowest ranks to generals have been provided, listing their strengths and weaknesses, their home addresses, vehicle registration numbers, details about their families and so on, giving us a valuable insight into the seams and cracks of the security system and its personnel. Such information was confirmation of data already in our hands from other sources.

For example, of her chief handler, Major Oosthuizen, she writes:

*"He is basically ambitious ... feels extremely guilty about neglecting his family. When*

*I am in South Africa he spends most of his free time with me. He has often told me that I am the only person he can speak to about his personal problems or to whom he can boast about successes which make him excited. He has also told me that he does not regard himself as working primarily for the South African government or any noble patriotic notions; his motivation is 80% professional and only 20% ideological. He is very racist. He has a sensitive ego, and is very conscious of his self-image; after I told him he was getting fat, he lost about eight kilograms."*

Apart from providing the most intimate details concerning Craig Williamson, she reported that:

*"... once he had resigned from the SAP, senior officers began to question what he had done in G1 (the section of the Security Branch headed by Williamson) in the years in which he controlled it."*

Forsyth continued:

*"There seems to be a growing opinion that he had ridden on his credibility gained in the field, and that G1 had in fact squandered hundreds of thousands of rands on operations which had failed. There was also criticism of frivolous spending on items like a fancy red BMW which was supposed to be an operational car ... Personal gain seems to be his overriding motive, and this includes financially. While he was in the SAP, he was involved in property speculation and other business deals. While in the Force, there were a number of occasions when he threatened to resign if he did not get promotion ..."*

Forsyth has been even less kind concerning her relative, Major Derek Brune, who took over G1 when Williamson resigned:

*"Brune is fairly bright, quite sly and very ambitious. He is quick to claim a successful operation as his, but will always blame failures on his subordinates. His major professional weakness appears to be a lack of field experience. He is regarded as a compulsive liar. He is married, but has affairs ... Ego is definitely a factor which could be exploited in his case ... to the extent that he will not hesitate to slander colleagues*

who threaten to undermine him or 'challenge' his expertise in any way."

Of Warrant Officer Palko, alias Gina:

"... she is ambitious but not very bright, a plodder who is given more secretarial than operational responsibilities, a fact which she resents ... She has expensive clothing tastes which a police salary cannot easily cater for ..."

Forsyth provided us with the following insight into the rivalry surrounding her own mission, which is eloquent testimony to the shambles that it had been reduced to by the time the ANC had sent her back to South Africa in May/June 1986:

"Operation Olivetti (the code name of her mission) has been run by a team consisting of people from John Vorster branch and G1. Prior to Olivetti, antagonism had been building up between them, more or less since Brigadier Erasmus and Major Oosthuizen had been in Johannesburg. The reasons for this included the fact that the successes of the John Vorster branch had begun to show up the inadequacies and lack of results on the part of G1. When John Vorster began to involve itself in operations like Olivetti, which reached over the borders of South Africa and into G1's official terrain, G1 began to feel threatened (Derek Brune in particular) ... G1 has consistently tried to wrest control of the operation and claim the successes for itself. Brune has used all sorts of tactics in these attempts, from manipulating Brigadier Stadler to slandering Oosthuizen at Security Branch headquarters, and Oosthuizen has countered these with tactics of his own ...

Before my trip to Lusaka ... there was a showdown meeting at Security Branch headquarters which illustrated this incompetence. The meeting was forced by G1 and included Brigadiers Erasmus and Stadler, Majors Brune and Oosthuizen and other senior officers claiming expertise in external operations as well as asserting that external ops were their domain. G1 said Olivetti should fall under their control ... This showdown was followed by further attempts by G1 to shunt John Vorster out of the operation ... As an RS agent, I am part

of G1, and Oosthuizen has pointed out that this conflict is due in large part to the fact that I am at present G1's 'trump card' and ... with their credibility at stake, G1 desperately needs to claim a success ..."

There are many other concrete gains from Forsyth's confessions to us. For instance, she enabled the ANC to alert endangered activists inside the country before the security police could pounce. Her exposure has seriously hampered the regime's nefarious attempts at infiltrating anti-apartheid forces, and served to alert and teach people in the mass democratic movement about the devious nature and tactics of the enemy.

The role of the British government in the whole Forsyth affair leaves a lot to be desired. They bear a heavy responsibility concerning the return of Pretoria's little errand girl to South Africa. All along, they were informed of the fact that she was a South African police officer of the rank of lieutenant who had been spying on the ANC as well as the Front Line States, including such Commonwealth countries as Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, they continually insisted on treating her as a British subject, disregarding her criminal activities.

### British Travel Documents

They put pressure on the Angolan government to secure her release. The passport they issued to her, enabling her to leave Luanda, was the third British document they presented her with in a short space of time. Forsyth was instructed by her controllers to apply for a British passport in Cape Town early in 1985 for the purpose of her mission, and a second in Harare in October the same year enabling her to travel throughout the region without the taint of the South African connection. She had received three British passports in as many years. This raises serious questions about the ease with which the notorious South African secret police have been able to use the British government for their sinister work. It is worthy of note that Britain lifted this known South African agent

from Luanda and safely delivered her via London to her handlers, who were waiting to receive her at Jan Smuts Airport in December 1988. From the beginning to the end, the whole project hinged on a series of British passports.

There is a growing number of South African agents using British passports to carry out subversive missions in the Front Line States. Amongst them are Steve Burnett, arrested in Botswana for attempting to assassinate an anti-apartheid activist. Burnett has confessed to being an agent not only for South Africa but for Britain's MI6. Other unsavoury characters of this type are regularly being exposed in the region. By their assistance to Forsyth, the British government has shown that it condones all these activities.

Olivia Forsyth is incapable of distinguishing fact from fiction. The truth is alien to her. In her eight years as a police spy,

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE: ANC—ICAAS—SANROC

The ANC met with the International Campaign against Apartheid Sport (ICAAS) and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) at its headquarters in Lusaka on February 23rd and 24th. Present at the meeting were the Chairman of ICAAS, Fekrou Kidane, and Sam Ramsamy, Executive Chairman of SANROC.

The main focus of the meeting was the international isolation of apartheid sport, and how to assist the non-racial sports movement inside South Africa.

The meeting paid tribute to the various organisations inside South Africa for their commendable efforts to establish non-racial sport in the country. However, the meeting re-affirmed the policy agreed upon with the non-racial sports bodies inside South Africa, that the creation of non-racial sports organisations does in no way imply their immediate entry into international sports competitions.

The ANC was accordingly outraged by suggestions made by Dennis Brutus, that it

she has behaved in a totally immoral way. Falsehood and betrayal have become second nature to her. Her behaviour during the period in our hands is best left unmentioned, but clearly reinforces the way progressives in South Africa have characterised her. Forsyth has not simply been involved in some glamorous game beloved by the writers of spy thrillers. She has for years been engaged in despicable acts in the service of an evil regime which is condemned by humanity.

Olivia Forsyth is not the first nor the last in a long line of apartheid spies. Her so-called career is a testament to the desperate efforts of a minority racist regime to cling to power in the face of inevitable defeat: the hands of a movement leading the people of South Africa to their liberation.

ANC, Lusaka  
February 14th, 1989

had given implicit approval for a change in the boycott policy. The ANC maintains contact with SANROC through its Executive Chairman, Sam Ramsamy, and with the non-racial sports movement inside South Africa on all matters relating to sport.

The meeting also recorded its gratitude to the many international organisations, governments, anti-apartheid movements and individuals who have contributed to the present isolation of apartheid sport. Appreciation was also extended to the International Olympic Committee for strengthening its stand against apartheid sport by establishing the commission, "Apartheid and Olympism."

However, the meeting observed that there are countries which still maintain sports links with apartheid South Africa. It therefore, examined various ways of applying pressure on these countries to end their collaboration with apartheid sport.

The three organisations also met with the non-racial South African Amateur Athletic Board and discussed the further development and consolidation of non-racial sport in South Africa.


The ANC, ICAAS and SANROC agreed to maintain regular contact.

Lusaka, February 24th 1989

367

# SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNALISTS IN THE FRONT LINE

By Brian Bunting



Above: Editors of the Weekly Mail address the press after the paper is suspended, November 1988

Right: Progressive papers of the sixties, also victims of censorship.

The New Nation, South, Weekly Mail, Grassroots and New Era have all suffered banning orders under the emergency regulations; Al-Qalam and Work In Progress are under threat. They are, of course, not the first newspapers in South Africa to have suffered from censorship.

Censorship is not a prerogative of the Afrikaners. It was the English governor of South Africa, Lord Charles Somerset, who suppressed the newspaper of Thomas Pringle and James Fairbairn, *The South African Commercial Advertiser*, in the 1830s, and deported George Greig, the

On The Eve Of May Day

## WORKERS' PARADE



120 Delegates:

JOHANNESBURG. Over 100 delegates and several dignitaries from all over South Africa attended the most successful workers' event of the month...


### Tanganyika Premier ...



### Freedom And Work In Tanganyika

From A. S. S. ... who had come to cover the ...

### ... And TANI



- GUARDIAN
- CLARION
- PEOPLE'S WORLD
- ADVANCE
- NEW AGE

African Embassy in London, that in a pamphlet on the *South African Press, Radio and Television* issued by the Embassy a few years ago he claimed that this ordinance:

*"was greeted as the Magna Carta of the Press in South Africa; (and) made the arbitrary suppression of papers a thing of the past."*

Tell that to Zwelakhe Sisulu, who was detained without trial for over two years; or the other journalists languishing in gaol under the emergency regulations; or the Catholic bishops responsible for the production of *New Nation*; or the director and staff of *South*; or Dr Jon Lewis, editor of the *South African Labour Bulletin*, who was deported from South Africa in 1987.

There were others after Lord Charles Somerset who tried to interfere with press freedom. In the days of the Transvaal Republic, Paul Kruger tried to interfere with the production of the *Johannesburg Star*, but the paper appealed to the courts, and its rights were fully restored. In the last year of fusion government under General Hertzog, another attempt was made to curb the freedom of the press, which was accused of insulting the heads of the Nazi and fascist states of Europe. After appealing to the newspaper editors to put their house in order, Hertzog drafted a censorship bill, but was prevented by the outbreak of war from putting it into effect.

### Fascist Draft Constitution

The idea of censorship continued to simmer in the Nationalist mind. The draft constitution, which was adopted by the Nationalist Party during the war in the expectation that the Nazis would be victorious, provided for "the total abolition of the British Kingship," the installation of a president with dictatorial powers, and the designation of Afrikaans as the "first official language" of the country, with English relegated to the status of "second or supplementary official language."

In the sphere of human rights, the draft constitution declared that the state would have power to make sure that:

*"individual citizens, as well as the organs of public opinion such as the existence of parties, the radio, the Press and the cinema, whilst their rightful freedom of expressions, including criticism of government policy, will be protected, shall not be allowed by their actions to undermine the public order or good morale of the Republic internally or externally."*

The form of this pledge has been repeated over and over again by Nationalist Party politicians in the intervening years. There is the promise to preserve "freedom of expression, including criticism of government." On the other hand, there is the

**Collection Number: AK2117**

**Collection Name: Delmas Treason Trial, 1985-1989**

***PUBLISHER:***

*Publisher:* Historical Papers Research Archive, University of the Witwatersrand

*Location:* Johannesburg

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