

Aljoscha Tillmanns

# Development for Liberation

M.G. Buthelezi's and Inkatha's initiatives  
towards a different South Africa, 1975–1994



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## **Development for Liberation**

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## 2. Introducing the Thesis

Looking at the vast amount of literature that has been produced on Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Inkatha since the 1970s, one might have thought that there was not much new to say on this topic. Numerous political and social scientists have written theses, books, and articles about Buthelezi and Inkatha, varying in their assessment from collaborator to liberator, from moderate to right-winger.<sup>1</sup> I argue, however, that a new assessment by historians is worth it.

Adam Houldsworth's 2016 thesis<sup>2</sup> on Inkatha, the National Party, and their relationship is the only major work by an historian on Inkatha of that I am aware.<sup>3</sup> Houldsworth brings the problem with most of the literature on Inkatha to the point: "But while existing studies of Inkatha provide interesting insights into the nature of Buthelezi's politics, many of the claims made in the existing accounts are not substantiated by primary source material and are not supported by detailed argumentation."<sup>4</sup>

I would qualify this to the extent that some studies are indeed lacking a backing by sources and some only cite a source here and there – or at least the writers did not make their use of primary sources visible. There are some studies, however, that cite sources extensively, including interviews, and build their arguments on the sources that would, in some cases, otherwise have been lost. Ironically, these studies are mostly unpublished theses.<sup>5</sup> It can also be observed that

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1 An overview can be found in Houldsworth 2016, 6–10.

2 Downloadable at <http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11660/4047/HouldsworthA.pdf>. Last access on 19.03.2019.

3 There are some journal articles that also deserve to be mentioned: Harries 1983; Harries 1993; Ngqulunga 2018; Sithole 2006; Sithole 2011. Many other works, especially on the violence in KwaZulu-Natal, mention Inkatha and will be cited when appropriate.

4 Houldsworth 2016, 10.

5 The following have proven especially valuable: Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A.N.M.G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimisation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR); Hassim, Shireen: Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS; McCaul, Colleen: Towards an Understand-

oftentimes the discussions on Inkatha are one-sided and tend to the extremes, i.e. many scholars either laud or condemn Inkatha. While their arguments may be logical in themselves (and may lack sources), I argue that the reality was and is more complex than this black-and-white scheme. In general, this thesis seeks to follow its own, more balanced line of arguments. Nevertheless, literature by political and social scientists can provide a rich quarry for factual information (thus, as a secondary source), although this has to be examined carefully (like any source).<sup>6</sup>

The innovative approach offered by the *Research Training Group 1919: Precaution, prevision, prediction: managing contingency* at the University of Duisburg-Essen<sup>7</sup> also helped to shed new light and thoughts on the topic. This led to a shift in perspective compared to many of the aforementioned studies and to the inclusion of Inkatha's practical work that has oftentimes been neglected in the discourse on Inkatha. The general perspective of this thesis follows the question how Buthelezi and Inkatha reacted and contributed to the increasingly contingent setting of 1980s' South Africa and developed their own initiatives – thus, how they managed contingency. To this end, an approach informed by praxeology is chosen to analyse what Buthelezi and Inkatha actually *did* to realise their vision of a future South Africa, especially so because Buthelezi seems to be a character who worked pragmatically to follow his *own* agenda, even in collusion with the apartheid government if necessary. While this attracted criticism of being a government stooge, we will see that Buthelezi very clearly followed his own aims and sought allies on a compromise basis, offering something for almost anyone. These questions will later be elaborated on in greater detail.

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ing of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC; Natrass, Nicoli: Like Chalk and Cheese: an Evaluation of two KwaZulu Development Corporation Projects in Natal, 1984. EGM T 338.9683 NAT.

- 6 The numerous works of Gerhard Maré have to be mentioned explicitly who also collected a lot of material on Inkatha in his Natal Room collection, today housed at the Alan Paton Centre & Struggle Archives, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg (PC 126).
- 7 Funding was provided by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).

This thesis is split into five parts. The first, which you are currently reading, introduces the thesis and its setting in theory and methodology. This results in a lengthy introduction, but theory and methodology need to be addressed before this thesis' questions become clear. This is followed by a chapter on the general context of South Africa in and around the 1980s.

The first main, analytical part will cover the practical work of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government inside KwaZulu, thus inside the apartheid structures. To answer the question on how contingency was managed to realise a new South Africa, aspects of constructive intervention are in focus, especially regarding education and culture, economic development, and the upholding of order in chaotic times. The violence in KwaZulu and Natal – for which Inkatha was infamous – will therefore not be part of the analysis, but it will of course be addressed. We will also see that the KwaZulu government used its position to challenge the apartheid government from inside, contributing to apartheid's erosion.

The second main part steps outside KwaZulu and apartheid structures, looking at national and international networking activities of Buthelezi and Inkatha to form alliances against apartheid – to which the South African government itself was invited but never joined. This networking activity started in the form of a political alliance (the South African Black Alliance), then turned to cooperation with scientists to democratise South Africa (the Buthelezi Commission) and, at last, to a close alliance with the business community (the KwaZulu Natal Indaba). Parallel to these developments, Buthelezi established a partnership with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and parts of the west German public to exert international pressure on the South African government and to build up a counterweight against the west's support for the ANC. Of course, this thesis will end with a general summary.

The availability of sources on these matters varies. Documents originating from the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba can be found in huge amounts at the Alan Paton Centre & Struggle Archives and the Campbell Collections while the cooperation with the FRG is also documented quite well in German archives.

Internal documents of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government are quite rare because there is no official archive (yet<sup>8</sup>), making it necessary to include literature from politology and sociology as well.<sup>9</sup> Lynn Oakley, who lived in South Africa in the second half of the 1980s, kindly opened her private collection and provided invaluable sources – including magnificent photos – that could be found nowhere else. Aron Mazel also kindly shared his photos. All other figures, mostly photos, in this thesis have been reproduced with the permission of the respective archives if they are currently holding the copyright.<sup>10</sup> I approached many other contemporaries who were involved with Buthelezi and Inkatha, including Buthelezi himself via his secretary, in some way or another, but hardly anyone was responsive. One might say that the insiders missed their chance of telling their side of the story.

At last, some remarks regarding terminology have to be made. Due to their history, many terms for South African groups, whether one might call them cultural groups, ethnic groups, or else, have gained negative connotations. When I am using terms like Coloureds, Indians, Blacks, Whites, Africans, Zulus, or Xhosas, or others, I am not implying that I subscribe to concepts of ethnicity or race. My point is to describe social realities – as created by apartheid or in defiance of apartheid and often used as self-designations – with concise terms. Because the analytical distinction between Blacks and Whites

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8 As far as I am informed, Buthelezi's personal collection is currently being assessed by Arthur Königkrämer, but it is not accessible yet. Further material probably is housed at the Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi Museum Documentation Centre, Ulundi. Presumably, the most revealing sources might not be included in public collections.

9 A full list of archives used can be found in chapter 11. There may very well be more sources to find in KwaZulu-Natal's provincial archives, especially at the Ulundi branch. But as any attempt to contact them from afar was unsuccessful, I did not visit the Ulundi branch. According to one report, the provincial archives are planned to be reordered in the future, which will hopefully open up new possibilities for other researchers; [https://etlconsulting.co.za/Projects/KZN\\_Archives\\_Repository.html](https://etlconsulting.co.za/Projects/KZN_Archives_Repository.html), last access on 14.08.2019.

10 More photos on the topic of Buthelezi and Inkatha can be found in de Kock 1986; Smith 1988; Temkin 1976; Temkin 2003.

can be reasonable in an apartheid setting, I will use these terms when necessary. The same applies to other terms: They are being used when they are analytically relevant in social or political terms, often due to the apartheid context. While some are used as (oftentimes proud) self-designations and are therefore not especially problematic to use, others are difficult. The term ‘Africans’, for example, usually referred and often refers to Bantu-speaking people(s) – but one can reasonably argue that all people with roots in South Africa are Africans, no matter when they or their forebears settled in Africa. I will also avoid colonial terms like ‘chief’ or ‘headman’ and use, when writing about Zulus, isiZulu terms. Titles, whether traditional, political, or academic, will be cited but not repeated every time, not as an expression of disrespect but to make the text readable.<sup>11</sup>

In the following paragraphs, I will introduce the theory and methodology used in my analysis. These are not going to be all-embracing descriptions of concepts; I will only explain what is important for the understanding of this thesis. This chapter starts with the general approach of the research training group in which this thesis originates and then continues to other concepts that are important for the analysis in the main part of this thesis. Because theory and methodology have a strong impact on my characterisation of the historical context, this will be addressed afterwards.

## 2.1 Managing Contingency

The DFG-funded<sup>12</sup> Research Training Group 1919 *Precaution, provision, prediction: managing contingency* focuses on human behaviour in contingent situations and contexts. This chapter shall explain the thoughts and concepts behind this briefly.

‘Contingency’ itself must be explained to be a useful category for analysis of historic situations, but also of the contemporaries’ perception and awareness of contingencies. A situation is contingent when

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11 See also Kelly 2018, 21–23; Marx 2012, 9.

12 Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation).

reality could be different, is open for (future) change; agents start acting accordingly when they not only experience, but also become aware of this contingency. On one hand, this offers opportunities for agents to work towards change in their benefit (because new possibilities arise), on the other hand this creates contingencies because future developments are heavily uncertain – while it could get a lot better, it could also get a lot worse. Structural contingencies, e.g. when a whole system could be different, are experienced through coincidental, contingent events; events, in turn, make it possible to analyse structures. Agents who are aware of contingencies then usually try to negate them, reduce them, or use them productively.<sup>13</sup>

‘Managing contingencies’ refers to the productive use of contingencies by agents in their interests.<sup>14</sup> ‘Precaution’ means the protection from external threats by preventing damages; ‘prevision’ is the case when agents recognise events as consequences of their actions and make implicit calculations on chances and risks based on their experience. ‘Prediction’ adds explicit calculations of probability (although not necessarily mathematical) based on empirical knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

During its first years, the Research Training Group has made out several fields in which high levels of human-made contingencies appear; these have been called ‘generators of contingency’. It should be noted that this is not a fully-fledged theory but still a concept that needs to be discussed. Five especially interesting generators have been identified, namely war and war-like conflicts, political turmoil, economic activity, mobility (aimed at discovery and new experiences), and (scientific) research. In these bipolar situations, agents are both creating a new reality (and new contingencies) and suffering from reality. In these contexts, agents are often acting towards the future (or another possible future), expanding their scope of action through new possibilities.<sup>16</sup>

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13 Hoffmann 2012.

14 Makropoulos 2004.

15 Research Training Group 1919 2017, 6.

16 Ibid, 5–8.

As all five generators mentioned above play a role in this thesis – albeit some more prominent than others – they shall be introduced in the following paragraphs, each followed by a short explanation how these analytical categories are useful in the context of 1980s' South Africa.

*War*, and war-like conflicts, are a prime example of how human action creates new contingencies, supplemented by external factors that might add to an already contingent situation. In general, nobody knows for sure when wars break out and what will happen during (often chaotic) violent conflicts. Additional to the involved parties, third parties, pests, and the weather can play unforeseeable roles. Even though forces might be imbalanced at the beginning of a violent conflict, the tide can turn due to unforeseen circumstances. Costly preparations for potential conflicts need to be balanced against what else could be done with these resources according to the likelihood of future conflict.<sup>17</sup> Although South Africa was fighting the South African Border War during the time in question, this is not the conflict relevant to this thesis. Rather, the violence in KwaZulu and Natal, especially from 1985 onwards, has to be seen as a violent, war-like conflict (as many contemporaries saw it). Clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporters, between migrant labourers and township dwellers, and between young and old – and the resulting casualties – made KwaZulu and Natal often look and feel like a war zone, especially for Blacks (more details on the violent conflict will be given in chapter 3.1). While these violent conflicts are not the topic of this thesis, they are the background in front of which practically all agents acted from about 1985.

The violent conflict is, in the South African case, intertwined with *mobility*. Voluntarily leaving home with the aim of experiencing something new or discovering something creates contingencies because the agents move into largely unknown surroundings; this is usually accompanied by calculations of risk and gain (as are the actions in other contingent contexts). The four most prominent groups of agents in this context are explorers, merchants, missionaries, and

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17 Ibid, 8–9.

warriors.<sup>18</sup> I argue, however, that labour migration in South Africa also falls in this category. Rural Zulu moved from the countryside into the cities or townships to experience something new: wage labour in industry. By entering new surroundings and interacting with previously unknown people, new contingencies arose that ultimately, inter alia, led to the violent clashes between migrant labourers and township dwellers. But this was not the only possible outcome; other migrant labourers preferred township life and values over what they had learned in the countryside or became politically active for the ANC or the UDF

*Political turmoil*, times of all-encompassing political change, opens up wide horizons of possibilities that were not possible (and maybe not even thinkable) in previous, resilient political systems. Not only small changes within the system seem possible, but the whole political system itself is up for debate. While political change is often reduced to singular moments, like the fall of the Berlin Wall or the release of Nelson Mandela, the processes behind it can last for years and were not foreseeable in the beginning. Political turmoil creates risks for the people, but agents also detect their chances and become active creators of something new and of new contingencies.<sup>19</sup> I argue, as will be explained in chapter 3.1, that the 1980s and beginning 1990s were a time of political turmoil which made many initiatives, like the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, possible only then. The work of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government also became more significant. Through most of the 1970s, for example, the apartheid state seemed invulnerable, but once it started shaking, people imagined different possible futures. Again, this is the background in front of which virtually everything depicted in this thesis took place, as this is not a book on general South African history during the 1980s and 1990s (and the context chapter does not claim to be all-encompassing). The two following generators of contingency, however, are the ones that Inkatha and its associates voluntarily chose to work on to manage the contingent situation in South Africa.

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18 Ibid, 13.

19 Ibid, 10.



*Economic activity* is contingent because its effects are often uncertain. Risky investments can mean a high profit, but also a high loss – and they can have unintended and unexpected side effects. Agents use several practices to reduce contingencies (e.g. through joint ventures or insurances) or to prevent them as a whole; furthermore, they make their structures resilient, so losses will not destroy their business. For better preparation, they use statistics, estimates, and guesses – although a good narrative can be more compelling than statistics.<sup>20</sup> The KwaZulu government entered the economic field through the KwaZulu Development Corporation (later KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation), fostering rural economic development and industrialisation by investing some of KwaZulu's money (and money from other sources). As will be seen, the improvement of living standards in KwaZulu was a major, but often overlooked part of Inkatha's work.

Scientific *research* is both a reaction to contingent developments, looking for empirically-based management strategies, and a creator of new contingencies through its output by widening the horizon of possibilities in the minds of the involved agents and through other, unintended consequences.<sup>21</sup> The Buthelezi Commission was a huge, mostly scientific undertaking of determining the best political solution for KwaZulu and Natal. Its findings opened up possibilities for closer regional cooperation and maybe for a joint provincial government for KwaZulu and Natal, but this also sparked unintended, negative reactions by other liberation movements. The Buthelezi Commission paved the way for the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, dominated by the business community, which inherited many thoughts and concepts from the Buthelezi Commission. Furthermore, the Inkatha Institute promoted research into the living conditions of black South Africans to improve said conditions efficiently, but again, this was followed by unintended backlashes, as we will see.

In this sense, change is planned, but in practice often a consequence of unexpected events. Agents react in concrete situations

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20 Ibid, 10–12.

21 Ibid, 14–15.

quite freely, but structures and habits still frame their possibilities and must not be forgotten.

## 2.2 Praxeology

My approach to contingency is further characterised by a praxeological view. Individuals acting in contingent contexts, aiming to manage them as explained above, are in focus, and not so much the discourses. There are different understandings of praxeology, however, that look at different kinds of action. Some have a rather narrow understanding and only analyse unintended action (e.g. routines, rites),<sup>22</sup> but this thesis follows the broader understanding of Anthony Giddens that includes intended and unintended action as will be outlined below. Taking a praxeological view does not mean ignoring structures and thinking of an autonomous individual (nor the other way around in this dualism); rather, the acting individual (or group) will be situated within the structures that frame its actions or that are perforated by unprecedented action. The social theory of Anthony Giddens seeks to mediate between structure and agency.<sup>23</sup>

Giddens' approach does not recognise any so powerful structures that rob the individual of its autonomy entirely, nor is the subject dissolved in anonymous discourses. Instead, the structures enable the agents to act and the agents (re)produce the structures through their actions. 'Praxis' is both the action of agents and the reproduction of structures. Structure and agency, therefore, cannot exist on their own, but need each other. Praxeology in the understanding of Giddens aims to analyse both in a hermeneutic circle, integrating experience (through which agents can detect structures) and discourses (as a praxis through which agents reflect their experiences). In this system, discourses cannot be anonymous – they need agents that create and reproduce them.<sup>24</sup>

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22 See, e.g., Reckwitz 2008.

23 Welskopp 2001, 99–103.

24 Ibid, 104–105.

Giddens' individual is integrated into social relationships, making both agency and structure relational, i.e. directed at social relationships. Not every action of the individual is intentional, much is based on a routine that is mostly unreflected; intentionality, however, plays a role in larger projects that the individual follows intentionally. Thomas Welskopp depicts the image of an agent steering a vehicle in the flow of action making course corrections from time to time: Most of the time, the individual orientates itself, observes, assesses, and follows routines; it only makes intentional changes from time to time. The individual has the often unreflected know-how on how to act in situations (that can become discursive if reflected) from which the individual or the later historian derives knowledge about structures; in any study, the agents' know-how must therefore be included.<sup>25</sup> The individual is not a predetermined puppet but also not almighty and autonomous – instead, its actions are structured along its context and experiences. Agency, therefore, is to be found in the middle of these two poles. The individual can, through its actions, change structures, so there is no absolute constraint by structures (but by resources and nature). Power imbalances, however, can curtail the agency of an individual. On the other hand, structures enable the individual to act. Welskopp offers the analogy of a road network: While the streets are clearly defined, course and destination are not, but the streets are needed to get there.<sup>26</sup>

For this thesis, this means that the (political) action of Buthelezi, Inkatha, and its allies will be analysed and the speeches – which have thoroughly been analysed in the past – will only feature in some parts when they evidently were meant to change present and future through convincing the audience of Buthelezi's point of view. Individuals and groups have to be seen inside the structures they act but are also capable of changing or breaking these structures. Buthelezi and his allies will be seen as agents who pursued their own interests proactively, not just as victims of apartheid that merely reacted.<sup>27</sup> Giddens' distinction

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25 Ibid, 106–107.

26 Ibid, 108–109.

27 On this point, see Evans 2019b, 8.

between larger intentional projects and unintentional practices within these projects will be checked against the findings in this thesis.

### 2.3 Imagination, Imagined Communities, and Imagined Traditions

The Research Training Group *Precaution, prevision, prediction: managing contingency* identifies imaginations as a core aspect of actions directed at the future. Imagining something does not mean an invention of a concept or a possible future from scratch. Instead, imaginations are (at least in parts) empirically based and describe something that is deemed to be possible and achievable. Implicit and explicit knowledge of the involved persons heavily influence their imaginations.<sup>28</sup> Richard J. Bernstein understands imagination as the way of thinking to cope with new and possibly unexpected contingencies. While it might look like blind guessing, it is not. Based on what we know, we use imagination to think of plural possibilities and to act for their realisation. As imagination looks for something new and may contradict the present, it can be risky to act according to these imaginations.<sup>29</sup>

In the context of this thesis, a closer look at imaginations regarding nationalism and ethnicity, including traditions, seems appropriate. In his widely acclaimed book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson explains why nations are imagined.<sup>30</sup>

The 20<sup>th</sup> century was, according to Anderson, all about nations and nationalism, with sub-nationalisms even appearing inside other nationalisms. This already indicates that ‘nation’, a worldwide phenomenon, does not have one clearly defined meaning but can refer to very different things. Even more, even internationalist or anti-nationalist movements (like communist or socialist movements) mostly act on national level.<sup>31</sup>

28 Research Training Group 1919 2017, 6.

29 Bernstein 2011.

30 Anderson 2006.

31 Ibid, 1–4. For a detailed account on the example of the Social Democrats in the

Anderson's basic observations are that nationalisms are new, but in the eyes of their supporters, they are old and virtually naturalised. Nationalism is a powerful, universal concept (everybody is meant to have a nationality), but there is no philosophy behind it. A nation "is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".<sup>32</sup> A nation is imagined because nobody will ever meet most other members of a nation in person but thinks of these as brothers and sisters;<sup>33</sup> limited because there will always be other nations; and sovereign because old hierarchies are crumbling and are meant to be replaced along national lines. Nationalism, therefore, does not awaken nations but imagines them where they did not exist before.<sup>34</sup>

In many cases, printing of books and newspapers in a 'national' language (in the cases of Czech and Finnish the language of the people, not of the rulers) played an important role in developing nationalist thinking.<sup>35</sup> In the colonies, however, the unifying language of the colonial power could also be a vehicle for the spread of nationalist thinking.<sup>36</sup>

Nationalism was a reaction of the old elites whose legitimacy and power were crumbling, but even the lowest classes of a nation still felt superior towards other nations and colonised people. Racism, therefore, legitimised rule and boosted colonial officers who lived like aristocrats in the colonies.<sup>37</sup>

The colonial census became the foundation of purportedly clear nationalities and ethnicities and furthermore divided groups along the lines of religion (although this was later abandoned). As a consequence, however, ethnicities based on religion developed and divided people who culturally belonged together into smaller groups (and in many cases, colonial measures were inaccurate even to their own

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Habsburg empire, see Beneš 2017.

32 Anderson 2006, 6.

33 As long as one subscribes to concepts of nationality, that is.

34 Ibid, 5–7.

35 Ibid, 67–82.

36 Ibid, 113–140.

37 Ibid, 141–154.

standards).<sup>38</sup> Clearly defined boundaries were also introduced by the colonial powers and later inherited by the postcolonial national states that had to cope with national boundaries dividing cultural groups. The postcolonial national states, therefore, needed to construct a new, national identity. They also inherited the museums of the colonial powers and used these together with unifying symbols to create a national identity, quite like the colonial powers had done before.<sup>39</sup>

This makes obvious that the *travelling concept*<sup>40</sup> of nations and nationalisms encountered totally different realities and concepts in the colonies. European understandings and definitions are not applicable. Although there were and are nationalist concepts based on ethnicity and language, there are also some based on indigenous people vs. settlers, rulers vs. oppressed, or along the (arbitrary) colonial boundaries.

While Anderson states that nations are imagined *communities* in the present, it can be argued that nationalist movements and national states aim to realise the nation as a *society* in the future. As stated above, imaginations include actions towards their realisation, making imaginations directed at the future (and delineating them from utopias).

Within such imagined nations, traditions and rituals play a key role in orchestrating and legitimising the nation state. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger published a volume called *The Invention of Tradition*<sup>41</sup> in 1983 in which they, together with other historians, argued and documented that in 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe as well as (post)colonial Africa many traditions were invented according to the needs of their present.<sup>42</sup> ‘Traditions’ include a common history as well as explicit rituals and procedures. According to Hobsbawm in the volume’s introduction, this formalisation and ritualisation of traditions usually is a feature of rapidly changing societies that have to cope with a high amount of uncertainties: Traditions shall offer guidance. This can be interpreted as management of contingencies. These are reduced by

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38 Ibid, 164–170.

39 Ibid, 170–185.

40 Neumann/Nünning 2012.

41 Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983.

42 It has to be mentioned that this idea was not entirely new; Barth 1970, Iliffe 1979.

inventing a (hi)story that explains the present as meaningful. To this end, elements from the past can be elevated to traditions or entirely new rituals can be invented.<sup>43</sup>

Ten years later, in 1993, Ranger specified these arguments for the context of (post)colonial Africa. Most notably, he replaced *invention* with *imagination*, emphasising the processual character of imaginations. People form their culture the way they imagine it, based on both the knowledge of their culture and their needs.<sup>44</sup> Ranger furthermore emphasised that he and Hobsbawm never intended to make a general claim about all traditions: There can very well be traditions that were not imagined in a rather short period of time but developed over decades.<sup>45</sup>

Aforementioned traditions, whether they developed over long timespans or were imagined, are a part of ethnicity: They are the purportedly unique elements used by kinship-based<sup>46</sup> groups to distinguish themselves from others – mostly in times of conflict and rapid change in which ethnicities arise and traditions are imagined. It is important to note that traditions claim to be old (and sometimes they are), but they are practised with intentions directed at the present and the future. Reinhart Köbler raises the question whether there actually can be ‘traditional societies’; possibly all societies are traditional and modern in their own sense but have different cultural heritage.<sup>47</sup>

In the case of colonial (southern) Africa this means that the European colonial powers produced a framework according to their imaginations of Africa; this framework was then filled in by Africans using their imaginations according to their needs.<sup>48</sup> The colonised even adopted European values and concepts and adapted them to their way

43 Hobsbawm 1983; see also Köbler 1994, 6–7.

44 See also Eckert 2011, 40–41.

45 Ranger 1993, 62–63, 80–83.

46 This can mean biological, but also linguistic or cultural kinship or sometimes similarities in appearance and behaviour. Relationships based on economic necessity also play an important role and are often parallel to the aforementioned kinships. In all these cases, large groups identify themselves in distinction from other groups; Maré 1992, 6–9.

47 Köbler 1998, 113.

48 Eckert 2000, 4–14; Köbler 1991, 15; Ranger 1993, 84.

of life (like the concept of nationalism as explained above).<sup>49</sup> As Carolyn Hamilton showed, Africans did not invent their history from scratch but rearranged and adapted elements from existing indigenous practices and discourses; these are processes of imagination as outlined above.<sup>50</sup> Mahmood Mamdani also stresses that although ethnicity or ‘tribalism’ was a colonial mode of ruling the subjects, it too could be an anticolonial revolt. Africans actively created their social reality and identity; ethnicity thus was not solely imagined by the rulers, but by all involved.<sup>51</sup>

Nevertheless, the European colonial powers forced their image of purportedly fossilised traditions onto Africa. African traditions often were highly adaptive, could provide identity, but could also be changed – now they were written down and became static, clearly showing the interests of the persons whose understanding of customary law and tradition was recorded. On the other hand, there were colonial officials who did not record (parts of) customary law because they wanted it to remain flexible and follow their own interests.<sup>52</sup>

Changes in kinship and ethnicity can also be seen as a reaction to the colonial powers: As they knew it from Europe, the colonial powers demanded clear identification with one ethnicity to enforce indirect rule via traditional (or imagined) authorities. Leaving one ethnic group and joining another, in a sense voting with one’s feet for another more prestigious ruler, or as a consequence of migration, became impossible.<sup>53</sup>

The ethnic groups of 20<sup>th</sup> century South Africa can consequently be seen as imagined quite like Anderson described it for nations (and many ethnic groups developed their own ethnic nationalism and imagined themselves as old and naturally). Nevertheless, the ethnic groups (and ethnic differences) are social reality and modern phe-

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49 Melber 1984, 144.

50 Hamilton 1998a, 25–32.

51 Mamdani 1996, 184.

52 Greiner 2000, 30–32; Guy 1979, 41–44; Kößler 1991, 15; Piper 1998, 65; Shadle 1999; Welsh 1971, 164–165. On the example of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, see Guy 2013.

53 Bowen 1996, 6; Eckert 2000, 9–13; Melber 1984, 146–148; Piper 1998, 62.



nomena that made use of their imagined past.<sup>54</sup> The ethnic groups should not be reduced to being products of apartheid, though – this would dismiss the active role of Blacks in the shaping of their culture(s).<sup>55</sup>

Ethnicities had formed through confrontation with the settler frontier, British troops, capitalism, and Christian mission or were strengthened by these before racist legislation formalised them: ‘Traditional’ authorities, formerly often leaders among equals and replaceable (by their people),<sup>56</sup> became middlemen of the colonial administration and hereditary leaders of ethnic groups that still had to be created.<sup>57</sup> In other cases, men without any legitimacy were made leaders of ethnic groups, making them even more dependent on the colonial administration, and former authorities were removed.<sup>58</sup> This way, e.g., Shepstone created a “cooperative, neo-traditional elite” in Natal.<sup>59</sup> Lungisile Ntsebeza describes the case of Xhalanga (and Transkei in general) where the colonial administration replaced ‘chiefs’ with a district council and left only the ‘headmen’ in place as part of the colonial administration. It was only under apartheid that chiefs, of course appointed by and usually loyal to the government in Pretoria, became regional rulers.<sup>60</sup> This method made chiefs in many parts of South Africa appear as stooges of the white government (if a chief resisted, he usually was replaced); Buthelezi’s KwaZulu government also relied on amakhosi.<sup>61</sup>

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54 Bowen 1996, 4; Eckert 2000, 2–3; Maré 1992, 14–20; Ottaway 1999; Piombo 2009, 7–12; Ranger 1983, 247–252.

55 Maré 1992, vii–viii.

56 In KwaZulu in the 1980s, for example, five Community Authorities elected their amakhosi while the office was hereditary in all other parts of KwaZulu – the colonial administration, therefore, was not successful in establishing a uniform procedure; KwaZulu Government: KwaZulu land tenure, tribal system of government in KwaZulu, 06.1986. APC PC19/7/4, 8.

57 Beall/Mkhize/Vawda 2005, 760–761; Daphne 1982, 1–3, 1–3; Marks/Trapido 1987, 1–10, 36–38.

58 Beall/Mkhize/Vawda 2005, 760–761; Welsh 1971, 111–113.

59 Düsing 2002, 82.

60 Ntsebeza 2005.

61 Beall/Mkhize/Vawda 2005, 761; Daphne 1982, 2–3. The term inkosi, plural

South African ethnic groups were not as fixed as they usually pretended to be (although a definition by descent was often propagated). A new, urban culture emerged that urban Blacks also felt part of; many urban Blacks were through apartheid legislation made part of a group that they had hardly any connections to.<sup>62</sup> A study by Hanf, Weiland, and Vierdag, e.g., showed that the majority of urban residents (excluding Whites) identified themselves as Blacks and not the way apartheid legislation defined them. Only in Durban, most Blacks identified as Zulus.<sup>63</sup> Cultural differences were a decisive factor in clashes between migrant workers and established township, but usually not among township dwellers themselves.<sup>64</sup>

As has been shown, imagination is central to identity, whether it may be seen as ethnic or national identity. Common traditions and practices, a shared history, and a feeling of communal spirit are integral parts to these forms of group identity. Again, it has to be emphasised: Imagination is not invention, but thinking of a possible, realistic state of affairs (based on knowledge and experience) that people are working to achieve, with historic, cultural elements rearranged and adapted to present needs.

## 2.4 Development

Development was a core narrative for Buthelezi and Inkatha during the 1980s, as we will see in this thesis. It was an important concept for the Buthelezi Commission, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, and both economic and cultural policy in KwaZulu in which the Women's Brigade and the Youth Brigade also played a role. This sub-chapter sets out to explain what 'development' meant in the international, capitalist

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amakhosi, has now largely replaced the colonial term of chief, meaning a traditional, regional ruler. In the communities, he or she is represented by an induna, plural izinduna, called headman in colonial times.

62 Eckert 2000, 7–9.

63 Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1981, 340.

64 Guelke 1992, 425–426.

arena (including colonial contexts),<sup>65</sup> but also how it was understood in South Africa in the course of time.

The colonial powers, according to Aram Ziai, legitimised colonialism through a ‘civilising mission’, thus bringing peoples in other parts of the world purportedly superior western ‘civilisation’. Natives were portrayed as inferior barbarians who used only their instincts instead of reason. The natives were meant to be assimilated and educated but were never accepted as equals, making it a colonial mimicry rather than education. The purported savagery in turn justified, in the eyes of the Europeans, leaving European standards behind and acting brutally against natives. This colonial relationship changed during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to policies of development, but in Europe, a discourse on development already existed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that development was the same for all peoples, but that some had progressed further than others. John Locke called Native Americans humankind in its infancy (while Europeans were seen as having progressed the furthest). The use of the verb ‘to develop’ then changed from intransitive (‘to develop oneself’) to transitive (‘to develop somebody else’) which meant bringing European education and religion to the colonies, but this also brought exploitation with it. Only during the course of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, uplifting the living standards of the colonised became part of ‘developing’ a colony, and slowly the colonised were seen as able to and were meant to develop to European standards – whether they wished to do so or not. The European way of life was set as the ultimate goal for everyone by the colonisers.<sup>66</sup>

After World War II, the colonised began to be seen as able to govern themselves, and people in general were seen as equal in official policy. ‘Development’ shifted from people to regions, thus it was now the goal to develop ‘underdeveloped’ regions instead of peoples; geography replaced biology. Therefore, Ziai argues, the dichotomy of civilised/uncivilised was exchanged for developed/underdeveloped.

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65 This will be important when analysing the development aid programmes by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

66 Ziai 2017, 27–30. On matters of development, see also Büschel/Chassé 2015; Kößler 1998.

Economy, science, living standards, and democracy now became important for the colonisers, leading to a new paradigm of progress. To achieve a good life, progress in all these areas had to be achieved, making all other ways of life deficient. The new elites in the colonies (which oftentimes were the first rulers after independence) now had the task to develop their country and usually did this, unsurprisingly, in the same authoritarian style as they had learnt it from the colonial powers. Natives were now, in theory, equal to the Europeans, but still branded as backward and meant to assimilate to European standards. The west, in its development mission, brought capitalism with it and marketed it as the saviour from all problems in competition with communism, which explains why significantly less 'development aid' was paid after the end of the Cold War. The development programmes of the west were not meant to reduce poverty (and they were hardly enough to achieve this), but to manage poverty that might become a threat to capitalism. For this task, development workers were brought in from the north to help the purportedly unknowing of the south (while it was unthinkable for the north that it might learn something from the south). Development now pretended to be apolitical and only an economic topic, although its use in the Cold War indicated quite the contrary.<sup>67</sup>

The yardstick of development was the north, but very selectively. Life expectancy, (compulsory) education and the gross national product were measured; violence, suicides, social networks, sustainability etc. were not considered, making development centred around the development of the economy.<sup>68</sup> The promise of prosperity should then keep the newly independent states away from communism while at the same time economic exploitation through the same hierarchy as in colonial times was continued. The problems of development were seen in a lack of capital, knowledge, and technology (and not in the postcolonial hierarchy and exploitation); therefore, 'underdevelopment' was officially based on the economy and not on politics. The solution was seen in importing capital and knowledge to stim-

67 Ziai 2017, 30–33. On development policies after 1945, see also Büschel 2014, 11–22.

68 Ziai 2017, 33–35.

ulate growth which could then be handed over to indigenous elites, the trustees that often had studied at universities in Europe or North America. At this time during the 1960s, social development became part of the discourse, but still marginalised by the economic emphasis. In the 1990s, post-development theory arose, changing the discourse on development – but this will not be discussed here.<sup>69</sup>

This understanding of development, therefore, was dominant internationally during the 1980s, the same decade that Issa G. Shivji calls the ‘lost decade’ for Africa. Structural adjustment programmes by the IMF and the World Bank were meant to stabilise the currency and foster economic growth through liberalisation where they were put into practice. The state was shrunked, health care and education were reduced, and life expectancy receded in the affected countries which oftentimes led to the exact opposite of what had been intended, e.g. in the case of Zimbabwe: The economy dwindled and industrialisation was in some cases reverted.<sup>70</sup>

This discourse could also be found in South Africa, but with an important shift in focus. Since the introduction of apartheid (but also in prior territorial segregation<sup>71</sup>), development meant separate development. Every legally defined ethnic group was meant to develop along its own, segregated lines, which led to the homeland or Bantustan system – all African groups were meant to develop (and seek political representation) in their respective ‘homelands’, the reserves that the colonisers had allocated them (see chapter 3.2).<sup>72</sup> Development in this case meant economic development, but political and cultural development as well. The fact that white South Africans devised and implemented this system made it clear that they saw the other groups as underdeveloped; misery and poverty in the insuffi-

69 Ibid, 45–52. On post-development, see Parfitt 2002, 12–44; Ziai 2012; Ziai 2014, the latter including thoughts on Ubuntu.

70 Shivji 06.10.2005.

71 For the time until the 1970s, which is not in focus here, also see Evans 2019a; Evans 2019b, 45–74.

72 The official term was ‘homeland’ while ‘Bantustan’ was usually used by critics; Ibid, 1. Both terms will be used; using the official term does not mean a positive acceptance of the homeland system in this thesis – a critical view will hopefully be obvious.

ciently small and often inarable homelands were even portrayed as the ‘natives’ fault due to purported backwardness and resistance to modernising forces.<sup>73</sup>

Although apartheid is often characterised as a South African ‘specialty’, research has shown that it was by no means an isolated occurrence. ‘Separate development’ was typical of the late colonial state in which population transfers, self-government, and a federation of ethnicities or nationalities under the trusteeship of the colonial power were seen as prerequisites for development along Western lines and, ultimately, independence. This explains Hendrik Verwoerd’s plan of granting independence to the homelands, a measure not envisaged by his predecessors, to gain international recognition for the apartheid state. If tiny Lesotho could become independent from Britain, the homelands could do so as well, he thought – while the European colonial powers had to be forced to grant independence, South Africa did so on its own initiative and would even help the ‘natives’ to develop as their trustee inside a Southern African federation. The international community, however, never recognised homeland independence.<sup>74</sup>

When Pieter Willem Botha came to power in 1978, it came to a “reinvention of development in South Africa in the 1980s”<sup>75</sup> when more and more Whites accepted that Verwoerd’s plan had not worked (although the Tomlinson Commission 1950–1954 had already made this clear).<sup>76</sup>

Official policy was reformed to make stability attractive for all South Africans through a form of power-sharing. The term ‘separate development’ was dropped and the differences between the homelands and South Africa as a whole were now regarded only as issues of economic development and as an apolitical topic. This made it

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73 This becomes ironic when one considers the introduction of the plough in South Africa by European settlers: Although seen as an act of modernisation, it actually led to soil degradation in many places which probably is the reason why ploughs had not been used by Africans before – because they had known better; Marx 2012, 19; Starkey 2000.

74 Evans 2019b, 55–69.

75 Tapscott 1995, 172.

76 Ashforth 1990, 173–177; Tapscott 1995, 172–176.

possible for people of varying political beliefs to work together on development issues in a new development movement, making development a technocratic issue that could be studied at universities and was mainly handled by NGOs. The white economy and its representatives, highly coveted as purported experts on (almost) all of South Africa's problems, were active in development and, together with the press, kept it in daily discourse while admitting that development aid was political self-protection. This was promoted by Botha who "urged the business community to 'play a more active role in helping to solve the development problems in Southern Africa'".<sup>77</sup> In 1983, a new Development Bank was founded, paid for by the government but working rather autonomously. The discourse was led by experts moving in between the state, higher education, and the economy, making it a project by the elites (as Ziai had already figured it for the international discourse). An example for one such expert might be Absolom Vilakazi, born in Natal in 1917, studied anthropologist, development officer, KwaZulu representative during the Buthelezi Commission and member of the board of directors of the Anglo American Corporation.<sup>78</sup> The desire for experts on matters of security further led to an integration of military personnel into many government structures under Botha, the former Minister of Defence.<sup>79</sup>

Although the term 'separate development' was abandoned, continuity was needed to secure electoral support. Change was therefore not attributed to growing political pressure but to an inappropriate economic model (capitalism had no mode of spreading growth, this needed planning by the state). Criticism, therefore, was not directed at separate development – the homeland system could continue to operate. Botha ascribed a critical role to private enterprise in developing the homelands and wished to keep the state out of it, making development an even more (seemingly) apolitical issue. One means to foster growth and development was a legalisation of the black informal sector, giving the small black middle class a reason to identify with the

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77 P. W. Botha in Posel 1984, 4.

78 Anthropology Today 1994, 20.

79 Posel 1984; Tapscott 1995, 176–180.

state: They were now able to achieve some prosperity through hard work, again blaming poverty on the poor.<sup>80</sup>

Development issues in the dominant discourse, therefore, were a matter of the economy and of science (and not of politics). Making development a science also implied the existence of objective truths which, in turn, made a new political order seemingly objective as it was based on science and not political convictions. White dominance over Blacks now became the dominance of the developed over the underdeveloped poor, eliminating racist terms from the discourse, but not the racist system itself.<sup>81</sup> While development in the apartheid sense had also meant political and cultural development, this hardly was a topic now; development was all about economics (although this was not entirely new, the aforementioned Tomlinson Commission from 1950 to 1954 had also left political and cultural development aside, so had the 1979 Riekert Commission<sup>82</sup>).

This understanding of development that had, one could argue, worked rather against than for political emancipation of Blacks, was adopted by the ANC government from 1994 whose Reconstruction and Development Programme focused on economic development (i.e. growth) and led to a building boom. This programme, however, was cancelled in 1996 and replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme, emphasising austerity for economic growth (which ultimately was one factor in the following economic decline).<sup>83</sup>

In South Africa, the development discourse therefore was quite similar to the international discourse. Just like the former colonisers were working to develop the ‘underdeveloped regions’ (which effectively meant ‘people’), South Africa followed a course of regionally separated development. In both cases, the hierarchy was guised as an economic topic and it was assumed that inequality could only be solved by economic development, i.e. a growing capitalist economy, concealing that this would still only benefit the more powerful and a

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80 Ibid, 181–183.

81 Ibid, 183–186.

82 Ashforth 1990, 173–205.

83 Turok 2011, 30–49.



small elite tasked with developing its country. Political and cultural development were mentioned but marginalised.

In the case of KwaZulu, this meant that a small elite – the Inkatha leadership – was tasked with developing KwaZulu and was assisted by experts (or ‘development workers’), namely white businessmen that were part of the KwaZulu Development Corporation’s/KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation’s executive. While the Inkatha leadership profited from capitalist, economic growth – maybe financially, but definitely by getting good connections to the white economy – it seems that big business made most of the profits and workers were often dissatisfied. Outsourcing development from the government to another institution that used scientific measures made development also in KwaZulu a seemingly apolitical and scientific issue, but trade unions brought politics back into economic development. This matter will be discussed in chapter 4.3.

## **2.5 Democracy and Democratisation**

One key topic and demand of Buthelezi and Inkatha was democracy and democratisation. There is, however, not one clear-cut definition of these terms and concepts. As will be seen, almost all participants in 1980s politics demanded democracy but meant quite different things – what then led to countless disputes. While Inkatha’s position on democracy will be analysed in the main part of this thesis, it is also important to know what other movements and their key players meant by ‘democracy’. To this end, this chapter will first approach democracy and democratisation from a general perspective (to show how diverse its understanding can be) and then show the different understandings in South African politics mainly during the 1980s.

### 2.5.1 The General Perspective

*Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.*

Winston Churchill<sup>84</sup>

A common method of political sciences to define democracy is the creation of a checklist listing all features that a democratic state is supposed to have.<sup>85</sup> This, however, does not work, especially not when European or North American criteria are put to use elsewhere in the world. Thus, another approach to democracy and democratisation is chosen, following political scientist Laurence Whitehead.<sup>86</sup>

Whitehead understands democracy and democratisation as a contingent<sup>87</sup> undertaking with an open ending; as a movement towards an imagined and pursued future. The process and the aims are subject to repeated negotiations and revisions; democratisation, therefore, is a complex, dynamic, and long process for which there neither can be a “cook book”<sup>88</sup>, nor is democracy a finalised, clearly defined condition.<sup>89</sup>

84 Winston Churchill in Rose 2009, 11.

85 Matthijs Bogaards has shown that an evaluation along a checklist does not work the way that some researchers think. Analysing quantitative studies on African democratisation, Bogaards found that virtually all studies contained serious errors; Bogaards 2005.

86 Similar views can be found in the works of, e.g., Jean Grugel and Matthew Louis Bishop; Grugel/Bishop 2014.

87 Grugel/Bishop make it even more explicit: “By stressing the essential contingency of democratization, we are to some extent able to stand back from pre-vailing ways of thinking, and investigate the ways in which historical legacies, geographical realities, class relations, culture and the orientation and activism of key actors together influence the extent to which democratic deepening occurs (or does not occur).”; Ibid, xi.

88 Whitehead 2002, 3.

89 Ibid, 1–5.

General opinion of finished democratisation is, according to Whitehead, that it labels the transition from authoritarianism to democracy after two changes of government due to regular elections – but his would mean, argues Whitehead, that Italy and Japan were not democratic for 40 years after World War II. On the other hand, democratic elections do not say anything about the rest of the state. Another common view is to speak of finished democratisation once all relevant agents have accepted democracy and its rules – again, this does not allow any conclusions on the state itself. Whitehead's argumentation centres, as mentioned, around the long, complex, and dynamic process with an open ending that leads to a rule-governed, consensus-based, and participatory democracy – incomplete without values and norms. As democratisation processes have to cope with the consequences of prior regimes, they are not always straightforward or aimed a clear target but are subject to negotiations; democracy itself needs to be constructed socially in a given context. Different ways can lead to the same aim; democracy has to grow through convincement, assessments, creation of consensus, and promotion of civil behaviour and responsibility. This makes, Whitehead admits, analysis more complex and possibly inaccurate but also more fruitful than following purported causal chains and path dependencies.<sup>90</sup>

In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Whitehead observed that new experiences and events were questioning the labels 'democracy' and 'democratic', for example the US presidential elections of 2000 in which Al Gore received a majority of votes but not a majority in the electoral college, making George W. Bush president of the United States of America.<sup>91</sup> The same happened in 2016 between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.<sup>92</sup>

Whitehead therefore concluded that 'democracy' on one hand is a label for existing conditions, but on the other hand it is also a pursued wish that existing democracy does not always fulfil. He stresses that

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90 Ibid, 26–35.

91 Ibid, 6.

92 <https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/president>, last access on 22.08.2018.

democracy is controversial and open for interpretation, but there are some variables that almost always (although in different manifestations) are met; these can bridge the gap between reality and checklists.<sup>93</sup>

Such a checklist, what Whitehead calls a minimum definition of democracy (distinguished from his procedural definition), shall be outlined here. These checklists can, according to Whitehead, be followed back to Joseph Schumpeter. The following was formulated by Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl.<sup>94</sup> Schmitter and Karl differentiate between concepts, procedures, and operating principles. The basic concept is that responsible citizens elect competing politicians. The procedures of a democratic state shall be as follows:

1. The government is under public control.
2. Regular elections are free and fair.
3. All adults have active electoral rights.
4. All adults have passive electoral rights.
5. Freedom of speech is universal.
6. Information is publicly available, citizens can freely select their source of information; the state protects plurality of information.
7. Citizens are free to establish associations, especially parties.
8. Elected officials must be able to fulfil their duties without hindrance.
9. The state must be autonomous and free from influence by superior institutions.<sup>95</sup>

Whitehead criticises this list as both incomplete and too strict. Based on it, one could argue that Great Britain in 1999 was not a democracy because the House of Lords did not get elected, there was no explicit Freedom of Information Act, and the European Court of Justice had quasi-legislative functions. This poses the question whether there can actually be fully independent states and how the results of democrat-

93 Ibid, 6–10.

94 Ibid, 10.

95 Schmitter/Karl 1993, 45.

ic processes have to be – even the greatest social injustice could be reproduced through democratic processes. In general, these lists do neither ask for values and norms, different constitutional models, individual freedoms nor for a welfare state.<sup>96</sup>

Not least, a definition of ‘democracy’ is always dependent on place, time, and culture – the context. The criteria mentioned above are from a northern American and western European context, have grown over centuries and are not applicable to other parts of the world or past times. For people in other contexts, wholly different situations can be democratically legitimised; political and social scientists as well as historians have to take the perspective of the people involved. But, Whitehead admits, there are some limits that no democratic state after World War II was able to cross without losing its legitimacy. Whitehead concludes that the criteria listed above cannot be a strict measuring tape, but that there is indeed a guideline as will be seen in the following paragraphs.<sup>97</sup>

One prerequisite for a stable democracy is, according to Whitehead, that the electorate is open for democracy. Just like a drama must appeal to the audience and the plot develops over time, democracy must be visualised for its audience and democratisation needs time. In other aspects like communication between the state and its citizens, charismatic leaders, necessary contextual knowledge, and ‘backstage’ events, Whitehead also draws parallels between drama and democracy.<sup>98</sup>

Not only has the electorate to be open for democracy, but there also needs to be a strong civil society that can resist antidemocratic tendencies from parts of the government or political movements and bridge cultural differences.<sup>99</sup> Although some factors like creation of a middle class, relative wealth, or modernisation are usually linked to successful democratisation, they cannot guarantee success. More important are discursive processes that negotiate society and democracy: The freedom of the individual, laws (even if one wants to

96 Whitehead 2002, 11–13.

97 Ibid, 12–26.

98 Ibid, 36–64.

99 See also Du Toit/Kotzé 2011, 26–30.

change them), and minorities have to be respected. Threats to a stable democracy are high unemployment, poverty, and violence,<sup>100</sup> which can also be consequences of a weak society, as well as particularistic interests.<sup>101</sup>

Furthermore, corruption can harm the democratic state because politics no longer happen in the interest of the electorate but of the highest-bidding – this can undermine democratic institutions. Whitehead describes corruption as a typical companion of democratisation processes when old elites try to secure power. More important is, however, what corruption tells about a society: Systematic corruption harms democracy while single scandals can boost it.<sup>102</sup>

Democratic institutions must fit to the existing civil society and have to grow with it and become more democratic when the society does the same; democratic norms, therefore, are not everything and empirical reality must be considered. A core feature of a constitutional democracy is that officials are accountable to the public – to Whitehead, this is not the aim of democratisation but the way to democratisation: If officials can behave any way they want, democratic procedures are at risk. It has to be considered, however, how much responsibility officials should take (too much of it can block the government's work through endless lawsuits) and who exactly takes which responsibility (unclear rules lead to arbitrariness). The constitution and the resulting institutions must be able to be adapted to social change to keep their legitimacy: The creation of a working democratic constitution, therefore, is a process of mutual accustoming of society, state, and constitution. This rules out the import of prepared constitutions from other countries – a forced constitution will not work (as numerous examples from the decolonisation of Africa have shown).<sup>103</sup> While rapid change must not be imposed on the state, the

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100 See also *Ibid.*, 29–30 – according to Pierre du Toit and Hennie Kotzé, these factors can generate tensions between ethnic or other groups that form communities of shared identity and values.

101 Whitehead 2002, 65–89.

102 *Ibid.*, 115–135; see also Rueschemeyer/Huber Stephens/Stephens 1992, 51–63.

103 Whitehead 2002, 90–114; see also Rose 2009.

same applies to its financial system to guarantee financial stability, security, and trust (as long as a market economy is aspired).<sup>104</sup>

Apart from a strong society, a stable democracy also needs a strong state that is able to secure civil society and itself from crime, terror, particularists, and more. Officials also must internalise democratic norms; the state must boast a reliable judiciary to protect state and civil society from each other.<sup>105</sup>

In all, according to Whitehead, democracy and civil society have to grow together; change takes time. Democratisation needs a strong society and a strong state, and it cannot be forced. Claude Aké agrees: “[D]emocratization is not something that one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen.”<sup>106</sup> This means that democratisation in Africa cannot be the introduction of European or northern American democracy but the development and negotiation of an African democracy that fits its people and its state.<sup>107</sup> Without a change in perspective, however, the international community would not accept this as democratic because it might not fit western standards.<sup>108</sup> Peter J. Schraeder supports this on an empirical basis: Prior to decolonisation, hastily written, untested constitutions were forced upon British and French colonies in Africa that often contradicted regional traditions and especially the authoritarian and arbitrary behaviour of the colonial authorities themselves. African

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104 Whitehead 2002, 136–164.

105 Ibid, 165–185; see also Cheeseman 2011, 355.

106 Aké 1993, 76.

107 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle argue against the claim that most people in sub-Saharan Africa were not ready for democracy, stating that democracy has to evolve in a long process in which accountability is most important; Bratton/van de Walle 1997, 10.

108 Comaroff and Comaroff give the example of Botswana where during the turn from 1960s to the 1970s a strong demand for a one-party state arose – not from the government but from the people. They believed that in a multi-party democracy the democratic procedures were reduced to voting every five years while in the meantime the government was hardly accountable which would alienate the people. In a one-party state, however, the ruling party would care for all and accountability could also be exercised through party structures; Comaroff/Comaroff 2016, 135–144.

political elites now were meant to become democrats of western standard<sup>109</sup> although they had been socialised under authoritarian European rule<sup>110</sup> – the rollback after this wave of democratisation shows how short-lived these constructs were.<sup>111</sup>

Patrick Bernhagen offers another point, contradicting Whitehead, and warns of mixing features of democracy with features of liberalism and social justice. Elections, franchise, freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, and the accountability of the government can well be features of a democratic state. Other features often connected to democracy, like capitalism, right to property, peace,<sup>112</sup> stability, economic efficiency and growth, freedom of religion, are not immediately connected to democracy according to Bernhagen.<sup>113</sup> This contradiction to Whitehead, especially regarding peace and stability, might surprise at first glance, but difference lies in perspective: “The concept of democracy denotes a mode of political decisionmaking in situations where binding rules have to be established or costs and benefits distributed”,<sup>114</sup> according to Bernhagen.

For him, democracy is a mode of decisionmaking (thus, he speaks of an electoral democracy), but for Whitehead, democracy is a societal model (liberal democracy). Whitehead’s argument is convincing because even an electoral democracy needs democrats to survive. Bratton and van de Walle note:

From a contingent perspective, political outcomes emanate from interaction and bargaining. Implicit is a notion of democracy, not so much as a model set of political ideals but as second-best compromise. Here, the key to democratic transition is the ability of

109 Some examinations suggest that the ANC had quite similar problems living up to set standards and to the demands of the electorate; Butler 2005; Kulzer 2000; Pretorius 2006.

110 Schraeder 1995, 46; see also Aké 1996, 1–6; Hanf in Thula 1980, 50–51.

111 Berg-Schlosser 2009, 48–49; Huntington 1993, 18–21.

112 Pierre du Toit and Hennie Kotzé also differentiate between democratisation, liberalisation, and pacification; Du Toit/Kotzé 2011, 6. Eghosa Osaghae differentiates between political and economic liberalisation; Osaghae 1999, 6.

113 Bernhagen 2009, 31.

114 Ibid, 30.



participants to arrive at arbitrated agreements that grant everyone at least part of what each wants.<sup>115</sup>

Those democrats that a democracy needs must be able to participate – the legal possibility alone is not sufficient.<sup>116</sup> Bernhagen's differentiation nevertheless is an important input.

Looking at democracy's history, a special glance at the relationship of ethnicity and democracy seems appropriate. But does it really determine elections and do people really vote along ethnic lines? For a long time in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ethnicity was seen as backwards, anachronistic, and undemocratic; scholars expected ethnicities to dissolve in the context of globalisation, modernisation and democratisation. Many opponents of apartheid rejected the whole concept of ethnicity because it was a core argument of apartheid and its homeland or Bantustan policy.<sup>117</sup>

In global perspective, this dissolution did not happen, so scholars had to address the relationship of ethnicity and democracy. Most studies agree that ethnic or cultural differences are no hindrance for democracy and democratisation but can even bolster democracy through shared symbolic values. Ethnic differences only become problematic when they are politicised by political elites to secure their power – ethnicities then become exclusive and not inclusive; they isolate groups from each other and create stiff boundaries between purportedly irreconcilable groups.<sup>118</sup> From this perspective, ethnic conflicts mostly appear as conflicts guided by political interests.<sup>119</sup> According to most scholars, therefore, ethnicity does not pose a problem to democracy but ethnic nationalism does.<sup>120</sup>

Politically mobilised ethnicity and lived, experienced cultural ethnicity are thus not the same and need to be analysed separately

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115 Bratton/van de Walle 1997, 25.

116 Aké 1995, 70–72; Heller 2012.

117 Lowe 1991, 195; Maré 1992, 36–37.

118 Ibid, 4.

119 Adam/Giliomee 1979, x; Adam/Moodley 1993, 14; Aké 1993, 72; Hanf 1989, 101–102; Kößler 1994, 4–5.

120 Lowe 1991, 195.

(of course, they do influence each other); the success of politicised ethnicity lies in its use of experienced, cultural ethnicity which can also be changed or manipulated during its use.<sup>121</sup>

Ethnicity usually does not determine election results, these are decided by interests: Like ethnicity is used to pursue interests, so are elections.<sup>122</sup> In the specific case of South Africa, it should be noted that several cultural identities could be combined; many South Africans saw themselves as Xhosa, Zulu etc. but also as Blacks. Especially in the fight against apartheid, the latter was stressed because it helped a joint cause.<sup>123</sup>

An increasing ethnic mobilisation was visible in Africa that, e.g., led to separate accommodation for African migrant labourers with different ethnic backgrounds in township hostels (the apartheid state did not require this). Said hostels were a hot spot of violent clashes between men from different ethnic groups – at the same time, this often was a political conflict about resources in poor areas with high unemployment and a generational conflict as well (although the media liked to portray it as a solely ethnic or “tribal” conflict).<sup>124</sup> After the first democratic elections of 1994, this ethnic mobilisation did not stop.<sup>125</sup>

### 2.5.2 The South African Perspective in the 1980s

To get a good overview of the political demands in 1980s South Africa, a broad political spectrum shall be outlined here, focusing on their respective understandings of democracy. This will also show with whom Inkatha could hardly cooperate although so many movements and groups called for democracy – and with whom Inkatha had conceptual overlapping. Nevertheless, some limitations are necessary

121 Campbell/Maré/Walker 1995, 288–289.

122 Basedau, et al. 2011, 462–465; Piper 1998, 17–39.

123 Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 169.

124 Brock 1992, 149–153; Köbller/Schiel 1994, iii; Segal 1992, 218–226. For some more details and explanations of the violent clashes, see chapter 3.1.

125 Lange 1998, 132.

to keep this chapter feasible. Especially those movements will be in focus which could actually influence politics. In the case of the disenfranchised majority, this means that organised resistance movements are especially relevant; for Coloureds and Indians, their respective political parties will be important as well (although their influence was limited in the 1983 constitution that is described below).

White South Africans and their parties will be analysed as they could have forced change through elections; regarding the black majority, there seem to be very few representative surveys which makes a look at the resistance movements even more important. Only publications and other material until about 1990 will be considered because the landscape changed during the CODESA negotiations when Inkatha was largely sidelined.

It is important to note that only proposals will be considered which would not have split South Africa into several independent countries and which are in the very broadest sense democratic. The far-right Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party will therefore not be included because they advocated in favour of the status quo or even more racial segregation and white domination.<sup>126</sup> The Pan-Africanist Congress and the Azanian People's Organisation will not be presented in detail because of their limited strength (their demands for a socialist state are obviously contrary to the parliamentary democracy that most others demanded). After all, the ANC, the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions were by far the most powerful organisations.<sup>127</sup>

Beginning with liberals in science, politics, and the economy, this sub-chapter will not only focus on South African scientists because experts from Europe and Northern America also participated in the discourse, were appreciated by their South African colleagues, and visited South Africa for various conferences.<sup>128</sup> The proposals

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126 Mabude 1983, 559–561.

127 Simkins 1988, 20–27.

128 Theodor Hanf, e.g., participated in a 1978 conference in Grahamstown; van Zyl Slabbert/Opland 1980, v; Arend Lijphart was part of the Buthelezi Commission; Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 37; and German Heribert Adam and South African Kogila Moodley were not living in South Africa (because their mar-

of other individuals and organisations were often analysed, but this sub-chapter will focus on the mostly empirically-based proposals for transition to a stable democracy by scientists.

In the year 1977, on a conference on “intergroup accommodation in plural societies”,<sup>129</sup> the South African Minister of Education spoke of a federal or confederal model like in Switzerland as a possible future solution. Talcott Parsons picked up the topic in his comment and called it a serious proposition that might absorb disparities and injustices on ethnic and social levels, but only when the white population would also have been split into groups.<sup>130</sup> Parsons gave no further details, but it seems that the scientific discussion about South Africa’s constitutional future started around this time in 1977.

In the same year, Arend Lijphart published his widely discussed<sup>131</sup> monograph *Democracy in Plural Societies*<sup>132</sup> in which he gave consociational democracy a theoretical framework and in which he promoted it as a method for conflict resolution and democratisation in plural and divided societies.<sup>133</sup>

In short, consociational democracy can be described as a system relying on consensus (or compromise) of all societal groups instead of the decisions of a majority (or even a minority). On all levels (legislative, executive, public service etc.), positions are allocated accord-

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riage was prohibited in South Africa, see <http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mp/2003/05/05/stories/2003050501380300.htm>, last access on 20.03.2017).

129 24–26 May 1977, hosted by the University of Pretoria; Rhodie 1978, xiii.

130 Parsons 1978, 461–466.

131 Lijphart was not the first scientist working on consociational democracy but by far the most influential and was also read in South Africa; Venter 1983, 274; for example, he was part of the Buthelezi Commission; Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 37.

132 Lijphart 1977.

133 As early as 1971, Leo Kuper pointed to consociational democracy as a possible way towards democratic change in plural societies. Prerequisites were, in his eyes, that individuals and groups come closer to each other, get to know each other, and that the ruling group would (slowly) incorporate individuals from other groups. Differences in identity would have to be recognised and tensions result from them (so change would become urgent). Consociational democracy could then be a way to share power and responsibility; Kuper 1971; Kuper 1974, 141–174; see also Kuper 2010.

ing to the proportions of ethnic groups in the country; government and parliament, i.e., shall represent the ethnic composition as exactly as possible and therefore include all groups into the political process. Small minorities can be overrepresented, though, for special protection. A further mechanism of protection lies in a veto system which single groups or minorities can use to block legislation of which they think that it would affect their group and their interests. If other groups then use the veto system as well, compromises have to be found to avoid deadlock. The various groups – consociational theory also speaks of segments – have inner autonomy, especially when it comes to education and culture (as an alternative, this could also be distributed between regions instead of groups).<sup>134</sup>

Theodor Hanf and Heribert Weiland saw consociational democracy (*Konkordanzdemokratie* in German) as the best compromise for all groups that could then get to know each other and negotiate at eye level – but this could only have worked if it had happened on all levels of society, not only politics. Apartheid, therefore, would have needed to be abolished. To them, it was not so much about majority or consociational democracy but about consociational democracy or failing, repressive, fake democracy.<sup>135</sup>

Consociational proposals met with a lot of criticism, its theoretical framework for example was criticised as vague and selective; many definitions were unclear.<sup>136</sup> The practical side was seen as problematic because nobody would fill the important role of the opposition. Furthermore, terms in office were not limited – mostly a point voiced from the US-American perspective – and elections, usually a core piece of democracy, would not matter in the end because the government would be an elite pact. For the same reason, consociational negotiations would neither be transparent nor participative but slow; critics spoke of an elite government or oligarchy in which minorities would have an overproportioned influence because of the veto system. Multiplication of institutions for every group would be costly and cement the separation of ethnic groups instead of bringing them

134 Hanf/Weiland 1978, 757–758; Lijphart 1977, 21–52; Lijphart 1978, 33–39.

135 Hanf/Weiland 1978, 759–767.

136 Boule 1984, 62–64.

closer together. Legal scholar L.J. Boule concludes that this, however, would still be better than a failing state, a coup, or a one-party state as a consequence of a failed majority system.<sup>137</sup> What has already shone through is that economic circumstances hardly feature apart from the general demand for fair economic policy. This allows to accuse consociational democracy as centred around the elite and ignorant towards the majority of the people and its needs.<sup>138</sup>

Lijphart did not make any comments on South Africa in his 1977 monograph, but in a 1985 publication, he did. For him, South Africa was too sharply divided for a majority system – this would have continued apartheid under a different government; centralism would have neglected regional needs. Instead, all groups were meant to participate in the political process, the regions were meant to have autonomy, and the minority veto and proportionality with a rotating head of government were to be in operation. It was especially important for Lijphart that the groups or segments constituted themselves and were not prescribed by law (like apartheid did). Consociationalism was to be combined with federalism comprising economically and administratively viable provinces that were also ethnically homogeneous<sup>139</sup> – these provinces would then have had a lower potential for conflict than South Africa as a whole.<sup>140</sup>

For Lijphart, unisono with Hanf and Weiland, consociational democracy was the only workable solution (albeit not perfect, as they admit), because it was the only compromise that all groups could somehow agree on. Consequently, Lijphart supported the proposals of the Progressive Federal Party and the Buthelezi Commission (see chapter 5.2.1).<sup>141</sup>

Answering his critics, Lijphart stated that a separation between government and opposition could also be seen as undemocratic (because it excludes a large proportion of elected representatives) and that the other option (an inclusion of all representatives, what critics

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137 Ibid, 61–62.

138 Nolutshungu 1982, 26–27; Rich 1989, 301–302.

139 I have no idea how this should have become reality in South Africa.

140 Lijphart 1985, 6–9, 80–82.

141 Ibid, 10.

called an oligarchy) was the better option. Overrepresenting minorities was unproblematic because it is actually a common feature of democratic federations: One vote from Alaska weighs a lot more in the elections to the US senate than one vote from California. That many states need a two-third majority to change the constitution interprets Lijphart as another feature of minority protection.<sup>142</sup>

In their 1979 book *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?*, Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee looked at possible alternatives to apartheid. Giliomee and Adam detected an urgent need and a real possibility for change to solve South Africa's problems (therefore, they wished to use contingency in a productive way). That Liberal Party, Progressive (Federal) Party and their supporters had been unable to change anything was caused by the Westminster system in which the constituencies elected their representatives in a winner-takes-all election, heavily disadvantaging small parties (the Liberal Party never won a constituency, the Progressive Party for a long time only had one of their members in parliament, Helen Suzman). Liberal-minded white South Africans were, therefore, heavily underrepresented and deprived of representation.<sup>143</sup>

Regarding consociational democracy, Adam identified three obstacles to a successful implementation. While Lijphart assumed the existence of cultural or ethnic groups that have evolved over time, Adam rather saw them as artificial products of apartheid forced upon people. The group system could therefore not be continued but membership in cultural<sup>144</sup> or ethnic groups would have needed to be voluntary.<sup>145</sup>

The second obstacle lay in the absence of legitimate, representative ethnic leaders with a loyal following that could enter such an elite pact. While there might be some legitimate ethnic leaders for Afrikaners, Zulu and in some other rural areas that could at least speak for

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142 Lijphart 1978, 29–30; Lijphart 1985, 11–13.

143 Adam/Giliomee 1979, 258–285.

144 As an example, Adam gives the Coloureds who originally felt part of the Afrikaners but then were excluded through racist legislation and forced to form their own, separate cultural group.

145 Ibid, 288–290.

a majority of their people, there were none for Coloureds, Indians and urban Africans. Their respective leaders were merely mouthpieces of group interests that could quickly lose their followers when making unpopular decisions. On the other hand, they might have had to radicalise to keep their legitimacy, but this would have made them bad partners in a system based on consensus and moderation. This was made even more complicated by the restrictive policy of the government of banning political organisations as soon as they became potentially dangerous.<sup>146</sup>

The third problem, according to Adam, lay in the huge differences in power between the groups, especially regarding economy and education, because a consociational system does not compensate these differences. Redistribution before the introduction of a consociational system was needed to allow negotiations eye to eye.<sup>147</sup>

Sam C. Nolutshungu voiced quite similar concerns. While consociational democracy acknowledges cultural plurality and diminishes potential for revolution, it does not reduce other inequalities and therefore does not shift power relations. Rather, the profiting elites are enlarged and more heterogenous, but the majority of people hardly profit at all.<sup>148</sup>

Nolutshungu further explained that there is good reason to call consociational democracy undemocratic because competition for voter support is missing and not all votes have the same weight – because in a consociational democracy, elites do not depend on the votes and minorities have more weight than majorities. Furthermore, no decisions can ever be made in the interest of all people, e.g. when a new factory shall be built that every group wants to have in their region. Proportional allocation of government offices also is difficult because this does not mean real control of a department and not all departments are equally important.<sup>149</sup>

The assumption that cultural groups could handle their internal affairs autonomously seems especially problematic in South African

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146 Ibid, 290–294.

147 Ibid, 295–300.

148 Nolutshungu 1982, 26–27.

149 Ibid, 27–30.



cities where people of all backgrounds live close to each other and it is hard to tell which affairs really affect only one group, Nolutshungu argued. A solution, in theory, would be even more segregation along apartheid lines or the drafting of a whole new societal group system – but consociational theory does not offer answers to this.<sup>150</sup>

Interesting in this context when many favoured some sort of power-sharing, often of a consociational style, is a study by Rupert Taylor and Mark Orkin. Virtually all of the above except Nolutshungu were part of a well-connected, even larger influential network of social and political scientists which its critics accused of being positivistic and undertheorised (Ari Sitas called Durban, where Lawrence Schlemmer was based, a “positivist heaven”<sup>151</sup>). It was further accused of a wrong assumption, namely that it accepted race and ethnicity as given, natural features and that it did not define these (as we have seen, this is not entirely true). The network further was accused of not considering other processes of group formation (through age, class, gender, education, wealth) and, therefore, of simplifying complex social relations. At the core of the network were, according to Taylor’s and Orkin’s analysis of many cross-references and acknowledgements, Heribert Adam, Hermann Giliomee, Theodor Hanf, Arend Lijphart, Lawrence Schlemmer, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, and David Welsh. Taylor and Orkin find that the almost entirely white network becomes self-referential like a filter bubble (in today’s language) and connects the apartheid state, big business, independent research institutions, and political parties (especially the Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha with Oscar Dhlomo being the only black member of the network).<sup>152</sup>

In 1979, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh, part of this network but also politically active, published their book *South Africa’s Options: Strategies for Sharing Power* which analysed the then present situation and aimed to draw consequences for future political action. Both had originally been professors, van Zyl Slabbert in Sociology and Welsh in Political Sciences, and wanted to join parliament in

150 Ibid, 31–32.

151 Sitas 1986, 93.

152 Taylor/Orkin 2001.

1974; only van Zyl Slabbert was successful<sup>153</sup> and later joined the Progressive Federal Party for which he became leader of the opposition from 1979 to 1986.<sup>154</sup>

Van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh advocated democratic change on the assumption that it is possible in a heterogenous or divided society; to this end, they gave several examples in South America, Asia, and Europe in which negotiations between the elites of several groups led to stability and democratisation. Consociational democracy was explicitly mentioned.<sup>155</sup>

Their vision was quite similar to consociational democracy and included power-sharing (instead of the Westminster system) e.g. through a huge coalition of most parties, and through basic human and civil rights. In one demand, they differed considerably: Legislation was to influence the formation of groups and movements by incentives to organise across cultural lines.<sup>156</sup> Federalism was to help sharing and devolving power as well as resolving conflicts; the executive was to represent all groups proportionally; separation of power, checks and balances, and a minority veto were to be applied. The transition phase was to be organised by a national assembly that negotiated the details.<sup>157</sup>

On a PFP congress in 1978, a committee led by van Zyl Slabbert presented its report on democratisation of South Africa which was then accepted as official PFP policy.<sup>158</sup> Unsurprisingly, this report matched the book by van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh in many points, so only some highlights shall be presented here.

The PFP then advocated a federal solution in its new policy that contained several consociational elements, namely proportionality, minority veto, and the representation of groups at a cultural council (as part of the Senate). Power was to be distributed between the provinces and Pretoria, the provinces (not the groups) enjoyed autonomy

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153 Van Zyl Slabbert/Welsh 1979, Preface.

154 Joyce 1999, 241.

155 Van Zyl Slabbert/Welsh 1979, 50–76.

156 Ibid, 133.

157 Ibid, 133–165.

158 Progressive Federal Party 1978, 3.

in some affairs and were all represented equally in Senate. Elections were to take place via lists (and not via winner-takes-all constituencies), the elected parties would have had to form a grand coalition. The judiciary was to be strengthened and a constitutional court added. The transition phase was to be organised by a constitutional assembly of all non-violent groups and movements which then would negotiate a constitution (at which the PFP would act for its proposals) – the old government and parliament would dismantle apartheid in the meantime.<sup>159</sup>

The PFP could have little hope to ever reach a majority in parliament. Instead, it could see and present itself as a think tank, generator of ideas, and an important voice of dissent in parliament. Big business, especially Anglo American, and (English-speaking) intellectuals supported it on this matter and ensured that the PFP had sufficient publicity. Oftentimes, the PFP directed its action solely at its white electorate, but the PFP always looked for credible black leaders with whom it cooperated.<sup>160</sup>

Parts of (big) business, however, were looking to keep politics and the economy separate (so politics would not interfere with business interests).<sup>161</sup> Pressure was applied on the government, e.g., when strikes led to financial losses; resistance also arose on the side of business representatives when apartheid legislation like the pass laws reduced profit – the Botha government partly gave in to these demands and loosened some apartheid laws.<sup>162</sup>

Even in the beginning of the 1990s, parts of the business community hoped that the economic status quo would remain untouched and economic questions left out of the negotiations – but especially trade

159 Ibid, 15–29; see also Boule 1984, 109–111; Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 156–161; Hanf/Weiland 1978, 764–765; Jooste 1983, 424–427; Lijphart 1985, 67; Nolutshungu 1982, 95–96.

160 Colin Eglin, for example, was a member of the Buthelezi Commission and a prominent figure in the PFP; Ray Swart, the PFP's Natal leader, was a member of the Indaba's Steering Committee (see following chapters). Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 156–161; Hanf/Weiland 1978, 764; Nolutshungu 1982, 95–96.

161 As we have seen in chapter 2.4, the NP government tried to do the same.

162 Hanf 1990, 5; Nolutshungu 1982, 97–109; for examples on the pressure applied by the business community, see Hill 1983, 47–77.

unions of course demanded to discuss these topics.<sup>163</sup> That the business community might be a force for liberation and for an improvement of living standards was heavily doubted from the left because business profited from cheap labour and only acted against some apartheid laws that affected it.<sup>164</sup>

The African National Congress fought for a political system that largely would have been an extension of the existing white privileges onto all South Africans. Human and civil rights, political rights, welfare, etc. should have applied to all and apartheid abolished. The existing voting system and centralised legislation via majorities was to be continued with a foreseeable parliamentary majority for the ANC. In this new democracy, gender, colour of the skin, and ethnic/group<sup>165</sup> background would no longer play an official role and the individual would be in focus.<sup>166</sup>

The ANC, however, was open for compromise if it was a compromise leading in the right direction;<sup>167</sup> coalitions, therefore, would have been possible.<sup>168</sup> Thabo Mbeki, for example, advocated federalism (like in the USA) in 1983,<sup>169</sup> accepting the demand to decentralise and devolve power and even making a white “homeland” (that the Conservative Party and others on the right wing demanded) thinkable.

For future practices, the ANC intended to use a pragmatic (instead of doctrinaire) socialism: nationalisation of big, core companies, equal opportunities (in education and profession), distributional justice, welfare – demands that also feature in many social democratic movements. Details on how the ANC imagined the future state often

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163 Ottaway 1993, 132–140.

164 Nolutshungu 1982, 4.

165 With this move, the ANC distanced itself from the Freedom Charter that had, after its creation in 1955, provided the guideline for the non-violent ANC. The Charter uses the terms “National Groups” and “Races” that were to be protected in their respective national prides; Suttner/Cronin 1986, 263.

166 Adam/Moodley 1993, 24–25; Ansprenger 1987, 76; Dlamini 2001a, 199; Friedman 1990, 38–57; Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 213; Hanf 1989, 108–109.

167 Adam 1988, 104–105; Friedman 1990, 38–57.

168 Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 213.

169 Lijphart 1985, 23.

remained vague until 1988 so there can be no description of a draft constitution, plans for democratisation, or the like for that time.<sup>170</sup>

In 1986, the ANC started investigations into a new constitutional dispensation through a Constitutional Committee under Jack Simons. The ANC opted for individual rights and freedoms and not for group rights, although parts of the ANC saw individual rights as bourgeois.<sup>171</sup> Its 1988 Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa set out to replace all of apartheid's institutions with democratic ones that no longer relied on race or ethnicity and guaranteed equal rights for all South Africans in a unitary state. Regarding group rights, it is clearly stated:

Under the conditions of contemporary South Africa 87% of the land and 95% of the instruments of production of the country are in the hands of the ruling class, which is solely drawn from the white community. It follows, therefore, that constitutional protection for group rights would perpetuate the status quo and would mean that the mass of the people would continue to be constitutionally trapped in poverty and remain as outsiders in the land of their birth.<sup>172</sup>

The United Democratic Front was a coalition of many organisations primarily of Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians<sup>173</sup> resisting apartheid; the trigger for its formation was the new South African constitution from 1983 that will be described below. Participating organisations ranged from trade unions, chambers of commerce, to sport clubs and others, so the UDF was a very heterogenous organisation. The uniting aim was the democratisation of South Africa, primarily based on the Freedom Charter, but also differing from the Freedom Charter that spoke of political groups and races:<sup>174</sup> South Africa was to become a

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170 Zulu 1988, 118–119.

171 Dubow 2014, 247–249.

172 African National Congress 1989, 130. This is a later publication of the 1988 document.

173 Whites were welcome to participate as individuals.

174 Suttner/Cronin 1986, 263.

non-racist central state (instead of a multiracial federation) in which all democrats participated and that worked for the benefit of all people. Quite similar to the ANC's position, the existing state should have been freed from apartheid legislation and its benefits extended to all South Africans.<sup>175</sup>

The concepts of democracy as framed by the UDF leadership extended this view and that of the ANC: Quite like the UDF was working as an organisation, South Africa was meant to introduce direct participation on all levels including elements of direct democracy – thus, democracy was supposed to be more than just electing representatives.<sup>176</sup>

In the end of the 1970s, Hanf, Weiland, and Vierdag asked black urban dwellers about their political aims and found that four fifths demanded an expansion of the existing voting system on all South Africans. Three fifths, however, would also have agreed to consociational, consensus-style democracy as a compromise; only one fifth insisted on a strong central state and another fifth demanded the partition of South Africa.<sup>177</sup> For rural Blacks, there seems to be no statistical data available.

Schlemmer also found, this time in 1982, that many black South Africans wanted to gain the right to vote and were heavily politicised. Most demanded a reintegration of the homelands and *one* parliament in which the black majority would make decisions for the whole of South Africa; a majority would also have agreed to a compromise between the white government and equal black representatives.<sup>178</sup>

Fitting these findings, a 1984/85 study observed that the majority of urban Blacks rejected the 1983 tricameral parliament; the core argument neither was that it was a continuation of apartheid nor that Whites had the biggest profit, but it was the fact that 'Africans'<sup>179</sup> were

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175 Houston 1998, 131–141; Houston 1999, 64–70; Lodge 1989, 210–220; Öhm 2002, 94–101; Swilling 1988, 90–100; van Kessel 2000, 60–71.

176 Simkins 1988, 36–37.

177 Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1978, 360–368.

178 Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 215–280.

179 In the sense of Bantu-speaking people. This also applies to the following uses of this term in this chapter.

not represented. Had they been represented, the 1983 constitution would have had a significant backing in the cities.<sup>180</sup>

At the same time, Schlemmer noted that now more than half of the black workers endorsed militant, violent tactics against the apartheid state and rejected negotiations.<sup>181</sup>

Coloureds and Indians did not feature in many surveys, only Schlemmer's 1982 survey for the Buthelezi Commission seems to be representative. He concluded that both groups predominantly supported better relations and understanding between all groups and demanded more rights for themselves and other Blacks. Coloureds and Indians were more open to an African government than Whites (but still only one third supported this) and endorsed a central state.<sup>182</sup>

The Labour Party, an important Coloured party, advocated for negotiations until 1980 when, on a party congress, it was decided to opt for more confrontation and to follow the ANC's aims, all to the resentment of the party's leader Sonny Leon who then left the party.<sup>183</sup> However, the LP participated in the tricameral parliament from 1983 to change the system from within which earned the LP a lot of criticism;<sup>184</sup> many Coloureds (and also Indians) boycotted these elections. The LP demanded a bicameral system (parliament and senate), equal rights for all South Africans, and separation of powers. Instead of the existing constituencies, all elections were to be based on lists and contain a 5-percent hurdle to gain proportionate representation in parliament (which was no requirement for the new government).<sup>185</sup> The apartheid government's efforts to integrate the LP via the tricameral parliament could only be an interim step to full equalisation. The Natal Indian Congress, on the other hand, the biggest Indian party South Africa's and founded by Mohandas Gandhi, saw itself in the tradition of the Freedom Charter and close to the ANC.<sup>186</sup>

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180 de Kock/Rhodie/Couper 1985, 344.

181 Schlemmer 1984, 17.

182 Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 280–292.

183 Gordon 1981, 28–31; Randall 1983, 17.

184 Abrahams 1983, 250–252; Cooper, et al. 1984, 29–30.

185 Boule 1984, 112–114; Guelke 1992, 423–424.

186 Cooper, et al. 1984, 40–41; Horrell 1982, 19.

From 1977, the National Party discussed a new constitution that was finally adopted in 1983 and was meant to tackle white fears of African, Coloured, and Indian cooperation against apartheid. A system that integrated Coloureds and Indians through their own, separate chambers and excluded all Africans (that were still meant to become excluded from South Africa along with their then 'independent' homelands) was meant to split resistance to apartheid. Although there was a somewhat progressive faction (the 'verligtes') around Piet Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, it could not enforce change against the NP's hardliners ('verkrampste') and real change seemed unthinkable. The constitution indeed largely cemented white dominance and no real discussions inside the NP were allowed.<sup>187</sup> Said hardliners were the career politicians of the NP (thus the majority of the government members) while other NP members, especially scientists and publicists, often were more progressive than the NP leadership.<sup>188</sup>

The new constitution, affirmed in a referendum (by Whites only) on 02 November 1983, gave Coloureds and Indians their own, respective chambers meant to be responsible for their own, internal affairs and to sit together with the white parliament on important matters – the new, more powerful executive president, however, decided which matters were internal affairs and which were not, and the white parliamentarians still had a majority. If a law still could not be adopted, the President's Council discussed it. The council consisted of members of all three chambers and appointed (by the president) members in a proportion so that the NP government would always have a majority. It was intended to include Coloureds and Indians in the apartheid system and put it onto a larger, taxpaying basis; the Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, understood Whites, Coloureds, and Indians as one nation that should stand united against an African majority. Said African majority was excluded from the new political system and meant to seek represen-

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187 Hanf/Weiland 1978, 767–768; Du Toit 1980; Welsh 1984.

188 Gordon 1981, 1; Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1978, 140–141, 162–168.



tation through their ‘homelands’ (even if they had no ties to them at all in reality).<sup>189</sup>

From 1986, slow change became observable; Pik Botha (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Heunis were willing to introduce some democratisation. Federal, consensus-based power sharing between the elites was discussed with the group and its protection (not the individual) at the core of its thinking – the vast majority of individuals was African – and all ethnic groups were seen as separate as defined by apartheid.<sup>190</sup>

The NP government realised that something had to change if it did not want to lose the initiative. Fundamental reforms, however, were difficult because it did not want to lose voters to the Conservative Party and because the ‘verkramptes’ were still a majority.<sup>191</sup> In 1989, the NP still advocated its group-based approach but slowly receded from segregation: Official policy became that different autonomous nations in one state should grow together as one nation.<sup>192</sup>

Regarding white South Africans, only a few representative surveys cover political attitudes; this changed in the end of the 1980s.<sup>193</sup> In the end of the 1970s, Hanf, Weiland, and Vierdag found that the majority of Whites wanted to continue separate development although a census suffrage for assimilated middle classes was at least thinkable (but rejected especially by Africans). The English-speaking Whites were significantly more progressive than Afrikaans-speaking Whites.<sup>194</sup>

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189 Boule 1984, 192–215; Cooper, et al. 1984, 11; Guelke 1989, 256–258; Marx 2012, 268; Nolutshungu 1982, 116–146; Sodemann 1986, 90–92; Welsh 1984.

190 A work group of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning also discussed a liberal parliamentary system in which groups were voluntary – meaning the abolition of all racist laws – and all groups had equal opportunities in the long run. The proposals, however, were vague and never became official policy; Simkins 1988, 43–44.

191 Adam/Moodley 1993, 40–41; Friedman 1988, 16–17, 26–27; Friedman 1990, 14–19.

192 Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 212.

193 wa Kivilu, et al. 2004, 722–723.

194 Hanf/Weiland 1978, 759; Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1978, 140–141; Hanf 1981, 90–93.

In his abovementioned survey for the Buthelezi Commission, Schlemmer found in 1981 that white Natalians largely rejected the NP's law-and-order policy and favoured the extension of individual rights and freedoms on all South Africans (all questioned groups demanded this). About half of white Natalians favoured centralism, the other half federalism, but the majority wanted to continue separate development, albeit without cultural segregation. The homelands should remain part of South Africa in any case; they could even be allocated more land or be reintegrated into the provinces. Unthinkable was an African government because Whites did not think of Africans as capable for the job.<sup>195</sup>

In a 1984 survey, most Whites still rejected a common franchise for all South Africans but supported negotiations with the resistance movements and concessions.<sup>196</sup> In 1989, Giliomee and Schlemmer summarised various surveys and concluded that the majority of Whites continued to dismiss a common franchise and favoured a parliament with chambers for each group and a minority veto; a chamber for Africans, therefore, could be added to the existing tricameral parliament. This shows that white South Africans were more willing to share power than ten or seven years earlier.<sup>197</sup>

It seems that albeit all talked about democracy, they meant very different things. For many, 'democracy' described the type of constitution that is in power in a country; therefore, an elaborate discourse on possible constitutional features existed. Some, e.g. the UDF, also thought about the democratisation of society (the processual democracy that Whitehead describes), and some of redistribution and equity.

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195 Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 280–300.

196 Cooper, et al. 1985, 62.

197 Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 156–157, 223.

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## 2.6 Psychology of Advertising<sup>198</sup>

At last, looking at the psychology of advertising in a thesis on a political movement might come unexpected, and it was indeed even unexpected for me to find that this topic actually allows some important insights as we will see. At first glance, advertising seems to be solely a matter of economics, i.e. companies trying to sell their products, but advertising is much more according to Bob M. Fennis and Wolfgang Stroebe:

Advertising is a ubiquitous and powerful force, seducing us into buying wanted and sometimes unwanted products and services, donating to charitable causes, voting for political candidates, and changing our health-related lifestyles for better or worse. The impact of advertising is often subtle and implicit, but sometimes blatant and impossible to overlook.<sup>199</sup>

The psychology of advertising, therefore, promises to give some insights into how and why Buthelezi's and Inkatha's appeals to their supporters were successful and how Buthelezi's specific image of history and identity was internalised by many. Furthermore, the publicity campaign of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba can also be understood better with this approach. This chapter tries to outline some basics of the psychology of advertising, focusing on aspects that seem important for this thesis.

Fennis and Stroebe make out four steps that the human brain takes when it is presented with advertisements (for products, services, political parties, etc.) and processes the new information mostly consciously. These will be presented in the following paragraphs after which the consequences of successful advertising – i.e. persuasion – will be discussed.

When an advertisement (visual or audible) reaches a person, the brain first undertakes a *preattentive analysis* to find out whether atten-

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198 As I am not a psychologist by training, I would like to apologise for any inaccuracies in advance.

199 Fennis/Stroebe 2016, i.

tion should be directed to the advertisement. If it shows interest in the advertisement and its content, the advertisement will enter explicit memory; if not, it will enter implicit memory which is quicker and goes unnoticed but can also include complex and detailed information. Both memories, however, can influence a human's behaviour, but only information that enters the explicit memory is processed consciously. An advertisement is more likely to draw attention and be successful if it evokes positive emotions and is already familiar. Repetition, thus, is a key element in advertising, hence the repetitive use of slogans, songs, and images. This mere-exposure effect leads to a more positive evaluation of familiar things or persons.<sup>200</sup> Another method to draw attention is to address or create fears.<sup>201</sup>

As a second step, to draw *focal attention*, an external stimulus (i.e. the advertisement) needs to stand out; this can be done, mostly, in three ways. Salience, the difference from the environment, can make a stimulus noticeable, but salience depends on the context; vividness helps provoking concrete images and emotional interest, but this aspect is disputed in research. Third, the novelty of a stimulus may take the recipient by surprise through its unfamiliarity, so the future consumer mobilises more cognitive resources to understand the information s\*he received. Surprise through exaggeration, however, can be counterproductive as consumers might be disappointed of the product's/party's actual performance. Another important aspect that helps drawing focal attention is the categorisation of a new product, service, political movement etc. People like to draw categories and classify new things in these categories through similarities (like colours etc.); when establishing a new brand, a parent brand can help: When Cherry Coke was introduced, it was presented to consumers as a family member of Coca Cola so it could be categorised as a tasty drink like its parent brand (at least by people who liked Coca Cola).<sup>202</sup> We will see that this parent brand – new brand relationship is not confined to products alone: Inkatha was often portrayed as the internal wing or heir to the ANC.

200 Ibid, 48–58; see also Hansen/Wänke 2009; Moser 2002, 242–247.

201 Ibid, 224–227

202 Fennis/Stroebe 2016, 58–71.

Once the focal attention is directed at the advertisement, *comprehension* sets in which is a prerequisite for persuasion. As quick and easy decisions are preferred, people tend to believe statements as default (called the ‘truth effect’) and only start questioning when a higher degree of cognitive activity is directed at the topic. Again, repetition increases the acceptability of a statement as true because the claim is familiar – even if it is repeatedly marked as false as research has shown.<sup>203</sup>

The fourth and highly conscious step when processing advertisement is *elaborate reasoning*; the possible consumer reflects on the way something is portrayed and which intentions might lie behind it. A positive assessment is more likely when the advertisement’s message is congruent with the recipient’s (positive) self-schema and therefore is in line with her\*his views and when the message increases the customer’s confidence (e.g. by lauding purported features of the recipient).<sup>204</sup> Important for a successful advertisement (i.e. one that persuades the possible consumer) is to create a high level of involvement, leading to a more conscious processing. The new information is then more likely to be related to known information and – if it is in line with the previous knowledge – creates new beliefs and conclusions more easily.<sup>205</sup>

Fennis and Stroebe go on explaining how human memory works, but this will not be spread out here. It should be noted, however, that implicit memory can have serious impacts on consumer behaviour without the consumer realising it (while the impact of explicit memory is noticed).<sup>206</sup> Also, positive and negative attitudes towards a product, service, or political movement rely on memory of a once formed attitude; all the information known about something is not retrieved when thinking of it, but only the positive or negative feeling once evoked by it. Therefore, even when personal views have changed, this does not necessitate a change in attitudes. It might even occur

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203 Ibid, 71–75; see also Bak 2014, 70–71.

204 Fennis/Stroebe 2016, 75–80; see also Bak 2014, 72.

205 Fennis/Stroebe 2016, 48–49; see also Bak 2014, 68–70; Fischer/Wiessner/Bidmon 2011, 33–51; Mayer/Illmann 2000, 147–166; Moser 2002, 131–136.

206 See also Heath 2012, 68–73.

that, when additional information on something is encountered, no *new* evaluation on all available information will take place.<sup>207</sup>

In the course of time, memory fades, but not only do memories disappear. Successful advertisement (or other bits of information received and believed to be true) can alter the memory of an event, e.g. of consuming a product. This also means that present images and concepts can be forced onto memories of the past, alter memories or even construct new memories held to be true (repetition, again, plays an important role in this process). Memory, therefore, is not a representation of the past, but highly alterable and fluid, and it has an enormous impact on attitudes. Fennis and Stroebe further explain how attitudes are formed which will not be displayed here (as much of it really only refers to products and brands).<sup>208</sup> It is notable, however, that authorities can have a huge influence and can even lead to compliance without persuasion, i.e. a decision is made without being persuaded but because an authority says so; the same refers to social/group pressure.<sup>209</sup>

With all this in mind, some strategies and successes of Buthelezi and Inkatha can be understood a bit better, as we will see in the respective chapters. This chapter has outlined terms and concepts that are important in my analysis. They shape a new perspective on a widely discussed topic; what we have seen here will consequently be picked up in later chapters. Before we turn to the analysis, the following chapter will explain why the 1980s in South Africa were a contingent setting in which contingency needed to be managed.

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207 Fennis/Stroebe 2016, 102–112.

208 Ibid, 112–178.

209 Ibid, 285–326; see also Bak 2014, 83; Moser 2002, 120–121.

### 3. Instead of the usual Chapter on Context: Why the 1980s in South Africa were a Contingent Setting

#### 3.1 Changing Apartheid

*The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms.*

Nadine Gordimer citing Antonio Gramsci<sup>210</sup>

As I have suggested in the introduction, I argue that the late 1970s and the 1980s were an increasingly contingent setting for political action inside South Africa because the apartheid state could no longer quell unrest, got in increasing financial troubles, and lost more and more of its legitimacy (among those people who had ever seen it as legitimate). During these years, the future seemed uncertain to many contemporaries, and developments could have taken different paths. This changed when the national negotiations started in 1991, making a negotiated settlement more and more likely – but this was still not a safe development as the numerous disruptions of the negotiations showed. In this chapter, I intend to give an overview over the political developments of the period covered in this thesis, namely from the middle of the 1970s to 1994. In this context, I will argue why this time was a contingent setting that enabled initiatives which had been impossible (and probably unthinkable) before. This will entail a focus on political history. Saul Dubow offers a compelling narrative of the period in question on which much of this chapter will rely.<sup>211</sup> I will supplement this with additional arguments and details, especially when it comes to the violence in KwaZulu and Natal.

The first “cracks within the system”<sup>212</sup> appeared in the form of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) which challenged the system from within and aimed at a psychological liberation of Blacks

<sup>210</sup> Gordimer 20.01.1983.

<sup>211</sup> Dubow 2014.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid, 156.

(namely of all oppressed). While it had started as an intellectual movement, it became more and more confrontational in the form of rallies from about 1974, making government and police more determined to suppress it, especially through trials against Steve Biko and other leaders in 1975 and 1976, in turn offering a political platform for them. Parallel to the emergence of the BCM, a wave of strikes unseen in the decades before hit South Africa (especially Durban) in 1973 with more than 100,000 workers striking.<sup>213</sup> This prompts Dubow to conclude: “The early 1970s were a crucial transition moment between apartheid’s Verwoerdian high point and the re-emergence of concerted domestic opposition”.<sup>214</sup>

On the international scene, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal of 1974 changed southern Africa as Mozambique and Angola became independent in 1975 with strong Marxist movements that cooperated with the ANC. This change and especially the Angolan civil war led to a new instability in southern Africa, questioning the apartheid government’s long-term survival. The South African Defence Force (SADF) invaded Angola and although it was not defeated, it had to retreat, harming its image as being superior and practically invincible, giving rise to resistance movements and to international criticism, especially from the US under Carter.<sup>215</sup> This was followed by rising investments into the SADF in times of recession due to a plummeting gold price in 1975/76 and rising oil prices. After a small boom in the end of the 1970s, South Africa’s economy went downhill through the 1980s and capital left the country. Blacks became ever more discontent not only with their political, but also with their economic situation, given that their actual wages had decreased over the last decades. This gave rise to a new trade union movement.<sup>216</sup>

In 1976, the introduction of Afrikaans for half the school subjects that had previously been taught in English in so-called Bantu Education sparked the Soweto riots. The police fired at a protest march of

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213 Ibid, 156–174; see also Lodge 2011, 411–419; Marx 2012, 258–263.

214 Dubow 2014, 174. On the Black Consciousness Movement, see also Macqueen 2018.

215 Dederling 2019, 7–8.

216 Dubow 2014, 174–179.



pupils when people were already fleeing the scene (the entry wounds mostly were at the backs of the protestors), leaving at least 176 dead, but probably many more. This led to numerous riots in the following months accompanied by strikes; the protestors had no detailed plan but agreed that the apartheid system and its collaborators had to go. The police clamped down the protests violently and managed to restore order in 1979 through mass arrests and detentions, and because thousands of protestors went into exile. The murder of Steve Biko in 1977 made him a hero among the protestors and drew increased international attention on South Africa, leading the government to ban all relevant BCM organisations and leading the international community (especially the US and the UN) to impose embargos and call for change. The Information Scandal ('Muldergate') of 1977/78, revealing the illegal funding of apartheid propaganda overseas, damaged the government's image: It was no longer trustworthy, giving additional reasons to turn to the liberation movements, and leading prime minister and later president Balthazar Johannes ('John') Vorster to resign.<sup>217</sup>

Vorster was succeeded by Pieter Willem ('P. W.') Botha who used the relative stability until 1982 for reforms in a setting of economic recovery due to an increasing gold price. Simultaneously, a conservative wave in international politics ensured that especially the US and the UK were first and foremost interested in keeping South Africa in the Western bloc due to their investments and the resources in South Africa. Botha presented himself as pragmatic, adopting an 'adapt or die' attitude and leaving some apartheid principles behind. Reforms abolished some of the nastiest apartheid laws, namely the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,<sup>218</sup> the Immorality Act,<sup>219</sup> and the pass laws.<sup>220</sup> Botha, in a working alliance with the business community,

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217 Ibid, 179–194. See also Lodge 2011, 419–426; Marx 2012, 263–266. For more details on Muldergate, see Marx 2018.

218 This act made marriages between Whites and all others illegal.

219 This act criminalised sexual, consensual relationships between Whites and all others.

220 This set of laws aimed at tracking and controlling each individual's movement, especially to keep them out of declared 'white' neighbourhoods (with the excep-

also put a focus on development, arguing that an improvement in living conditions and the creation of a black middle class would appease most Blacks. To this end, investments into development projects were made, also from the business community, e.g. through the Urban Foundation by Harry Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert. Indeed, the 'colour bar' (preventing Blacks from accessing better jobs) was lifted and more Blacks occupied positions in skilled labour. The development of townships resulted in accepting the urbanisation of 'Africans'; additionally, trade unions were legalised.<sup>221</sup>

At the same time, the perceived 'total onslaught' (by communists) was to be met with a 'total strategy', namely keeping control through a strong, authoritarian, and autocratic state under a communist siege. The business community cooperated under this premise because white rule secured capitalism (but many argued that capitalism also secured white rule). The new 'securocrats' together with Botha actually governed the country, sidelining the cabinet and the National Party.<sup>222</sup>

Nevertheless, Botha's reforms alienated right-wing hardliners, and the Conservative Party was founded that posed a threat to the NP's supremacy. Botha's new style of apartheid ('neo-apartheid') pretended to be non-racial, spoke of population groups, and of a multi-cultural nation of minorities. Some sort of power-sharing was to be exercised and all groups were to enjoy internal autonomy. A 'constellation of states'<sup>223</sup> with the 'independent' homelands and compliant neighbouring countries was to increase stability throughout Southern Africa between purportedly equal partners. These proved to be euphemisms, however: South Africa continued to dominate the region,

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tion of workers that had to enter the neighbourhood). People caught without a pass or in an area where they were not permitted to be were then fined or jailed and sent to a region assigned to them. In the case of Africans, this usually meant deportation to a homeland, even if they had been urban dwellers for all their life and never seen their purported 'homeland'.

221 Dubow 2014, 195–199. See also Marx 2012, 266–273.

222 Dubow 2014, 200–202. See also Lodge 2011, 466–481; Maré 1989, 179; Posel 1984, 6.

223 Breytenbach 1980; Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane Uni 1980; Daily Dispatch 1980c; Horrell 1982, 289–290.

and the homeland system was continued, thus mostly denying Africans political rights outside the homelands they were assigned to (the tricameral parliament only included Whites, Coloureds, and Indians) and restricting access to cities. This led to a loss of legitimacy that Botha might have had at his accession, and the introduction of the tricameral parliament sparked the formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 – a new wave of internal resistance through a mass movement erupted that could not be contained.<sup>224</sup>

The Vaal Uprising (1984–85), massive protests of workers, students, community organisations, and unemployed, shook the country, also because they turned violent regularly, and were met with increased militarisation, a state of emergency, and violence not only by the police but also by the SADF. The military's actions in the townships actually fuelled the revolts, prompting observers to speak of a civil war.<sup>225</sup>

At the same time, the ANC had returned to the scene. Attacks, mainly on government buildings, from 1977 to 1980 had not proven effective, but the ANC managed to blow up fuel tanks at SASOL refineries in 1980 worth 66 million Rands, followed by attacks on other targets in the following years. These attacks, that sometimes included civil casualties, posed no real, material danger to the state, but they aroused the country and added to a growing feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. The government reacted with raids on purported ANC camps, assassinations, parcel bombs, and other means of terror, but it also supported counterrevolutionaries in Angola and Mozambique and managed to force pacts on said countries on South Africa's terms. This led to a moment of strength and some international recognition for securing stability, but more revolts were to come.<sup>226</sup>

Political conflict at the time also included the clashes between Inkatha on one side and the UDF, the ANC, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) on the other side. This will be summarised in a few separate paragraphs below.

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224 Dubow 2014, 203–210. See also Lodge 2011, 437–461.

225 Dubow 2014, 210–213.

226 Ibid, 213–217. See also Lodge 2011, 426–437.

When Botha made his infamous Rubicon speech on 15 August 1985, the masses of South African and international viewers had expected announcements of abolishing apartheid and releasing political prisoners. Botha, however, furiously turned against anyone who wanted to convince him of a change of mind, rejecting a one-man-one-vote system and stressing the notion of a nation of minorities. This was an international PR disaster. Even conservatives in Europe or the US could no longer take his side and the business community lost any trust in Botha from whom it had demanded negotiations. The Rand plummeted, foreign investments declined, and South Africa had issues paying its debts. Even the US, against Reagan's will, imposed more sanctions, just like the EU. The great wave of disinvestment, however, did not cripple South Africa; local companies often bought factories, etc., cheaply from their previous foreign owners and continued operations. Imports continued on indirect routes. Far more important than the economic damage was the moral effect of the west practically abandoning South Africa.<sup>1</sup>

Internal movements continued to press for change while legitimacy and authority of the state were dwindling; the security apparatus, however, was stronger than ever.<sup>2</sup> The formation of the UDF and COSATU, independent from the ANC, and their continued operations showed that resistance was not going to end; nevertheless, they also continued to clash with Inkatha. Compared to Botha's Rubicon speech, the ANC seemed to many as a more realistic and moderate player and a (possible) future government. The ANC and the government made first steps to get in touch with each other (although future developments were completely unclear). At the same time, the SADF continued to attack purported ANC camps in Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, infringing on the sovereignty of said countries and giving even more reasons for sanctions.<sup>3</sup>

A second state of emergency was imposed in 1986 that lasted until 1990, bringing the securocrat, military state to its peak and clamping down the UDF. In 1988, order had been restored, but protests

1 Dubow 2014, 221–225. See also Marx 2012, 273–278.

2 See also Gerhart/Glaser 2010c, 114.

3 Dubow 2014, 226–240. See also Lodge 2011, 461–466.

returned in the form of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in alliance with COSATU in 1989. Apartheid was no longer working in the cities, especially in Johannesburg where mixed neighbourhoods were emerging, a new alternative press was openly criticising apartheid, and even the Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church began to reject apartheid. Moreover, the capitalist business community began to talk to the communist ANC. In 1986, both the ANC and the government started investigations into new constitutions, showing that they perceived a need for change towards a new order.<sup>4</sup> In the same year, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba also set out to find a new constitution, albeit only for KwaZulu and Natal (see chapter 5.2.2).

Although the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was not really a threat for the SADF, the securocrats opted for negotiations because unrest was not going to stop – a move which Botha still rejected. Despite the draconic measures of the apartheid state, support for right-wing hardliners was growing, and political violence was increasing, especially in KwaZulu and Natal where Inkatha on one side and an ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance on the other side entered a vicious circle of retaliation in which peace calls of the leaders were frequently ignored and many vigilantes used the occasion for personal enrichment. The police, as part of the violent apartheid system, worsened the problem. The political scene in the years 1989 and 1990 was viewed as a stalemate by many in which none could overthrow the other; it was unclear what was to come and whether negotiations might solve the problem.<sup>5</sup>

Important changes came when Botha was pushed out of office and replaced by Frederik Willem de Klerk in 1989 who turned out to be a reformer, to the surprise of many. Despite initial electoral losses, he managed to return control from the securocrats to the cabinet which was met with reluctance, but after all, the hardliners had run out of ideas and the Cold War, a primary legitimisation of apartheid and white rule, had ended. De Klerk decided to take the initiative and call for reforms to spearhead the change that was to come, although he surely

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4 Dubow 2014, 240–255. See also Marx 2012, 273–278.

5 Dubow 2014, 255–262; see also Gerhart/Glaser 2010c.

did not intend to give up power, but nobody could know what the near future might bring. Nevertheless, his announcements in 1990 to unban the resistance movements and to release political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, prepared the path for negotiations that were, nevertheless, accompanied by unprecedented levels of violent conflict.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned above, KwaZulu and Natal were the hotbed of political violence. The following paragraphs attempt to summarise this complex topic that fills whole volumes and still needs research on the ground.

Political violence really started in 1985 in Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding areas, especially the townships, where COSATU had successfully organised workers. Here, Inkatha tried to (re)gain political control of the townships, to intimidate critics and opponents, and reportedly recruited new members by force, especially in the years 1987 and 1988.<sup>7</sup> The locals appealed to the Supreme Court to stop the terror by Inkatha warlords, some of the latter being loyal Inkatha followers and some opportunists. Although the Supreme Court gave orders as requested, complaints about the police not following these orders were numerous. Indeed, it was regularly reported that the police protracted investigations, was hostile towards the victims, or even supported Inkatha followers by driving them around or even supplying them with weapons. Nevertheless, it also has to be asked whether the police actually had the capacity to investigate into all reported crimes or whether its funding was so inadequate that it basically became impotent.<sup>8</sup>

One of the most prominent incidents in this first phase occurred in Inanda in August 1985: Blacks from an informal settlement that the apartheid government attempted to dissolve rioted after UDF lawyer Victoria Mxenge had been killed by a government hit squad. The riots turned against other Blacks who were seen on the side of the govern-

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6 Dubow 2014, 262–266.

7 Aitchison 1989; Harris 1989, 4–5; Kentridge 1990.

8 Africa Watch 1991, 1; Aitchison 1989, 461; Aitchison 2003, 91–92; Cawthra 1993, 120–121, 144–145; Gerhart/Glaser 2010c, 113; Harris 1989, 5–7; Marks 2014, 26–27.

ment and/or Inkatha, including Indians also due to material and racist motivations. Indians fled Inanda until Inkatha's *impis*<sup>9</sup> were brought to Inanda and restored order through counterviolence.<sup>10</sup> Oscar Dhlo-mo, secretary-general of Inkatha, admitted that Inkatha had brought *impis* to Inanda to restore everyday life and blamed the UDF and the Natal Indian Congress for everything.<sup>11</sup>

The violence worsened, as the Trust Feed Massacre of December 1988 exemplifies. A group of policemen assaulted a group of mourners inside their house at 3 o'clock at night, leaving eleven dead and two wounded; among the dead were a four-year-old boy and a 66-year-old woman. The local police tried to cover this as actions against terrorists and protracted investigations; it was only when Frank Dutton of the Special Investigating Unit took over the case that the perpetrators were arrested. Some of the policemen had since been transferred to the KwaZulu Police. Eventually, in 1992, the group's commander Captain Brian Victor Mitchell was found guilty and sentenced to death eleven times (later changed to 30 years of imprisonment) and each of the shooters was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. Notably, Mitchell was the first senior policeman to be found guilty which also made the apartheid state's role in the violence public: The state and its police actually fuelled it instead of securing order. Although Mitchell testified that it was his own, ad-hoc decision, it cannot be ruled out that he had received orders himself.<sup>12</sup>

While some incidents like this one stand out, violence became endemic and the state could no longer enforce law and order – and some elements, what was usually termed the 'third force', actually intended to weaken the opposition through violence and chaos. Nevertheless, the violence of the second half of the 1980s was only the prelude of what was to come from 1990. When the ANC and other liberation

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9 Groups of armed men.

10 Booth 1988, 75; Freund 1996, 181; Hughes 1987; Krämer 2007, 64; Steele, Richard: Basic chronology, Phoenix Settlement, Inanda, 06.-12.08.1985. CC KCM98/3/54.

11 Dhlo-mo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17, 1–3.

12 Coombe 1992.

movements were legalised, they could operate in South Africa more freely; the fight over territory in KwaZulu and Natal between the ANC alliance and Inkatha reached its worst stages.

In the Seven Days War, beginning on 25 March 1990, approximately 12,000 Inkatha impis attacked Vulindlela, Edendale, Ash-down, and Imbali, leaving more than 200 dead while the police and the army did not intervene. Moreover, it was claimed that the police supplied ammunition and vehicles. Approximately 3,000 houses and shacks were destroyed, making about 30,000 people homeless. Inkatha warlord David Thandabantu Ntombela was a key figure, especially in Edendale, where he and his followers robbed and murdered civilians, and again, this was not persecuted by the police despite obvious evidence.<sup>13</sup>

In Bruntville, Mooi River, hostel dwellers armed with traditional weapons and rifles marched through the township, attacking the township dwellers who had requested the police and local government to prohibit carrying weapons three days earlier in November 1990. But this request was not complied with, arguing that the prohibition of traditional weapons would insult Zulus who would carry weapons by tradition. ANC supporters were not allowed to carry weapons. In the Boipatong Massacre in 1992, 200 men attacked an ANC-aligned township, killing 45 and wounding 30, among the victims were many women and children, including a pregnant woman and two babies. Although the police had been warned about the incident, it was not obstructed. Moreover, it was again reported that the police trained Inkatha fighters and even fought on their side against ANC supporters (which was later confirmed by the Goldstone Commission).<sup>14</sup>

Police behaviour like it has been described in the paragraphs above destroyed any trust in the rule of law that black South Africans might still have had. Even if one argues that the police force was too small to secure law and order, this does not explain actual collusion with Inkatha fighters. It has to be noted that, of course, policemen have their own political views, and people that could identify them-

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13 Aitchison 2003, 73–84; Minnaar 1992, 73–74; Sanders 2006, 274; Smith 1992.

14 Golan 1994, 17–18; Marks 2014, 26–27; Simpson 2012, 629–634.



selves with the state, especially with KwaZulu, were more likely to join the police forces in the first place. When the ANC and its allies attacked KwaZulu and Inkatha, it was not unlikely that the KwaZulu Police would take sides. This might apply to the South African Police to some extent, too. Nevertheless, at least a tacit approval from above cannot be ruled out in both cases. From all the evidence, I would conclude that much of the endemic violence that was happening on a smaller scale was not controlled by (but also not prevented by) Buthelezi or the Inkatha leadership. These were rather conflicts of locals and warlords that sided with the ANC or Inkatha.

Apart from repeating peace calls, with the exception of 'self-defence', it is not clear how much Buthelezi and the Inkatha leadership actually did against the violence. After all, an unqualified order for peace from Buthelezi would have been seen as surrender by the other side and probably even by his own supporters.<sup>15</sup> Only a mutual peace agreement was possible, but this would have required trust in each other's actions and honesty that just was not there. Even if Buthelezi had called for peace unconditionally, I would question whether he actually had the authority to enforce it. Local developments seemed to be out of anyone's control, and especially the opportunists that took the Inkatha or the ANC side out of their own interests were hard to control.

Numbering the victims of the violence is a difficult task, especially because political violence and conflicts due to other reasons overlapped as we will see below. Anthea Jeffery, in her extensive study, calculates that the political violence from 1986 to 1992 cost 14,500 lives, of these were 7,500 from KwaZulu and Natal. While the political violence had started there, it spread to the townships around Johannesburg and Pretoria in 1990 where Zulu migrants clashed with township dwellers. Attacks on commuter trains in 1992, for example, left 278 dead and 563 injured. Other calculations also circle

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15 This happened to Nelson Mandela in 1990 when he came to Durban and requested his supporters to 'throw their weapons into the sea'. The audience booed him and walked away; Mazel 2013.

around 10,000 and 20,000 deaths and more than 20,000 injured. In all, 200,000 to 500,000 people likely became internal refugees.<sup>16</sup>

It is important to stress that violence emanated from all sides in the conflict and the incidents depicted above only allow a small glimpse at the bloodshed that was happening. The ANC and its allies killed, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at least 76 Inkatha office bearers;<sup>17</sup> Anthea Jeffery counts this to be at least 400.<sup>18</sup> Inkatha's self-protection units clashed with the ANC's self-defense units on the ground to gain control of settlements, and the police actively participated in some cases. Many victims of raids and assassinations, however, were civilians that were not involved in the fightings.<sup>19</sup> Trevor Noah, who witnessed the township violence as a child, summed it up:

Instead of uniting for peace they turned on one another, committing acts of unbelievable savagery. Massive riots broke out. Thousands of people were killed. Necklacing was common. That's where people would hold someone down and put a rubber tire over his torso, pinning his arms. Then they'd douse him with petrol and set him on fire and burn him alive. The ANC did it to Inkatha. Inkatha did it to the ANC.<sup>20</sup>

Over the years, several explanations have been given for the violence from 1985 to 1994 of which political violence was a part. I will summarise these explanations in the following paragraphs in an arbitrary order and comment on them because they vary in their validity and do not necessarily exclude one another.

The *first* explanation circles around the urban-rural divide. When apartheid no longer kept unemployed, poor, and hungry migrants from coming into the townships and residing in the hostels, this led

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16 Beall/Mkhize/Vawda 2005, 757; Golan 1994, 15; Jeffery 1997, 1–2; Olivier 1992, 1; Taylor 2002.

17 Foster/Haupt/Beer 2005, 253.

18 Jeffery 1997, 773.

19 Foster/Haupt/Beer 2005, 253–273.

20 Noah 2016, 12.

to to conflicts about scarce resources in which the rural migrants often took the Inkatha side and the township dwellers the ANC/UDF side – after all, Inkatha was especially strong in the countryside in a system of ‘traditional’ government while ANC and UDF were stronger in urban areas. Both movements embodied the prevalent values of their respective regions. Violence was also rampant in townships without Zulu migrants and Inkatha followers, adding to the explanation of violence about resources.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, interviews with young fighters pointed out that they, first and foremost, had no prospects for a future outside crime and violence; society and the state could offer them no perspective.<sup>22</sup>

These clashes came parallel with a generational conflict in which older men fought against the ‘demise’ of the (hetero-)patriarchy, changes in manhood, and shrinking paternal authority in general. Young men, on the other hand, more and more rejected to adopt this role. In this setting, violence became a means of securing and visualising masculinity and manhood. The older men, and especially the labour migrants, were more strongly rooted in traditional contexts and thus more likely to side with Inkatha which stood for their vision of traditional Zulu society and manhood. Younger, more progressive township dwellers were thus more likely to side with the UDF, the ANC, or trade unions with a different understanding of society and democracy.<sup>23</sup> Conflicts around resources including access to land,<sup>24</sup> and around age and gender blended into an explosive mix in which individuals, groups, or whole settlements could take the side of ANC or Inkatha.<sup>25</sup>

21 Adam/Moodley 1993, 13; Beall/Mkhize/Vawda 2005, 758; Gibbs 2017; Jeffery 1997, 3–4; Krämer 2007, 198–203; Ntuli 2016, 7258; Sitas 1986, 88–89, 88–89.

22 Ntuli 2016, 7260.

23 Mahmood Mamdani would call the township dwellers ‘citizens’ and the rural labour migrants ‘subjects’; Mamdani 1996, 23–32.

24 These conflicts could be decades old like in the Msinga area; Clegg 07.05.1979.

25 Adam/Moodley 1993, 128–141; Aitchison 1989, 457; Campbell 1992, 614–625; Clegg 07.05.1979; Dlamini 2001a, 198; Elder 2003; Gibbs 2017; Haas/Zulu 1994, 441; Hemson 1996; Jeffery 1997, 4–5; Kelly 2015, 179; Krämer 2003, 284; Krämer 2007, 198–203; Marks 1989, 215–216; Mchunu 2007; Sitas 1996, 243–246.

While this explanation names generational differences and an urban-rural divide as the main reason for the violence which then integrated politics, the *second* (and related) explanation focuses on politics.

This time, the violence is explained as first and foremost political, namely as a struggle about power and territory, albeit not commanded by the political leaders. Even if the leaders called for peace, they were unable to enforce peace among the locals that continued to fight. State and party structures were just not strong enough to control each and every fighter – especially not the opportunistic ones. Again, this applied to all sides: Neither ANC fighters, nor Inkatha fighters, nor the police stopped their aggressive actions. In this context, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley reasonably argued that the South African government itself, especially since de Klerk had taken over, had no interest in the police colluding with Inkatha because it undermined its own project of negotiations, giving its voters reasons to flock to the Conservative Party, and giving the ANC reasons for radicalisation. Rather, it is possible that some semi-autonomous securocrats, the ‘third force’, were the driving actors behind this collusion because de Klerk wanted to cut their powers. Additionally, on local level, policemen might have taken things into their own hands to prevent a future that they deemed undesirable (namely one under an ANC government). Just like ANC and Inkatha could not control their respective followers, both the apartheid government and the KwaZulu government likely were unable to fully control its own personnel. Buthelezi and the Inkatha leadership, on the other hand, must have been aware that police collusion would harm its role in the negotiations. One has to note, however, that although they might not have been in favour of the violence, it is not clear what they actually *did* to prevent it from coming from the Inkatha side (mutual peace agreements were made repeatedly, however).<sup>26</sup>

Walter Felgate, as a former Inkatha insider, argued in the same vein that Buthelezi and the Inkatha leadership had no regional con-

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26 Adam/Moodley 1992, 488; Adam/Moodley 1993, 123–131; de Kock 1994, 302; Krämer 2007, 195–198; Kynoch 2013, 283; Marks 1989, 215; Marks 2014, 27.

trol and that local Inkatha leaders did as they pleased. Inkatha itself focused on persons that strove for power (instead of structures), making Inkatha fragmented and letting locals run Inkatha to their own advantages. Felgate further claimed that Buthelezi himself was a bad administrator who just let things happen unless something really needed to be done, also for the sake of his own image. The fight for territory, thus, was happening from the ground upwards without a central agenda; local leaders could do what they wanted to do as long as it benefitted Inkatha, and after all, Buthelezi could not do much about it. At least, Inkatha warlord Thomas Shabalala was removed from the Inkatha central committee when he had become unbearable.<sup>27</sup>

At last, we will turn to more simplistic explanations. The *third* one claimed that Inkatha and the KwaZulu government were merely an executing arm of the apartheid government acting against its opponents. Inkatha would thus enter an alliance with the state, especially the police, to preserve power. Buthelezi and the Inkatha leadership were, in this scenario, willing to use violent means and easily to be controlled from outside by the ‘third force’ which, in this scenario, not only included parts of the security apparatus, but the apartheid state as a whole.<sup>28</sup>

The *fourth* and last explanation largely denied the role of politics in the violence, branding clashes as ethnic violence, tribal feuds, or ‘black-on-black’ violence as if violence among Blacks was just a natural, self-explaining thing. This contained a derogatory understanding of ‘tribes’, claiming them to be underdeveloped and barbaric. Of course, when the South African Police clashed with the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, nobody spoke of ‘white-on-white’, ‘tribal’ violence. Even more, this misses the whole point: In KwaZulu and Natal, it was mostly Zulus against Zulus, and also regularly members of one community against other members of the same community. While there were incidents where ethnic divisions played a role and

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27 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 23–24, 61. Felgate also claimed that Inkatha had received weapons but never managed to distribute them; Ibid, 84–85.

28 Choi 2008, 50; Haas/Zulu 1994, 442; Krämer 2007, 192–195; Piombo 2009, 154.

rivalries between some communities or 'tribes' surely existed, much of the violence is left unexplained.<sup>29</sup>

In the bigger picture, I would reject this fourth explanation, although it might contain truth for some incidents. The third one of Buthelezi being a willing stooge of the apartheid government is also problematic as this thesis will show (see especially chapter 4.4). I will argue that Buthelezi followed his own agenda and rather attempted to use the state when he could – which included cooperation with the intelligence services and the SADF, as we will later see. Local warlords could, of course, also side with the police or other state organs. The first two explanations, however, are compelling when combined: Conflicts about resources, about age and gender, and surely about culture and identity (but not necessarily ethnicity) mixed with political conflicts; and/or the already conflicting individuals and groups took the sides of ANC, UDF, or Inkatha to further their own interests. Based on what I have presented here and what will be detailed later in this thesis, I highly doubt that these fights were orchestrated from above. Both Inkatha's and the ANC's or UDF's structures were not strong enough for this. I would rather see this as complex local conflicts that were out of control. Even if Buthelezi (or the ANC leadership) would have wanted to stop them, they just were unable to do so. Local peace initiatives could be successful (and sometimes they were), but in all, violence could not be stopped from above. This does not mean that Buthelezi did not approve of the violence. Indeed, he repeatedly justified counterviolence as 'self-defence',<sup>30</sup> and he surely had an interest in securing territory for Inkatha.

Anthea Jeffery aptly summarised that there

is much that remains to be explained about the violence that has racked KwaZulu/Natal for close on 20 years. One thing is, however, clear. No simplistic theory of the violence – in which one side is regarded as entirely innocent and the other as entirely to

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29 Freund 1996, 185; Kelly 2015, 179; Maré 1991, 187; Marks 1986a, 1–2.

30 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M. G.: Youth action for survival and democracy in the face of failing peace initiatives, 05.09.1992. HPD A1045; Murray 1985, 27.

blame – can be accepted as the truth. Reality, as always, is more complex.<sup>31</sup>

Given this setting in politics and society, I argue that the 1980s were an increasingly contingent setting. The Black Consciousness Movement and the Soweto riots showed that the state was not as strong as it seemed to be during the 1960s and could actually be challenged from within. Although the state regained control in the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, it had become obvious to the contemporaries that it could not continue as it had before. The apartheid government and many others began looking for constitutional alternatives and the tricameral parliament ultimately included Coloureds and Indians.<sup>32</sup>

Of course, the idea of changing or even democratising South Africa was not new and had been demanded many times through past decades, e.g. by liberals from the Liberal Party that advocated majority rule,<sup>33</sup> and it had also been discussed in philosophy.<sup>34</sup> I argue that this had mostly happened on the ground of morals or ethics which continued to be relevant during the 1980s, but added to it was a feeling of (political) necessity or urgency among people who never would have associated themselves with liberals.<sup>35</sup> Now, the idea of change or democratisation gained a much more practical side.

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31 Jeffery 1997, 781.

32 The Buthelezi Commission was one such example when in a position of strength, the state was asked to introduce significant reforms to keep the initiative in hand. Other commissions and reports on the matter were headed/created by Lombard, Quail, Schlebusch, Du Preez, and a few years earlier SPRO-CAS, to name only the most important ones. These commissions were an explicit sign of increased anxiety about the future, but also of new reasons to hope for improvements; Buckland 1982.

33 Vigne 1997.

34 See especially Turner 1972.

35 The term 'liberal' can be defined in varying ways, either focusing on economics, society, or individuals. The Progressive (Reform/Federal) Party combined all these understandings, although one can argue that the economic aspect was usually put in the foreground; Tillmanns 2014, 36–38.

Then, with increasing levels of violence and increasing challenge to the state that could no longer be suppressed, the future became more and more uncertain. A continuation of repression by the white minority was still an option, but also a communist revolution, a negotiated settlement, or anarchy and destruction. Not only was the violence amounting to a civil war, the government itself had lost credibility and was under internal and international pressure. The economy was in decline, more and more straining the state's finances but also bringing unemployed people to the streets.

This opened, as mentioned, new possibilities. Resistance movements could now operate inside South Africa and the state was not able to suppress them. Apartheid, as it had been known, was going to end, in one way or another. It became possible to think about alternative futures and to act according to these plans or imaginations. This included constructive action that will be most prominent in this thesis, thus actions to realise a certain vision of the future, but also destructive actions that were meant to prevent other futures from realisation. Therefore, the open future contained chances for huge improvements, but it could also get a lot worse.

A few examples shall show that this contingency cannot only be seen on an analytical level – many contemporaries were well aware of it. Already in the late 1970s, it was predicted that the costs of maintaining apartheid would be higher than the economic benefits and apartheid, therefore, would have to change. The system was in crisis, as the Soweto riots had shown, and anxieties about the future rose among all groups, according to surveys, also leading to people going into exile, including Whites.<sup>36</sup> This had been different in the beginning 1970s when many liberal and conservative reformers still expected a stable system that just needed a few adaptations.<sup>37</sup> A 1985 study showed that 70% of Whites expected that power-sharing with Blacks would happen, proving an increasing perception of upcoming change, and numerous surveys during the 1980s showed increasing

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36 Adam/Giliomee 1979, 4–5; Hanf/Weiland 1978, 761; Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1981, 206–209.

37 Nolutshungu 1982, 1–7.



levels of anxiety about the future among all groups.<sup>38</sup> A few book titles of a new kind that emerged in the late 1970s shall exemplify this new anxiety: *Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight, South Africa. Time Running Out, South Africa at War, Endgame in South Africa, How Long Will South Africa Survive?, South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny, The Crisis in South Africa.*<sup>39</sup>

Indeed, as this thesis will show, Inkatha and its allies were well aware of the possibility for change, thus perceived the contingency I have described above. Other internal movements, especially the UDF and later the ANC, saw the opportunity to organise resistance inside the country and challenge it in various ways to enforce radical changes.

The government under Botha responded with militarisation and an expansion of the security apparatus, but also by implementing reforms and reaching out to the international community, although the latter was no longer successful after numerous raids on independent neighbouring states. Botha, as former Minister of Defence, put the focus on the Department of Military Intelligence, part of the SADF, under the leadership of the State Security Council with which he bypassed the cabinet. Vorster as former Minister of Police and Prisons had relied on the Security Branch of the South African Police and the Bureau for State Security which coordinated the Security Branch and military intelligence. Thus, with Botha the focus shifted from the police to the military that became increasingly powerful. Indeed, during the 1980s, ARMSCOR became the third largest business in South Africa and the fifth largest weapons producer worldwide because of the weapons embargo imposed on South Africa. It was only under de Klerk that the influence of the military and the police was reduced (he treated the civil National Intelligence Service as most important).<sup>40</sup>

One aspect that brought many experiences and contingencies with it, the homeland system, has hardly been touched yet, but because

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38 de Kock/Rhodie/Couper 1985; Giliomee/Schlemmer 1989, 153; Orkin 1987; Schlemmer 1984.

39 Brewer 1989; USA / The Report of the Study Commission on US Policy towards Southern Africa 1981; Leonard 1983; Cohen 1986; Johnson 1977; Murray 1987b; Saul/Gelb 1981.

40 Cock 1990, 49–50; O'Brien 2012, 10–44.

Buthelezi and Inkatha heavily relied on it, this topic will now be addressed in greater detail.

### 3.2 The Homeland System

*The actual intentions of the bantustan practices are the following: To create a false sense of hope amongst the black people so that any further attempt by blacks to collectively enunciate their aspirations should be dampened. To offer a new but false direction in the struggle of the Black people. By making it difficult to get even the 13% of the land the powers that be are separating our “struggles” into eight different struggles for eight false freedoms that were prescribed long ago. This has also the overall effect of making us forget about the 87% of land that is in white hands. [...]*

*When they created these dummy platforms, these phoney telephones, they knew that some opportunists might want to use them to advance the black cause and hence they made all the arrangements to be able to control such ‘ambitious natives’.*

Steve Biko<sup>41</sup>

When the newly elected National Party government introduced its apartheid policy from 1948 onwards, segregation was not new to South Africa, especially not in Natal on which this chapter will focus.<sup>42</sup> There, the British colonial administration had practiced indirect rule, a cost-cutting method of governing a province which integrates local authorities, i.e. the amakhosi, into the colonial system. The amakhosi governed all Africans according to purportedly traditional rules, the groups being demarcated by officially recognised ethnicity. The province’s governor was even stylised as supreme chief who could modify ‘traditional’ rule as necessary, removing and appointing amakhosi to strengthen colonial rule. In this context, white supremacy was secured through segregation and exploitation which continued in

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41 Biko 2005, 83–84.

42 For the whole of South Africa before apartheid, see Dubow 1989.

the first decades of the Union of South Africa; the Natives Land Act (1913) granted 7.13% of South Africa to Africans, upgraded to still only 13.6% by the Development Trust and Land Act (1936), causing overcrowding and land deterioration already in the 1920s that would later become even more pressing. Apart from securing the best land for white settlers, this also forced Africans into wage labour and suppressed the development of African agriculture that could have posed a threat to the settlers' agriculture, restricting Africans to subsistence farming. As this also alleviated the problem of poor Whites, an alliance between Africans and poor Whites against the rich and powerful became unlikely. Parallel to this tradition of white supremacy, Cape liberals advocated and practiced limited representation of the suppressed majority in the Cape, but this did not become South African policy with the formation of the union and was later abolished by the apartheid government.<sup>43</sup>

The new policy of 'separate development', creating 'grand apartheid',<sup>44</sup> fused both traditions, in theory promising "equal rights, representative government, and economic development – the proviso being that these would be granted only within racially, tribally, or ethnically exclusive areas."<sup>45</sup> This was also a move against westernisation and urbanisation of 'Africans' – Bantu-speaking South Africans –, trying to make urban Africans rural, tribal people. To justify this approach, scientific language was used, and it was claimed that the whole concept was based on science.<sup>46</sup> In the countryside, the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act created tribal authorities, i.e. a 'chief' or 'headman' and a council that was appointed by the inkosi, although the white Native Commissioner could interfere and make his own appointments. In the past, amakhosi had often been advised by a council against which they

43 Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 9–12; Egerö 1991, 14–15; Harcourt 1976; Mamdani 1996, 27; Myers 2008, 16–22; Sodemann 1986, 216.

44 'Petty apartheid', on the contrary, describes the segregation within the cities, e.g. different entrances and exits to public buildings, benches only for Whites, etc.; Jung 2000, 45.

45 Myers 2008, 22.

46 Although this purportedly was meant to be a return to pre-colonial circumstances for Blacks, apartheid explicitly was a modernisation project to form a new South Africa as prescribed by NP policy and academics; Evans 2019b, 17.

could not act, but colonial, indirect rule had abolished these councils and focused on the amakhosi as solitary rulers that were easier to influence and control. While the introduction of new tribal councils was indeed a revival of traditional rule, most amakhosi opposed it because it diminished their power. Said Bantu Authorities Act made all amakhosi and izinduna appointed rural administrators and therefore members of the state who received a salary, undermining their legitimacy and power. Thus, the “myth of hereditary succession”<sup>47</sup> needed to be continued to legitimise amakhosi by usually appointing a direct heir or, if the heir did not comply, by ‘discovering’ chiefly lineage of somebody else. Through this construction, many chiefs became somewhat legitimate local administrators deflecting criticism by their people from the national government onto themselves and oppressing resistance through their own security apparatuses. The chiefs that did resist the central government for the sake of their people, however, had to face the danger of being removed or even exiled.<sup>48</sup>

The homeland policy was based on the Afrikaner thinking that South Africa consisted of a plurality of nation states that needed to be protected from one another and from mixing with each other; these nation states, thus, were to be separated territorially and were to govern themselves based on their own development and emancipation. The different national or ethnic groups were thought of as so contradictory that any form of coexistence in the same region was seen as impossible. This was rooted in Afrikaner history and thought; Afrikaners had fled British rule in the Cape and in Natal to preserve their own identity and homogeneity and feared assimilation (or revenge) by other groups. Another argument was the protection of Christian morality and values against other cultural systems, ignoring the fact that many Blacks had taken up these Christian values themselves. While the main reason for segregation and ‘separate development’ was fear, there also was the ‘interest in anthropology’, i.e. preserving and studying other purportedly innocent cultures. Afrikaners, therefore, could continue white domination and, at the same time, think

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47 Myers 2008, 24.

48 Hill 1964, 12; Keenan 1988, 142–145; Myers 2008, 22–28.

that they were acting in the true interest of Africans based on such selective perceptions and without consulting Africans. It was realised, however, that the implementation of complete segregation had to remain a future ideal realised through industrialisation of the homelands and mass immigration from Europe; in the meantime, Africans needed to continue to serve as the cheap industrial and agricultural workforce of which two thirds did not reside in the homelands anyway when the policy was introduced.<sup>49</sup>

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act from 1959 developed the system of 'separate development' further, largely ignoring most of the government-appointed Tomlinson Commission's findings<sup>50</sup> but taking up one core argument: The report saw South African Whites as one homogenous entity and South African Blacks as split in separate 'national units'. Thus, in a 'nation of minorities', all these 'national units' (North Sotho, South Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, Zulu)<sup>51</sup> were to be treated separately and to receive separate home regions in which they were meant to seek political representation based on the fragmented reserves.<sup>52</sup> Not only did the new policy deny any cultural cohesion between Africans in the sense of divide-and-rule, it also claimed that Bantu-speaking Africans and Europeans had arrived in South Africa at the same time, only migrating from different directions – ignoring historical facts and the role of Khoisan, Coloureds and Asians in South Africa. Using this revised history and the "language of anticolonialism and national self-determination",<sup>53</sup> the South African government continued indirect rule and white dominance under a new disguise; the Urban

49 Evans 2019b, 9; Hill 1964, 1–6; Meer 1976; Norval 1996; Platzky/Walker 1985, 103–106.

50 On the Tomlinson Commission, see Ashforth 1990, 149–194.

51 The Xhosa were subsequently split between the Transkei and the Ciskei, thus creating two Bantustans for one group, and the Ndebele were later 'discovered' by lawmakers.

52 From the early 1960s it was planned to consolidate the homelands by buying land from white farmers and handing it over to the homelands, but this process was slow and insufficient.

53 Myers 2008, 34.

Bantu Councils Act from 1961 expanded the councils to the townships where chieftaincy was largely rejected.<sup>54</sup>

The erected homelands or Bantustans had to administrate scarce land overcrowded with the rural population and Africans that had been removed from the cities by force and relocated to the homelands. The heterogenous urban quarters were sorted by ethnicity and many people were moved to their respective 'homelands' that they had never seen before. As the homelands had only a small tax revenue, they were heavily subsidised by the central state (only one fifth of the budget was generated inside the homelands); many of the subsidies went into the bloated administration, making it an important sector of employment and making the public sector (including police and a security apparatus) part of the homeland leaders' power base. This economic dependency, and the SADF's interventions e.g. in Bophuthatswana, revealed the surreality of homeland independence.<sup>55</sup> Only four homelands, the TBVC states, accepted formal independence from South Africa: Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1979), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) – no other country acknowledged them as independent states,<sup>56</sup> but the formal independence meant that about eight million South Africans lost their South African citizenship.<sup>57</sup>

Although the homeland agriculture was mainly based on subsistence, many homeland dwellers (in KwaZulu up to 25% in 1987) did not have any access to land, solely relying on wage labour, usually in the white, urban economy or on white farms; even those who were active in agriculture often needed further sources of income. A study from 1989 showed that many people were too poor for successful agriculture, i.e. they could not afford seeds and fertiliser. This means that even where there was, in theory, enough land available, agriculture remained far below its potential and the underused land was often bought by white investors, quite contrary to the idea of 'separate development'. Many of the homeland dwellers employed in the cities lived

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54 Egerö 1991, 15–16; Meer 1976; Myers 2008, 32–37; Platzky/Walker 1985, 110–117.

55 Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 13–17; Egerö 1991, 16–17; Hill 1964, 11.

56 Bank/Southall 1996, 412–413.

57 Waetjen 1999, 658.

in the densely populated townships (albeit with no infrastructure) on the edges of the homelands from where they commuted to the cities. Most of the township dwellers had in the past been removed from the cities, only few were migrants from the countryside, showing the large degree of African urbanisation in the past. In the beginning, the South African government promoted industrial growth points close to the borders of the homelands (dubbed ‘border industries’) to reduce commuting distances and prohibited investments from flowing into the homelands (so Africans could ‘develop’ along their own lines). But as this scheme was not successful, said investments from outside were legalised in 1967/68 (see chapter 4.3 for the example of investments in KwaZulu). The South African government itself invested into the industrialisation of the homelands, exceeding the yearly sum of R 500 million in the mid-1980s, but foreign investors were also active in the homelands. Nevertheless, the profits for the homelands and their budgets were marginal because most companies only came to the homelands due to incentives like tax exemptions and because, in most cases, already existing companies opened up a branch in the homelands (instead of the foundation of entirely new companies), leading to an outflow of profits into ‘white’ South Africa.<sup>58</sup>

During the 1980s, when tensions were rising, the South African government intensified its efforts to realise its homelands scheme, focusing on removals within the countryside. Around 1,129,000 Africans were removed from farms and brought to the already overcrowded homelands between 1960 and 1982 and yet another million Africans were threatened with forced removals during the 1980s. Black farms on designated ‘white’ land (‘Black Spots’) were also removed, bringing 475,000 to the homelands, and due to land consolidation between the South African state and the homelands, another 139,000 people were moved by force.<sup>59</sup> Another estimate is that more than 3.5 million people were affected by forced removals between 1960 and 1980.<sup>60</sup> During this process of continued forced removals,

58 Egerö 1991, 18–26; Hill 1964, 101.

59 For more statistical data and details on legislation, see also Horrell 1973a; Southern African Research Service 1982a.

60 Evans 2019b, 2.

some homelands cooperated eagerly (e.g. Ciskei and Bophuthatswana which had the reputation of being especially autocratic and corrupt) and others reluctantly (e.g. KwaZulu). The same applied to amakhosi; some complied, some were neutral, and some resisted openly,<sup>61</sup> joining forces with upset masses demonstrating against independence plans, leading to violent clashes between supporters and opponents of the homeland policy stifled by violent police action.<sup>62</sup>

In 1982, the government even tried to denationalise some of its citizens. 7,680 square kilometres, the homeland of KaNgwane and the Ingwavuma area of KwaZulu, were to be ceded to Swaziland to create a buffer zone between Mozambique, from where ANC guerrillas were coming in, and South Africa. This way, the government would have handed over about 750,000 Swazi speaking Africans – including the ones living outside KaNgwane – and some of KwaZulu’s citizens (whose respective homeland leaders were rejecting ‘independence’) to politically compliant Swaziland which, in turn, would have received direct access to the sea. This plan, however, was stopped in court (see chapter 4.4).<sup>63</sup>

When the national negotiations started in 1990, most expected the homelands to be reintegrated into the South African state and vanish. For the homeland leaders, however, this would have meant a loss of power, so especially the leaders who were not aligned with the ANC were reluctant. The politically conservative homeland leaders, like Bophuthatswana’s Lucas Mangope and KwaZulu’s Mangosuthu Buthelezi, were cautious during the negotiations and often demanded a federal order for the new South Africa to save their regional power positions and to secure the regional administration that offered jobs to their power bases. While KwaZulu could wrest concessions from the main negotiating parties through pressure and in-and-out tactics, the homelands in general were sidelined during CODESA and MPNF

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61 E.g. through CONTRALESA (Convention of Traditional Leaders of South Africa) which was politically close to the ANC; Bank/Southall 1996, 415. For the views of Clemens Kapuuo and Cedric Phatudi, see Munger 1974; for the views of Albert Luthuli see Couper 2006/2007.

62 Gerhart/Glaser 2010b, 22–27.

63 Ibid, 22–23.



negotiations. In the end, however, all homelands were integrated into South Africa's new provinces.<sup>64</sup>

Nevertheless, the homelands brought an important experience with them: Blacks could administrate themselves, they did not need the 'ever-helping' hand of the apartheid state, and neither would it be impossible for Blacks to administrate and rule South Africa.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the homelands could bring the insight with them that present and future could be different. On the other hand, the appalling conditions and increasing migrant labour which led to a change in social structures<sup>66</sup> also brought new contingencies with them. Traditional ways of life were changing, and not necessarily for the better, showing that newfound possibilities could also result in negative or undesired developments.

### 3.3 Buthelezi, Inkatha, and Zulu History: An Introduction

In order to understand Buthelezi and Inkatha, and especially the references to Zulu history and ethnicity, it is important to look at certain aspects of Zulu history and Buthelezi's career before the revival of Inkatha. The first subchapter on Zulu history will not be a detailed account on Zulu history, but instead focus on how different agents tried to make the Zulu empire an ethnic group, thus worked towards Zulu nationalism. Afterwards, Buthelezi's career and the history of Inkatha will be outlined as a background for later analysis. Inkatha and Buthelezi will be dealt with in a combined chapter because, as will become clear, he made Inkatha very much his own organisation and his positions largely were Inkatha's positions. The focus will be on those aspects that are not core parts of later chapters.<sup>67</sup>

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64 Robinson 2015, 953–962.

65 It has to be noted, however, that a significant number of Whites were employed in KwaZulu's civil service, even as department secretaries.

66 Jung 2000, 55.

67 For detailed accounts on Zulu history, e.g. see Eldredge 2014, Guy 1979, Taylor 1994, Wylie 2006.

### 3.3.1 History of “the” Zulu?

The Zulu started as a chiefdom that, under the rule of King Shaka from 1816 to 1828, expanded massively and became one of Africa’s most powerful empires. This expansion was enabled by military innovations and force, so that some neighbours were conquered, some were peacefully annexed, and some fled.<sup>68</sup> Shaka was killed by his brother and successor Dingane in 1828 who still ruled over a powerful empire. The empire of Shaka and his successors was by no means a homogenous entity; the subjected chiefdoms retained some of their autonomy in political and cultural terms, especially in remote areas and south of the Thukela<sup>69</sup> river, and neither identified themselves as Zulus nor were integrated into the empire. Therefore, Shaka founded an empire of linguistically related Nguni tribes with the Zulu king as a central figure, but not a Zulu *nation*.<sup>70</sup> In the following decades, the power of the Zulu empire declined due to pressure from Boer and British settlers, and two civil wars (1839–40, 1856) were fought in the Zulu empire. In 1879, the Zulu empire was defeated by British troops which brought King Cetshwayo’s rivals onto the scene and led to a fragmentation of the Zulu empire. His successor, King Dinuzulu, even was imprisoned by the British following the Bambatha rebellion which tried to shake off British rule and taxation. The Zulu kingdom was only rehabilitated in the 1920s and 1930s and officially

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68 This period of unrest is referred to as Mfecane, but its reasons are contested. Some ascribe it to the actions of Shaka, some give social and economical change (overpopulation and drought) as reasons. A third position is seeing the Mfecane as an alibi of white missionaries and traders explaining a population decline (that originally rooted in slave trade) which legitimised settling in an “empty” land; Ansprenger 1999, 35–36; Cobbing 1988; Golan 1994, 1; Hamilton 1998a, 15–20; Wylie 1994, 9–10.

69 The real kingdom probably has only been north of the Thukela river, while the people south of the Thukela might have paid tributes but did not constitute a part of the Zulu empire and were culturally different. Colonial rule, however, subsumed them as Zulu; Hamilton/Leibhammer 2016, 14–15; Harries 1993, 109; Klopper 1996, 55.

70 Haas/Zulu 1994, 436–437; Kelly 2015, 183; Wylie 1994, 10.

recognised by the NP government in 1948.<sup>71</sup> Zululand was annexed in 1887 and incorporated into Natal in 1897; the weak colonial state employed indirect rule over its new subjects, so amakhosi remained in place. As mentioned above, this did not necessarily correspond with the structures before the annexation but rather how the Europeans perceived them and how indirect rule fit their needs. Therefore, at least some of the amakhosi appeared as stooges of the government, undermining their own authority.<sup>72</sup> As the king was exiled and imprisoned, he did not appear as a stooge of the colonial government and could retain much of his influence among his subjects.<sup>73</sup>

The moment from which the group formation of the Zulu started is disputed. During the 1860s and 1870s, under escalating conflict with Boer and English settlers and their armed forces, unity inside the Zulu empire grew because of the common enemies, but according to Georgina Hamilton and John Wright, the majority of the people inside the Zulu empire retained their regional or local identities; only the ruling elite might have identified themselves as Zulus. This also explains why, after the defeat of the Zulu king, loyalties ended abruptly and his successors were partly greeted with resentments.<sup>74</sup> On the contrary, Michael Mahoney states that a common Zulu identity indeed started at this point during the 1860s and 1870s but was not formed by an elite. Instead, a Zulu identity was promoted by young men in times of internal conflict, and many common people now constituted what being Zulu meant by naming themselves Zulus, by identifying themselves as Zulus, and by acting according to their understanding of what it meant to be Zulu.<sup>75</sup>

In the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Boer and British settlers and traders also played their part in the formation of what ‘Zulu’ meant and who the Zulu were. These outsiders called every subject of the Zulu king a Zulu, driven by their contemporary understanding of

71 Jung 2000, 41; Marks 2004, 187.

72 Golan 1994, 5; Harries 1993, 108, 108; Maré 1995b, 9; Marks 2004, 186; Sithole 2006, 818–819; Wright/Hamilton 1990, 16.

73 Tessenor/Boult 1991, 4.

74 Cope 1990, 433–434; Hamilton/Wright 1993, 43–44.

75 Mahoney 2012, 1–7.

European national states. After the crushing British defeat at Isandlwana during the invasion of the Zulu empire, Zulus were especially depicted as strong and brave warriors, or even a “warrior race”, by Europeans to ease the feelings of humiliation. Therefore, in European contemporary literature<sup>76</sup> Zulus were idealised and depicted as a noble savage: exotic, having a naturally ordered society with strong authorities, proud, honourable. At the same time, Zulus were shown as tribal, barbaric and bloodthirsty, or even supernatural and magic.<sup>77</sup> They also helped constituting the myth around Shaka by portraying him as the prototypical black tyrant and fearing he might attack the Natal colony.<sup>78</sup> Shaka later became popular in Africa, being seen as the first black nationalist and a proof of African strength; Léopold Sédar Senghor and his Négritude movement even called Shaka a black Christ and a martyr.<sup>79</sup>

In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the population of Zululand and Natal grew and conflicts over scarce land erupted. In this time of insecurity and social change (through increasing migratory labour), the need for solidarity of a larger group rose and several attempts at group formation were made. This also included a wider identification as African as in the foundation of the African National Congress.<sup>80</sup> Multiple identifications as African, as Zulu, and as a worker did not exclude each other. Another attempt at group formation by educated, Christianised elites and the petty bourgeoisie was the first Inkatha. However, the various agents differed in their images of Zulu and Zulu history. A uniting aspect for many were the language, standardised by indirect rule, and the Zulu king as well as, more generally, patriarchal structures.<sup>81</sup>

76 E.g. the work of H. Rider Haggard.

77 Draper/Maré 2003, 553–554; Hamilton/Wright 1993, 43–44; Jung 2000, 40–41; Leech 1998, 91–97; Marks 2004, 185–186; Piper 1998, 2; Wylie 2000.

78 Golan 1994, 5.

79 Ibid, 5–6.

80 At first under the name of South African Native National Congress.

81 Haas/Zulu 1994, 436; Hamilton 1998a, 5; Hamilton/Wright 1993, 45; Harries 1993, 112; Jung 2000, 42–43; Marks 2004, 186–189; Piper 1998, 68–69.

The state, sugar barons, and mining investors were also interested in an emphasis of the Zulu king, as he could potentially appeal to people of all classes and pacify Zulu society. The Native Affairs Department even financed the Zulu Society of Chief Albert Luthuli that promoted 'traditional' values and a strong king.<sup>82</sup>

### 3.3.2 The first Inkatha

One movement that should foster group and identity formation was the first Inkatha, its full name being *Inkatha ka Zulu* (sometimes written as *Inkata*). It began working due to the initiative of Reverend S. D. Simelane in 1924 and got its first constitution in 1928, this is why its foundation is often dated to 1928. The constitution was given to Inkatha by King<sup>83</sup> Solomon kaDinuzulu who, at first, did not associate with Inkatha, but financial attraction persuaded him to join in 1928.<sup>84</sup> Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton claim that the constitution was originally written by the (white) lawyer Joseph Henry Nicholson from Durban by order of George Heaton Nicholls, MP, president of the South African Planter's Union and known for segregationist tendencies.<sup>85</sup> This is supported by a copy of this document found during the author's research.<sup>86</sup>

'Inkatha' refers to the king's 'sacred coil, symbolising the unity of the tribe, the circular form of which is believed to have the power of collecting up all traitors and disaffected subjects, and joining them

82 Hamilton 1998a, 72–167; Marks/Trapido 1987, 46.

83 The colony of Natal and the South African state did not recognize Zulu Paramount Chiefs as Kings since the Anglo-Zulu War and only reinstated the Paramount Chief as officially being King in 1948/1951, the Zulu kings during this period nevertheless were recognised by many Zulus as kings and this perspective (instead of the colonial perspective) shall be taken.

84 Cope 1993, 97–98; Du Toit 1983, 379; Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimization, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 68; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 46.

85 Ibid.

86 Inkatha ka Zulu/Nicholson & Thorne Solicitors and Notaries: Deed of trust and constitution of the Inkatha ka Zulu (Zulu National Congress), 1928. HPD A957f.

together with the rest of the nation in affection for the king'.<sup>87</sup> Another description by Sighart Bourquin<sup>88</sup> goes as follows:

The *inkatha* of the Zulu nation was the symbol of national unity and strength, and consisted of a grass coil a little less than one metre in diameter, the circular form of which was believed to have the power of collecting up all the traitors and disaffected subjects, and joining them together with the rest of the nation in affection for the king. It contained the *insila* or body-dirt of the king and his predecessors; also the scrapings from door posts and straw soiled by the action of their bodies passing in and out of the huts, their vomit, animal hair or teeth, and such other ingredients as might be prescribed by the *inyanga* or responsible medicine-man. The whole was shaped into a coil and wrapped in python skin, which in turn was securely bound with grass rope. An *inkatha* is handed down from generation to generation and the *inkatha* used by Shaka was kept right until Cetshwayo's reign, when it was burnt by the British in the 1879 war. In addition to the Zulu national coil, personal *izinkatha* belonging to individual chiefs were in existence.<sup>89</sup>

Inkatha ka Zulu was founded together with educated, land-owning, Christian elites to further Zulu identity and consciousness and to give the Zulu king a powerful role in times of urbanisation, mission, and western education, but also to fight for further land purchases by Blacks that had been outlawed by the Natives Land Act of 1913; Inkatha ka Zulu could therefore be seen as an alternative to urban unions.<sup>90</sup> The unity that Inkatha ka Zulu and the king were striving for was by no means a unity of the classes but a unity of the chiefdoms and, therefore, an elite pact. What it meant to be Zulu would

87 Krige 1950, 243.

88 Sighart St. Imier De Bellelay Bourquin was Director of Bantu Administration in Durban 1950–1973 and worked closely with the Zulu royal house; Kolberg Buverud 2007, 18.

89 Dlamini 1986, 116.

90 Cope 1990, 433–434; Cope 1993, 96–98; Du Toit 1983, 379; Harries 1993, 112.

predominantly be determined by these elites and not the majority for which they claimed to speak.<sup>91</sup>

Another role in the foundation of Inkatha ka Zulu played the changes that had taken place in the Natal Native Congress, separated by John Dube from the South African Native National Congress.<sup>92</sup> The Natal Native Congress radicalised itself and replaced its leading figures Dube and William Bhulose who then joined Inkatha ka Zulu and made the Christian, urban elite dominate Inkatha ka Zulu. Traditional elites played a minor role from the beginning and the king did not participate officially in the founding congress although it was held at his residence.<sup>93</sup>

Conflict arose in the years 1926 and 1927 on the question who would lead Inkatha: the chairman of the central committee or the Zulu king. In the constitution of 1928, it was decided that the chairman would lead Inkatha and that Inkatha would promote a constitutional monarchy as well as democratisation. Inkatha rejected the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union's militancy and cooperated with white business which had its own interest in pacifying its workers. In doing so, Inkatha tried to portray itself as an attractive partner for the state as it was neither militant nor promoting an autocratic king; therefore, it advanced the interests of the black middle class.<sup>94</sup> The conflict about leadership showed that even inside Inkatha ka Zulu there was more than one ideology, but they all were associated with the royal house.<sup>95</sup>

Inkatha ka Zulu's primary, declared field of action apart from ideological promotion were commercial agricultural cooperatives that administered their money centrally to buy and cultivate their own farms – but it seems that this latter part never happened. Inkatha ka Zulu also tried to convince Zulus to prefer buying from other Zulus

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91 Cope 1993, 112–113.

92 Natal often tended to follow regional leaders like John Dube and A.W.G. Champion; Gerhart/Glaser 2010c, 112.

93 Cope 1993, 109–111; Heuser 2005, 352.

94 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 46; Tessendorf/Boult 1991, 4–5.

95 Cope 1990, 435.

and it wanted to improve education according to the needs of the economy.<sup>96</sup>

After the death of King Solomon kaDinuzulu in 1933, Inkatha was almost forgotten (and probably had run out of funds). The next king, Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, rediscovered Inkatha, but the secretary for Bantu Administration C. B. Young prevented a revival in 1959 and 1960.<sup>97</sup>

### 3.3.3 Buthelezi before Inkatha

Ashpenaz Nathan Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi was born on 27 August 1928 in Mahlabatini to his mother Magogo, granddaughter of King Cetshwayo kaMpande, and his father inkosi Mathole Buthelezi. Not only was he related to the Zulu king, he also grew up in the royal Kraal of King Solomon kaDinuzulu where he spent time with the king's heir, Cyprian Bhekuluzu kaSolomon.<sup>98</sup>

Buthelezi visited Adams College from 1944 to 1947 and the University of Fort Hare from 1948 to 1950 to study 'Bantu Administration' and History until he had to leave Fort Hare because of his relations to the ANC Youth League.<sup>99</sup> He completed his B.A. at the University of Natal in Durban and worked for two years at the Department of Native Affairs<sup>100</sup> until he became acting inkosi and advisor to King Cyprian in 1953. It took four years until the NP government officially recognised Buthelezi as inkosi in 1957. In the year 1952, Buthelezi had married Irene Audrey Thandekile Mzila, a nurse; over

96 Cope 1993, 114–115, 171–172.

97 Du Toit 1983, 379; Tessororf/Boult 1991, 5.

98 Du Toit 1983, 381; Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A.N.M.G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 19; Sithole 2006, 815–817; Vickerman 2009, 4.

99 Buthelezi himself states that he was an active member of the Youth League, this is questioned by others. It is also reported that he worked at the Natal Indian Congress in 1949; Meer 2002, 117.

100 According to the ANC's Mzala, Buthelezi was brought to the Department of Native Affairs by Werner Eiselen to assure the government of Buthelezi's loyalty by serving the state and no longer associating with the ANC; Mzala 1988, 71.



the years they had three sons and four daughters.<sup>101</sup> During the 1950s, his position was by no means secure, even after being recognised as inkosi: His *older* brother Mceleli had a good standing among the Buthelezi clan and made efforts to become inkosi himself by pressure and court action. The Department of Native Affairs nevertheless preferred Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Mceleli was subsequently banished to Sibasa in northern Transvaal. This order was only revoked in 1975.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, the Buthelezi clan was reluctant to accept the Bantu Authorities Act and elect a Tribal Authority while the King's clan had done so and could be seen as the more cooperative partner by the government. Pressured by his people, he turned to the Department of Native Affairs, assuring them of his loyalty (instead of turning to the Buthelezi people).<sup>103</sup>

Buthelezi later claimed that he had rejected the introduction of the Bantu Authorities Act among the Buthelezi for as long as he could and only agreed when the state declared it compulsory (and the Buthelezi were indeed among the last to implement it). Anna Kolberg Buverud however argues, based on letters by and to the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) of Natal of that period, that Buthelezi actually voiced support for the introduction from very early on (albeit without urging anyone to implement it),<sup>104</sup> but Buverud also notes:

Before jumping to the conclusion that Buthelezi was, in fact among the first supporters of the Bantu Authorities system, his official position at the time should be taken into consideration. He had previously been expelled from Fort Hare University for participation in a protest against the government, which had branded him a troublemaker. Now, his probationary period as acting chief of the Buthelezi had been extended with a year (although the CNC believed this to be 'largely due to his youth'). Well aware

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101 Ansprenger 1999, 50–51; Du Toit 1983, 381; Jung 2000, 44; Maré 1992, 54–55; Sithole 2006, 815–817; Vickerman 2009, 4–5.

102 Badat 2013, 149–151.

103 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 28–32.

104 Kolberg Buverud 2007, 104.

that he might not be installed as chief if the government suspected that he opposed its policies, and more exposed to such suspicions because of the Fort Hare incident, Buthelezi might have found it in his own best interest to appear somewhat more cooperative than he actually was.<sup>105</sup>

During the 1960s, Buthelezi was the chairman of his regional Tribal Authority and claimed that he was rather unwilling to take this position, but he would obey as a loyal citizen and a servant of his people.<sup>106</sup> Already at this time, he legitimated his claim to power by being a relative of the king and coming from a family of advisors to the king (and Buthelezi himself had been a close advisor of King Cyprian); special reference was made to his great-grandfather Mnyamana who had been an advisor of King Cetshwayo.<sup>107</sup> Buthelezi often referred to Zulu history for the legitimation of his own position, so did the ANC and the NP government, but only Buthelezi was a friend of the Zulu king and already active in commemorative activities like organising Shaka Day<sup>108</sup> which might explain his appeal to traditionalists.<sup>109</sup> After all, emphasizing the purported qualities of the Zulu might be flattering, and Buthelezi commonly was (and is) regarded as a very charismatic person.<sup>110</sup>

Buthelezi had good relations to King Cyprian, but was shoved out of royal matters after King Cyprian's death in 1968 and his kinship with the royal house was seriously questioned.<sup>111</sup> This did not stop Buthelezi from being elected as the Chief Executive Councillor of

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105 Ibid, 82–83.

106 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 35–36.

107 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 21; Forsyth 1992, 75.

108 In 1971, Buthelezi tried to make Shaka Day (23 September) an official holiday, but the Minister of Bantu Administration declined and said that not all blacks in KwaZulu and Natal were Zulus, although Buthelezi said that they all were Zulus; Ibid, 78–81.

109 Ibid, 75–78.

110 Vickerman 2009, 134–135.

111 Sithole 2006, 827.

the new Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970 and laying claim to being an elected (not appointed) advocate for every Zulu.<sup>112</sup> Buthelezi's rivals at this point, Prince Clement Zulu and inkosi Charles Hlengwa,<sup>113</sup> became chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, although the election results could not be predetermined and Hlengwa seemed to have good reason to hope for becoming Chief Executive Councillor.<sup>114</sup>

Opening the Zululand Territorial Authority, Buthelezi explained that the Zulu nation (as he understood it) was finally able to speak with one voice – through his voice – and gain its freedom just like the Afrikaners had. He assured the South African government of his and the Zulu people's loyalty despite some reservations that some Zulus might have had towards the government and its policy of separate development. Zululand, however, needed more territory, investments, and the Zulu people needed higher wages, as Buthelezi explained to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.C. Botha.<sup>115</sup>

At this point, Buthelezi still considered the prospect of Zululand becoming independent (and South Africa becoming a federation or confederation<sup>116</sup>) and saw no need for political parties; delegates were to vote according to their opinions instead.<sup>117</sup> There also was no official opposition as KwaZulu, in Buthelezi's words, could not "afford deliberately to create apparatus for petty bickering among ourselves.

112 Du Toit 1983, 381; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 37; Sithole 2006, 815–817; Vickerman 2009, 4.

113 Interesting to note is that another of Buthelezi's rivals was Prince Regent (of Goodwill Zwelithini) Israel Mcwayizeni Zulu who shoved Buthelezi out of royal affairs, and that Israel was supported by AWG Champion. Champion later supported Buthelezi while he was forming Inkatha, and Buthelezi called Champion a "living ancestor"; Champion can also be seen as somebody who brought the strategy of opposing a system while collaborating to Natal (Tabata 2016, 48–49).

114 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 49–50; Kelly 2018, 138.

115 Buthelezi, M. G.: Speech at the inauguration of the Zulu Territorial Authority, Nongoma, 11.06.1970. CC KCM98/3/59.

116 Buthelezi, M. G.: Federation and the future of South Africa, 10.11.1973. CC KCM30008/15; Newsweek 1977, 9.

117 Horrell/Horner/Kane-Berman 1972, 34.

At present we debate every issue thoroughly and everyone expresses his opinion honestly and votes according to the best dictates of his conscience. This is Zulu democracy at work based on a consensus of opinion.”<sup>118</sup> Soon afterwards he made the consolidation of KwaZulu by handing over land from the South African state a prerequisite for accepting independence.<sup>119</sup>

His critics however accused Buthelezi of being a willing partner of the NP government and of supporting the homeland system (also as a means for a personal gain of power), only turning against the government when it became clear that no additional land would be handed over to KwaZulu.<sup>120</sup>

The Territorial Authority was converted to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) on 01 April 1972 while Buthelezi remained at its head. The assembly consisted of the king or a representative of the king, three amakhosi of each of the 22 Regional Authorities, and 55 elected members. Every minister was appointed by the Chief Minister and the constitution explicitly placed the Chief Minister above the (now) representative king<sup>121</sup> in all matters of the government, therefore securing Buthelezi's power and in the eyes of many contemporaries answering the question who would be the advocate of the Zulus.<sup>122</sup> The self-government introduced by the national government was meant to be the way to official independence of KwaZulu, but Buthelezi now refused to take further steps to an officially independent, but in reality heavily dependent and fragmented KwaZulu.<sup>123</sup> Buthelezi openly criticised ‘separate development’ as “a very thin icing on the Apartheid cake, so thin that it is absolutely transparent.”<sup>124</sup> He simultaneously presented himself as a loyal citizen and as

118 Buthelezi 1978b, 468.

119 Horrell, et al. 1973b, 36.

120 Sithole 2006, 814–818.

121 See also Naidoo 1972.

122 Forsyth 1992, 78–81.

123 Bonnin, et al. 1996, 147–148; Breytenbach 1974, 77; Dlamini 2005, 52; Jung 2000, 46; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 38–41; Maré 1992, 56–57; Marks 1986b, 117; Piper 2002, 78; Sithole 2006, 805–806, 825–828; Sutcliffe/Wellings 1988, 327.

124 Buthelezi, M. G.: The launching of the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha), Ezakheni, 13.07.1975. DocAfr Acc 4, 2, 4.

an advocate of the Zulus who, he said, had a desire for self-determination just like Afrikaners had.<sup>125</sup>

Thus, the often conservative amakhosi were an important pillar of Buthelezi's and later Inkatha's influence. It was reported that loyal amakhosi were rewarded through a system of patronage (apart from the salary they would get as members of the KLA): New streets, hospitals or schools were built primarily in the areas of loyal amakhosi, improving their standing among their people, and not in the areas of resistant amakhosi.<sup>126</sup>

Buthelezi first mentioned Inkatha publicly in 1972. Inkatha would be important in the next elections, but it would not be a party; rather, it would be a national movement (i.e. of the Zulus) striving for an improvement of socio-economic circumstances. No claims of Inkatha being a liberation movement were made.<sup>127</sup>

In the beginning of the 1970s, Buthelezi was under pressure from various sides. Other amakhosi wanted to gain power and founded parties (that will be described below), the king and his Zulu Royal Council<sup>128</sup> still wanted to play an active role in politics after being marginalised by Buthelezi, the NP government interfered in Buthelezi's government (as Buthelezi seemed to become unreliable and did not accept independence), and a conflict with traders arose around tripartite companies (see chapter 4.3).<sup>129</sup>

For one, this resulted in a shift to black nationalism, unions and Black Consciousness to gain a national power base which lasted until the break with the ANC in 1979. Buthelezi still presented himself as a Zulu to his homeland base, but also as a black nationalist and a representative of or heir to the early ANC to the rest of the country. His notion of the Zulu was quite inclusive and not separating; every Black originating in KwaZulu or Natal would be a Zulu and would

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125 Forsyth 1992, 78–81.

126 Jung 2000, 58–59; Maré/Ncube 1989, 483.

127 Du Toit 1983, 380; Tessenorf/Boult 1991, 7.

128 The Zulu Royal Council, advising the king, was disbanded under Buthelezi's pressure in 1973 after the king had addressed striking workers without any effect; Kelly 2018, 141.

129 Maré 2000, 67; Tessenorf/Boult 1991, 7–8.

still be able to have his or her own history and culture.<sup>130</sup> This tolerance, however, was only for loyal amakhosi. When resistant amakhosi wanted to bring the king back into politics with arguments concerning Zulu history, Buthelezi soon established a monopoly on the interpretation of Zulu history and Zulu symbols. He stated that the Buthelezis were traditional prime ministers and had always governed for the Zulu kings, while the kings had been mere representative figures (which is not historically accurate).<sup>131</sup>

This made Buthelezi's role quite contradictory. He wanted to be a black nationalist and a Zulu nationalist at the same time; furthermore, he wanted to resist apartheid while cooperating with the government. He also claimed to be nonviolent but participated in a violent system which in turn began eroding his nation-wide power base.<sup>132</sup>

The other reaction to these pressures was the re-establishment of Inkatha that Buthelezi had already spoken of in the KLA in 1972.<sup>133</sup> According to Buthelezi's own depiction in a 1976 speech, he distributed the constitution of the old Inkatha to many KLA members and other prominent Zulus in 1972 and invited them to make propositions on how to amend the constitution for the needs of the 1970s. But as nobody except Dr Morris Sipo Nyembezi from Soweto replied to this request, Buthelezi met with cabinet members, some prominent Zulus, and Ubhoko, a think-tank led by Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu,<sup>134</sup> in 1975 to discuss the old Inkatha's constitution as well as others, e.g. the Zambian UNIP constitution. At the meeting, a draft was written that was then discussed within the KLA and the regional authorities until it was approved on 22 March 1975 – legislative bodies, thus, discussed the constitution of a movement, whether all the bodies' members supported the movement or not.<sup>135</sup>

130 Forsyth 1992, 75; Maré 1992, 96–97.

131 Forsyth 1992, 81–84; KwaZulu Executive Council 1978.

132 Mzala 1988, 7–11.

133 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 67.

134 Temkin 2003, 185.

135 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening Address at the Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the National Council, 15.01.1976. CC KCM30010/57, 2–3; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 7, 01.-06.05.1975, 13.-17.10.1975, 19.01.1976. LL.

### 3.3.4 Buthelezi and Inkatha

Inkatha as a movement (not yet a party) was revived<sup>136</sup> on 22 March 1975 at the KwaNzimela Diocesan Centre, Melmoth, and soon put up branches in many rural and some urban parts of KwaZulu and Natal.<sup>137</sup> Its name changed in the course of the first years; the exact dates are not clear, but a shift in its meaning can be made out: At first, the full name was *Inkatha Ya KwaZulu*<sup>138</sup> – Inkatha, therefore, was explicitly for the people of KwaZulu which were, by Buthelezi's definition, all Zulu. The later, better-known name was officially adopted around 1977 (but talked of and used since at least 1976<sup>139</sup>) when most references to Zulus were replaced by references to Blacks in the constitution: *Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSizwe*, officially (but not literally) translated to *National Cultural Liberation Movement*.<sup>140</sup> Inkatha's first Secretary-General, Si-

136 Some claim that this was not a revival, but a genuinely new organisation that just shared the name with the Inkatha from the 1920s. But as the first constitution of the revived Inkatha refers to the old Inkatha and King Solomon kaDinuzulu explicitly, it can rather be seen as a revival; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 3–4; Southall 1981, 454; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: *Verbatim Report* 7, 01.-06.05.1975, 13.-17.10.1975, 19.01.1976. LL, 737. Furthermore, Buthelezi himself called the foundation of Inkatha a revival; Buthelezi, M.G.: *Launching the National Cultural Liberation Movement*, Umlazi, 14.06.1975. DocAfr Acc 8, 3.

137 Dlamini 2005, 55; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 45; Tessorf/Boult 1991, 10. Additionally, branches were put up in townships outside KwaZulu and Natal where a considerable number of Zulu labour migrants (coming from the countryside) lived; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 3–8.

138 Sometimes spelt differently; *Inkatha YaKwa-Zulu: Constitution*, ca. 1976. HPD A957f.

139 Buthelezi, M.G.: *Opening Address at the Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the National Council*, 15.01.1976. CC KCM30010/57, 5.

140 *Inkatha: Constitution*, 1979. APC PC126/3/1; Maré 1992, 57; Vos 1977. It is quite difficult to keep track of the exact dates because the constitution was not widely distributed to the public. The first publicly available constitution already carried the new name, but it is not dated; Ntuli 2016, 7255. Furthermore, when the constitution was amended in 1979, Inkatha destroyed all copies of the old constitution they had; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 35. Also in the year 1979, the reference to

busiso Bengu, even claimed in 1978 that this had been intended from the start: “In 1975 already we emphasised that INKATHA was a Black Consciousness Movement and not INKATHA KA ZULU”.<sup>141</sup> Indeed, Inkatha was not confined to Zulus, but among its members and its leadership, Zulus were clearly dominating.

*Inkatha* refers to the king’s sacred coil as described above (in everyday use, it refers to a cushion that is put between the head and a basket when carried on the head<sup>142</sup>). *YeNkululeko* translates to “liberation” and *YeSizwe* “of the nation”.<sup>143</sup> The change in name coincided with the official opening of Inkatha (including its central committee) for every South African and the deletion of references to King Solomon kaDinuzulu, although all important positions would still be occupied by Zulus.<sup>144</sup> Inkatha’s official aim was to foster solidarity among Zulus and/or Blacks.<sup>145</sup>

When Inkatha was revived in 1975, the KLA prohibited every other party in KwaZulu, while Inkatha in its constitution, partly based on Zambia’s United National Independence Party’s constitution,<sup>146</sup> ruled that only Inkatha members can be elected in KwaZulu, that there can

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King Solomon kaDinuzulu was deleted, “people of kwaZulu” was substituted for “black people” and several changes in the modus operandi were made; Inkatha: Constitution, 1979. APC PC126/3/1. For more details on the persons involved in the founding of Inkatha, see Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 21–22.

141 Bengu, Sibusiso M.E.: A summary of address on: “The role of Inkatha and the youth in the black liberation struggle in South Africa”, Youth Brigade conference, Ulundi, 11.02.1978. HPD A1045, 1.

142 Dubazane ca. 2017, 5.

143 Brewer 1986, 355; Du Toit 1983, 378–379; Forsyth 1992, 77; Harries 1993, 117; Waetjen 2004, 14.

144 Brewer 1986, 356; Du Toit 1983, 382–383; Gordon/Horrell 1980, 40; Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 21; Leatt/Kneifel/Nürnbergger 1986, 129; Maré 1992, 74; Ntuli 2016, 7254; Piper 2002, 79; Teague 1983, 15.

145 Du Toit 1983, 382–383; Gordon/Horrell 1980, 40; Leatt/Kneifel/Nürnbergger 1986, 129; Maré 1992, 74; Ntuli 2016, 7254; Piper 2002, 79; Teague 1983, 15.

146 Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 70–72; Maré 1995a, 159; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 61; Southall 1981, 459.



only be one party (Inkatha) and that the president of Inkatha should always be the Chief Minister. Inkatha claimed that Zulus, by tradition, settled their conflicts through consensus, so there would be no need for other parties, also because Zulus needed to be unified in the struggle against apartheid.<sup>147</sup> The KLA then accepted Inkatha's constitution, showing how party, government, and administration were intertwined.<sup>148</sup>

The Central Committee of Inkatha was the final decision-making body on all matters concerning the movement. It consisted of 50 persons including Buthelezi: the chairpersons of the subcommittees, all Inkatha members that were elected to the KLA, one representative of the Youth Brigade and of one of the Women's Brigade.<sup>149</sup> These representatives were elected by full meetings of each brigade, but nominated by Buthelezi, just like he appointed all the chairpersons and all the ministers. This made the Central Committee centred around Buthelezi and gave him extensive powers or, one could say, made it an effective patronage system where everybody was reliant on Buthelezi's benevolence.<sup>150</sup> Although about 60% of Inkatha members were women, the Central Committee did not match this at all and the only female member was the leader of the Women's Brigade.<sup>151</sup>

From very early on, Buthelezi and Inkatha portrayed themselves as the true heirs<sup>152</sup> and even adopted colours, flag, and uniform of

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147 Golan 1991, 114; National Council, Inkatha: Resolutions, 15.01.1976. HPD A1045, 1.

148 Sithole 2006, 827–829. The KwaZulu flag was also identical to Inkatha's flag; Brewer 1986, 357.

149 Women could only join the Women's Brigade; the main organisation consisted of men of 18 years and older only; Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 73.

150 Brewer 1986, 380–381. For more details on Inkatha's structure see Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, ch. 4.

151 Golan 1994, 12.

152 Buthelezi even claimed that Albert Luthuli had symbolically given the leadership of the liberation struggle to him, but this is highly questionable; Couper 2006/2007, 267; Maré 2000, 71.



**Figure 1: Frank Mdlalose, Buthelezi, and Oscar Dhlomo entering the tent at an Inkatha conference. The shoulder straps are in ANC colours.**

the ANC as the picture above indicates.<sup>153</sup> *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika*, the ANC's hymn, was regularly sung at Inkatha gatherings<sup>154</sup> and Inkatha leaders regularly addressed each other as comrades.<sup>155</sup> The ANC itself agreed to the revival of Inkatha and saw it as a legal arm of the liberation struggle (the ANC had been banned in 1960 together with the PAC). Oliver Tambo even called Buthelezi a good friend and competent, influential leader at the time; Buthelezi called for Mandela to be released which he continued to do until 1990.<sup>156</sup>

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153 Gerhart/Glaser 2010a, 29; Klopper 1996, 63; Lodge 1983, 351.

154 See, e.g., Inkatha: Visit of the Executive Councillor of KwaZulu and members of the Executive Council, De Wet Nel Stadium, Agenda, 29.09.1976. CC KCM30013/75.

155 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: Central Committee meeting, presidential greetings, Ulundi, 24.02.1984. ABI, 1.

156 Golan 1994, 12; Jung 1996, 48; Jung 2000, 47; Karis/Gerhart 1997, 251; Klop-

Buthelezi and Inkatha also got in touch with the Black Consciousness Movement about which Buthelezi claimed that it was rooted in Zulu culture, especially in Ubuntu-Botho (see chapter 4.1.3) and in King Shaka's (purported) nationalism.<sup>157</sup> Accordingly, Buthelezi called for unity of all oppressed, got connected with Coloureds and Indians, turned against racism, advocated a unitary state with majority rule for all South Africans and ultimately demanded dialogue with Pretoria to end apartheid and oppression. These popular positions indeed gave him a reasonable standing among the South African people.<sup>158</sup> Differing from the ANC position, Buthelezi and Inkatha opposed boycotts (although exceptions could be made<sup>159</sup>), sanctions, and militant struggle.<sup>160</sup> Instead, the living conditions should be improved

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per 1996, 63; Maré 1992, 57–58; Ntuli 2016, 7254; Piper 2002, 78; Sellström 2002, 529.

- 157 Relations to Black Consciousness never got cordial because Buthelezi remained a part of the homeland system; Forsyth 1992, 84–86; Gordon, et al. 1978, 37; Jung 2000, 50; Karis/Gerhart 1997, 251; Maré 1992, 58–59.
- 158 This is reflected in the survey conducted by the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg i.Br. Here, Buthelezi was by the far the most popular leader among urban blacks; only if listed for ethnicities, Buthelezi is in a close second place after ANC leaders; Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1978, 370–379. These results are questioned by Franz Ansprenger, Mark Orkin and Rupert Taylor: Many other leaders including the ANC could not be cited in newspapers and the items before the relevant questions had asked about Buthelezi explicitly; Ansprenger 1999, 71–72; Taylor/Orkin 2001, 79. These results provided Buthelezi with publicity and he often referred to them, so they have to be mentioned here; see, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: One hundred and fiftieth anniversary [sic] of King Shaka's assassination [sic]: "Where are we one hundred and fifty years after King Shaka's demise?", King Shaka's tombstone, Stanger/KwaDukuza, 25.09.1978. HPD A1045, 14–15. Du Toit 1983, 383–385.
- 159 Inkatha never called for international boycotts, only for local boycotts or boycotts of a certain product or brand. For example, the Women's Brigade called for meat boycotts protesting high prices; East Rand Bureau, *The Star* 1980; Buthelezi himself threatened that Inkatha members might be urged not to buy alcohol from hotels that did not take black guests; Mercury Reporter 1980.
- 160 Buthelezi admitted that he would choose sanctions over violent struggle if he had to, but people queueing for jobs were proof to him that the majority would reject sanctions because jobs would only be created through trade and investments; Buthelezi, M.G.: Statement on sanctions and investments, 04.11.1977. HPD A1045.

by redistribution, foreign investments,<sup>161</sup> and trade which should ultimately lead to liberation.<sup>162</sup> As Buthelezi's power base lay in rural, poor areas, boycotts would have hit his following the worst and thus could hardly be an option.<sup>163</sup>

Working within the homeland system was justified as an infiltration and use of certain institutions that would help the struggle for liberation and could ultimately become institutions of representation in a democratic South Africa.<sup>164</sup> Buthelezi cooperated with the Indian Reform Party and the Coloured Labour Party as well as with the homelands KaNgwane and QwaQwa which together formed the South African Black Alliance (see chapter 5.1) to work on a broader basis crossing ethnic lines.<sup>165</sup> They tried politics of a third way between collaboration and militant struggle, appearing as conservative-liberal, but many critics called Inkatha a populist and even fascist movement.<sup>166</sup>

In 1977, KwaZulu accepted phase two of self-rule, so the KwaZulu government gained control over police, education, and infrastructure in KwaZulu.<sup>167</sup> The requirement set by the government in Pretoria for phase two was that there had to be elections in KwaZulu that had not been held yet. When these were held in 1978, it was reported that dissidents were denied citizenship certificates and could not vote for rival candidates. Inkatha won this election, being unopposed in many constituencies.<sup>168</sup> In the same year, the first serious signs of discord with a liberation movement appeared when Buthelezi visited the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, former PAC leader: A crowd of youths threw stones at Buthelezi and his car, so he had to flee the scene.<sup>169</sup>

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161 His critics argued that the numerous foreign investments of the 1960s and 1970s had brought hardly any improvements; unemployment and poverty had risen instead; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 101–103.

162 McCaul 1988, 153.

163 Kane-Berman 1982, 165.

164 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 154–155.

165 Du Toit 1983, 387; Kane-Berman 1982, 161; Tessendorf/Boult 1991, 10.

166 Piper 2002, 78; Teague 1983, 2.

167 Jung 2000, 46; Maré 1988, 127; Sithole 2006, 807.

168 Gordon, et al. 1979, 291–292; Sithole 2006, 807.

169 Ntuli 2016, 7256.

After a meeting between the ANC executive and Buthelezi (and other Inkatha leaders) in London 1979, relations deteriorated as Buthelezi neither wanted to be a junior partner of the ANC nor wanted to take up the armed struggle.<sup>170</sup> It became apparent that Inkatha and the ANC pursued entirely different practices of resistance: Buthelezi followed the lines of the early ANC and now portrayed himself as the only heir to its ideals while the ANC of the 1970s had taken up other forms of resistance – after all, resistance through petitions and negotiations had not worked in the past decades.<sup>171</sup> Buthelezi traced the politics of negotiation back to King Cetshwayo kaMpande who, according to Buthelezi, had swapped the spear for negotiations.<sup>172</sup> Two ANC ‘founding fathers’ joined Inkatha once it was revived by Buthelezi, namely A.W.G. Champion and H. Selby Msimang. Buthelezi took this as proof of Inkatha being the real heir to the ANC:

Mr. Msimang’s membership of Inkatha justified what I say so often that Inkatha is structured on the ideals of the banned African National Congress as propounded in 1912 by the founding fathers. He was one of those founding fathers whose membership of Inkatha testified to the fact that it was not us in Inkatha who have deviated from those ideals. The ideals of the founding fathers who were descendants of black warriors were structured on the foundation of non-violence and negotiations.<sup>173</sup>

Buthelezi even asserted that the liberation struggle had begun with King Shaka and that the Zulu were carrying it since then; Buthelezi,

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170 African National Congress: Consultative meeting with Inkatha (Minutes), 29./30.10.1979. ARCA PV357, I/AI/5.

171 Buthelezi said that the ANC executive in London was idle and had lost contact to the realities of the liberation struggle; Ansprenger 1999, 64–70; Du Toit 1983, 388; Forsyth 1992, 86–87; Golan 1994, 13; Harries 1993, 120; Jung 2000, 50–51; Lodge 1983, 351; Maré 2000, 65; Piper 2002, 79–80.

172 Adam/Moodley 1992, 498; Ansprenger 1999, 64–70; Du Toit 1983, 388; Forsyth 1992, 86–87; Golan 1994, 13; Harries 1993, 120; Jung 2000, 50–51; Lodge 1983, 351; Maré 2000, 65; Piper 2002, 79–80.

173 Buthelezi, M.G.: Unveiling of the tombstone of the late H. Selby Msimang, Edendale, 06.04.1987. HPD A1045, 5.

therefore, would only be accountable to history.<sup>174</sup> For the ANC, and later for the UDF, Buthelezi now appeared as a traitor, cooperating with Pretoria, cementing Bantustan structures and their inherent racism.<sup>175</sup>

Buthelezi had tried to appeal to all black South Africans before the break with the ANC (now referred to as “ANC Mission in Exile” by Buthelezi<sup>176</sup>), but then shifted to a regional consolidation of power increasingly addressing only Zulus.<sup>177</sup> The tone of Buthelezi’s speeches became more conservative and was orientated at his power base: amakhosi, traders, public servants, which made up a quite conservative middle class in comparison to urban workers that Buthelezi had tried to win over to his side with limited success.<sup>178</sup> Buthelezi and Inkatha also tried to find a new ally in South Africa’s white economy. While Buthelezi had advocated African communalism and criticised capitalism to some degree in the 1970s, he now represented an openly capitalist stance.<sup>179</sup> Buthelezi also turned to white moderate politi-

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174 Forsyth 1992, 87–89.

175 Golan 1994, 12.

176 See, e.g., Buthelezi 1980, 2.

177 Gerhart/Glaser 2010c, 112; Maré 1992, 60; Marks 1986b, 119.

178 Booth 1988, 75; Southall 1986, 588. Several opinion surveys show Buthelezi’s public decline. In 1980 the most popular organisation in Soweto was the Committee of Ten; Marketing & Media Research: Opinion Polls, *The Star*, 1980–81. ABI, 8–10; this was backed in 1981 when opinion surveys found that in the South African cities the Committee of Ten and Nelson Mandela were the most popular organisations or leaders; *Ibid*, 35–36. The findings of the Buthelezi Commission however showed Buthelezi leading in front of the ANC except for the Witwatersrand; Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 244, 313. In the middle of the 1980s, Buthelezi was far behind the ANC and Mandela in all cities and in the countryside except for KwaZulu and Natal, his support base reduced to mainly Zulus. In the Natal townships, around half of the township dwellers supported Buthelezi (which is a notable decline in comparison to 1977 and 1981), especially people who rejected sanctions were still supporting Buthelezi. In the same townships, already a third of the people supported ANC and/or UDF; Aitchison in Beattie 1991, 10; Brewer 1988, 359–360; Cooper, et al. 1985, 58; de Kock/Rhodie/Couper 1985, 346; McCaul 1988, 152; Orkin 1987, 35–47; Schlemmer 1984, 16; Southall 1986, 582.

179 Ashforth 1991, 67–68; Daily News Reporter 1977; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 98–101; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 78–79.

cians (to the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party), media, and scientists, which culminated in the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba dealt with in a later chapter.<sup>180</sup>

In the same year, 1979, the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini<sup>181</sup> kaBhekuzulu tried to become active in politics again, but Buthelezi stifled this move quickly. He called Goodwill Zwelithini before the KLA accusing him of involving himself in politics against the constitution, evoking violence, and showing improper behaviour towards the Usuthu tribe. The KLA ceased paying the king's salary, but then intentionally dropped the charges and restored the king's honour. The king agreed to comply with Buthelezi's rules and knew that he would risk his own material existence if he broke them.<sup>182</sup> Buthelezi, in turn, involved the king in many ceremonial gatherings and used him to legitimise his own power as 'traditional' advisor.<sup>183</sup>

In the international arena, Buthelezi had quite a good standing, especially among conservative governments and evangelical groups. The *Offensive junger Christen (Offensive of Young Christians)* even proposed to the German Bundestag (parliament) that it should back Buthelezi as a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, and so the Bundestag did with votes from every parliamentary group in 1981.<sup>184</sup> Obviously, Buthelezi could still appeal to groups on the political left during these years which changed during the 1980s (while many

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180 Du Toit 1983, 389.

181 In sources, his name alternates between Goodwill Zwelithini and Zwelithini Goodwill. Today's common order of his names is employed in this thesis.

182 Sithole 2006, 834.

183 Jung 2000, 52.

184 The recommendation was drawn up by Hermann Kroll-Schlüter, assisted by the Institut für Jugend und Gesellschaft (Institute for Youth and Society); Daily News Reporter 1981; Möllers 1984, 13. Buthelezi was not awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but he got several other awards: The Order of the Star of Africa (Grand Commander, 1975); the French Order of Merit (1981), the George Meany Human Rights Award (1983), the Apostle of Peace (Rastriya Pita) award (by Pandit Satyapal Sharma of India) (1983); as well as honorary doctorates from the University of Zululand (1976), University of Cape Town (1979), Tampa University Florida (1985), Boston University (1986); Brewer 1988, 374; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 62; Vickerman 2009, 7.

anti-Apartheid movements had been critical of him from the beginning<sup>185</sup>). In the late 1980s, even the conservative German media could no longer deny that Buthelezi and Inkatha might not be the peaceful liberators that they claimed to be.<sup>186</sup> Nevertheless, the conservative German government continued funding Inkatha via the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, as we will see in chapter 5.4. After all, a strong Buthelezi and a strong Inkatha in a democratic South Africa would have safeguarded capitalist structures which Buthelezi separated ideologically from apartheid exploitation.<sup>187</sup>

When the UDF was formed in 1983, the fight for territory began and reached its first peak in 1985. The UDF, as a coalition of many civil organisations, could gain huge numbers of supporters in urban areas in a short time, securing many townships as strongholds of supporters and potential voters. Inkatha claimed to have 1.3 million members in 1985.<sup>188</sup> It was reported that a part of these members had been recruited by force: Inkatha supporters drove into unaligned or ANC/UDF-aligned townships, spread terror, and forced men to join Inkatha and therefore bringing said townships under Inkatha control. This was often called tribal or ethnic violence of ANC-aligned Xhosa and UDF-aligned Indians against Inkatha-aligned Zulu, but in reality, it often was Zulus fighting against Zulus and, to some extent, urban township dwellers against migrant workers from the countryside.<sup>189</sup>

185 Ansprenger 1999, 9.

186 Adam/Moodley 1992, 491–492; Brock 1992, 158–159; Marks/Trapido 1988, 15.

187 Gerhart/Glaser 2010a, 30; Lowe 1991, 197–198.

188 Inkatha membership figures are highly problematic, as members that no longer paid their fees would still be counted as members, and the membership figures could never be verified by an independent authority; *Ibid.*, 197; Southall 1986, 578–581. Sometimes, even Inkatha officials could not determine the actual size of Inkatha membership; Cooper, et al. 1993, 480. In 1984, it was reported by Dhlomo that a journalist of an English language newspaper inspected Inkatha's membership records and found that these were legit, but no further accounts of who this journalist was and how he checked the records could be found; Dhlomo, O.D.: Tenth Annual General Conference, Secretary General's annual report, 22.-24.06.1984. CC KCM98/3/53, 1. Nevertheless, Inkatha was a potent organisation with a significant following. Tessendorf/Boult 1991, 10. Another source states 1.155.054 members; Cooper, et al. 1986, 18.

189 Ansprenger 1999, 91; Piper 2002, 80–81; Sutcliffe/Wellings 1988, 334.



Indeed, violence occurred on both sides and was instigated by both sides. The Comrades – young, armed men fighting for the ANC – fought against the IFP and sometimes entered a bloody circle of retaliation. The ANC further plotted to assassinate Buthelezi.<sup>190</sup> However, a distinct majority of human rights abuses was attributed to Inkatha members (in comparison to the ANC and South African Police) and even high ranking Inkatha officials.<sup>191</sup> Some of these officials were warlords, powerful and violent local leaders with their own armed forces, that Inkatha had incorporated and who were allowed to rule their areas as they pleased as long as it benefitted Inkatha.<sup>192</sup> One especially infamous figure, Thomas Shabalala, even became part of the Inkatha Central Committee.<sup>193</sup> The first hesitant steps away from these warlords were made in 1988, years after the conflict had erupted.<sup>194</sup> Inkatha also clashed with supporters of FO-SATU and, later, COSATU. The police generally did not intervene and sometimes even helped Inkatha by driving its supporters around, participating in violent confrontations on the Inkatha side and, in the aftermath, protracted investigations.<sup>195</sup> Although this was frequently denied, the accounts of Inkatha-police cooperation were numerous and documented.<sup>196</sup> Another strategy of gaining influence was taking over the administration of townships from the central state, therefore incorporating townships into KwaZulu. This was met with heavy

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190 Villa-Vicencio 1999a, 341.

191 Sanders 2006, 273.

192 To a somewhat lesser extent, warlords could also be found in the ranks of the ANC, e.g. Harry Gwala, and were incorporated into the new power structures after 1994; Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 23–24; Mathis 2013, 422; Minnaar 1992, 65–66.

193 Freund 1996, 182. Shabalala was suspended from the Central Committee in May 1988; Cooper, et al. 1989, 107. An impressive photograph of Shabalala can be accessed at <http://www.digitalcollections.lib.uct.ac.za/collection/islandora-858>, last access on 06.03.2019.

194 Aitchison 1989, 463.

195 Ansprenger 1999, 91; Cooper, et al. 1989, 103; Piper 2002, 80–81; Sutcliffe/Wellings 1988, 334.

196 See, e.g., New Nation 1990; Witness Reporter 1990.

resistance from township movements that preferred a participatory way of action instead of being centred around one figure.<sup>197</sup>

In this struggle for dominance in KwaZulu and Natal, Inkatha bought the *Ilanga* newspaper in 1987 via its Mandla Matla publishing company from Argus publishing house.<sup>198</sup> Originally founded as *Ilanga lase Natal* by John Dube, it had come under white ownership, thus Buthelezi could celebrate the takeover as the newspaper's return to the people that founded it and were reading it, especially so because it now was the only major newspaper owned by Blacks.<sup>199</sup> Nevertheless, Ilanga's old staff resented working for Inkatha and walked out in protest; some staff members were later reemployed. Although Inkatha now owned Ilanga, it did not become a party newspaper – changes were more subtle. Reporting on Inkatha and KwaZulu had been critical before and now became more benevolent, supplemented by a new focus on the Zulu royal family. Due to Buthelezi's good connections, Ilanga was able to feature advertisements from big business; it also promoted the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (see chapter 5.2.2). The purchase can nevertheless be seen as an attempt to influence especially urban Blacks that routinely read Ilanga and convince them of the Inkatha side (Inkatha was strong in the countryside, but ANC and UDF were more popular in the cities).<sup>200</sup>

Not only did Inkatha supporters cooperate with local police forces. In 1986, about 200 Inkatha supporters were taken to Camp Hippo at the Caprivi Strip, Namibia, for six months of paramilitary training (defensive, offensive, intelligence) by the SADF (called *Operation Marion*). Training continued until 1988, then the fighters were employed in the KwaZulu Police and other security services. They also got engaged in the shooting and killing of UDF supporters and their families, including children.<sup>201</sup> The *Inkathagate* scandal of July 1991

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197 Sutcliffe/Wellings 1988, 326.

198 It is not clear how the necessary funding was acquired that was rumoured to be R400,000 to R800,000.

199 Buthelezi, M.G.: You have come home Ilanga. A few remarks announcing Inkatha's take-over of Ilanga, 15.04.1987. DocAfr Acc 8.

200 Gillwald 1988.

201 Ansprenger 1999, 84–85; Francis 2011, 59; Gerhart/Glaser 2010c, 113; Koch

revealed that the South African government had financed Inkatha's rallies against the ANC (Operation Marion was revealed to the public at around the same time). Buthelezi denied any awareness of this money and of Operation Marion, his personal assistant Zakhele Khumalo took the blame,<sup>202</sup> and Inkatha returned the funds, but its legitimacy as a part of the resistance was in tatters.<sup>203</sup> Oscar Dhlomo, though, stated that he "would be surprised if he [Buthelezi] didn't know".<sup>204</sup> The NP in turn had lost its credibility in the negotiations and had to make concessions to the ANC to guarantee a continuation of the negotiations.<sup>205</sup> It is unclear how much the state president knew in these cases; they might have been uncontrolled actions of the security apparatus. After Inkathagate, de Klerk dismissed the ministers in charge, but this was also a chance to get rid of problematic hardliners.<sup>206</sup> Additionally, local Inkatha groups negotiated with the extreme-right Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and cooperated in violent action against the ANC,<sup>207</sup> and the IFP joined the Concerned South Africans Group, later renamed Freedom Alliance, together with the extreme-right Afrikaner Volksfront and the governments of Ciskei and Bophutatswana; additionally, there were talks of an NP-IFP-alliance in 1990 and meetings with the extreme-right Conservative Party.<sup>208</sup>

Oscar Dhlomo, Secretary-General of Inkatha, KwaZulu Minister of Education and Culture, chairman of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and

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1990; Piper/Morrow 2010, xvi; Sanders 2006, 268–269; Villa-Vicencio 1999b, 220–224.

202 Khumalo was later accused of being the hub in the killings of political opponents; Reuters/CNN 06.08.1997; Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 08.12.1995; Wren 01.03.1992.

203 Ansprenger 1999, 83–84; Golan 1994, 14; Piper/Morrow 2010, x.

204 O'Malley 05.08.1991.

205 Mathy 1998, 65.

206 Ibid, 64.

207 Cooper, et al. 1993, 481; Villa-Vicencio 1999a, 650–651.

208 Buthelezi, M.G.: Memorandum for a second discussion between the leader of the Conservative Party and leader of the opposition in the House of Assembly, Dr. A.P. Treurnicht MP, and members of the Conservative Party, and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Durban, 06.01.1992. HPD AG2838; Fabricius 1990; Haas/Zulu 1994, 443; Maré 1995a, 87; Natal Mercury 1990.

of the Joint Executive Authority (see chapter 5.3) – thus, one of the most powerful Inkatha leaders – resigned from all offices on 31 May 1990. Officially, this was due to private reasons, but rumours had it that Dhlomo, one of Buthelezi's closest confidants, had attracted Buthelezi's rage because Dhlomo had passed some of KwaZulu's competences to the Joint Executive Authority. Buthelezi, therefore, faced a reduction of his power.<sup>209</sup>

In December 1990, Inkatha became the Inkatha Freedom Party,<sup>210</sup> and the fight over territorial control as well as over people continued. The mightier the IFP seemed, the more imperative it was to make concessions to the IFP in the negotiations for a democratic South Africa, although the IFP effectively boycotted the CODESA and MPNF negotiations while demanding a recognition of 'traditional' rule in the new constitution and a federal state.<sup>211</sup> Instead, Buthelezi resorted to threats and Inkatha supporters to violence.<sup>212</sup> The ANC, in turn, started addressing Zulus in particular and spoke of a 'rainbow nation', leaving its original non-ethnic stance behind.<sup>213</sup> Neither side put their weapons down; violence increased again after it had decreased in the late 1980s, both sides pushed the conflict further, and the state also fuelled the conflict.<sup>214</sup>

When the date for the first open elections on 27 April 1994 was set, Buthelezi and his close advisor Walter Felgate (said to "speak as one"<sup>215</sup>) announced that the IFP would not participate in the elections and warned of possible civil war if the elections were pursued further. To this end, the IFP erected a paramilitary camp called Indunazulu at Mlaba to disturb and sabotage the elections (e.g. through the cutting of phone lines and through roadblocks) as media reported and, later, Felgate admitted.<sup>216</sup> This course led to one of the few times of

209 Cape Times 1990; City Press 1990.

210 Ansprenger 1999, 31; Cooper, et al. 1992, 32; Mathy 1998, 62.

211 Cooper, et al. 1992, 32–33; Maré 1995b, 10; Williams 2010, 82.

212 Ansprenger 1999, 32; Hamilton 1998a, 1–2; Jung 1996, 52; Klopper 1996, 63; Piper 2002, 83.

213 Golan 1994, 14; Piper 2002, 83–84.

214 Ansprenger 1999, 88.

215 Southern Africa Report 1993, 5.

216 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 71–72;

open criticism inside Inkatha/the IFP. Peter Miller (formerly NP) and Mike Tarr (formerly DP), member of the Inkatha Central Committee, openly criticised this decision and pointed especially at Felgate, explaining that he was in effect the one who had decided that the IFP would not participate in the election. Even Frank Mdlalose, a top Inkatha member and KwaZulu Minister, announced on national TV that the question of participation would be decided by a special congress of the IFP and not by individuals. KwaZulu's Minister of Health and chief negotiator, Ben Ngubane, also said that a return to the negotiations was not impossible.<sup>217</sup>

Following concessions concerning the Zulu king, the amakhosi, and federalism (and after the Freedom Alliance had proven unsuccessful), the IFP decided to participate in the first democratic elections of 1994.<sup>218</sup> Recent research by Hilary Lynd, published in the *Mail & Guardian*, has suggested what made Buthelezi agree to the elections: the passing of the Ingonyama Trust Act, Act No. 3KZ of 1994, immediately confirmed by de Klerk. According to Lynd, this had been negotiated behind the scenes and without the knowledge of the ANC to bring the IFP into the elections. The act's effect was that all communal land of KwaZulu, about 2.8 million hectares, became trust land that was administered by the Zulu king as its only trustee. This way, Lynd argues, the Zulu kingdom was preserved as an autonomous institution, and the king significantly gained power due to his control over land and who would be allowed to live and farm on it. Even though KwaZulu ceased to exist, a strong power base for the king and probably Buthelezi survived.<sup>219</sup>

Buthelezi, in a reply, stated that the act was the work of him and the KwaZulu government alone without any need for agreement on the side of de Klerk. The president only signed the law because this was the normal procedure for all KwaZulu laws. Buthelezi further accused the M&G of knowingly publishing false facts because he had been approached before publication, but his responses had been

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Kindra 14.02.2003.

217 Robinson 2015, 959–962; Southern Africa Report 1993.

218 Choi 2008, 51; Klopper 1996, 56.

219 Lynd 07.08.2019.



Figure 2: Bottom end of the 1994 ballot paper. It is obvious that the IFP line was added later.

ignored. Moreover, the ANC had been duly informed of the act, Buthelezi stated.<sup>220</sup>

The decision to participate in the elections had been delayed for so long that the ballot papers had already been printed and needed to be altered as seen above. Although there had been serious accusations of fraud in KwaZulu-Natal,<sup>221</sup> the elections in general were seen as free and fair. Violence in KZN, including police violence, continued, but declined notably.<sup>222</sup> The IFP became part of the Government of National Unity from 1994 to 2004, Buthelezi being the Minister of Home Affairs. ANC and IFP now both employed a more cooperative, multicultural rhetoric (although the IFP still demanded a stronger federalism and rejected any moves towards socialism); the IFP abandoned its Zulu nationalist stance in many aspects.<sup>223</sup> Interestingly enough, the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, switched sides and supported the ANC that gave him greater independence and guaranteed for his own land (the Ingonyama Trust), ending his dependency on Buthelezi.<sup>224</sup>

In 1997, Frank Mdlalose, then Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, and IFP Secretary-General Ziba Jiyane resigned and left the IFP, likely

220 Buthelezi 05.06.2020.

221 Melber 1994, 659.

222 Ansprenger 1999, 88–89; Choi 2008, 52; Ewing 1995, 5–6.

223 Felgate 1996; Hampton 1998; Piper 2002, 84–85; Vickerman 2009, 8; Wright 2006, 150–151.

224 Ansprenger 1999, 32; Hamilton 1998a, 1–2; Jung 1996, 52; Klopper 1996, 63.

because they had fallen from grace with Buthelezi.<sup>225</sup> Mdlalose later claimed that “Buthelezi had shamed him more than once, and kicked him out of the party chairmanship and premiership” and that “the party had not been committed to a peaceful resolution between itself and the ANC.”<sup>226</sup> The aforementioned Walter Felgate, who had been a member of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature for the IFP, left and joined the ANC in 1997. Felgate explained that he could no longer tolerate Buthelezi’s “dictatorial ways” and accused Buthelezi of being “an undemocratic leader holding SA to ransom through his confrontational style of politics.”<sup>227</sup> When leaving, Felgate took a huge amount of IFP documents – allegedly more than seven tons – with him which were seized by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.<sup>228</sup> Only a few of these documents are accessible today at the South African History Archive, Johannesburg.<sup>229</sup> In 2005, Gavin Woods, former head of the Inkatha Institute and then IFP MP, crossed the floor from the IFP to the National Democratic Convention founded by Jiyane.<sup>230</sup>

The IFP’s share of votes declined gradually and it was defeated in the 2004 election in KwaZulu-Natal, the new provincial government being formed by the ANC. In 2011, the National Freedom Party broke away from the weakened IFP unsatisfied with Buthelezi’s leadership.<sup>231</sup> It was only in 2017 that Buthelezi announced that he would not be up for reelection as IFP leader.<sup>232</sup> In August 2019, Velenkosini Hlabisa was elected new IFP leader.<sup>233</sup>

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225 Louw 1997.

226 da Costa/SAPA 31.01.2011; see also Mdlalose 2006.

227 Louw 1997, 1. Buthelezi explained that Felgate had acted out of revenge as he did not receive a cabinet post neither in the national nor in the provincial government; South African Press Association 27.11.1998.

228 Hlongwa 1997.

229 SAHA AL3456.

230 Quintal 07.09.2005.

231 Sithole 2011.

232 Ndou 2017.

233 Nkosikhona 26.08.2019.

### 3.3.5 Other Parties inside KwaZulu: Alternative Traditions

As mentioned before, several other parties were founded in KwaZulu and subsequently forbidden by the KLA. Little is known about these parties, so only brief accounts can be given. The aim of this subchapter is to clarify that Buthelezi's notions of Zulu history and Zuluness were by no means uncontested.

The Zulu National Party was established in 1968 by Lloyd Ndaba, a former information minister in the Department of Bantu Administration, and Bishop W.G. Dimba, the latter representing a pro-separate development stance. The ZNP was a monarchist party opting for an executive king inside a democratic setting at a time when the Zulu king and his royal council were struggling with Buthelezi. His position, thus, was far from secure, but Ndaba invited him to become a member of the ZNP. As tensions rose, Ndaba accused Buthelezi of being a leftist and Buthelezi, in turn, accused Ndaba of cooperating with Pretoria's security apparatus. In 1972, when KwaZulu's constitution was drafted and discussed, the ZNP claimed to have the endorsement of the Zulu king, Prince Regent Israel, Prince Clement Zulu, and A.W.G. Champion. The ZNP had contacts to the ANC, to business (especially to Ephraim Shabalala, a millionaire who later became mayor of Soweto<sup>234</sup>) and the state. On 24 October 1973, it joined Umkhonto kaShaka.<sup>235</sup>

On this date, Umkhonto kaShaka (Shaka's Spear) was founded by amakhosi under the leadership of Charles Hlengwa, second chairman of the KLA, and traders, dissatisfied with Buthelezi's connections to big capital, who wanted to propagate a different understanding of Zulu traditions. The ZNP's founder Ndaba became a leading member of Umkhonto kaShaka. Like the ZNP, they advocated for an executive king and disempowering Buthelezi; ultimately, they opted for an in-

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234 Cowell 1983; Pongoma 2009.

235 Breytenbach 1974, 78; Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 57; Inkatha: Royal Intrigues, ca. 1973. CC KCM30022/207; Kotzé 1974, 53–54; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 4, 03.-17.05.1974. LL, 42–46; Sabela 1989, 67–68; Sambureni 1997, 45–46; Sithole 2006, 828; Tessendorf/Boult 1991, 8.



dependent KwaZulu.<sup>236</sup> Soon after the party's foundation, King Goodwill Zwelithini prohibited Hlengwa from using Shaka's name because, although Umkhonto kaShaka wanted to bestow the king with greater powers, he did not or could not support it.<sup>237</sup>

The motion of no confidence that Hlengwa wanted to put before the KLA heavily criticised Buthelezi's aspirations for black unity and claimed that Buthelezi had lost his identity as Zulu. For Hlengwa, the future lay in a strong Zulu movement, centred around the Zulu king, because only this could serve the Zulu people properly. In a black, anti-ethnic movement, Zulu identities would have had no place.<sup>238</sup> He closed his proposed motion as follows:

Having noted with sadness and regret the failure of this Executive Council to recognise the traditional supremacy of the Zulu King, its failure to effect a democratic government and to honour and protect Zulu traditional political institutions and the rights and privileges of chiefs, and its dismal failure to work for the unity, development and independence of the Zulu nation, I hereby propose a motion of no confidence in the Executive Council of KwaZulu.<sup>239</sup>

The notion, however, was never voted on; the KLA instead voted to affirm its confidence in Buthelezi.<sup>240</sup> Hlengwa further accused Buthelezi of being "an aspirant dictator",<sup>241</sup> but was then forced to

236 Breytenbach 1974, 78; Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 57; Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 85; Kelly 2018, 141; Kotzé 1974, 54–55; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 4, 03.-17.05.1974. LL, 43; Sabela 1989, 69.

237 King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu: Statement on Umkhonto KaShaka, 16.11.1973. DocAfr Acc 22.

238 Hlengwa 1978.

239 Ibid, 477–478.

240 Hlengwa, Charles: Umkhonto KaShaka, ca. 1974. CC KCM30022/195, 1; Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 4, 03.-17.05.1974. LL, 40–42.

241 Hlengwa, Charles: Umkhonto KaShaka, ca. 1974. CC KCM30022/195, 1; Sanders 2006, 260.

apologise by a vote of no confidence and his Regional Authority was dissolved, therefore weakening his power base. Buthelezi suspected that the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) through its agent François Fouché had provided the funds for the founding of Hlengwa's party which was confirmed by one member of Umkhonto kaShaka, Grinith Mageba.<sup>242</sup> Hlengwa of course denied these claims and while some called Mageba a leader of Umkhonto kaShaka, Hlengwa called her "an unmarried woman who was employed as a clerk by this Party. She was discharged for untrustworthiness and when it came to the notice of my Executive that she was involved in a criminal action. It is also an open secret that she was an informer for certain Government Departments."<sup>243</sup> A defector from Umkhonto kaShaka allegedly provided Buthelezi with deposit slips that proved the party's funding through BOSS.<sup>244</sup>

The revival of Inkatha can be seen as a reaction to Umkhonto kaShaka; Buthelezi might have seen the need for a second power base apart from the KLA.<sup>245</sup> Secret Agent Martin Dolinchek<sup>246</sup> claimed in 1991 that the Bureau for State Security had founded Umkhonto kaShaka and then discredited it on purpose to strengthen Buthelezi.<sup>247</sup> He further stated that BOSS had an office in Empangeni near Ulundi since 1974 that provided Buthelezi with information; Walter Felgate confirmed Buthelezi's monthly briefings by BOSS (from at least 1973) in front of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1998.<sup>248</sup> TRC personnel had further seen evidence to these claims.<sup>249</sup>

The Zulu Labour Party was founded in Durban in 1975 by Uvulamehlo Izimtuphuthu, a separatist church leader. It supported Buthelezi but

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242 Ibid.; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 4, 03.-17.05.1974. LL, 46–47

243 Hlengwa, Charles: Umkhonto KaShaka, ca. 1974. CC KCM30022/195, 2.

244 Kelly 2018, 141.

245 Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 57; Maré 1992, 57; Sithole 2006, 828–829.

246 This is the same Martin Dolinchek who is the main suspect for killing Rick Turner in 1978; Villa-Vicencio 1999b, 181–182.

247 Piper/Morrow 2010, xv.

248 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 11; Sanders 2006, 260.

249 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 69.



**Figure 3: Pledge to withhold from politics, signed by King Goodwill Zwelithini.**

did not approve of amakhosi being active in politics.<sup>250</sup> Barney Dladla, Executive Councillor for Community Affairs of the KwaZulu government, was accused of being involved with the ZLP, but this might have been a move to get rid of Dladla as he was too close to workers and unions and wanted to build up his own power base (after a power struggle, Dladla resigned by himself).<sup>251</sup> In 2014, Buthelezi explained that Dladla was expelled by the KLA for moving his office furniture to his home in Estcourt and that this had nothing to do with Dladla's relations to workers, especially Durban's dockworkers.<sup>252</sup>

<sup>250</sup> Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 58; Sithole 2006, 830.

<sup>251</sup> Butler/Rotberg/Adams 1977, 59–60; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 120–124; Temkin 2003, 156–160.

<sup>252</sup> Buthelezi 25.09.2014.

Another party, Inala, was founded<sup>253</sup> in December 1975 by inkosi Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, a popular inkosi and chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority, with members of the KLA. Inala, too, was a monarchist party, claiming that Inkatha and its politics had destroyed the honour of the king and that he had to be reinstated as an executive king standing above everyone else. Inala turned against white capital in KwaZulu, especially tripcos (see chapter 4.3). Maphumulo was legally disempowered by the KLA because of involving the king in politics, which was unlawful, but he was allowed to remain part of the KLA. After the elections of 1978, he was the only non-Inkatha candidate to enter the KLA, but Inkatha took away his seat and banned him from his Regional Authority. Furthermore, he was labelled as an agent of the South African Bureau for State Security. In the beginning, Inala had the support of King Goodwill Zwelithini, but he withdrew after being pressured by Buthelezi and signed a pledge to withhold from politics in the future.<sup>254</sup>

This exemplifies a typical theme in Inkatha's politics: For Buthelezi and Inkatha, there was just one correct version of Zulu history and tradition. Everybody who deviated from this understanding was silenced and accused of being paid by Pretoria.<sup>255</sup> The foundation of several parties that wanted to empower the king shows that not to every Zulu the king was just a symbolic figure. Instead, Buthelezi constructed his version of history and tradition that suited his own needs.

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253 According to Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, the party had only been founded "in principle" because it neither had a constitution nor funding; Kelly 2018, 142–143.

254 Gordon, et al. 1979, 292; Horrell, et al. 1977, 248–249; Maré 1978, 308; Sithole 2006, 830–832; Tessendorf/Boult 1991, 8.

255 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Day: The Foundation of a Nation and the Father of Liberation, Umlazi, 24.09.1983. EGM N968.300994 BUT, 3.

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## 4. Working Inside the System: Developing KwaZulu

A lot of public and scholarly attention has been paid to what Buthelezi and other Inkatha officials *said*. Owing to the praxeological influence in this thesis, this chapter is going to shift the focus on what they *did*, but of course still supplemented by what was said about these actions. This will include several activities of both Inkatha as a movement and of the KwaZulu government which were hard to separate, after all. Most of Buthelezi's and Inkatha's activity inside KwaZulu was happening under the keyword *development*, encompassing both cultural and economic development as means for liberation. The first sub-chapter, *Development of the Society*, will cover the ways in which Buthelezi attempted to influence Zulu culture, history, and identity to his own and to political ends of the people of KwaZulu (in his perception). While this will still mainly focus on aspects of discourse on Zulu history and how the discourse was attempted to be controlled, rituals and customs will also play an important role.

The second sub-chapter, *Organising the Masses in Development*, will shift the focus on the Inkatha Youth Brigade and Women's Brigade, how they worked, and which aims the brigades and members pursued (provided the sources allow statements on individuals). We will see that the brigades worked at the interface between cultural development and economic development, leading us to the third sub-chapter, *Development of the Economy*. Before concluding the chapter, the relationship between Inkatha/the KwaZulu government and the central government in Pretoria will be analysed in the sub-chapter *Challenge and Cooperation*, questioning whether this might actually be called resistance from within.

The extent to which the various sub-chapters can access rituals and practises varies with the accessibility of sources. Sources on the activities of the brigades often do not go into detail, thus broader statements will be made which nevertheless allow for meaningful conclusions. This chapter obviously focuses on Inkatha's practical work inside KwaZulu and on its own. It is not so much about how KwaZulu was administered but about how economy and society were

(attempted to be) shaped on various fields, in the latter case especially in education and culture and, at last, how outside influences by the apartheid government were averted.

In general, the KwaZulu administration heavily relied on traditional authorities, i.e. amakhosi and izinduna, that usually led the tribal and regional authorities. The *Zulu Chiefs' and Headmen's Act* of 1974 bestowed traditional authorities with wide-ranging, undivided powers and made them responsible to the KwaZulu government only and not to their locals whom they represented. They were not only meant to administer their area but also to exert social control.<sup>256</sup> In line with apartheid policy in the rest of South Africa, the police also enjoyed wide-ranging powers including detention without judicial order and acted against protests. KwaZulu could further ban books and organisations (like the apartheid state did).<sup>257</sup>

The reliance on traditional leaders and authorities surely led to Steve Biko's assessment that "Gatsha is supported by 'oldies'".<sup>258</sup> But we will see that Inkatha appealed to very different people and its membership thus was diverse. While structures were generally top-down, Inkatha members managed to use Inkatha for their own purposes.

#### 4.1 Development of the Society

After the break with the ANC in 1979, Buthelezi increasingly turned to Zulu culture as a source of legitimation and attempted to define all Zulus as what he understood as the Zulu nation. He wished to unite all Zulus around the king and himself to establish a firm power base. While Buthelezi had already referred to his royal ancestry and his purportedly hereditary role as 'traditional' prime minister before, he had also portrayed himself as the leader of all Blacks. This latter thread, however, largely disappeared throughout the conflict with the ANC. Inkatha's power base largely lay in KwaZulu and Natal where

256 Daphne 1982, 3–5.

257 Maré 1989, 181–183.

258 Biko in Woods 1978, 98.

Zulus (as a rather heterogenous group, especially in the periphery and when comparing urban to rural dwellers) made up the majority. Buthelezi now demarcated his power base on increasingly ethnic lines, appealing to mostly more conservative, rural people, the middle class (at the time often referred to as the *petty bourgeoisie*),<sup>259</sup> and labour migrants in the townships through claims to Zulu culture and the incorporation of the Zulu king. This politicisation of ethnicity led to new conflicts and worsened already existing ones where ethnicity had not been a divisive factor before.

Especially in the townships where people with diverse self-identifications lived together, this opened up a new line of conflict in times when other conflicts about resources and power were already lingering. As the ANC turned against Inkatha and KwaZulu, and Buthelezi on the other hand reinforced ethnicity amongst his supporters, a conflict about power and politics became a conflict about identity.<sup>260</sup> The ANC's rejection of ethnicity threatened Zulus that identified with Inkatha or the Zulu king in their whole identity, making resistance more likely. For Buthelezi, the turn to ethnicity was a logical step after realising that he could not appeal to Blacks nationwide: It provided every Zulu that was not willing to abandon tradition for a revolutionary movement with an alternative. A strong identity with references to past glory could help coping with a present of oppression and poverty.<sup>261</sup>

Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini, who also demanded resistance against the (in its leadership) Xhosa-dominated ANC and was the successor of independent Zulu kings, served as a symbol around which Zulu could gather to protect what they understood as the Zulu nation.<sup>262</sup> To this end, KwaZulu itself was stylised as being the successor to the

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259 This included many traders, but also parts of the educational elite.

260 It should be noted that identity is not the same as ethnicity. People can have multiple identities (as mothers, workers, Christians, Blacks, Zulus, etc.) that become more or less important situationally. Indeed, a township study has shown that other identities could be way more important than the identity as Zulu; Campbell/Maré/Walker 1995.

261 Adam/Moodley 1992, 501.

262 Ibid.

Zulu kingdom (“KwaZulu is the only surviving Kingdom in South Africa”<sup>263</sup>) that had once fought back the British, and its warriors enjoyed a reputation of being some of the best in the world. Because the king and KwaZulu succeeded the independent kings and the Zulu kingdom, Buthelezi had to present himself as the ‘traditional’ prime minister that actually ruled KwaZulu for a symbolic king – in any other case, he would have risked becoming exchangeable. Precision and historical accuracy, thus, were not key elements in Buthelezi’s understanding of history – indeed, the role of the prime minister had not been hereditary and one could argue whether ‘prime minister’ actually is the correct term: Many of the Zulu kings’ main advisors had not been related to Buthelezi and they indeed only *advised* the king that had been an executive king throughout the independent Zulu kingdom.<sup>264</sup> It was Buthelezi through the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly who made the king a symbolic figure and this move had sparked resistance (see chapter 3.3.5). Buthelezi contradicts himself when he states that the king had always been a symbolic figure that kept himself out of day-to-day politics but, on the other hand, Shaka (and not his advisors) formed a huge kingdom or empire.<sup>265</sup>

Every deviation from his and the king’s line was seen as a betrayal of the Zulu nation. Even more, everybody within KwaZulu who did not actually identify themselves as Zulu was marginalised, even when deviant self-identifications were historically justified (for the case of the amaTonga, see chapter 4.4).<sup>266</sup> The image of Zulus as strong warriors surely played into Buthelezi’s hands as he could use the impi (regiments of warriors) to enforce order and fight against the ANC which the other side naturally viewed as oppression.

About Zulu men, Buthelezi said: “In this part of South Africa, we come from warrior stock and there is a resilient determination in KwaZulu and in Inkatha which even the full might of the State will

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263 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Day, Durban, 23.09.1984. EGM N968.300994 BUT, 1.

264 Waetjen/Maré 2009, 355–358.

265 Golan 1994, 20–21; Kößler 1991, 16.

266 Dlamini 2001a, 201; Haas/Zulu 1993, 48; Harries 1993, 108.



never be able to flatten.”<sup>267</sup> Zulu men were, by his definition, all warriors, and Zulu history was a story of men fighting and – until 1879 – usually winning. In this tradition, Zulu men would continue to fight for their heritage.

Buthelezi claimed that Zulu men would, by tradition, carry traditional weapons, but in fact this had been prohibited in 1891 and hardly occurred until the 1980s. Although these weapons, especially knobkerries, were often used against political dissenters, i.e. ANC and UDF, the South African government did not act against them (but it did confiscate the ANC’s Kalashnikovs).<sup>268</sup>

Buthelezi argued for the carrying of weapons:

Taking away the cultural weapons of the Zulus means depriving my people of their chosen and traditional tools of self-identification. It is a devious strategy to destroy the Zulu ethnic identity and consciousness, and to intimidate them in the most militant expression of their identity. There is an orchestrated plot to culturally and ethnically castrate the Zulu people through intimidation and provocation.<sup>269</sup>

Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini argued quite similarly: “The call to ban the bearing of cultural weapons by Zulus is an insult to my manhood. It is an insult to the manhood of every Zulu man.”<sup>270</sup> Zulu manhood, thus, was entirely centred around being a weapon-carrying, dominant warrior. It has to be stressed again that a purportedly traditional image of Zulu men actually served a very modern purpose: defending KwaZulu against the ANC. To mobilise fighters, it was useful to provide a stable self-image in uncertain times of being strong, disciplined and independent. Furthermore, it placed identity as a Zulu man in the foreground (against identities as Blacks, Africans, labourers, etc.).<sup>271</sup> This also demarcated Inkatha warriors who

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267 Buthelezi 2010, 387.

268 Cooper, et al. 1992, 35; Golan 1994, 19–20; Klopper 1996, 63.

269 Buthelezi in Golan 1994, 20.

270 Goodwill Zwelithini in Maré 1992, 68.

271 Waetjen/Maré 1999, 200.

fought the struggle inside South Africa from the ANC leadership in exile that let others do the fighting.<sup>1</sup> Political conflict often came parallel to differing images of manhood and generational conflicts, i.e. older Inkatha supporters attempted to restore their authority over younger ANC comrades.<sup>2</sup>

These warriors were then used to enforce order in rural KwaZulu. They were also ‘bused’<sup>3</sup> into the townships to prevent or stop boycotts and riots and to protect property of Inkatha supporters – but ‘protection’ included counterviolence, entering a vicious circle of violence and counterviolence.<sup>4</sup>

An often-cited example is the one of Inanda in August 1985 that has already been mentioned above: Blacks from an informal settlement that the apartheid government attempted to dissolve rioted after UDF lawyer Victoria Mxenge had been killed by a government death squad. The riots turned against other Blacks who were seen on the side of the government, but also against Indians due to material and racist motivations. Indians fled Inanda until Inkatha’s impis were brought to Inanda and restored order through counterviolence.<sup>5</sup> Oscar Dhlomo admitted that Inkatha had brought impis to Inanda to restore everyday life and blamed UDF and the Natal Indian Congress for everything.<sup>6</sup> To be fair, it has to be noted that ANC supporters were also ‘bused’ into Inkatha-aligned settlements.<sup>7</sup>

Women, on the other hand, were seen as peacemakers and innocent victims (when their role was addressed at all), so what the contemporaries had as an image of *the* Zulu was actually an image of Zulu men.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, women played an active part, e.g. through the Inkatha Women’s Brigade that will be covered below.

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1 Waetjen/Maré 2001, 204.

2 Carton 2001, 130; Mchunu 2007.

3 I.e. brought in by bus.

4 Sitas 1986, 110; Dlamini 2005, 71.

5 Booth 1988, 75; Freund 1996, 181; Hughes 1987; Krämer 2007, 64.

6 Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General’s annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17, 1–3.

7 Kelly 2015, 193.

8 Ibid, 179–180.

These appeals to a Zulu *brotherhood* designed a conservative, imagined community that appealed to many rural Zulus but also to some urban or township dwellers, especially traders.<sup>9</sup> Many parts had already been in place and were arranged and interpreted in a way that Buthelezi favoured and endowed his supporters with self-esteem.<sup>10</sup> Buthelezi made this explicit on occasion: “No people can wrestle successfully with problems of the day, unless they have a past from which to draw their inspiration, to enable them to face the present and the future with confidence and fortitude.”<sup>11</sup>

This is not to deny Zulu identity and culture as a social and historical fact; it rather has to be seen that Zulu culture was not as homogeneous as Buthelezi would have liked it to be. The various attempts at making the king an executive king again as described in chapter 3.3.5 should suffice as an example and, in the end, every nation or ethnic group, whatever the terminology might be, can be seen as an imagined community (see chapter 2.3). It should not be forgotten, as Mahmood Mamdani stresses for other examples, that although Buthelezi and the Zulu king had a huge influence on Zulu identity, it was also shaped on grassroots level and it could be a way of (psychological) liberation for the ones who followed this path.<sup>12</sup> Buthelezi reinterpreted Zulu history and culture in his favour as the following examples will show.

#### 4.1.1 Rituals and Customs: Shaka Day and Reed Dance

To establish and strengthen his interpretation of Zulu culture, Buthelezi used rituals and customs additionally to the repeated assertions about Zulu culture in his speeches. Performing rituals and following customs often is done by routine and remains unreflected, leading to a strong belief in values that are associated to the ritual

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9 Sitas 1986, 95.

10 Harries 1993, 106–107.

11 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Memorial Celebrations, Eshowe, 28.09.1974. Doc-Afr Acc 8, 84, 3.

12 Mamdani 1996.

and to a sense of belonging.<sup>13</sup> In this case, the rituals placed the Zulu king and Buthelezi at the top of Zulu society which is likely to remain unquestioned and even defended by the people participating in the rituals described below. Other customs enforced a patriarchal social order that benefitted Buthelezi and Inkatha.

In 1972, 24 September – the reported day of Shaka's death – became a public holiday in KwaZulu called Shaka Day. As a national holiday, however, it had been rejected by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in 1971, arguing that not all South Africans were Zulus and that Shaka had not ruled over all Zulus.<sup>14</sup> Introducing Shaka Day in 1972 in Stanger at King Shaka's memorial, Buthelezi explained:

Here we come to honour a man who is an example even to us in this twentieth century. The biggest danger facing the Human Race to-day [sic] is Racism or racial discrimination. King Shaka was no Racist. [...] Today all politics in this Country evolve on phobias such as the Swart Gevaar, Engelse-haat or Boer-haat. We are assembled here to pray that the Spirit of King Shaka the Non-racist be born again in the hearts of all peoples of South Africa. [...] The motivation in his invasions was to unite Black[s] into one united Black Nation in the manner in which he united various Zulu tribes. The mode of doing it may not be acceptable to us in our days.<sup>15</sup>

Hence, the Shaka Day of the 1970s was initially about uniting all Blacks by remembering Shaka as a non-racist, unifying leader – Buthelezi's very own interpretation of Shaka. As explained in chapter 3.3.1, the notion of Shaka founding a more or less homogenous nation has to be contested, he rather built an empire in which many affiliated themselves with being Zulu, but by no means did this lead to cultural

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13 Marshall 2002.

14 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 56.

15 Buthelezi, M. G.: Introduction of King Shaka Day and introduction of the present Zulu monarch, Stanger, 23.09.1972. DocAfr Acc 8, 23, 2.

unity. During this time, Shaka Day was also celebrated outside of KwaZulu and Natal (e.g. in Soweto), presumably in part among Zulu migrants.<sup>16</sup> While Shaka might have been a violent conqueror, this is not what he should have been remembered for in Buthelezi's opinion. Nevertheless, Shaka was already named as the ruler who "amalgamated us [Zulus] into one people"<sup>17</sup> or "who formed the Zulu nation"<sup>18</sup> in the 1970s.

Pursuing the Zulu past was to be for a bigger aim, however: "The glory of the Zulu Empire of years gone by, will be recaptured only if we set our sights, just as our founder did, beyond the perimeters of our own particular race group. He shared everything he had with his people, and with the white foreigners who were in his kingdom."<sup>19</sup> Remembering Shaka should therefore help to overcome ethnic boundaries; Buthelezi consequently damned rivalry between liberation movements and plots against him, although he used a cautious phrasing when speaking outside of KwaZulu and Natal, i.e. somewhere with fewer Inkatha and more ANC supporters.<sup>20</sup> Remembering Shaka in a positive fashion should further contribute to psychological liberation (like the Black Consciousness Movement embraced it):

The conquest of 1879 was bad, but it is nothing compared with the conquest of our human spirit, which the various forms of brain-washing has done to our psyche. [...] But I can never forgive some of those who were not content with colonising our land and our people, but who wanted above all, to colonise our minds. Some of these people tried to inculcate into black minds that we

16 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Day Celebrations, Soweto, 29.09.1974. DocAfr Acc 8, 85; Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Day Celebrations, Sharpeville, 28.09.1980. EGM N968.300994 BUT.

17 Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Memorial Day, Nongoma, 24.09.1974. DocAfr Acc 8, 83, 4.

18 Buthelezi 1972b, 1.

19 Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Memorial Celebrations, Eshowe, 28.09.1974. DocAfr Acc 8, 84, 6.

20 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Memorial Function, Welkom, 27.09.1981. EGM N968.300994 BUT.



Figure 4: Unveiling of the Shaka memorial in Stanger, 24 September 1954. Pictured are from left to right: Joyce Thoko Majali, King Cyprian Bhekuzulu, and Buthelezi. Photographer: Sighart Bourquin.



Figure 5: Unveiling of the Shaka memorial in Stanger, 24 September 1954. King Cyprian Bhekuzulu is second from right. Photographer: Sighart Bourquin.

had to be ashamed of our past. [...] Our heroes had to be presented as nothing more nor less than blood-thirsty savages.”<sup>21</sup>

Buthelezi often referred to the first time he celebrated King Shaka at his memorial in Stanger in 1954 which was unveiled by King Cyprian (see image above). Cyprian and Buthelezi wore Western clothing on the first day and traditional clothing on the second. Notably, neither Cyprian nor Buthelezi actually owned any traditional clothing, so it had to be crafted for this occasion. This raises the question how ‘traditional’ their clothes actually were and whether they might actually represent a 1950s’ projection of the Zulu past. According to Buthelezi, it was the first time for both of them to wear ‘traditional’ clothes.<sup>22</sup> Buthelezi and the king continued to wear traditional clothes at Shaka Day celebrations.

From 1982, Buthelezi’s way of referring to Shaka changed. He now repeatedly called Shaka “the founder of the Zulu nation” and claimed that Shaka “had the sagacity and prowess to bring together various Nguni Clans in this part of the world and he welded them into one of the most powerful Nations that have ever emerged on the world scene.”<sup>23</sup> This positive way of remembering Shaka should also restore Zulu pride. Nevertheless, Buthelezi still wanted Shaka to be understood as a unifier of all Blacks and turned against splits between Blacks.<sup>24</sup> In times of increasing tensions and violence, Buthelezi’s attacks on the ANC, its armed struggle and the accompanying destruction became harsher while he was referring to his own past membership of the ANC before it was banned, therefore presenting himself as the sole heir to the non-violent ANC.<sup>25</sup>

21 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka’s Day – a short address on this remembrance day held on the 151st anniversary of the death of the king and founder of the Zulu nation – His Majesty King Shaka Zulu, Stanger, 24.09.1979. CC KCM30020/176, 2.

22 Klopper 1996, 58.

23 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka’s memorial celebrations, Eshowe, 24.09.1982. HPD A1045, 1.

24 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Commemorative Funtion, Stanger, 25.09.1982. EGM N968.300994 BUT.

25 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Day: The Foundation of a Nation and the Father of Liberation, Umlazi, 24.09.1983. EGM N968.300994 BUT; Buthelezi,



Figure 6: Shaka Day celebrations, Taylor's Halt 1988. In the foreground are Buthelezi (left), Prince Gideon Zulu (centre), and King Goodwill Zwelithini (right). Photographer: Aron Mazel.

Shaka Day celebrations were advertised<sup>26</sup> mass gatherings but also opportunities for Buthelezi to meet and address important allies, e.g. from the South African Black Alliance (see chapter 5.1), the government, commerce, and the PFP.<sup>27</sup> Buthelezi's speech was often fol-

M.G.: King Shaka Day, "Our role to ensure that unity is strength", Stanger, 24.09.1985. HPD A1045; Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Day, Umlazi, 28.09.1985. ABI.

26 Posters advertised Shaka Day and appealed to Zulu unity; Haas/Zulu 1994, 438.

27 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: King Shaka Day: The Foundation of a Nation and the





Figure 7: Shaka Day celebrations, Taylor's Halt 1988. Women participating in the celebrations. Photographer: Aron Mazel.

lowed by a speech by Goodwill Zwelithini, but hardly any copies of these speeches survive.<sup>28</sup> On at least one occasion, Bishop Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu held a speech in isiZulu.<sup>29</sup> One might ask to which extent the crowd actually understood Buthelezi's elaborate, English speeches.

The participants dressed in traditional clothes, carried shields and traditional weapons, and danced – a ritual that was repeated every year and evoked emotions of identity and belonging among the participants. A warrior dance additionally evokes a feeling of power and

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Father of Liberation, Umlazi, 24.09.1983. EGM N968.300994 BUT.

28 King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu: King Shaka Day celebrations, Stanger, 26.09.1992. HPD A1045; King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu: Address at King Shaka Day celebrations, KwaMashu, 27.09.1992. HPD A1045.

29 Zulu, Alphaeus Hamilton: Shaka's Day, Edendale, 24.09.1976. CC KCM98/3/53.



Figure 8: Shaka Day celebrations, Stanger 1987. View of impi and the crowd.  
Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

strength.<sup>30</sup> As Judith Lynne Hanna explains, a dance in combination with the leaders' dancing bodies (like in the image above) asserts power and dominance because the ones in power were leading the dance and other dancers followed. Thus, dancing shaped and reinforced social hierarchies.<sup>31</sup>

This way, Buthelezi presented himself as a high-ranking traditional leader close to the (now) symbolic king and not as the chief minister. Nevertheless, it is reported that many residents who did not participate in the celebrations fled the area to escape the stirred-up crowd.<sup>32</sup>

In the role of the traditional leader, Buthelezi usually wore traditional clothes, but when he acted as chief minister and leader of the KLA, he wore a suit. These two roles appealed to different audiences: the traditional leader to amakhosi, izinduna, and large parts of the

30 Hanna 1977.

31 Hanna 1979, 128–147.

32 Maré/Hamilton 1987, between 182 and 183.

rural population; the chief minister mostly to KwaZulu's educational elites and Whites.<sup>33</sup>

The empire that Shaka had founded more and more became the blueprint for black unity, implying Zulu leadership or at least guidance in the struggle against apartheid:

The great King Shaka forged together numerous peoples to build a mighty nation and empire which established Zulu power in what is now the whole of KwaZulu and the whole of Natal and part of the Transkei, the Transvaal, Swaziland and Mocambique. That was all King Shaka's domain. Beyond the power which was his in this mighty nation, so spread across vast tracks of land, his influences stretched a great deal further."<sup>34</sup>

For Buthelezi, it was also possible for outsiders to become Zulus:

We in Zulu society most certainly have always made those who came to us from elsewhere our own. Just as our early Kings conquered to incorporate, so every time a stranger walks in our midst we shift a little aside to make him or her welcome.<sup>35</sup>

When F. W. de Klerk continued to dismantle apartheid in 1990, Shaka was more than ever presented as the "very first new South African who welded the people together".<sup>36</sup> At the same time, the ANC and its allies were campaigning to dissolve KwaZulu which Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini interpreted as an attack on Zulu heritage and culture.<sup>37</sup>

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33 Harries 1993, 117.

34 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Day celebration, Enseleni, 27.10.1985. HPD A1045, 1.

35 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Day, Stanger, 24.09.1988. HPD A1045, 4.

36 Buthelezi, M. G.: Celebration of King Shaka Day, Nseleni, 06.10.1990. HPD A1045, 2.

37 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka annual commemorative celebrations, Stanger, 26.09.1992. HPD A1045; King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu: King Shaka Day celebrations, Stanger, 26.09.1992. HPD A1045.

In 1994, however, after the first democratic elections, things changed dramatically. The KwaZulu government had put huge tracts of land under the direct control of the Zulu king via the Ingonyama Trust<sup>38</sup> and thus made him independent from Buthelezi. King Goodwill Zwelithini invited Mandela to the Shaka Day celebrations of 1994 – Shula Marks argues that this was to ease ANC-IFP tensions<sup>39</sup> – but Buthelezi perceived this as a threat and stated that he could not guarantee Mandela's safety. Mandela subsequently cancelled his visit and Goodwill Zwelithini cancelled all Shaka Day celebrations, but Buthelezi and his supporters gathered anyway. On the following day, Buthelezi and his bodyguards forced an advisor to the king, Sifiso Zulu, out of the running TV programme *Agenda* for claiming that there had never been a traditional prime minister to the Zulu king.<sup>40</sup> An angry Buthelezi then turned to the audience and explained his view. The split between Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini had now become public and in 1995, the king was openly on the ANC side.<sup>41</sup>

In the democratic South Africa, Shaka Day has become Heritage Day on which all South Africans are meant to celebrate their heritage and diversity. Many cultural gatherings and celebrations take place and even many urban people can be seen wearing traditional clothes.<sup>42</sup>

These annual gatherings to commemorate Shaka commenced in 1972 and were a new form of remembering, a decidedly new ritual (although other forms of remembering Shaka already existed, of course). Different was the case with the Reed Dance (*uMkhosi woMhlanga*) that was first recorded as a Zulu ritual in 1984 but allegedly is a ritual from precolonial times, according to Buthelezi, but there is no evidence to support this.

The Reed Dance was and is performed by Zulu girls or young women in front of and to honour the Zulu king, making it a prestigious

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38 Ingonyama Trust Act, Act No. 3KZ of 1994. This act originated in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and was later made a national act.

39 Marks 2004, 192.

40 As we have repeatedly seen, there were good reasons to this claim.

41 Hamilton 1998a, 1–2; Klopper 1996, 55–64; Maré 1995b, 9.

42 Own observation in Durban, 24 September 2017.



Figure 9: Reed Dance celebration, Nongoma 1987. Zulu girls carrying reeds and wearing KwaZulu Natal Indaba caps. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

endeavour for participants.<sup>43</sup> It is a rhythmic dance focusing on legs and feet while carrying reed in the hands and singing praise songs. Participants are barefooted and many dance moves are turning and jumping, switching between slow and fast moves. Shaking and pantomime are also parts of the Reed Dance. The reeds are delivered to the king as a (symbolic) means of reinforcing his residency.<sup>44</sup> Over the years, it has become a huge celebration with massive preparations.<sup>45</sup> One of the main purposes was and still is to combat rising levels of teenage pregnancy (and perceived moral decline with it): Participants had to be virgins which was tested during the preparations.<sup>46</sup> Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini explained:

Since 1984 I have revived the Reed Dance, where young girls descend on one of my residences for a ritual of bringing reeds to the residence. This provides a forum for me to address these maidens

43 Nkosi 2013, 25–34.

44 Herbert 2012, 111–112.

45 Nkosi 2013, 28–31.

46 Hassim 1988, 12.

on matters of acceptable sexual behaviour with an emphasis on the prevention of the scourge of HIV/Aids.<sup>47</sup>

According to Lynn Oakley, witness of the 1987 Reed Dance, the ceremony also served to pick future wives for the king, his amakhosi, and izinduna.<sup>48</sup> In all the reports by early Portuguese sailors and later ethnologists, there are no traces of the Reed Dance as a Zulu tradition. It is possible that Europeans never witnessed it before the defeat of the Zulu kingdom in 1879 and it was then discontinued and largely forgotten about, but it is also possible that it never existed as a Zulu tradition. Other dances, especially warrior and marriage dances, are recorded in detail.<sup>49</sup> Dancing still is important in Zulu culture and there are many regional and social variants.<sup>50</sup>

Among the neighbouring Swazis, however, there existed and still exists a quite similar Reed Dance that also focuses on young virgins and dates back at least to the 1930s. It is now also centred around purity and abstinence and strengthens the role of the king.<sup>51</sup> Walter Felgate, former advisor to Buthelezi and social anthropologist, claimed that the Zulu Reed Dance was indeed a copy of the Swazi Reed Dance on request by Goodwill Zwelithini; Felgate then developed a fitting mythology in the speeches he wrote for Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini.<sup>52</sup>

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47 Goodwill Zwelithini in Oomen 2005, 94.

48 Oakley, Lynn: E-mail, 16.08.2018.

49 Berglund 1976, 235; Bryant 1967, 228–231; Firenzi 2012; Gluckman 1960, 157–159; Hanna 1977, 117–199, 126; Krige 1950, 336–344. Already in 1976, Buthelezi noted that women participated in the construction of the king's residence, but he does not mention any dance or other ritual connected to it; Buthelezi, M. G.: Speech at a ceremony at which the KwaZulu government hands over a newly-completed palace to His Majesty Ingonyama Goodwill ka Bhekuzulu, KwaKhangelamankengane, Nkunzana area, Nongoma district, 25.11.1976. HPD A1045, 5.

50 Ngema 2007.

51 Abhari/Tropp 2015; Twala 1952. Among the Venda, there also was and is a Reed Dance (called tshikona), but it is performed by men to the playing of reed flutes; McNeill 2011, 4.

52 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 27.



Figure 10: Reed Dance celebration, Nongoma 1987. Zulu girls dancing.  
Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

Under these circumstances, it seems that the Reed Dance served a modern purpose in a traditional vest. It strengthened the positions of the Zulu king and of Buthelezi who appeared as the ‘traditional’ prime minister close to the king. It further was meant to work against teenage pregnancy, HIV/AIDS, and (perceived) moral decline in turbulent, contingent times. A purported tradition was used instead of tackling real problems that led to teenage pregnancies and HIV infections like rape, the belief that sex with a virgin cured HIV, and of course unprotected intercourse in general.<sup>53</sup>

The Zulu Reed Dance was and is a prime example of an imagined tradition as explained in chapter 2.3. Cultural elements that were (vaguely) familiar to the people – either due to their own remote history or due to their Swazi neighbours – were reassembled and provided with a new meaning; the strong Christian and nationalist connotations are also impossible to originate from precolonial times.<sup>54</sup> Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini strengthened their authority by defining how Zulu girls and women should be and how they should behave; additionally, it *practised* an image of Zulu history that

53 Hassim 1993, 9–10; Leclerc-Madlala 2002.

54 Firenzi 2012, 421–422.

was meant to be valid in the present and future. The participating girls and women, in turn, legitimised their leaders symbolically and strengthened the hierarchy between participants and leaders, especially through praise songs.<sup>55</sup> This leadership affirmation happened on an often unreflected, subconscious level. Nevertheless, it was and is highly successful as an imagined tradition, attracting large numbers of visitors and tourists.<sup>56</sup>

Virginity was also a precondition to participate in beauty contests that were introduced during the 1980s; the girl who wore traditional clothing most gracefully won the contest. This generated funds for branches of the Inkatha Women's Brigade (see below).<sup>57</sup> However, little else is known about these contests, but in 2007, the IFP started its own official beauty pageant.<sup>58</sup>

Another example has to be mentioned although it does not fall into the period that is covered in this thesis. Around 1993 to 1995, virginity tests independent from the Reed Dance became a common *public* practice. In the course of these tests, elderly women and sometimes men examined the virginity of Zulu girls because, again, virginity was seen as a means against the spread of HIV/AIDS. Elderly women understood it as their duty to control the sexuality of girls and it also strengthened their authority in a world dominated by men. Girls are taught to be abstinent, obedient, and to fulfil the men's wishes, again contributing to male control over female sexuality.<sup>59</sup>

Virginity testing goes back to a practice that fell out of use after the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; mothers controlled their daughters' virginity, albeit in private and not tied to rituals.<sup>60</sup> Virginity test-

55 Gilman 2009, 16–18.

56 Katleho 2017.

57 Hassim 1988, 12; Hassim, Shireen: Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 68.

58 Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 15.05.2007.

59 Bennett/Mills/Munnick 2010; George 2008; Hamilton 1998b; Le Roux 2006, 13–14; Leak 2012, 182–202; Leclerc-Madlala 2001; Leclerc-Madlala 2003; Marcus 2009; Nnazor/Price Robinson 2016; Robillard 2009; Schäfer 2008, 161–164; Scorgie 2002; Scorgie 2006; Taylor, et al. 2007; Wickström 2010.

60 Krige 1950, 105–106.



ing of girls under the age of 16 was prohibited in South Africa in 2007, but Goodwill Zwelithini continued to support them in context of the Reed Dance.<sup>61</sup>

It can be concluded that participation in mass events could indeed bolster Zulu identity and a sense of unity, both consciously and unconsciously. Buthelezi was put in a position of power by the performances that he led together with the king. But this did not appeal to everyone. Those who wished to see the king as sole and prime leader could be repelled by Buthelezi's position (also see chapter 3.3.5) and it was also reported that parts of the crowd just attended gatherings due to free meals.<sup>62</sup>

At last, a short turn from rituals to customs shall take place. One 'good manner' that Buthelezi and Goodwill Zwelithini repeatedly emphasised (because they perceived it as being in decline) was *ukuhlonipha*, translatable as *to act respectfully* (*hlonipha* meaning *honour*) according to a recent dictionary.<sup>63</sup> A 1958 dictionary adds the meaning *act modestly; cover the breasts*.<sup>64</sup> Following this custom, the elder always has the last word in a discussion or argument regardless of the younger's argument; women and kids lower the heads in front of the patriarch.<sup>65</sup>

Buthelezi transferred this to Inkatha which was, inter alia, popular among older men and amakhosi; Buthelezi himself was an inkosi and already an older man as he was born in 1928, and the king needed to be respected in any case. Openly dissenting, disrespecting, and disobeying them could then be condemned as conflicting with Zulu culture and illegitimate. Especially the youth and/or people at the bottom of the hierarchy were meant to obey. Not only did this strengthen the leaders' authority, it also ran contrary to the UDF's strategy of questioning authorities (which is popular among young people anyway).

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61 Memela 2007.

62 Haas/Zulu 1994, 198.

63 <https://isizulu.net/?ukuhlonipha>, last access on 06.02.2019.

64 Doke/Malcolm/Sikakana [1958] 1971, 110.

65 Carton 2001, 135; Kelly 2015, 195.

Thus, anybody who criticised Buthelezi, Inkatha, or the king, was suspected of being a UDF supporter.<sup>66</sup>

In general, it can be observed that the more some traditions are violated, the stronger some people cling to these traditions, as Jill Kelly concludes in the context of the violent struggle. If, e.g., funerals and mourning are interrupted by violent clashes, this increases emotional stress.<sup>67</sup> Following rituals and customs was not only demanded by elderly men but also by women, especially in the context of said funerals that were often disturbed by or made impossible by armed gangs and conflict. This further increased the generational conflict between younger radicals and elderly conservatives as it was often the case (of course, this pattern did not apply to everyone).<sup>68</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Official History

*For us, history is not a chronicle of facts. History for us is the recounting of growth and movement towards ideals.*<sup>69</sup>

Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi

It has already become clear that history and tradition played a vital role in Buthelezi's politics.<sup>70</sup> The case of the Reed Dance already pointed to one observation that will become more pronounced in the following sub-chapter: History was not necessarily about factual correctness; history (as an interpretation of the past) could be 'adapted' to present needs. Buthelezi further understood history as something that one could learn from, especially by drawing parallels between past and present developments. History also bestowed people with

66 Dlamini 2001a, 206–208; Dlamini 2005, 88–89.

67 Kelly 2015.

68 Bonnin 2000, 307–308; Kelly 2015, 196–198; Schäfer 2008, 162.

69 Buthelezi, M. G.: Speech at a function to commemorate the Battle of Ulundi – the final battle of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1979, Ulundi War Memorial, 26.05.1979. CC KCM30019/165b, 25.

70 Buthelezi had shown interest in history earlier and had studied history; Buthelezi 1972b; Buthelezi 1978a.

culture and identity and was needed for liberation, according to Buthelezi. Of course, only Buthelezi's version of history was the correct one, as we will see.<sup>71</sup>

We have already encountered other examples when Buthelezi had differing views from many others, including historians, like the question whether there had actually been 'traditional', hereditary prime ministers to the Zulu king – which is highly questionable. He did, however, advocate this understanding quite successfully.<sup>72</sup> Another example was the role of the Zulu king, whether he was a symbolic figure or an active leader (see chapter 3.3.5). Buthelezi's interpretation of Zulu history became manifest in his speeches, but even more in (educational) museums and publications on which this sub-chapter will focus, supplemented by a few other examples.

Initially, state-run archaeology and accompanying museums were the responsibility of the National Monuments Council (operating from Cape Town) until 1980 in the case of KwaZulu. Part of the homeland policy's separate development was to cede the authority over cultural matters to the respective homelands well before they became (pseudo-)independent. KwaZulu never accepted 'independence', but it enjoyed a self-governing status in internal matters. Legislation allowing archaeology and museums run by KwaZulu was prepared from at least 1977 by a working group in KwaZulu's Department of Education and Culture also including (white) members of the National Monuments Council, members of the Zulu royal family (Prince Ndesheni E. Zulu and Prince Lloyd Zulu), and scientists.<sup>73</sup>

Legislation was only put into place in 1980 to take over the sites currently administered by the National Monuments Council and put them under the KwaZulu Monuments Council (KMC); it was as before made up of government officials, members of the royal house, and a representative of the National Monuments Council. The KwaZulu

71 Harries 1993, 114–115.

72 John Kane-Berman, CEO of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations, for example accepted this as fact; Kane-Berman 1982, 144; and still in 1999, Buthelezi was portrayed as traditional prime minister in a PhD thesis; Das 1999, 25.

73 KwaZulu National Monument Council: Minutes, 09.11.1977. Amafa.

Monuments Foundation was formed on 30 July 1981 for fund-raising and public relations.<sup>74</sup> Work had started immediately, inter alia with the erection of tombstones commemorating King Cetshwayo and King Dinuzulu, but also by taking historic sites and buildings under government protection. During the works, not only workers of the government departments were involved but also local traditional authorities, Inkatha branches, and schools. These were especially meant to protect monuments from vandalism.<sup>75</sup>


The Planning and Research Committee for the reconstruction of Ondini, King Cetshwayo's residence, was established in 1979 and consisted of government representatives, archaeologists, and museum professionals, and was tasked with exploring Ondini. While a small part of the Ondini residence had become a national monument in 1940, it was seldomly visited and overgrown. Based on their findings, the residence was to be reconstructed and operated traditionally including smelting, pottery, agriculture, and the herding of cattle; an adjacent museum was to inform visitors about the site's history. The agricultural parts were meant to educate visitors on sustainability and the use of indigenous vegetation, also as medicine. Excavations started on 31 July 1981 and the reconstruction was opened to the public on 24 November 1984.<sup>76</sup> Financing was undertaken via the KwaZulu Monuments Council Trust Fund, at first only with funds from the KwaZulu government and the KwaZulu Development Corporation, but later also with donations from the private sector. It further acquired and re-sold cultural items and ran tourist accommodation at Ondini.<sup>77</sup>

74 Dlamini 2001b, 43–45

75 Buthelezi, M.G.: Unveiling of King Cetshwayo's tombstone, Nkandla district, 27.09.1980. CC KCM43086/266; Buthelezi, M.G.: King Dinuzulu ka Cetshwayo (1868 to October 18, 1913), King of the Zulus. The ceremony to unveil King Dinuzulu's tombstone, Nobamba, 29.08.1981. CC KCM43087/293; KwaZulu Monuments Council: Minutes, 08.05.1980. Amafa; KwaZulu Monuments Committee: Minutes, 15.01.1981. Amafa; KwaZulu Monuments Council: Minutes, 25.02.1982. Amafa.

76 Buthelezi 1986b; Dlamini 2001b, 39–41.

77 Buthelezi 1986b; KwaZulu Monuments Council: Minutes, 08.05.1980. Amafa; KwaZulu Monuments Council: Minutes, 25.02.1982. Amafa; KwaZulu Monu-



**Figure 11: A shop inside the reconstructed premises at Ondini. Undated.**

During the KMC's further work, Cetshwayo's sites were in focus, especially the battlefield at Isandlwana which emphasised the martial side of Zulu culture that Buthelezi frequently cited. Notably, Buthelezi's paternal great-grandfather Mnyamana's grave was allocated more extensive funding than comparable sites. The public had already been invited to the yet unfinished site at Ondini on 20 August 1983 to celebrate the *Year of Cetshwayo* (as declared by the KwaZulu government) and to lay the foundation of the KwaZulu Cultural Museum. To this end, an amphitheatre holding up to 1500 visitors was erected and performances by a choir and by dancers (including an impi) were conducted. A book on King Cetshwayo was also presented to the public (see below). The museum was opened on 13 April 1985, showing selected aspects of Zulu culture.<sup>78</sup> The content of KwaZulu's museums will be described in some detail below.

Buthelezi's opening speech of the KwaZulu Cultural Museum consisted of more than 50 percent of quotations from historiography on Cetshwayo and the decline of the Zulu kingdom because these

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ments Council: Minutes, 05.10.1984. Amafa.

78 Dlamini 2001b, 47–51; Steering Committee of Ondini: Minutes, 16.02.1983. Amafa; KwaZulu Government Service/KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture: Memorandum to the Cabinet, 29.03.1983. Amafa.

were “lessons that we need to learn from all this. [...] History has always demanded that we stand together with the people [...], history has decreed that we are one people”.<sup>79</sup> As we have already seen, Buthelezi’s version of history was unambiguous and clear-cut; so were the lessons to be learnt from it. Rallying around the Zulu king was to promote Zulu unity, albeit in a way that Buthelezi defined. Further on in his speech, Buthelezi stressed the need for a cultural revival for the liberation of black minds; the KwaZulu Cultural Museum was to be a part of this cultural revival:

Our nationhood makes us proud South Africans walking tall in our self-assessment, ready to employ our strength for the country we love so much. Yet there are some who want us to cast aside our Zulu heritage. This museum however, is a visible symbol of our commitment to the kind of human decency we have evolved in this part of South Africa, and it is a symbol of our determination to stand secure in the knowledge of who we are, where we came from and where we will yet go to.<sup>80</sup>

Buthelezi further thanked the involved archaeologists for their work and sponsors for donations. He made another important point, showing that the KMC’s work could indeed be seen as resistance to apartheid from within through a new perspective on Zulu history:

The exhibits which come from the archaeological excavations by a team of young archaeologists, who are here today, are going to revolutionise all the thinking on the history of South Africa. These exhibits have proven that there were Black people living in these parts hundreds and hundreds of years before the time when it is often said Black people migrated from the north.

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79 Buthelezi, M. G.: Official opening of the KwaZulu Cultural Museum and before the unveiling of a memorial to King Cetshwayo and those who served him in his kingdom and those who died for him, oration, 13.04.1985. DocAfr Acc 8, 10.

80 Ibid, 14.

This ran absolutely contrary to official apartheid policy which (incorrectly) claimed that Blacks had arrived in the area of South Africa at the same time as Europeans, therefore both competing about 'empty land'. This resulted, inter alia, in an effort of controlling archaeology and its results to the benefit of the state – by concentrating on traces of relatively recent migration and attributing sites like Mapungubwe to other people(s). The remarkable findings of Mapungubwe, for example, were only really made public after 1994.<sup>81</sup>

While sites related to Cetshwayo, Buthelezi's maternal great-grandfather and the last independent Zulu king, received a lot of attention, some others were oftentimes neglected or ignored like King Dingane who murdered Shaka and only received rhetorical attention in the context of the Ingwavuma land deal (see chapter 4.4). While Shaka was omnipresent in speeches, which emphasised his links to Cetshwayo and thus to Buthelezi, and due to Shaka Day, his sites were not important in the KMC's archaeological programme.<sup>82</sup> Buthelezi's familial ties to Shaka were repeatedly emphasised by Buthelezi, but also by others like Frank Mdlalose who made Buthelezi look like a reincarnation of Shaka:

In 1828 the great orator, the great military genius, the great architect of a Nation took leave of us and disappeared from the face of this earth. He did not die. He simply disappeared.

In 192[8], a hundred years later, somebody was brought into this land. That same year 1928, King Solomon took this newly born into his house. That same year, 100 years after King Shaka had disappeared King Solomon founded INKATHA.

Today in 1978 150 years after King Shaka disappeared, 50 years after Inkatha was established and 50 years after the Prince of KwaPhindangene was born, we hold our Conference under the skilful hand of His Excellency, our President, Prince and Chief Dr. M. G. Buthelezi!<sup>83</sup>

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81 Hall 1990; Maggs 2000; Xolelwa 2013.

82 Dlamini 2001b, 61–92.

83 Mdlalose, F.T.: Welcome address, 13.07.1978. HPD AK2810/C.

When the Joint Executive Authority commenced working in 1986 (see chapter 5.3), the KMC began cooperating with the Natal authorities. One such project was the exploration of the battlefields at Isandlwana hill where Zulu warriors defeated British forces on 22 January 1879 and at Rorke's Drift where the British defeated the Zulu army. Securing and conserving the battlefield and the discovered artefacts was largely financed by the business community (South African Sugar Association, South African Breweries, Sanlam, Tongaat-Hulett, Richards Bay Minerals) to which Buthelezi had good connections anyway. The region benefitted from (temporary) jobs on construction sites and from a 25% levy on entrance fees that was transferred to the Tribal Authority. Focusing on Isandlwana was meant to bolster Zulu pride, especially as warriors; consequently, the KMC did not involve itself in the works at Rorke's Drift.<sup>84</sup>

In his opening speech at the Isandlwana visitor centre, Buthelezi called it a

hallowed ground. It is for us one of the most significant historic sites in the whole of KwaZulu. It is here that the glory of the past mighty Zulu Nation will be commemorated forever and it is here that the beginning of the new South Africa – which we are now starting to negotiate in CODESA – actually began.<sup>85</sup>

Buthelezi not only referred to a past mighty Zulu nation but also projected its memory into an eternal future, stressing the importance of the Zulu nation through all of time. He further linked the military defeat of the British to the expected political defeat of apartheid, thus claiming an important role in its demise. Buthelezi described the importance of the Zulu nation in the past and in the future as the most “powerful force [...]. There will be no new South Africa in this last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century without dealing with the Zulu reality.”<sup>86</sup>

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84 Dlamini 2001b, 68–98.

85 Buthelezi, M.G.: Official opening of visitor centre and Isandlwana historic reserve, Isandlwana, 18.01.1992. HPD A1045, 1.

86 Ibid, 3.



Without participation and consent of the Zulu nation, there could therefore be no democratic South Africa.

Buthelezi then narrated Inkatha's focus on cooperation for development and human dignity with special mentions of the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (see chapter 5.2) because the works at Isandlwana were a cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal. Of course, Buthelezi also thanked the various donors.<sup>87</sup>

As sources are scarce, not much can be said about the way in which the museums presented Zulu culture and history to visitors. In 1991, historian John Wright and archaeologist Aron Mazel published a survey of KwaZulu's museums and their exhibits. The KwaZulu Cultural Museum and the Ondini Site Museum, both on the premises of Cetshwayo's Ondini residence, were open and running, but the Nodwengu Museum at King Mpande's grave was closed and empty. In general, the museums showed the history of a homogenous Zulu nation focusing on iron age archaeology and the 19<sup>th</sup> century centred around the royal house and traditional Zulu exhibits. While the museums mentioned the destruction of the Zulu kingdom and showed the life of the common people since then, there were no signs of interactions with Whites. Also missing were the last decades to which contemporaries could have objected due to being witnesses.<sup>88</sup>

Zulu history, according to the museums, was a glorious history made by great men, namely the Zulu kings, and KwaZulu as it existed in 1991 was seen as a continuation of the Zulu kingdom: The Ondini Site Museum featured a series of eight maps called "KwaZulu 1800–1983" showing how it was thought that KwaZulu's borders had changed in the course of time without giving explanations.<sup>89</sup> King Goodwill Zwelithini and Buthelezi were shown as the successors to earlier, independent Zulu rulers through plaques picturing Buthelezi's genealogy and photos of the two without reference to the homeland structures that institutionalised Buthelezi's power. The displays on

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87 Ibid.

88 Wright/Mazel 1991b, 62–66; Wright/Mazel 1987.

89 It has also to be noted that such clear-cut borders are problematic if not impossible to apply to precolonial contexts.



**Figure 12: Exhibits inside the KwaZulu Cultural Museum. Undated.**

“Archaeology in KwaZulu” further characterised the Zulu kingdom as a naturally given area instead of a contingent, political structure.<sup>90</sup>

Especially revealing were cultural exhibits (as pictured above and below) and their descriptions. While the history of the Zulu kings showed some aspects of historical change, the cultural exhibits were completely timeless; social and familial relations and roles were clear-cut and everlasting: Everybody knew her or his place, the social order was stable and without friction due to age or gender<sup>91</sup> – evoking the same “myth of Zulu unity”<sup>92</sup> as in Buthelezi’s speeches. One diagramme, using ethnographic present tense, even bore the following description: “In the home each member of the family understands

90 Wright/Mazel 1991b, 67–68.

91 Wright/Mazel 1991b, 69; Wright/Mazel 1987.

92 Ibid, 307.



**Figure 13: Exhibits inside the KwaZulu Cultural Museum. Undated.**

where all the different activities take place and what their own position is in these activities”.<sup>93</sup>

As we have already encountered multiple times, Buthelezi stressed his royal genealogy explicitly, as Wright and Mazel quote:

Buthelezi’s concern to link himself closely to the royal house in the public mind is even more graphically revealed in the inscription on King Mpande’s gravestone at Nodwengu. The money for the king’s gravestone was obtained, readers are told, in a fund-raising drive led

“by one of his descendants and great great grandson, Prince Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the son of Princess Magogo S’bilile, the daughter of King Dinuzulu, the full sister to King Solomon, and her husband and Prime Minister of the Zulu during the reign of King Solomon, Mathole Buthelezi. This was constructed during the reign of King Mpande’s heir and descendant, and successor, his Majesty King Zwelithini Mbongi Goodwill ka Bhekuzulu.”<sup>94</sup>

93 Ibid.

94 Wright/Mazel 1991b, 68.



**Figure 14:** Part of the display on Zulus, Stanger Museum 1987 (today KwaDukuza Museum). Placing Zulu kings next to an exhibit on “Pre-Historic Creatures” exemplifies how Zulu history was seen as apart from ‘general’ history. 1987. Photographer: Aron Mazel.

Notably, the KwaZulu Cultural Museum was the only museum in Natal and KwaZulu that mentioned the evolution of the human species at all (in 1987), albeit no museum mentioned the extinction of Natal’s hunter-gatherer communities despite the rich evidence of artifacts and rock art in the Drakensberg mountains.<sup>95</sup> Somewhat ironically, while KwaZulu’s museums left out Whites in an apartheid manner, Natal’s museums did quite the same, just the other way around. Blacks either did not feature at all, continuing the incorrect narrative of the empty land that Europeans purportedly had settled, or they appeared in separate rooms as part of dehistoricised, ethnologic collections. In all, Blacks did not seem to have a history of their own according to white museums.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Wright/Mazel 1987.

<sup>96</sup> Wright/Mazel 1991b, 62–66.

Not only did the KMC take care of archaeological sites and museums, it also coordinated the publication of several booklets on Zulu history by historians.<sup>97</sup> Buthelezi had spoken of a new current of historians writing against the colonial perspective already during the 1970s;<sup>98</sup> about other historians, Buthelezi lamented:

What further compounds the problem is that from some of the writings of a few contemporary historians and writers, it is quite obvious that not much Zulu history is written from the all black perspectives of the Zulu people themselves. There are, furthermore, quite some revelations from some current writings which show that some of the past authorities, who are main sources for most writers on Zulu history, were dishonest and that they fabricated quite a lot to dramatise and justify the rape of Zulu land. [...] At the same time I do applaud the appearance of some young historians who are trying to put themselves in the black man's shoes.<sup>99</sup>

Oscar Dhlomo, former history teacher and then Minister of Education and Culture, further complained about the lack of black historians; although it was possible to study history, there were hardly any black history lecturers. Promising black students were to be encouraged and, additionally, oral history was to be accepted as a source (also by white historians). It was important that black historians worked on perspectives that white historians usually left out.<sup>100</sup>

Black historians working on Zulu history were not available, however. A few white historians that differed from the colonial view (as defined by Buthelezi) were then approached in the beginning 1980s.<sup>101</sup> The first booklet was written by John Laband and John Wright, called

97 Laband/Wright 1983; Laband 1985; Laband 1988; Laband/Mathews 1992.

98 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Memorial Celebrations, Eshowe, 28.09.1974. Doc-Afr Acc 8, 84.

99 Buthelezi, M. G.: The bias of historical analysis, 07.02.1979. CC F968.3 BUT, 4–5.

100 Dhlomo, O. D.: The future of Zulu historiography: address to the Anglo-Zulu Conference, 09.02.1979. CC F968.3 DHL.

101 Other historians who supported the need of a new perspective (and who did not write for the KMC) were especially Peter Colenbrander and Jeff Guy; Dlamini 2001b, 52–56.

*King Cetshwayo kaMpande* and published in 1983 with financial support by Old Mutual. The KwaZulu government had reserved the right to examine the draft before publication and had no objections. It contains two forewords, one by the KMC's future chairman Tim Maggs and one by Buthelezi. According to these, it was meant to combat a colonial bias that many white historians had towards Zulus. The booklet also contained the omnipresent re-narration of Buthelezi's history and genealogy.<sup>102</sup>

When the second volume, published as *Fight us in the open* by John Laband in 1985, was produced, tensions between politics and historical science arose. The booklet contained Zulu views on the Anglo-Zulu War as recorded in the James Stuart Archive in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Extracts from these transcribed interviews (which were marked as such) were reproduced but contained allegations that the Inkatha leadership wanted to keep secret. The reproduced transcript stated about Mnyamana, Buthelezi's paternal great-grandfather:

The king, as is shown by his narrative taken down by Ruscombe Poole, accepted his commander's version of events; but his men accredited their defeat to his poor generalship. Mpashana complained to Stuart:

Mnyamana ... commanded the impi ... in a bad spirit ... Mnyamana stirred up the impi to make it burn like a fire. He used to upset it with his talk. He kept on giving it orders to make ready and prepare for action, so as to be ready to face the whites, whose spies were in sight. He alarmed it and caused it to become apprehensive ... he was unduly ... fearful of the results. When the battle occurred, the impi was not directed by Mnyamana but took up position by itself.

Whatever the truth in these accusations, the fact was that the main Zulu army had been utterly routed, and King Cetshwayo could not fail to perceive the implications.<sup>103</sup>

102 Laband/Wright 1983.

103 Forsyth, Paul: The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 201.

These paragraphs present Mnyamana as a coward who first stirred up the warriors to become ready for battle, then made them anxious, and at last fled the scene. The second paragraph that was rejected read:

and then he heard that Mnyamana had promised Sir Garnet Wolseley to do his best to assist him in capturing Cetshwayo, and the people warned him that Mnyamana had promised that he should be delivered up if he went to any of the kraals in his district.<sup>104</sup>

According to these lines, Mnyamana even offered to betray Cetshwayo and hand him over to the British. As noted, the manuscript did mark these as transcribed interviews with contemporaries and not as the result of the historians' work. Nevertheless, the Inkatha leadership objected to these paragraphs and contacted Tim Maggs and John Laband.<sup>105</sup> Dhlomo's letter to Maggs reads:

Dear Dr. Maggs

Thank you for your letter of 7 June 1984 and a copy of the revised draft of Dr Laband's manuscript: "Fight Us In The Open". The first major objection to the manuscript is that King Cetshwayo's narrative as recorded by Ruscombe Poole on page 35–36, gives the impression that Prime Minister Mnyamana Buthelezi delivered the King to Sir Garnet Wolseley. This is clearly unacceptable as it will cause a lot of conflict among the Zulus. You will surely understand that many Zulu people who will read the manuscript will not appreciate the scientific fact that this is a mere record of the testimony of historical witnesses. They will take the testimony as gospel truth, as it were. If Mr Laband your Editorial Committee would find this acceptable, I suggest that the last six (6) lines of King Cetshwayo's tale on pp. 35–36, be excluded altogether.

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104 Ibid, 203–204.

105 Dlamini 2001b, 56–59.

The second objection concerns the testimony of Mpatshana on page 29, where he attributes the defeat at Khambule to Prime Minister Mnyamana Buthelezi's alleged poor generalship. This allegation will also have serious implications and I would be pleased if Mr Laband and your Committee could agree to exclude it from the revised manuscript. Otherwise, I am happy with the rest of the manuscript. [...]

Warm regards  
Yours sincerely

DR O. D. DHLOMO  
MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE<sup>106</sup>

This makes clear that the Inkatha leadership indeed understood the text, but they thought that other readers would not and hold these accounts as true. History was no end in itself, it served the purpose of legitimising the present hierarchy in KwaZulu and Inkatha. Thus, only the right aspects of history were welcome. Unsurprisingly, Laband and Wright were not happy with this interference in their work. Dhlomo sought a personal conversation with Laband, taking Laband for a ride in his government Mercedes and explaining that these passages would stir up conflict among Zulus and needed to be deleted. According to a later statement by Laband, Maggs accused Laband of intended provocations by including these passages. The first passage was shortened to "The main Zulu army had been utterly routed, and King Cetshwayo could not fail to perceive the implications"<sup>107</sup> and the second deleted.<sup>108</sup> Laband did not speak at the booklet's public presentation and Wright was no longer invited to the KMC's Editorial Sub-Committee's meetings. Nevertheless, Laband published two fur-

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106 Forsyth, Paul: *The past as the present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political legitimation*, 1989. CR T 968.491 BUT(FOR), 200.

107 Laband 1985, 37.

108 Ibid, 46.



ther volumes with the KMC in 1988 (*The battle of Ulundi*) and 1992 (*Isandlwana*, with Jeff Mathews).<sup>109</sup>

John Wright and the KMC, however, did not get back together. Wright and Aron Mazel published articles in the *Echo* supplement of the Natal Witness on South African history that became quite popular. Their article about Shaka, however, brought them into conflict with the Ilanga newspaper that had been bought by Inkatha through its Mandla Matla Publishing company in 1987.<sup>110</sup>

Mazel's and Wright's first article on Shaka was titled *Shaka Zulu: What do we really know about him?* and aimed at explaining that not much was known about Shaka for sure and many stories were myths that had "been made up by people who want to bend history to suit their own purposes." The article then presents very different characterisations of Shaka made by a British trader (James King), a Zulu writer (Magema Fuze), a missionary (Alfred Bryant), and a KwaZulu politician (Jordan Kush Ngubane<sup>111</sup>). Their views ranged from "cruel monster" to great leader and founder of the Zulu nation – which tells a lot about the four persons cited and their motivations to characterise Shaka in a certain way, the article explains.<sup>112</sup>

The following article, *Shaka Zulu: a big debate is beginning*, focused on the (then) current debate on Shaka among historians and the interested public. Among these "new ideas" were that Shaka had enemies inside his family because he did not rule by birthright, that the Zulu empire had not been united and some powerful chiefdoms resisted his rule, and that the Zulu empire had actually been smaller than in popular belief and the amakhosi on the periphery had been

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109 Dlamini 2001b, 56–59.

110 Königkrämer 1990; Königkrämer 1991; Witness Reporter 1987.

111 Journalist, author, founding member of the ANC Youth League, he left the ANC as he saw it compromised by communists, joined the Liberal Party in 1955 and became its national Vice-President, then left for the PAC in 1959 and went to exile after its banning, first to Swaziland, then to the USA where he lobbied for Inkatha and theorised on Ubuntu-Botho (see chapter 4.1.3). In 1980, Buthelezi made Ngubane return to South Africa, gave him a post within the KwaZulu government and the Central Committee; Rosenberg 2000.

112 Wright/Mazel 1991d. It also touches the questions of Shaka's physical appearance.

highly autonomous. The article further explains that these assumptions were not new or made up but came from “new ways of thinking about old stories.”<sup>113</sup>

The next article (in a much longer series) is the last one of interest here, called *Changes in Natal (1750–1830)*. It explained the differences between the pre-Shakan society and the society inside the Zulu empire. Before Shaka built his kingdom, people had probably been largely equal on a material level and were only diversified by age and gender. Under Zulu rule, however, there was a rich elite of the ruling house and its supporters, a second group of “common people” from which the king drew his fighters and workers, and a third of very poor people on the periphery whose cattle had largely been taken away. This third group was being looked upon by the others and called, e.g., *amalala* (low-class servants).<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, the article explained that the king kept close control over people and even kept a group of young women at his homestead to give to his supporters as wives.<sup>115</sup>

These articles indeed covered trends and discussions in historiography that are still largely up-to-date and being discussed at the time of writing this thesis. Nevertheless, they ran counter to Buthelezi's and Inkatha's version of history and sparked a serious backlash by Inkatha's *Ilanga* newspaper. In its issue of 14 to 16 February 1991, it published an article called *On academic body servants* that started with explanations on the ANC's campaign against Inkatha and then turned to the question why the series by Mazel and Wright was, in their eyes, an ANC undertaking against “everything Zulu”. *Ilanga* of course rejected about everything that Mazel and Wright had written and presented its own, clear-cut and unambiguous version of history, but it also attacked them *ad hominem*:

Now, Messrs Wright and Mazel are first and foremost Marxist. And, secondly, they are what one might call ANC *nsilas*. Another historian described them as “academic hyenas of the left with

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113 Wright/Mazel 1991c.

114 On the *amalala*, see Hamilton/Wright 1990.

115 Wright/Mazel 1991a.

a mission to diminish the accomplishments of King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu Kingdom.”

He described the “Learn with Echo” series and the use by Wright and Mazel of the term “warlord” to describe King Shaka as “historical pornography dressed up as revisionist history designed to indoctrinate youth to reject the contributions to state craft achieved by King Shaka.” [...]

In a sense they are like the monkeys on the barrel organ. As long as the Marxist organ grinder cranks the handle, they will dance to his tune.<sup>116</sup>

It is not known who this other historian is supposed to be, and if these are actually statements by an historian at all. “Nsila” can be found in dictionaries as *insila*, translatable to *butler* or *body servant* (as in the title of the article), but also to *dirt*, *filth*.<sup>117</sup> The first translation is somewhat misleading as an *insila* is “charged with the task of disposing of the bodily wastes of the king”.<sup>118</sup> This task made them influential because of the belief that, if not properly disposed, the bodily fluids remained connected to the king and could then be used in harmful medicines by diviners or witches.<sup>119</sup> As Sighart Bourquin describes it:

The body-servant, *insila*, was in constant, close attendance upon his master. One important function was to receive upon his body the royal spittle, whenever the king wished to expectorate. This the *insila* would rub into his skin lest a witch-doctor got hold of some it, as this was regarded as potent medicine.<sup>120</sup>

This article, thus, attempted to deny any validity of Mazel’s and Wright’s explications on the matter of King Shaka. Not only did it argue against

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116 Hanga 1991a.

117 <https://zu.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/isizulu-english/insila>, last access on 08.02.2019; Doke/Malcolm/Sikakana [1958] 1971, 281. It can also be found as “iNsila”.

118 Hamilton 1998a, 218.

119 Van Wyk 2014, 125.

120 Dlamini 1986, 115. Original emphasis.

the content, but also against the authors by insulting them as insilas, hyenas, and monkeys. It further accused them of working for the ANC side by indoctrinating the youth through “historical pornography”. This hostility towards opponents is surely typical for the political climate of Natal in the beginning 1990s, but it also shows that Buthelezi and Inkatha saw their worldview and version of history as increasingly endangered and that they were willing to use any means to defend it. Of course, the irony is obvious: Ilanga, as an Inkatha-owned newspaper (although it claimed to be operationally independent), did exactly what it accused Mazel and Wright of, for the IFP.

But this was not the end of the story. The managing editor of the Echo supplement sent a letter to Ilanga, correcting factual errors and asking for an acknowledgment of the controversy around facts regarding King Shaka – Ilanga had portrayed Shaka in a very unambiguous way as if all facts had been clear. Ilanga newspaper published this letter and commented on it extensively.<sup>121</sup> It accused Mazel and Wright of being the ones with a “narrow vision” (regardless of the fact that they had presented sources from multiple perspectives) and following an ideological perspective (as if Ilanga and Inkatha had no ideology). In the end, the Ilanga article repeated what had already been written and added other accomplishments attributed to Shaka. They reference other historians whom they regard as trustworthy (in opposition to “Marxists” Mazel and Wright), but it seems very ironic that among these, of all people, is Jeff Guy, famous for his Marxist views.<sup>122</sup> Eventually, Mazel and Wright sued Ilanga, and part of the settlement was to maintain silence on the matter.<sup>123</sup>

Producing written documents on history can have a huge impact on commemorative culture that should be noted here. Oral history remains fluid, up for changes and reinterpretations, but once it is written down, it usually becomes unambiguous, and whoever writes it

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121 Davies 1991.

122 Ilanga 1991b. See <https://sites.google.com/site/rememberingjeffguy/home> for many memories of Jeff Guy, last access on 28.05.2019. See also <https://www.anglozuluwar.com/professor-jeff-guy> and <https://mg.co.za/article/2014-12-18-farewell-to-jeff-guy-an-extraordinary-sa-historian>, last access on 28.05.2019.

123 Hamilton 1998a, 13–14.

down can influence and control the discourse to a relevant extent. Only written documents could store a precisely defined version of history as propagated by Buthelezi and Inkatha that everybody, no matter how distant in space and time, could access – history, therefore, gained a significantly wider range.<sup>124</sup> Museums and restorations like the Ondini residence did quite the same thing, but more plastically and also accessible for anyone who would not or could not read such publications as the ones introduced above.

This influence through writing down one specific understanding of history can be turned around: destroying unwanted written documents or at least making them inaccessible. Already in 1979, according to Colleen McCaul of the South African Institute for Race Relations, Inkatha tried to destroy all copies of its old ca. 1975/76 constitution<sup>125</sup> that named the organisation as *Inkatha Ya KwaZulu*, made an explicit reference to King Solomon as its 1928 founder (see chapter 3.3.2) and was for “the people of KwaZulu”.<sup>126</sup> Later versions called the movement *Inkatha YeNkululeko YeSizwe* and exchanged “people of KwaZulu” for “black people”.<sup>127</sup>

In May 1991, Buthelezi’s attorneys Friedman & Friedman sent letters to various university libraries, claiming that Mzala’s book *Gatsha Buthelezi. Chief with a double Agenda*<sup>128</sup> was defamatory and needed to be removed from library circulation or Buthelezi would claim for damages in court.<sup>129</sup> Notably, it was neither further defined nor discussed which parts were deemed defamatory – not even whether allegations were actually true or not. Although Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo) was working for the ANC, his book was respected in academic circles as an important (if controversial) part of scholarly discourse.

124 Bösch 2011, 51–52; Wenzel 2008, 88–102.

125 McCaul, Colleen: Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 35.

126 Inkatha YaKwa-Zulu: Constitution, ca. 1976. HPD A957f.

127 Langner, E.J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 282–288; de Kock 1986, 174–177.

128 Mzala 1988.

129 Under South African law at the time, just circulating a book that had been written and published by somebody else was seen as making it public, making it possible to sue libraries or booksellers in court.

Libraries at first obliged and removed the books, but the University of Natal, e.g., found out that copies had been missing (or, one could suspect, had been saved from disappearing by students or staff). This attempt by Buthelezi and his attorneys was regarded as censorship among the scientific community, and university libraries largely returned the book to the shelves after seeking legal advice.<sup>130</sup>

This initial compliance on the side of the university libraries probably was furthered by the experience of Buthelezi threatening to sue writers and publishers. For example, it is reported that Michael Sutcliffe of the University of Natal paid R50,000 to Buthelezi in an out-of-court settlement to avoid a defamation trial.<sup>131</sup> Buthelezi also successfully sued Denis Beckett and Saga Press for articles in *Front-line* magazine about him that he deemed untrue and defamatory.<sup>132</sup> One last, recent example of attempting to destroy unwanted text shall suffice: Omar Badsha, South African activist and artist, wrote on Facebook in 2017 about a request by Buthelezi's secretary to remove Buthelezi's biography at [www.sahistory.org.za](http://www.sahistory.org.za) and to replace it with a "sanitized" one.<sup>133</sup> Again, history was a political means for control and for liberation, offering simple explanations in complex times.

#### 4.1.3 Education: Ubuntu-Botho

History and culture also played an important role in education.<sup>134</sup> Part of the homeland policy was that the homeland governments enjoyed internal autonomy on cultural matters which included education. In the first phase of self-government from 1970, this was still limited and apartheid's Bantu Education was still in place that was designed to keep schooling for Blacks especially cheap and bad.

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130 Wyley/Merrett 1991.

131 Ibid, 101.

132 See files in HPD AK2209.

133 Badsha 05.11.2017.

134 Another focus was on vocational training to supply the economy with qualified workers in cooperation with the business community. This will be detailed in chapter 4.3.1.

The new KwaZulu government of the 1970s under Buthelezi wanted to improve the situation in schools. It realised that

Africans have had no effective control over their education which was European-designed and European-executed going under the term “Native Education” and later “Bantu Education” with no Black voice in the decision-making machinery connected therewith, and this educational system purported to prepare Africans for inferior status in life.<sup>135</sup>

Therefore, KwaZulu’s schools were to be improved to educate future entrepreneurs, academics, teachers, politicians, and skilled labourers. This plan included the erection of many new schools because there were, in 1972, 1672 primary schools in KwaZulu but only 63 secondary and high schools, four teacher-training centres, and six industrial and technical colleges.<sup>136</sup>

Due to this situation, KwaZulu’s Executive Councillor for Education James Alfred Walter Nxumalo and his colleagues wrote the Education Manifesto for KwaZulu. It stated, *inter alia*:

We need a Black-oriented education (in aim, content and organisation) designed to satisfy the genuine needs and aspirations of the African: an educational system adopted to meet the challenges of the scientific-technological age. [...] Therefore, we adapt the following as the aim of our education: The effective organisation of the African’s experience so that his tendencies and powers may develop in a manner satisfactory to himself and the nation, by the growth of requisite knowledge, desirable attitudes and congenial skills required to face the modern age. [...]

Our objective is free compulsory education for the first ten years of schooling, that is, from 6 to 16 years of age or Standard 10 whichever comes first. We need to take a bold step forward in

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135 Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: The education manifesto of KwaZulu, 14.02.1973. DocAfr Acc 23, 1

136 Ibid, 1–2.

order to wipe out the current educational bankruptcy which is our unfortunate lot.<sup>137</sup>

The document spells out further details of future schooling in KwaZulu, e.g. an early introduction of English and other measures taken to improve education including the foundation of a new university of sciences and technology (what later became the Mangosuthu Technikon in Umlazi), a new medical school,<sup>138</sup> and an institute conducting research on KwaZulu's political and social needs under black leadership.<sup>139</sup> This idea was later continued in the form of the Inkatha Institute (see chapter 5.2.4).

Nxumalo was going to launch a huge modernisation programme to create a school system that was apt to the needs of the present and future and overcame Bantu Education by paving the way for Blacks into upper areas of employment. Black empowerment and liberation were to happen through education and a fair share in South Africa's wealth. Education, therefore, became a means of development, as Buthelezi put it:

Community Development [...] means formal as well as informal means of education and training i.e. non school and non university degree training. The ultimate object of all training, whether at school, technical college, university or in service should be community development. That is why training encompasses more than a number of youngsters studying for degrees and diplomas.<sup>140</sup>

Education, thus, was more than the accumulation of degrees, but it served the needs of the people and their economy through the acqui-

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137 Ibid, 2.

138 The only medical school for Blacks in KwaZulu and Natal was the University of Natal's "Non-European Section"; Bhana/Vahed 2011.

139 Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: The education manifesto of KwaZulu, 14.02.1973. DocAfr Acc 23, 2-3.

140 Buthelezi, M. G.: University training for economic and community development on the occasion of the opening of the course for company directors at the University of Zululand, 26.01.1976. HPD A1045, 7.



sition of practical skills. This was by no means to replace intellectual education but supplement it. Only this way, Blacks could replace Whites in the administration, economy, and schools of KwaZulu.<sup>141</sup> In this sense, education was a way of liberation:

African parents are vocal about condemning this unfair system which is oppressive, but do not end up there. They still within their limited means do all they can to give their children education. They do not think it is good enough to sit down and only yell about the iniquities [sic] of denying Africans a free education. They do something practical to get out of the chains of ignorance posed on the black Community. In doing so they are in fact engaged in the process of liberation.<sup>142</sup>

While there is no reason to doubt these intentions, they could hardly be realised given the financial restraints of KwaZulu. However, new schools and teacher training facilities were built indeed, more teachers employed and books supplied, and teachers received more in-service training.<sup>143</sup>

During the Soweto riots in 1976 that were sparked by the forced introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in schools, KwaZulu schools remained relatively quiet because the KwaZulu government could decide on its own which language to use (thus, English and isiZulu were used). Buthelezi also saw this as a result of the Youth Brigade's organising work.<sup>144</sup> The Soweto riots spread to the University of Zululand (Unizulu) that did not fall under the direct responsibility of the KwaZulu government. It was closed from June 1976 for at least nine months due to unrest, delaying the exams of badly needed teachers.<sup>145</sup>

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141 Ibid.

142 Buthelezi, M. G.: A short address to the youth workshop, Mahlabatini secondary school, 02.07.1976. HPD A1045, 4.

143 Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: Policy speech 1977/1978 by the Minister of Education and Culture, Ulundi, 03.1977. HPD A1045.

144 Maré 1988, 129–130; Tilton 1992, 168–173.

145 Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: Policy speech 1977/1978 by the Minister of Ed-

Universities had been a difficult space for Buthelezi before,<sup>146</sup> but in 1976 this was taken to a new level. When Buthelezi was conferred an honorary doctorate (law) by Unizulu, about 200 students protested against this move and violently clashed with Inkatha supporters. All involved students that trained to become teachers had to apologise before they were allowed to continue their studies. Nevertheless, further riots on campus on 17 and 18 June 1976 led to physical damages amounting to R500,000. During the following years, Unizulu never really calmed down and Inkatha supporters repeatedly clashed with its opponents which was, as reported, accompanied by racist slogans from the pro-Inkatha side against other Blacks.<sup>147</sup>

On 29 October 1983, the centenary of King Cetshwayo's death was commemorated in Unizulu's Bhekuzulu hall by Buthelezi and Inkatha. Inkatha supporters clashed with opposing students of which many were affiliated with the Azanian Students' Organisation (AZASO) which was close to ANC and UDF. This left five people dead (probably four on the side of Inkatha opponents) and more than a hundred injured. There were two stories explaining what happened: Either Inkatha supporters insulted students who then attacked their opponents which was met by fierce resistance and revenge by Inkatha supporters; or the opposing students insulted Buthelezi and were then attacked by Inkatha supporters. In any case, Inkatha supporters played a very active role in the violence that amounted to more than just 'self-defence'.<sup>148</sup> Buthelezi, confronted with the violence that his supporters had used, commented: "My brothers and sisters if we had done the things we are accused of doing at the University of Zululand, no single member of AZASO would be alive to tell the tale."<sup>149</sup> In

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ucation and Culture, Ulundi, 03.1977. HPD A1045.

146 Buthelezi, M. G.: Trying to find each other, as we march together in the abyss of a dark tunnel towards black fulfillment, an address to the students of the University of Zululand, 30.08.1974. CC KCM30009/36.

147 Sithole 2006, 835; Teague 1983, 47–63.

148 Middleton, A. J.: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Violence Which Occurred on 29 October 1983 at the University of Zululand, 02.1985. HPD AK2810/C; Office of the Rector and Vice-Chancellor, University of Zululand: Violent Conflicts of 29th October 1983, 08.11.1983. APC PC126/3/18.

149 Buthelezi, M. G.: An Inkatha Reaction to the AZASO Pamphlet "Massacre at

any case, it seems that resistance to Inkatha was especially strong at universities including Unizulu that was not under KwaZulu control.

KwaZulu's schools, however, were under extensive control by the KwaZulu government from 1977 due to the introduction of phase two of self-government. Bantu Education was completely abolished in KwaZulu in 1978 which was – with good reason – presented as liberation; the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture then had more powers to change the school system according to its needs and the needs of the economy: Bantu Education had not contained any preparations for skilled labour which the economy needed. To this end, the business community, for example the South African Sugar Association or the Urban Foundation, but also private persons and communities made donations to KwaZulu's schools and to students as bursaries.<sup>150</sup> Donations from the US (books and bursaries) were received and distributed by the Inkatha Institute (see chapter 5.2.4).<sup>151</sup>

Nevertheless, KwaZulu's education system was already in crisis at the time due to a lack of money, qualified personnel, teacher training, and schools. Indeed, it was common that communities built their own schools and that parents paid the teachers directly. These were problems that the KwaZulu government could not solve due to a lack of funding. While 82% of pupils successfully completed standard 10 in 1978, this went down to 32% in 1983, but improved again to 54% in 1987 (examinations were managed centrally from Pretoria).<sup>152</sup>

The year 1978 saw the introduction of a new subject in KwaZulu schools named *The National Cultural Liberation Movement* or, in short, *Inkatha* that was meant to introduce Inkatha to pupils. The Natal

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Ngoye", 06.11.1983. APC PC126/3/18.

150 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: L.E.A.R.N. fund, L.E.A.R.N. school at Ophapheeni, 08.02.1977. CC KCM30014/94; Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening of Okhahlamba high school – and Tshanibezwe junior secondary school, 19.09.1976. CC KCM30013/81; Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: Policy speech 1977/1978 by the Minister of Education and Culture, Ulundi, 03.1977. HPD A1045.

151 Maré 1988, 129–130; Tilton 1992, 168–173.

152 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 33, 30.04.-15.05.1984. LL, 618; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 49, 25.04.-16.05.1988. LL, 661–662; Maré 1988, 129–130; Thusi 12.1993, 18–24.

African Teachers' Association (since 1977 affiliated to Inkatha<sup>153</sup>), members of the KwaZulu administration, and academics of the University of Zululand drafted a syllabus for the new subject that was to be taught with one lesson per week and without exams. Once a year, this was to be supplemented by an *Inkatha Day* of recitations, singing, dance, and displays of what the pupils had produced recently. It probably was a reaction to teachers and headmasters rejecting the Youth Brigade and obstructing its work at schools, and it was meant to inhibit future boycotts.<sup>154</sup>

The "syllabus is based on the aims and objectives of the National Cultural Liberation Movement as found in the Constitution"<sup>155</sup> and defines what was to be taught in which form. Pupils were to develop as individuals along the notion of Zulu culture as defined by Inkatha, i.e. inside a strict hierarchy:

In drawing up this draft syllabus the committee was influenced by the following: [...] the need to develop in our youth the whole person within the ambit of Inkatha Constitution. For this reason the study of the individual as a member of a family which family is part of the community and which community is a component of a nation is considered essential. The rehabilitation of many people from social problems like drink, crime, poverty, continued illegitimacy is as important as the prevention of these social problems in the building up of a strong and united nation.<sup>156</sup>

This should also serve to make school more relevant to the questions and needs of the youth. Regular schools should further include more

153 Tribune Reporter 1977.

154 Argus Correspondent 1979; KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture: The National Cultural Liberation Movement Syllabus for Primary and Secondary/High Schools, 1978. APC PC126/20/7, 17–18; Maré 1988, 131–134; Mdluli 1987, 61; South African Institute of Race Relations: The Inkatha Syllabus (Information Sheet 4/1980), 1980. APC PC126/20/7.

155 KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture: The National Cultural Liberation Movement Syllabus for Primary and Secondary/High Schools, 1978. APC PC126/20/7, 1.

156 Ibid. Original emphasis.

practical work and creativity. However, a plurality of thought was not intended:

[M]any adults seem to hold divergent views and beliefs about Inkatha for various reasons. These are passed on to the young and cloud the youths' minds. It is thus honed that this syllabus together with its guide will clear many doubts and thus create unified ideas to match with the goals of Inkatha.<sup>157</sup>

The syllabus' general aims are summed up as follows:

1. To acquaint pupils with the role and significance of the N.C.L.M.<sup>158</sup> and to make them realize that a successful Nation must be well-organized. It is the main purpose and function of Inkatha to work towards this goal.
2. To equip youth with such knowledge and skills as will enable them to develop a keen sense of nationhood and service to both nation and country.
3. To develop physical, social, mental and spiritual behaviour patterns in youth that will make them worthy citizens.
4. To make pupils understand the contribution education, work and a strong national culture should make to the building of a nation.
5. To develop the pupils' concept of themselves as individuals who are pillars of the Nation, hence the necessity for them to dedicate themselves to the service of the Nation and country.<sup>159</sup>

Thus, pupils were meant to learn that Inkatha was working for the nation and, basically, nobody else could compete with Inkatha. Pupils were meant to become proud of their nation (as a form of psychological liberation) and supporters of Inkatha while behaving like they were told. Liberation should be done through education and working for the nation that still needed to be built as the syllabus admitted:

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157 Ibid, 2

158 National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha).

159 Ibid.

“The task of nation building and the creation of national unity is one great task confronting any education system.”<sup>160</sup>

Each standard and form throughout primary and secondary education was to receive schooling on Inkatha. Each year, the Inkatha class was divided into seven units:

1. Inkatha
2. History of Black South Africa/African History
3. African culture
4. Modern Life Style
5. Environmental Studies
6. Religious Studies
7. Practical

Inkatha was to be introduced in sub-standard A as follows:

- a) The story of Inkatha as revealed in the life history of King Solomon ka Dinuzulu
- b) The story of its revival as revealed in the life and times of Prince M. G. Buthelezi
- c) Brief treatment of what Inkatha is, what it stands for and why it is necessary
- d) The story of the Youth Brigade. What it is, what it stands for and why it is necessary
- e) Brief exposition of the administrative hierarchy and organizational structure.<sup>161</sup>

This puts Inkatha and Buthelezi in a religious, Christian framing, reminiscent of the Revelation of John and also inhibits questioning whether they are necessary at all – prohibiting looking for alternatives to Inkatha.

Later classes on Inkatha would then focus on Inkatha, its constitution and discipline, the liberation struggle and important leaders

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, 3.

before 1960, the Youth Brigade, and the Zulu nation very repetitively. The units on “History of Black South Africa” and “African culture” focus on Zulu history and culture, especially the Zulu royal house (but also other African leaders in southern Africa), encounters with white settlers, oral tradition, ubuntu (see below), and communalism – the same core themes as in many speeches by Buthelezi. Notably, the history of the liberation struggle in South Africa seems to end in 1960 according to the syllabus, only Pan-Africanism and the struggle in the whole of Africa extend into later periods.<sup>162</sup> Other liberation movements like the ANC, the PAC, and the BCM hardly feature in the syllabus.<sup>163</sup> Following the syllabus, Inkatha seemed to be the only active and legitimate liberation movement in South Africa after 1960 (when ANC and PAC were banned). Furthermore, the Zulu nation seemed to be the most important factor in the liberation struggle.<sup>164</sup> The reading list that was later supplied to teachers, however, featured many scientific texts that without doubt covered multiple perspectives and all liberation movements.<sup>165</sup>

The other units deal with life in urban and rural areas, health issues and sex education, ecology, various religions, labour and economy, and age but not gender. Most interesting for this study are, of course, the practical units. They included caring for the school and the community, e.g. by closing furrows, planting trees, maintaining sports grounds, gathering of donations for people in need, and voluntary work in libraries, schools, clinics, etc. Part of the Inkatha class were also singing (including war cries) and dancing – the importance of rituals to consolidate opinions and attitudes as well as routines at the will of leaders has already been explained above. This has become most obvious in the example of Shaka Day to foster self-images of Zulu warriors, but young

162 Apty, the only other post-1960 leader mentioned in the school books was the PAC’s Robert Sobukwe who had died in 1978; Inkatha: Ubuntu-Botho. Incwadi YeSithathu 3, 1981. CC 968.3 UBU, 6–7.

163 Dhlomo later claimed in an article that this was not the case and all relevant movements featured in the syllabus, but this could not be verified; Dhlomo 1988, 142.

164 KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture: The National Cultural Liberation Movement Syllabus for Primary and Secondary/High Schools, 1978. APC PC126/20/7.

165 Inkatha: Ubuntu-Botho reading list, ca. 1987. LO.

boys training war cries surely had a similar effect. In secondary schools, debates and discussions on relevant topics were added to the syllabus as well as poetry, music, and (graphic) arts. Also in secondary school, physical education and self-defence became part of the syllabus.<sup>166</sup>

Gerhard Maré compares this syllabus to the Christian National Education of Afrikaner nationalists with good reason. The Inkatha class was meant to consolidate a common ethnic identity or to build a nation (as prescribed by Inkatha) and it prepared the youth for working on the Inkatha side. While the units clearly focus on Zulu history and culture, they are also open to the interpretation that all Blacks or even all South Africans could form a nation (albeit under Zulu leadership), as Daphna Golan and Blade Nzimande argue. Simultaneously, its focus on order, development, and peace appealed to many Whites and the business community.<sup>167</sup> Christian National Education was a policy “of education which, put into practice by an uncompromising Afrikanerdom, would hold Afrikaners together and would ensure political, social and economic power through the careful and thorough indoctrination of its youth.”<sup>168</sup> After ongoing criticism and resistance, the subject was renamed Ubuntu-Botho/Good Citizenship,<sup>169</sup> the syllabus’ implementation enforced, and a second lesson per week added, but its contents remained largely the same.<sup>170</sup>

While Buthelezi often referred to Ubuntu-Botho, it is hard to find a clear-cut statement of his definition of these terms. In general, a

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166 KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture: *The National Cultural Liberation Movement Syllabus for Primary and Secondary/High Schools*, 1978. APC PC126/20/7.

167 Maré 1988, 136–137; Golan 1994, 30–31; Mdluli 1987, 69–70.

168 MacMillan 1967, 44.

169 Ubuntu (in Nguni languages like isiZulu, isiXhosa, and others) or Botho (in Sotho languages like Setswana, Sesotho, and others) meant, in general, humane or humanitarian behaviour towards one’s fellow human beings, universal brother- and sisterhood, solidarity, and sharing. In turn, it has also been used to demand subordination of the individual under the community and to exclude dissenters. During the 19th and 20th century, these terms have been instrumentalised repeatedly, enabling them to convey all kinds of meanings; Eze 2010; Marx 2002, 52; Mdluli 1987, 64–65; Ngubane 1981.

170 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: *Verbatim Report 16*, 11.-19.06.1979. LL, 345–



society based on Ubuntu (in Nguni languages) and Botho (in Sotho languages) meant to him a society based on “our common humanity, UBUNTU, or humanism and not race, creed, colour, age or sex. This means a non-racial society in which every human being will have the right and opportunity to make the best possible use of his life.”<sup>171</sup> This focus was also enshrined in Inkatha’s constitution right from the beginning.<sup>172</sup> As a consequence, peaceful coexistence also with Whites and an emphasis on the community were focal points.<sup>173</sup>

Implementing the syllabus proved problematic, however: A significant number of teachers and headmasters was reluctant to follow the syllabus.<sup>174</sup> It was then repeatedly reported that teachers and even pupils were forced to join Inkatha<sup>175</sup> or pupils lost their bursaries as soon as they criticised Inkatha or the KLA.<sup>176</sup> When school boycotts fully reached KwaZulu in 1980, Buthelezi made it the task of mothers to teach their children to obey the government,<sup>177</sup> but also threatened to use violence to restore order in schools and accused outsiders of agitating in KwaZulu to stir up the masses.<sup>178</sup> According to numerous reports, these threats of violence were put into practice by Inkatha supporters: Boycotting pupils were called enemies of Inkatha, abducted, lectured on correct behaviour (even in front of the KLA), taken into custody by the police, their houses were burnt down, and their families attacked.<sup>179</sup> It was also reported that schools which

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347; Maré 1988, 131.

171 Buthelezi in Ngubane 1981, 11.

172 Inkatha YaKwa-Zulu: Constitution, ca. 1976. HPD A957f, 1.

173 Ngubane 1981.

174 This included white teachers who were then threatened by Dhlomo to be withdrawn from service; Daily News Reporter 1979.

175 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 22; Golan 1991, 120–122. According to Felgate, even people seeking hospital treatment needed to be members of Inkatha.

176 Badat 2002, 254; Qwelane 1984.

177 Hassim 1990, 111.

178 Sithole 2006, 843; Work in Progress 1980.

179 Teague 1983, 34–38; Work in Progress 1980, 38.

obeyed the KwaZulu government received more supplies in the form of books etc.<sup>180</sup>

Of course, this was denied from the Inkatha side,<sup>181</sup> but the claims probably have some truth in them. What could be verified is that teachers, other civil servants, and recipients of bursaries were required to pledge allegiance to the KwaZulu government.<sup>182</sup>

Nevertheless, the Inkatha syllabus was successfully introduced in many schools. Sandile Evidence Dubazane recalls that it was at Kwazibonele primary school at Gezinsila township in 1985 when he, in the Ubuntu-Botho class, first heard of the ANC. As a child, he was not interested in politics, but he really liked a song they were singing regularly which he calls *Inkath' unomajikela wenomajikela*. He sums the content up as “Inkatha was all over the nation”<sup>183</sup> which he only learnt and understood years later. Dubazane went to Ubuntu-Botho class once a week in the afternoon when the pupils would sing about Inkatha and read the schoolbooks made for this class. Ironically, Dubazane recalls that what he and others read about the pre-1960 ANC in the Ubuntu-Botho schoolbooks drew them to the still existing ANC and not to Inkatha, even though it was portrayed as the ANC’s heir and the only movement with a feasible strategy. According to Dubazane, his primary school and virtually all other township schools stopped teaching Ubuntu-Botho from about 1987, only rural schools continued to do so.<sup>184</sup> This is, however, not reflected in Dhlomo’s annual reports or any other source.<sup>185</sup>

It seems that rituals like singing and dancing, along with the stories in the books, were meant to recruit young pupils who did not understand their political content yet and make them part of the Inkatha

180 Tilton 1992, 171.

181 See, e.g., KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 11.12.1989. APC PC142/3/5/2.

182 National Council, Inkatha: Resolutions, 15.01.1976. HPD A1045, 2; Qwelane 1984.

183 Dubazane ca. 2017, 1.

184 Ibid, 1–3.

185 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 49, 25.04.-16.05.1988. LL, 665–666; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 56, 03.-22.05.1990. LL, 541–542.

camp – which was not successful in this specific case. The first schoolbooks that Dubazane mentions were only available from 1980/81 and were written in isiZulu. They were structured in the same way as the syllabus except for a missing chapter on practice. Not only were they written in isiZulu, none but the first three schoolbooks could be found during my research.<sup>186</sup> Thankfully, Blade Nzimande (under the pseudonym of Praisley Mdluli) provides some translations and observations.<sup>187</sup>

The chapters about Inkatha and the liberation struggle presented Inkatha's method of internal, non-violent resistance as the only feasible way and the armed struggle as purely destructive. Therefore, tasks for the pupils did not ask for open discussion at all: "You must now think of other reasons why the armed struggle won't succeed in present day South Africa. Write these down and discuss them in your small groups. You are further expected, as Inkatha youth, to be exemplary in the struggle, and in carrying out the strategy of non-violence".<sup>188</sup> Armed struggle was ruled out beforehand instead of encouraging the pupils to assess varying views on the topic and to make their own judgment; even more, all pupils were addressed as Inkatha youth even when they were not, and they were taught how to behave outside school. This exemplifies how the Zulu nation, Inkatha, and the KwaZulu government were often seen as one.

Furthermore, the books allowed no differing views inside Inkatha; Buthelezi was portrayed as a supreme, ingenious, hereditary leader that had to be respected under all circumstances. This, combined with the fact that gender issues are only addressed in the context of etiquette, upheld patriarchy among pupils. Consequently, the books referred to *ukuhlonipha* (see chapter 4.1.1) that demanded hierarchical respect for old men, especially established leaders.<sup>189</sup> This becomes particularly relevant considering that many ANC comrades were

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186 Inkatha: Ubuntu-Botho. Incwadi yokuqala 1, 1980. CC 968.3 UBU; Inkatha: Ubuntu-Botho. Incwadi yeSibili 2, 1980. CC 968.3 UBU; Inkatha: Ubuntu-Botho. Incwadi YeSithathu 3, 1981. CC 968.3 UBU.

187 Mdluli 1987.

188 P. 7 of book nr. 6 (1985), in translation cited from Ibid, 63.

189 Ibid, 65–66.

young men and many Inkatha leaders were rather old men. The second schoolbook makes this hierarchy explicit:

This respect within the (Zulu) nation is found even among adults. In the family the man is the head. The woman knows that she is not equal to her husband. She addresses the husband as ‘father’, and by so doing the children also get a good example of how to behave. A woman refrains from exchanging words with a man, and if she does, this reflects bad upbringing on her part.<sup>190</sup>

A similar hierarchy applied to the workplace, surely to the benefit of Inkatha’s allies in the business community, and for anything in relation to the government:

In order that things go smoothly in all kinds of work situations, there are always people appointed to manage such undertakings. In schools, government offices, police, hospitals and everywhere there are people given authority to run and control these institutions. If you are at work, no matter what job you do, even in the mines, don’t forget that you must respect all those above you at all times. Even if your ideas clash, that must not make you forget that that person is still above you by virtue of his/her position [...]. All government laws, even those whose flouting may not necessarily bring you before the courts, must be strictly respected.<sup>191</sup>

Apart from reading and discussing the texts from an Inkatha perspective, pupils also were instructed to sing Zulu war songs, collect images and newspaper cuttings about Inkatha, and memorise the Inkatha leadership.<sup>192</sup> In times of increasing unrest, further material sought to convince pupils of maintaining order like a flier stating *inter alia*:

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190 P. 30 of book nr. 2, in translation cited from *Ibid*, 67.

191 P. 34 of book nr. 2, in translation cited from *Ibid*, 68.

192 *Ibid*, 63–67.

We have a group of pseudo-revolutionaries – the thugs. This group thrives on destruction. Once they see school pupils demonstrating, they join in with a programme of self-laceration in having Blacks burning down their own facilities. They incite children to burn down schools, furniture, capsize cars, loot and the rest. In the end, you are the one left without a classroom, with a gloomy future. Your pseudo-comrades – the thugs, rascals, drop-outs rejoice as you join the club of loiterers and social misfits.

Your parents place a tremendous premium on the value of education. They struggle to educate you. They scrape and go without things for themselves, to take you to school. Your elder sisters and brothers who are working contribute towards your education. Do not let them down. [...] It is high time that you, the flowers of our nation, got your priorities right. Youth of our country, join hands and keep your schools free of cheap politics leading to black-on-black confrontations and the destruction of property.<sup>193</sup>

This way, a clear distinction between the ones whose only future could lie in illegality and immorality and the ones who were well-behaved and educated was made. Of course, KwaZulu's pupils were meant to obey the rules and get educated to liberate themselves. In 1988, it was considered to include lessons on the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (see chapter 5.2.2) in the syllabus because its spirit of negotiation and mutual understanding was seen as a prime example of Ubuntu-Botho. It would, however, have made the Indaba look like an Inkatha project despite its operational autonomy.<sup>194</sup>

Since the end of apartheid, Ubuntu has become a ubiquitous concept in the discourse around nation building in South Africa and in the whole of sub-saharan Africa, focusing on similarities and solidarity between different ethnic groups and countries. Nevertheless, it is also being criticised as being unhistoric and a tool of the elites to appease the still poor masses.<sup>195</sup>

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193 The Bureau of Communication, Department of the Chief Minister, Ulundi: Be wise now or be sorry tomorrow, 1987. LO.

194 Oakley, Lynn: Report on the Prococ meeting, 20.01.1988. LO.

195 Eze 2010, introduction. See also Gade 2017; Marx 2002; Praeg 2014; Praeg/

## 4.2 Organising the Masses in Development

Buthelezi's and Inkatha's work inside schools was only part of the undertaking to educate, influence, and control the youth. Pupils were encouraged to join the Inkatha Youth Brigade (founded in 1976) and participate in its activities. The largest wing of Inkatha, however, was the Women's Brigade (founded in 1977) – women that joined Inkatha automatically became part of the Women's Brigade and could not be part of the main organisation. Both the Youth Brigade and the Women's Brigade were very active in self-help projects but were also meant to uphold order, understood as a means to develop society and culture, as this sub-chapter will show.

### 4.2.1 Youth Brigade

The Inkatha Youth Brigade (IYB) was defined in Inkatha's constitution as "the reserve of the Movement and [should] play the vanguard role of upholding and consolidating the gains of the Movement."<sup>196</sup> The chairman of the IYB was appointed by Buthelezi, all other IYB officials were elected at the IYB's General Conference. Of course, this leadership was meant to organise the IYB, but also to "act at all times in accordance with the directions of the President of the Movement or of the Central Committee and in accordance with approved policy"<sup>197</sup> In this task, it was "directed by the President of the Movement"<sup>198</sup> Although women under the age of 18 also were part of the IYB, its leadership was dominated by men.<sup>199</sup> For the formation of the IYB, Gibson Thula was sent to Zambia to study the Zambian Youth Service in 1976 and Musa Mkhize was sent to Malawi to study the Young Pioneers (which had an image as being "party thugs" and

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Magadla 2014; Ziai 2014.

196 Inkatha YaKwa-Zulu: Constitution, ca. 1976. HPD A957f, 22.

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid.

199 Work in Progress 1987.

“storm-troopers”) in 1980 for additional input. Further conceptual aid was given by the Canadian Coady Institute.<sup>200</sup>

Although the IYB was founded in 1976, its inaugural congress was only convened in 1978. Already during these approximately two years, the IYB commenced operations. At a school workshop in 1976, Buthelezi explained his vision of the new brigade as a means of development:

Development problems are enormous and various methods have been used to face up to these problems. We have to learn from our brothers even as an unfree people, and adopt some of the methods they use to tackle developmental problems. Some of the methods are implemented by the Youth Brigades of these Countries and the Womens Brigades. I have seen Youth Brigades in Malawi, and Zaire, in operation. The Youth Brigades are also used extensively in Zambia, Kenya, Tunisia and in Botswana on our door-step. [...] That is why Inkatha makes provision for a Youth Brigade. [...] Brigades are designed to be self-sustaining skill-training programs that cover their operating costs through their own labour. [...]

It gives us the opportunity to help ourselves and our people towards liberation through practical programmes, and thus render National Service, which the Youth of any Nation have to render. At the same time it enables those of us who are privileged to be learned to share what we know with our less fortunate brothers, through literacy programmes, agricultural schemes etc. It also gives us the opportunity to change our christianity from being an abstract ideology to a living religion and a way of life. It makes our brothers' keeper, which is what our Christian faith is about. It enables us to demonstrate our Ubuntu-Botho ideal, where each one of us lives for others than himself, through a formula of reciprocity.<sup>201</sup>

This is indeed a depiction of what was to come, although Inkatha's critics liked to add one accusation, namely that of the IYB upholding

200 Maré 1995a, 172.

201 Buthelezi, M. G.: A short address to the youth workshop, Mahlabatini secondary school, 02.07.1976. HPD A1045, 5–6.

order in a paramilitary fashion.<sup>202</sup> That the IYB was meant to uphold order was admitted openly, however. Debating school boycotts and violence in the KLA in 1978, then Minister of the Interior Frank Mdlalose explained to the KLA that the formation of the IYB “was the only way to quell student unrest.” Ben Ngubane, later Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, even said that this was “our only salvation and our only hope.” He further stated that “Black youth had developed a collective psychopathic personality”.<sup>203</sup> Appealing to the youth had become increasingly important because, according to estimates, about half of KwaZulu’s population was made up of minors due to a massive population growth.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, unemployment was high among the youth and the IYB offered a possibility of engagement and training (as we will see below), but it also acted against drug abuse and crime amongst the youth that had lost perspectives due to unemployment.<sup>205</sup>

From its inception, the IYB was officially meant to be peaceful, just like Inkatha had declared itself non-violent. Indeed, in the time following the Soweto riots, the IYB remained peaceful but, according to Buthelezi, this did not undermine its solidarity with the Soweto youth:

I have nothing but praise for you for identifying yourselves with the peaceful resistance of our Youth in the Transvaal, against Police onslaughts. I know that you fully identified yourselves with their peaceful struggle. The fact that you did not resort to acts of arson, except for the University of Zululand incident, does not mean that you did not identify with your brothers and sisters in that struggle. I know just what kind of pressures you were subjected to in attempts to persuade you to indulge in acts of violence. I know how many pressures you are under even at this moment, to do so. I know how some fire-eaters amongst our loquacious

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202 Teague 1983, 18.

203 Daily News Reporter 1978.

204 Teague 1983, 20.

205 Buthelezi, M. G.: Preparing for the long road ahead. Youth Brigade 2nd ordinary conference, Ondini, 24.03.1979. CC KCM30019/161; Maré 1995a, 171.



self-acclaimed revolutionaries, denigrate you. Our people have suffered a lot as a result of the unrest.<sup>206</sup>

Whilst violent resistance might follow a noble aim, Buthelezi reasoned that more was needed for liberation:

We can never hope to cause the walls of Jericho to fall through our shouting at them only. We need the inner strength which comes out of self-help schemes, and self-reliance. We all want to wipe out the system, but we need to do something practical for ourselves, as its victims whilst it exists. Nothing can undermine the system more than the inner moral strength which emanates from self-help and self-reliance.<sup>207</sup>

The IYB, thus, was a core means to pursue this aim, reminding his listeners also of Black Consciousness ideas.<sup>208</sup> Development included, as was already indicated, economic development, but also development in the fields of education and culture (see chapters 4.3 and 4.1, respectively).

When the inaugural congress was finally held on 11 February 1978, Buthelezi excused this delay with the difficulty of finding a suitable date; after all, Inkatha youth were meant to go to school or work. Buthelezi further reported on criticism that only old people would support Inkatha, ignoring its active IYB. Thus, he greeted the present Inkatha youth with the words “So hello oldies!”<sup>209</sup> and explained his idea of the IYB (as above).<sup>210</sup>

Also at the inaugural congress, Secretary-General Sibusiso Bengu explained Inkatha’s policy to the present Inkatha youth. He stressed that

206 Buthelezi, M.G.: Official opening remarks, Youth Brigade training course, Mahlabatini, 05.07.1977. CC KCM30015/112, 1.

207 Ibid, 11.

208 The Black Community Programmes, affiliated to the Black Consciousness Movement, indeed followed quite similar aims, albeit without a strict political hierarchy or the involvement of big business; Hadfield 2016.

209 Buthelezi, M.G.: Youth Brigade Inaugural Conference, 11.02.1978. APC PC140/2/9/4/2, 2.

210 Ibid.

Inkatha was an African movement open for all Blacks and not a Zulu movement; while Inkatha's Zulu members valued their heritage, this did not make them tribalists just like valuing British heritage did not make Britons tribalists. While Inkatha was a cultural movement, this explicitly included politics, the economy, and religion, making the struggle for cultural liberation all-encompassing and at grassroots level (instead of giving orders from exile).<sup>211</sup> At the following meetings, Buthelezi continued to call for sustained, non-violent struggle for liberation.<sup>212</sup>

From its inception, the IYB was therefore very political (unlike the Women's Brigade, as we will see) and reminiscent of a disciplined military brigade due to its use of uniforms and its marches accompanied by chanting.<sup>213</sup> This was done publicly and proudly, as Arthur Königkrämer explained in a 1980 newspaper article:

The rows of neatly-uniformed Inkatha Youth Brigade members bent down as if picking something up as they rhythmically swayed to and fro, reciting the simple little ditty over and over again. Suddenly, in reaction to an unseen command from the instructor, the ground shook as the groups stood to attention and the air was filled with an earsplitting cry of "Amandla!" amid a sea of fists clenched in salute. [...]

Translated it [the ditty] goes like this: "Pick up that sixpence, what will you eat when you get to where you're going?"

I asked Inkatha's administrative secretary, Mr Zakhele Khumalo, to explain its meaning.

211 Bengu, Sibusiso M.E.: A summary of address on: "The role of Inkatha and the youth in the black liberation struggle in South Africa", Youth Brigade conference, Ulundi, 11.02.1978. HPD A1045.

212 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: Preparing for the long road ahead. Youth Brigade 2nd ordinary conference, Ondini, 24.03.1979. CC KCM30019/161; Buthelezi, M.G.: Address to the National Executive Committee of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, 23.11.1980. CC KCM43083/261; Buthelezi, M.G.: The struggle for liberation is our own struggle. This is regardless of whether it will be won through blood, or through tears or through sweat, or through all three and more, Youth Brigade general conference, Ondini, 15.08.1981. CC KCM43087/289.

213 Langner, E.J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 153–154.

“The song is intended to teach self-reliance and to get the youth to understand that it will have to make-do with little. Hard work lies ahead – that is symbolised by the bending of backs to figuratively pick up the sixpence,” Mr Khumalo said.

To the casual observer this attitude may appear to contradict the more overt side of the movement. He sees uniforms, mass rallies, fists raised in the black power salute and tough speeches from top leadership.

At a recent youth camp I asked several young men dressed in uniform why they were wearing it. One replied: ‘Have you heard our president speak of discipline? We need to be disciplined as a people – a uniform helps install discipline and symbolises our unity.’ Asked whether he thought youth was impatient for change and would rather use violence to achieve change, he said: “That depends on the president. But, whatever he decides, our actions will be disciplined. That is what our camps are all about.”<sup>214</sup>

Thus, the IYB was indeed about discipline which naturally reminded observers of military units that, *inter alia*, marched and sung while not being deployed. The question remains whether ‘paramilitary’ as used by its critics was an apt description, whether IYB members were actually trained in this fashion, and whether the IYB was used in an oppressive way. After all, there were more than enough experienced Zulu warriors at the hands of Buthelezi and the king. It is of course possible that (former) IYB members also were members of impi, vigilante groups, or other fighting groups. We will return to this question later. The IYB was also about hard work for the community, e.g. an anti-litter campaign and a flood relief programme were run,<sup>215</sup> and about the improvement of living standards (i.e. economic development).

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214 Königkrämer 1980. This is the Zakhele Khumalo who was later accused of having been an agent for the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) before becoming Buthelezi’s personal secretary, the link between Inkatha/IFP and the SADF during Operation Marion, and the hub in the killing of political opponents; Reuters/CNN 06.08.1997; Staff Reporter, *Mail & Guardian* 08.12.1995.

215 Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference,



**Figure 15:** Buthelezi inspecting the IYB at the Inkatha Annual General Conference 1987. To the right of him is Musa Zondi, National Chairman of the IYB. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

To this end, the *Youth Service Corps for Social Reconstruction* (YSC) was formed in 1980<sup>216</sup> and based at Emandleni-Matleng.<sup>217</sup> It was meant to educate and train the youth in practical skills which the participants could later use and pass onto others in their hometowns but also, as the name suggests, to form a more disciplined and hard-working communal spirit. The YSC thus tackled youth unemployment but also kept the participating youth from developing militant behaviour like school boycotts (which the IYB had not prevented).<sup>218</sup> Keith Musakawukhethi (Musa) Zondi, head of the Youth Affairs section of Inkatha's Bureau for Community Development and Youth Affairs (and later chairman of the IYB) explained in 1983:

19.08.1984. APC PC126/3/17, 5; Makhanya 1984b; Makhanya 1984a.

216 One source states 1982 as the year in which the first trainees entered the camp.

217 Orthography on this location's name is not precise, sometimes it is also written as eMandleni-Matleng.

218 Kane-Berman 1982, 164; Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 67–68; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 187; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 25–28; Teague 1983, 69.



Figure 16: The Ntuzuma branch of the IYB arriving at Inkatha's Annual General Conference 1987. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

The camp is headed by the camp commander, Mr Gcumisa, because we realised that this undertaking needed to be run along the lines of paramilitarism. So it is run along a paramilitary approach in order to ensure the necessary degree of discipline among the trainees which is essential for disciplined work. To mobilise such members would be pretty difficult without the enforcement of discipline of some kind, similar to that of normal National Servicemen. Because we are, in fact creating an army for development with this movement and Services Corps for Social Reconstruction. When Buthelezi visits the camp, he inspects them in military fashion.<sup>219</sup>

Consequently, the camp participants wore uniforms and were organised into sections, brigades, and companies, but they did not receive military training as such. The day at Emandleni-Matleng began with physical exercises from four to seven o'clock in the morning, followed by seminars and lectures on agriculture (stock farming, crop production, irrigation), brick- and block-making, plumbing, electricity,

<sup>219</sup> McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 26.

building, mechanics, bookkeeping (e.g. for credit unions and cooperatives), health and first aid, literacy training methods, leadership, and contents similar to the Inkatha syllabus (see chapter 4.1.3). All skills were used as sources of income for the camp, if possible, to make it self-sustaining. In 1982, 200 to 300 people were being trained at Emandleni-Matleng who mostly came from rural KwaZulu and Natal but also from cities or townships including Soweto. An extension of the programme was planned and it was structured by the Inkatha Institute (see chapter 5.2.4) which wrote the curriculum.<sup>220</sup> In said year 1982, YSC members were sent to the Ingwavuma region (that the apartheid government attempted to cede to Swaziland, see chapter 4.4) and represented Inkatha among the affected communities.<sup>221</sup>

YSC members were referred to as “amabutho”<sup>222</sup> (Zulu warrior regiments) and Buthelezi addressed the graduates at passing-out parades; these were staged events to which allies of Inkatha were regularly invited.<sup>223</sup> Buthelezi explained at the passing-out parade in 1985:

The real battle is the battle to make life worthwhile for ordinary people after victory. Armies which go out and conquer do not produce miracles for the people whom they liberate. Hunger remains; sickness remains; poverty remains and this is the story across the length and breadth of Africa, millions of children are dying of starvation. Millions of people live in abject poverty because during the struggle for liberation, they did not do that which we are starting to do here at Emandleni-Matleng. You are the young liberators of our country, but because you have been here you are liberators in the true African idiom. You will participate in the process to liberate South Africa as caring young people. You

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220 Buthelezi 29.11.1985; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 25–28; Teague 1983, 70–73.

221 *Ibid.*, 71.

222 Emandleni-Matleng Camp: *Mission & Objectives*, ca. 1987. LO.

223 Emandleni-Matleng Camp, Board of Management: *Invitation to Passing Out Parade* (to Lynn Oakley), Programme, 27.11.1987. LO; Gielink, Shelley: *Excuse for not attending Passing Out Parade* (to Emandleni-Matleng Camp), 24.11.1989. CC KCM01/2/11/28.



**Figure 17: Passing Out Parade at Emandleni-Matlang, 27.11.1987.  
Photographer: Lynn Oakley.**



**Figure 18: Emandleni-Matlang's Honour Guard marching in at Inkatha's Annual General Conference 1987. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.**

should leave this place with the responsibility of employing the skills that you acquire not to make yourself comfortable in life; not to make yourself richer; not to make yourself more important. You have acquired skills here which you are expected to put at the service of the people.<sup>224</sup>

Thus, after finishing their training at Emandleni-Matleng, the graduates officially remained part of the YSC and were meant to run self-help projects in their hometowns, based on the acquired skills, and to uphold order and discipline, especially in schools and at the University of Zululand. Nevertheless, it was also reported that the graduates acted against ANC/UDF rivals, but it is not known whether this was organised through official YSC structures.<sup>225</sup> In 1984, *Amatikulu Youth Camp* was opened as a similar training centre which became a school for police officers in 1986.<sup>226</sup>

On 14 January 1994, at the height of violence between IFP and ANC due to the upcoming elections, armed training began at Emandleni-Matleng in addition to the already existing Mlaba camp (see chapter 3.3.4).<sup>227</sup> Emandleni-Matleng continued operations as a training facility in its original sense after 1994 and became part of Mthashana College in 2004 which supplies technical and vocational training for the people of KwaZulu-Natal.<sup>228</sup>

When conflicts between ANC and UDF on one side and Inkatha on the other increased in 1983 (and further escalated the following years), the IYB stated despite its policy of non-violence:

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224 Buthelezi 29.11.1985, 3–4.

225 Dlamini 2005, 58; McCaul, Colleen: *Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yezizwe*, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 25–28; Teague 1983, 73.

226 Buthelezi 26.06.1984; Buthelezi 01.05.2015; Inkatha Youth Brigade: *Resolutions of the Annual General Conference*, 26.-28.08.1983. APC PC126/3/17; Inkatha Youth Brigade: *Resolutions of the Annual General Conference*, 19.08.1984. APC PC126/3/17; Maré 1989, 183.

227 Villa-Vicencio 1999b, 319.

228 Msibi 05.04.2004.



This Conference reiterates its commitment to Inkatha's strategy of non-violence in spite of the apparent hopelessness of the situation and the continual emergence of factors that would push us towards violence. However, Conference wishes to sound a grave warning that our non-violent strategy does not mean that we will brook any tendency by other organisations to trample on us. Conference wishes to serve every organisation with a notice to the effect that Inkatha in dealing with other organisations will adopt an eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth attitude when confronted with turbulent forces which seek to weaken and undermine our efforts to champion black South Africa's struggle for liberation. Conference, therefore, urges all Youth members to deal with these turbulent forces as harshly as possible.<sup>229</sup>

So, while non-violence was officially advocated, the IYB made it clear that any aggression would not only be met with self-defence, but with counter-aggression to which individual members were empowered. In the following years, the IYB repeatedly called for peace,<sup>230</sup> but also resolved to "redouble our efforts to make our reassuring presence in every township felt by every member of the community" and to "re-dedicate ourselves to develop the power that we need to defend that which we believe in and to protect the Movement".<sup>231</sup> Of Buthelezi's role, it was resolved to "commit ourselves in everything we do to remember that the anger that burns in our young hearts needs always to be at the disposal of our President in his historic task of leading our country to sanity."<sup>232</sup>

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229 Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 26.-28.08.1983. APC PC126/3/17, 3.

230 See, e.g., Zondi, Musa: Statement at a press conference, 12.11.1987. LO; Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 22.-23.08.1987. EGM N968.3 INK; Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the 10th Anniversary Conference, 13.-14.08.1988. EGM N968.3 INK; Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 26.08.1990. HPD A1045.

231 Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 25.08.1985. APC PC126/3/17, 2.

232 Ibid, 4.

This makes it clear that the IYB was designed to be a disciplined instrument to be deployed by Buthelezi. Indeed, he encouraged the IYB to the new, more aggressive stance:

We now have a new dimension to our liberation struggle. We should never allow ourselves to be caught as flat-footed as we were when these eruptions of violence took place. [...] We will not be intimidated and ours now is the motto: An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. If a man sticks out his hand to shake my hand, I will shake his hand. If a man swears at me, I will swear at him. If a man hits me with his fist, I will hit him with my fist. If he uses a knife on me, I will use a knife on him. History demands no less of me than this. We dare not be weak. We dare not be intimidated.<sup>233</sup>

By this move, Buthelezi practically accepted that the IYB would become part of (counter-)violence because he knew that the other side of the conflict would not give in. On the other hand, he could not call for unconditional peace because this would have been seen as surrender. ‘Self-defence’ through counter-violence became part of the Inkatha youth’s programme, at least informally. In 1987, the IYB’s national organiser Ntwe Mafole<sup>234</sup> said:

If somebody takes my eye out, I will take somebody’s eye out; if they take my tooth out, I will take somebody’s tooth out; if they stab me, I will stab. That is defence. [...] As far as Inkatha is concerned, there is no difference between self-defence and retaliation. It is all one thing.<sup>235</sup>

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233 Buthelezi, M. G.: Summer camp, Amatigulu, 29.12.1985. HPD AK2810/C.

234 Mafole was one of the few examples that not all high-ranking Inkatha members were Zulu; Mafole identified as Tswana. Another example was Charles Manjanja, Inkatha Youth Brigade Regional Director in Ulundi who identified as Xhosa; Nkosi 2010.

235 Jeffery 1997, 73.

This makes it even clearer that ‘self-defence’ meant more than just preventing harm to oneself. Furthermore, it should be noted that Mafole did not necessarily speak of a payback towards the person that attacked him but towards anyone he deemed to be the enemy. Buthelezi, when questioned about this violence, answered that he “could not be responsible for everything done by the organisation’s million members.”<sup>236</sup> Oftentimes when confronted with very concrete accusations, any involvement by the IYB was denied, but in general the IYB National Chairman Musa Zondi admitted that violence also came from the Inkatha side:

We are here [...] to reply to the unfair allegation made so often against Inkatha that it and it alone is a violent organisation and that the UDF members are completely innocent and only their members die or are injured. This impression of course is completely untrue. Many Inkatha members have suffered as much as the UDF members have suffered.<sup>237</sup>

The IYB was accused of colluding with the police in its actions against political enemies which was constantly denied. Quite ironically, the IYB once sent out a press statement denying cooperation with the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police from a fax machine called “LoopstraatX” under the number 53676 – this fax machine belonged to the Security Branch of the South African Police based at Loop Street (today Jabu Ndlovu Street), Pietermaritzburg.<sup>238</sup>

At the same time, the IYB appealed to Whites for cooperation and in 1986 also praised the KwaZulu Natal Indaba.<sup>239</sup> Buthelezi and the IYB first reached out to the University of Potchefstroom in 1979 and a first meeting between the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) and the IYB materialised in 1980. In spite of further contact, relations worsened around the Ingwavuma land deal (see chapter 4.4), but relations improved in 1983 accompanied by visiting each other’s congresses.

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236 Ibid.

237 Zondi, Musa: Statement at a press conference, 12.11.1987. LO, 1.

238 New Nation 1990.

239 Bhengu 1986; The Citizen 1987a.

A joint committee of ASB and IYB was formed in 1984 for planning of further projects, but it is not clear how fruitful this actually was. Nevertheless, ASB and IYB held a joint congress in 1985 to discuss South Africa's political future; delegates agreed that mutual understanding and peaceful negotiations would be needed. The ASB preferred a federal/confederal state which the IYB could accept as a compromise. Disagreement, however, could be perceived when evaluating the causes of disparity in South Africa: Some Blacks blamed Afrikaners while some Afrikaners viewed Blacks as inferior.<sup>240</sup>

Apart from the ASB, Buthelezi and the IYB had good connections to the Progressive Federal Party Youth and to the Labour Party Youth. The IYB further entered an alliance with the South African Youth Foundation which then held a leadership course at the University of Zululand.<sup>241</sup>

Nevertheless, despite all the invoked discipline and unity, it was reported in the beginning of the 1980s that parts of the IYB attempted to move away from Buthelezi's course to more radical approaches in the struggle against apartheid, e.g. by supporting or not preventing school boycotts. This surely led to Buthelezi's repeated insistence on discipline.<sup>242</sup> Even more, this allegedly led to personal consequences:

According to Ziba Jiyane, the first national administrative secretary of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, when it was originally formed it was widely believed that it was necessary to work within the system as a means of convenience. However, after conflicts with Buthelezi over his "collaborative and reactionary tendencies", an antagonism developed between leading Inkatha Youth Brigade members and Buthelezi. The latter persecuted Jiyane and others, who were forced out of the organisation, and in some cases into exile.<sup>243</sup>

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240 Argus Correspondent 1985; Theron 1985.

241 Teague 1983, 25–26.

242 Ibid, 23–45.

243 Naidoo 1992, 153.

In the open, however, IYB representatives followed and echoed official Inkatha policy.<sup>244</sup> The resolutions at the IYB's Annual General Conferences also reiterated official Inkatha policy, including the official stance on non-violence, and praised Buthelezi.<sup>245</sup> The increasing levels of violence became a topic of internal discussions, as a fax by IYB National Chairman Musa Zondi to Buthelezi shows:

Ndebezitha, I am deeply concerned by reports of the rising spate of violent conflicts between our members and the supporters of the UDF-COSATU alliance. My deepest concern stems from reports which allege Inkatha to be on the forefront of these ugly things. For instance, the following incidents are alarming:

Assaults to people by Inkatha members in the Inanda area led by such people as Mr Shabalala and Mr Jamile on Sunday.

Attacks at about 4 am this morning in the Inanda Area again led by Mr Shabalala which resulted in several people being killed and no less than ten children of plus or minus 2 years old savagely killed with spears, axes and pangas. These are reported to have been killed after their parents fled the houses and as the children woke up crying after their parents, our people were heard shouting "Asizibulale lezizingane ngoba ziyinzalo yamaqabane".<sup>246</sup> [...]

I am terribly concerned about the image of the Movement under the circumstances. It is really at stake. While we uphold the position that it is our inalienable right to defend ourselves when attacked, I do not believe there was a case of self-defence in the Inanda incidents. If it is true that children were killed, just how does one defend oneself against babies of two years or so.

I submit that I might be ill-informed, but pending information to the contrary I now strongly believe that some of our members have found a pastime in killing other people as long as those people are not Inkatha, that seems to be enough basis for taking their lives.

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244 See, e.g., *Work in Progress* 1987.

245 See, e.g., *Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference*, 02./03.07.1988. EGM N968.3 INK.

246 An explicit command to kill the children.

My view is that we need as a Movement to make a strong statement disassociating ourselves from the perpetrators of these crimes and push hard that these people be brought to justice. I am worried because our Disciplinary Committee seems to be lax about this behaviour of some of our members. [...] <sup>247</sup>

A hand-written note by Buthelezi on the fax states that he inquired with Jamile who denied everything. Buthelezi then wrote about Zondi: "This disturbs me if some of our people are now beginning to swallow our enemies' propaganda." <sup>248</sup>

Sadly, this kind of internal source is a rare occurrence. It does, however, allow us to see that some leading Inkatha members were concerned about the violence that was perpetrated by Inkatha members and exceeded self-defence. Thomas Shabalala was especially infamous for being a violent warlord and had been excluded from the Inkatha Central Committee in May 1988, seven months before Zondi sent the above fax. <sup>249</sup> Thus, it seems that at least some Inkatha leaders abhorred violent clashes and wanted to act against them.

In the beginning of the 1990s, the IYB still called for peace but also to the government and the ANC to acknowledge Inkatha's role in the national negotiations. The training programmes described above also continued focusing on political education and leadership training. <sup>250</sup> Nevertheless, the IYB was also important in the formation of 'self-protection units', i.e. (armed) units that upheld order and Inkatha control in the struggle with the ANC and its allies. <sup>251</sup>

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247 Zondi, Musa: The rising spate of violence in the Durban-Pietermaritzburg area, 20.12.1988. SAHA AL3456/88 SEC-12.

248 Ibid.

249 Cooper, et al. 1989, 107; Freund 1996, 182.

250 Inkatha Freedom Party Youth Brigade: Annual Conference: Report, 04–06.09.1992. EGM N329.968 INK.

251 Buthelezi, M.G.: Youth action for survival and democracy in the face of failing peace initiatives, 05.09.1992. HPD A1045; Inkatha Freedom Party: Annual Youth Conference, 06.09.1992. EGM N329.968 INK.

### 4.2.2 Women's Brigade

*The backbone of the Nation are the womenfolk whatever the male Chauvinists care to say.*<sup>252</sup>

Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi

Two years after Inkatha had been founded as a 'National Cultural Liberation Movement' in KwaZulu, the Inkatha Women's Brigade (IWB) was launched in May 1977 at the Inanda Seminary near Durban. The national organiser at its inception was Daphne S'bongile Nene, a sociologist from the University of Zululand.<sup>253</sup> A 1978 newspaper article names Anastasia Thula, trained nurse and wife of Gibson Thula, as secretary-general.<sup>254</sup> Throughout most of the 1980s, Abbie Mchunu was chairperson until being succeeded by Elizabeth Bhen-gu in 1989.<sup>255</sup> The IWB's uniforms were very similar to the ANC Women's Brigade's uniforms and included a badge of Buthelezi as the image below shows.<sup>256</sup> Just like it was the case with the IYB, its secretary-general was appointed by Buthelezi who also needed to approve of each conference's programme. From 1979, the IWB was officially placed under Buthelezi's control; it had been under the control of the Central Committee before (which, nevertheless, was also appointed by Buthelezi and followed his orders).<sup>257</sup>

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252 Buthelezi, M.G.: Youth Brigade Inaugural Conference, 11.02.1978. APC PC140/2/9/4/2, 10.

253 Hassim, Shireen: Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 59.

254 The Star 1978.


255 Buthelezi, M.G.: Address to the Women's Brigade Annual General Conference, 14.10.1989. EGM N968.300994 BUT, 1.

256 Hassim 1990, 103.

257 Buthelezi, M.G.: Distribution of Indaba material at Inkatha conferences (to Dawid van Wyk), 07.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/19; Hassim, Shireen: Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 103; Mdluli 1987, 67.

At the inaugural congress, Buthelezi did not yet assign specific tasks to the IWB. Instead, in a more general manner, it was meant to play an important, active role in the liberation struggle and work as an organising force:

The people of South Africa must be mobilised in the name of liberation. They must be organised and they must be given jobs to do in the struggle for liberation. The people cannot be mobilised and organised and put to work building a better South Africa if the women do not rally their menfolk and their children, and if they do not organise themselves into a disciplined work force for justice.<sup>258</sup>



**Figure 19: An IWB member takes notes at an Inkatha gathering. Undated.**

Nevertheless, this phrasing makes it clear that the IWB would carry out tasks given to it by the leaders and would have to organise men and children. This foreshadowed a trend which became clearer during the following years, namely that men and the youth were active in politics and women were only meant to assist them in doing so.<sup>259</sup> In his speech, Buthelezi further damned the inequalities between men and women emanating from the Natal Code which he and Inkatha attempted to change. Legal equality of men and women was a defined goal of Inkatha.<sup>260</sup> Indeed, men and women became legally equal (including equal pay in the civil service) in KwaZulu in 1981,

258 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening address: inaugural national conference of the Women's Brigade, Inanda seminary, 27.05.1977. HPD A1045, 2.

259 See also his speech on the next day: Buthelezi, M.G.: Address to the Inkatha Women's Brigade inaugural congress, Inanda Seminary, 28.05.1977. HPD A1045.

260 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening address: inaugural national conference of the Women's Brigade, Inanda seminary, 27.05.1977. HPD A1045.



as soon as it was possible for the KLA to introduce such changes.<sup>261</sup> This was then criticised in a patriarchal vein as being untraditional, but the KwaZulu government argued that Shepstone's Natal Code had artificially frozen a hierarchic version of traditional law when it was written down and had prevented further development, and it eventually succeeded in changing KwaZulu legislation.<sup>262</sup>

Later in 1977, Buthelezi made the objective of the IWB clearer:

On the women's brigade is placed the instructive task of mobilising our womenfolk, and the task of the upbringing of the children towards the objectives of the movement. It is a people's struggle and the people determine what should be done. [...] This role is not assigned by us to the Women of our Nation. It is a task which God in His divine wisdom gave to our women, when He gave them motherhood. No house can stand without a proper foundation. The foundations of every human being are laid within in the very beings of our Womenfolk.<sup>263</sup>

The women of the IWB thus were by definition all mothers or mothers-to-be (girls rather became part of the IYB) who were meant to raise, educate and discipline their children in accordance with Inkatha's policy. This was an attempt to prevent school boycotts and riots by the youth like in Soweto 1976 but also to keep the youth away from the ANC's armed struggle. Religion helped to bolster an image

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261 The process of reviewing the legal role of women had been initiated by the KwaZulu Executive Councillor for Justice, Walter S.P. Kanye, and seconded by Buthelezi in 1974; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Verbatim Report 4, 03.-17.05.1974. LL, 62–73.

262 Buthelezi, M. G.: Inauguration of the Buthelezi branch of the Women's Brigade, Mahlabatini, 13.09.1981. CC KCM43087/298; Hassim, Shireen: Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 85–95; Inkatha: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 1981. APC PC126/3/17, 3; Kane-Berman 1982, 163; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 67.

263 Buthelezi, M. G.: Women's Brigade first annual general conference, opening address, 29.10.1977. CC KCM30016/129, 2.

of women as mothers who were important but in the background.<sup>264</sup> During the following years, it became more and more explicit that the youth were to struggle and the women to assist.<sup>265</sup>

The roles were clear: “You in the Women’s Brigade must accept the need to be the servants of the masses.”<sup>266</sup> Consequently, the IWB’s delegates resolved that all members should have clean homes, discipline their offspring, and care for their families and communities.<sup>267</sup> This was usually regarded as a ‘return’ to a better past: “Many white people talk glibly of how immoral blacks are and yet no society was as upright and as pure as our society before we were subjugated by the whites.”<sup>268</sup> Through this imagination of a harmonic past, a conservative ideal for the present and future was created.<sup>269</sup>

Now, in 1979, the other, very practical side of the IWB’s activities also became clearly defined (and it was developed further during the 1980s): self-help, or as the IWB put it: “bread and butter problems”.<sup>270</sup>

The Women’s Brigade must be involved with the youth Brigades and others in digging wells and lavatories in building class-literacy training. Don’t plead poverty; don’t ask for money. Place your members in communities. Let them stand there with the people and do that which the people can themselves manage. [...] Don’t employ money; employ your bare hands, your wisdom, your

264 At various IWB conferences, Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu also addressed the gathered women and prayed, sometimes in English and sometimes in isiZulu; see his speeches/prayers in CC KCM98/3/12 and KCM98/3/53.

265 Buthelezi, M. G.: The power of women in the struggle for liberation. Women’s Brigade third annual conference, Ondini, 15.12.1979. CC KCM43082/226, 7.

266 *Ibid.*, 10.

267 See, e.g., Inkatha Women’s Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 09.-11.10.1981. APC PC126/3/17; Inkatha Women’s Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 19.-21.10.1984. APC PC126/3/17.

268 Buthelezi, M. G.: Address to the Inkatha Women’s Brigade inaugural congress, Inanda Seminary, 28.05.1977. HPD A1045, 5.

269 See also Hassim 1993, 5.

270 Inkatha Women’s Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 09.-11.10.1981. APC PC126/3/17, 1.

muscles, your brains. Find the comradeship of being poor together and doing something about it.<sup>271</sup>

Over the years, a huge variety of (economic) self-help initiatives was realised. Resources were pooled and skills shared (which included literacy programmes), community gardens and bakeries were run to combat food shortages, and handcraft groups generated additional cash income. This was usually assisted by officers of the KwaZulu government or the KwaZulu Development Corporation<sup>272</sup> who then could also exert control over the projects and members.<sup>273</sup> The latter produced, according to Buthelezi, various goods and clothing through knitting, crocheting, spinning, and weaving.<sup>274</sup> All these products were then proudly presented and sold at the IWB's Annual General Conference as the images below testify. There was, however, the perception that all these self-help schemes benefitted only some women, mostly the already privileged ones, leading to further stratification of Zulu women.<sup>275</sup> Shireen Hassim explains the partial focus on handcraft by pointing at idealistic, Christian images of domesticity which see women sewing in their homes.<sup>276</sup>

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271 Buthelezi, M.G.: The power of women in the struggle for liberation. Women's Brigade third annual conference, Ondini, 15.12.1979. CC KCM43082/226, 16–17.

272 One example, the Umgababa sewing circle, will be analysed in chapter 4.3.1 on the KwaZulu Development Corporation/KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation.

273 Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 61–71; Hassim 1993, 3.

274 Buthelezi, M.G.: Preparing for the challenges of a new liberated South Africa during the present political impasse when there is failure to get the politics of negotiation on track and the challenges the black women of South Africa face in refusing to abandon hope, 08.10.1988. HPD A1045, 7.

275 Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 73.

276 Hassim 1993, 3.



Figure 20: IWB tent at Inkatha's Annual General Conference July 1987.  
Photographer: Lynn Oakley.



Figure 21: IWB member presenting self-made goods. Inkatha Annual General Conference 1987. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

After the flood disaster of 1987, the IWB was active in aiding the affected people and in rebuilding what had been destroyed. Victims of violence were also supported by the IWB.<sup>277</sup> The IWB chairperson Abbie Mchunu stated in 1988:

Let us use our humanitarian approach of helping each other. Nobody should go to bed on an empty stomach. Simple 'mahewu' with soya beans is enough to feed a nation. Our gardens should have vegetables that are easily shared with other people, for example, Imbuya and New Zealand spinach.

Let us teach others the skills that we have, organise soup kitchens for the unemployed, build up clothing banks for disaster care, give extra-mural lessons to students, teach job skills such as carpentry, welding, sewing and knitting. Let us organise firms to sponsor training centres, classrooms, bursaries and educational trips. We have to stretch ourselves where no government is available. Let us volunteer to help each other in the hour of need, irrespective of colour, race, organisational or religious affiliations.<sup>278</sup>

Thus, although the business community aided the IWB (e.g. the Anglo American Corporation<sup>279</sup>), most of the work was done by the IWB members in the form of self-help projects. Surely this added an economic incentive additional to political reasons to join the IWB. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most discussions in the IWB were centred around the violent conflict in Natal and women were portrayed as peacekeepers that were meant to pacify the youth.<sup>280</sup> All the while, the IWB was in line with Buthelezi's policy. Although women

277 The Inkatha Institute for South Africa 1989, 52–54.

278 Ibid, 54.

279 Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 72.

280 Buthelezi, M.G.: *Address to the Women's Brigade Annual General Conference*, 14.10.1989. EGM N968.300994 BUT; Buthelezi, M.G.: *The role of women in the Inkatha for black South Africa*, 13.10.1990. HPD A1045; *Inkatha Women's Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference*, 14.10.1990. EGM N329.968 INK; *Inkatha Women's Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference*, 09.-11.10.1992. HPD A1045.

played an important role as the ‘backbone’ of Inkatha and the IWB was a large wing of Inkatha, in some calculations the largest,<sup>281</sup> they were not represented in Inkatha’s leadership proportionally which the IWB’s Faith Gasa admitted openly in 1991.<sup>282</sup>

In her study of the violence in the years 1990 to 1994, Jill Kelly observes that, in Zulu culture, women were indeed seen as peacemakers and innocent victims, not only by Buthelezi and Inkatha. Thus, what usually was typical of Zulus – the image of proud warriors – just referred to men. Of course, Zulu women nevertheless saw themselves as Zulu, but they also played their role in the continuation of this image despite the pleas for peace.<sup>283</sup>

Although Buthelezi presented the IWB as homogenous and united, Zulu women, including the ones in the IWB, of course were individual agents pursuing their own aims. Women in the IWB did not see it as a means of oppression but they *wanted* to fulfil the role ascribed to them as Christians, homekeepers, and mothers. For them, (female) Zuluness was not about fighting but about exercising spiritual and mourning practices, about caring for husband and children and protecting them, resulting in quite complementary gender roles. These male and female roles were actively constructed by women but also subverted, e.g. when Zulu women acted as auxiliaries, disguised their sons as daughters, or persuaded their husbands to run away instead of fighting.<sup>284</sup>

At the same time, many young men attempted to assert their dominance by subjugating all women through violence including rape which contradicted *ukuhlonipha* and further shook gender relations. The IWB can thus be seen as a means to restore safety for themselves

281 The Inkatha Institute gives the following figures: 1985: IYB 438.936; general membership 323.466; IWB 392.732; total 1.155.134. 1987: IYB: 586.951; general membership 1.544.609; IWB 556.060; total 2.687.620. 1989: IYB: 718.875; general membership 555.258; IWB 464.048; total 1.738.181. As mentioned before, Inkatha membership figures have to be treated cautiously; Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade, 1976 to the Present, 1990*. CC T 968.3 HAS, 6–7.

282 Gasa 1991.

283 Kelly 2015, 179–180.

284 *Ibid*, 184–192.

and their daughters among with Zulu traditions; discourses did not only originate from men but also from women who wished to use the IWB according to their own needs.<sup>285</sup> Shireen Hassim introduces two members of the IWB (and their respective stories) that she interviewed in the late 1980s for her thesis. Extracts will be quoted in the following paragraphs.

Albertina Mnguni was born in 1926. Trained as a teacher, she found the pay insufficient and therefore changed her profession and became a nurse. In 1965, she formed the Zamokahle (“Try your best”) Women’s Welfare Society in KwaMashu together with women from the YWCA and other church groups. In 1969, with the help of lawyers and the KwaMashu township manager, the group was registered as a welfare organisation. With the support of the city council and, from 1973, the Port Natal Administration Board the organisation built two creches.

Albertina Mnguni stood for election to the KwaMashu Community Council in 1972 as she felt that “women were getting insufficient protection from men for their rights and causes... If we women – black and white – worked together we could achieve a lot more in fundamental issues. What man knows what it’s like dragging a small child around town when there are no public toilets for example.” She won the election against competition from two other male candidates. She encountered some resistance to her election from men because “... our black men are still having that a woman’s place is in the kitchen.” [...]

The establishment of the Women’s Brigade was the culmination of the activities of women like Albertina Mnguni. For her, it was important for women to organise and to counter the negative influences of “western civilisation”. Although active in promoting the position of women, she also maintained that “I may be civilised but I don’t want to cut away from my customs and my culture”. On the one hand, she was concerned about the decline of Zulu

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285 Bonnin 2000, 301–309; Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 63–64; Hassim 1993, 9–12.

customs among the youth and supported the active intervention of mothers in this regard. On the other hand, she was a proponent of the right of women to control their bodies. She supported birth control, even though the majority of black men, including her husband, opposed it: “I have to hide it as much as I can because if he [her husband] can discover it then he can divorce me, he can beat me, he can do anything, you know.”<sup>286</sup>

Albertina Mnguni is one example showing that Inkatha and the IWB could also appeal to more progressive and urban township dwellers, not only to rural women (who nevertheless made up the majority of the IWB). The IWB was a possibility for women to organise themselves, to make their voices heard by the political leaders, and to fight for their rights. This was a more political reason to join the IWB, but others also joined out of economic interests:

Ms Mcoyi trained as a nurse and wished to study further but was forced by her father to join his business in Hammarsdale in 1972. She learnt silkscreening as a hobby and then, with the help of her father, turned this hobby into a small scale part-time business. In 1973, she joined Inyanda (Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce) and as a result, was granted a loan by the KwaZulu Development Corporation to invest in her business. Her major enterprise became the making of Inkatha uniforms.

She has adopted a strong stance on the position of women, arguing women should now prove that they can do things on their own without the help of men.’ However, she has acknowledged the limitation on women’s entrepreneurial activities:

“I’m still having that problem of getting women and especially married women [to join her clothing business]. They are not really free to do this. They must get permission from their husbands... and yet single girls don’t really have any money to invest in this type of business. Well, if I can’t really find women to involve in

286 Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 64–65. Original additions.



my business I'm forced to get men but that's against my will. For business purposes I'd be forced to do that."

She feels that women want more freedom "but men are not flexible, they want to retain control. Even when the woman is working and the man is not, he still wants to take control over her salary. And he still doesn't take over domestic chores."

The revival of customs and traditions has little resonance for women such as Ms Mcoyi for whom membership of Inkatha has produced economic benefits. It does provide a means by which some women can argue for emancipation of women from economic restrictions.<sup>287</sup>

In all, it can be observed that the IWB's members played an important role for Buthelezi and Inkatha, albeit in the background, at the 'home front', and not in the open political struggle. Consequently, their representation in Inkatha's leadership was limited and their actions in the IWB controlled from above. As Buthelezi made it explicit, they were meant to be witnesses of the struggle, not agents – as "servants of the masses" they were important, but they were also told what to do. In this sense, they were first of all important in their relations to men as wives and mothers of warriors whom they should feed and take care of.<sup>288</sup> Not all women joined the IWB out of political convictions, some joined due to material benefits, some for protection.<sup>289</sup> The IWB members were engaged in several self-help projects for the economic advancement of KwaZulu while they were, at the same time, mothers that were meant to control the youth.

The Youth Brigade also was a means to control and train the youth, uphold order, and work for the (economic) development of KwaZulu through self-help-projects. We will now turn to economic development as a policy of the KwaZulu government.

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287 Ibid, 66. Original additions.

288 See also Hassim 1988, 8; Maré 1992, 68.

289 Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 7.

### 4.3 Development of the Economy

‘Development’ has been a keyword in the chapters above regarding society and culture through Inkatha’s education and culture policy, but it has also been a key topic regarding economic development for the Inkatha Women’s and Youth Brigades.<sup>290</sup> The KwaZulu government funded many development initiatives in both agriculture and industry that were meant to improve the everyday lives of KwaZulu citizens; new vocational schools were built that supplied the economy with skilled labourers. This chapter, therefore, is divided into two parts, first covering both vocational training and supporting local, small-scale initiatives like sewing circles and (subsistence) agriculture. The second part of the chapter will focus on the industrialisation programmes. We will see that economic development was meant to be part of the struggle for liberation on all fronts – for liberation from oppression in the economy, in politics, and culture.<sup>291</sup>

The 1970s saw a large increase in unemployment due to a growing population and a turn to capital-intensive production that demanded fewer, but more skilled workers.<sup>292</sup> Unemployed workers, classified as Africans, were moved to the homelands by force, away from the industrial centres. From the mid-1970s, however, other Southern African states prohibited labour migration to South Africa, generating a labour shortage, prompting the business community and the government to turn to the homelands again, internalising its labour.<sup>293</sup> Border industries, namely the building of factories right at the homelands’

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290 We will later see that development was also an important topic for the Buthelezi Commission (see chapter 5.2.1) and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (see chapter 5.2.2), just in line with international discourses at the time as explained in chapter 2.4. Although development discourses were at its height in 1980s’ South Africa, these were not new to the KwaZulu government.

291 See, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: At the handing over ceremony and opening of the training centre: Inhlabamkosi Yase Msunduze, Ndwedwe District, 20.02.1976. CC KCM30011/58; Buthelezi, M.G.: Education in the totality of the struggle for liberation. The handing over of Ezakheni Technical College, Ladysmith, 22.04.1983. DocAfr Acc 8.

292 Posel 1984, 5.

293 Evans 2019b, 98.

borders on the South African side so that homeland dwellers could commute to these factories, were created. The demand for skilled labour was met by the business community, e.g. through the South African Sugar Association, by building training centres itself to recruit skilled personnel already in the 1970s, but Buthelezi also made the topic a focal point of his and (later) Inkatha's policy.<sup>294</sup>

During a visit to the United States in 1972, Buthelezi discussed the topic of economic development and industrialisation and, differing from later years, stated that this would not necessarily have to happen in a capitalist, free-enterprise environment. Whether the state or private entrepreneurs would develop KwaZulu would be the decision of the Zulu people and would be determined by which promised to be most effective. While this did not actually rule out a planned economy, Buthelezi also envisioned a 'Zululand Development Corporation' run by Zulus for Zulus which was to replace the existing Bantu Development Corporation (that was run by Whites who were keen to profit from it, Buthelezi complained). One unnamed man from the audience remarked that a black American was going to launch a company in KwaZulu which was, after some profit for the founder, going to be taken over by Zulus. This discussion in 1972 foreshadowed what was to come later: The state would become active in the economy, albeit with private partners, through a development corporation; businessmen from outside KwaZulu were to launch companies that were later taken over by Zulus (the so-called 'tripcos', see below).<sup>295</sup>

At this point, however, Buthelezi seemed more radical than during the 1980s as we will later see in this chapter. Not only was he open to other economic systems as alternatives to capitalism, he also openly rejected the South African government's plan for border industries.<sup>296</sup> In later years, Buthelezi ceased criticising this approach, and advertisements by Siemens for border industries even made their way into KwaZulu government publications.<sup>297</sup>

294 Buthelezi, M. G.: At the handing over ceremony and opening of the training centre: Inhlabankosi Yase Msunduze, Ndwedwe District, 20.02.1976. CC KCM30011/58.

295 Buthelezi 1972b.

296 Ibid, 18–24.

297 See, e.g., KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1974. UNISA libr. 351.684025 KWAZ,

In 1972, SPRO-CAS<sup>298</sup> and the Christian Institute issued a publication called 'Black Viewpoint', edited by Steve Biko, that was centred around development issues. The publication contains a speech by Buthelezi to the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce on 16 June 1972. Buthelezi made it clear that a prerequisite for economic development and independence was the consolidation of the fragmented KwaZulu homeland. Only an enlarged KwaZulu that formed one single entity inside Natal would be economically viable and able to develop. As a result of a former workshop,<sup>299</sup> Buthelezi presented a new differentiation of his policy: both KwaZulu as a territory and the Zulu people needed to develop or be developed. Thus, the consolidation of KwaZulu was not enough, the Zulu people needed access to training and better wages that would allow accumulation of wealth and the development of KwaZulu's own economy instead of relying on migrant labour.<sup>300</sup>

For the sake of clarity, these two threads are separated in this chapter. It will start with vocational training for use on the job market that KwaZulu citizens were to receive and the support offered to their daily work and small-scale initiatives. The (envisioned) development towards an industrialised economy will be covered in the second part of the chapter.

Buthelezi admitted that the citizens of KwaZulu mostly had no experience in large-scale agriculture that aimed at producing cash revenue and was to compete with white-owned farms:

This is a complex operation for a peasant people such as we are. A black Cane farmer suddenly finds himself face to face with problems which are new, and which without any know-how, he can hardly even begin to tackle. He finds that unlike planting a patch of mealies or corn, he must determine how much cane he culti-

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32; KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1975. UNISA libr. 351.684025 KWAZ, 32.

298 Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society.

299 Buthelezi, M. G.: Towards comprehensive development in Zululand. A working conference. Opening address at the Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, Durban, 09.02.1972. HPD A1045.

300 Buthelezi 1972a.

vates on the basis of a quota, he is entitled to deliver to the mill. He finds that he needs money for cost of development if he must get the best yields from his canefarm. He needs special knowledge of his cane crop. Much more labour is needed if his cane farming is to be any success at all. [...]

I have just said a little earlier, that Africans are often ridiculed for failing to till the land better, than all the other race groups. Africans are expected to do by magic, what all farmers can only accomplish through money, hard work and expertise.<sup>301</sup>

Thus, expertise and probably funding from outside KwaZulu were to be brought in, but development itself remained the task of KwaZulu citizens through “hard work. There is no other magic, no other trick, no gimmicks. [...] No expertise, no mechanisation, no money can replace hard work.”<sup>302</sup> We will see that this combination of external expertise, oftentimes from Whites, and internal work did not only apply to training but also to the running of businesses. To this end, training centres were erected and run by the KwaZulu government in cooperation with the (white) business community.

One of the most prominent examples was the Mangosuthu Technikon, today’s Mangosuthu University of Technology. Funded mainly by Anglo American Corporation and De Beers under Harry Oppenheimer as well as other companies that also provided bursaries later, it was to provide technical and vocational training in Umlazi township near Durban. After being discussed for some years, the project of establishing the Technikon was led by Professor G.R. Bozzoli, former vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand, and the foundation stone laid on 23 July 1980. At the opening ceremony, Buthelezi again stressed the need for vocational training and development, rejecting school boycotts that would prove fatal in the long run, especially in a democratic South Africa – they would result in continued dependence on Whites. Only if Blacks advanced in all spheres, they

301 Buthelezi, M. G.: At the handing over ceremony and opening of the training centre: Inhlabankosi Yase Msunduze, Ndwedwe District, 20.02.1976. CC KCM30011/58, 7–8.

302 Ibid, 16.

could be liberated and all South Africans could live as equals. Indeed, Buthelezi quoted an opinion poll showing that Blacks actually demanded better education for better chances on the job market.<sup>303</sup>

As we have seen, KwaZulu's own development agency had already been envisioned in 1972. Lawrence McCrystal, the KwaZulu Development Corporation's first chairman, recalls that Buthelezi had observed the work of the Lesotho National Development Corporation that McCrystal had set up with Anton Rupert and Professor Owen Horwood in 1967. Thus, McCrystal remembers, Buthelezi approached him to do the same for KwaZulu but without any interference or assistance of the central state which would have made the KDC an apartheid institution in Buthelezi's eyes. McCrystal convinced Buthelezi that although financing would partly come from Pretoria, the KwaZulu government would have full control over the KDC's personnel and operations. The KDC was then launched on 01 April 1978 "to further economic development"<sup>304</sup> in cooperation with the South African government, thus providing additional funds, and McCrystal became chairman of the board of directors which was shared by Whites and Zulus.<sup>305</sup> Development funding had previously been run by the Bantu Investment Corporation, from 1977 under the name of Corporation for Economic Development (CED) of the Republic of South Africa, largely out of Buthelezi's control, from which the KDC bought most assets and liabilities, but the industrial hubs were excluded (see below). McCrystal had good connections to the CED, making the takeover and further cooperation easier, and was the director of the Industrial Development Corporation, offering the KDC good connections at its start.<sup>306</sup>

303 Bozzoli 1995, 316–321; Buthelezi, M. G.: Education as an agency for change in the black liberation struggle, the laying of the foundation stone of Mangosuthu Technikon, Address, 23.07.1980. DocAfr Acc 8, 216.

304 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Its involvement and objectives in the development of KwaZulu, 1978. NLSA OP 11042, 5.

305 Most Zulu members were also members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and businessmen themselves; see, e.g., KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Annual Report, 1986. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

306 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1979. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3; McCrystal, Lawrence: E-mail, 13.04.2018/21.05.2018.

He defined the KDC's aims as "to plan, co-ordinate, promote, carry out and stimulate the development of KwaZulu in the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, mining and other ventures". Its secondary objectives were "to create on its own, and through the agency of others, avenues of employment in order to increase the number of economically active people in KwaZulu".<sup>307</sup> It was further meant to support self-help projects, improve infrastructure (for commuters), and enhance research, teaching, and training.<sup>308</sup>

Buthelezi said about the KDC at the opening of the Holiday Inn Ulundi:

The establishment of KwaZulu's own Development Corporation with effect from the 1st April 1978, fills a long-felt need. I would like to remove any misunderstanding about the identity and role of the new Corporation. It is not as some would say, either the old Bantu Investment Corporation or the Corporation for Economic Development in a new guise. Neither does it have the same constitution. A glance at the identity of the members of the Board of Directors would remove any doubt about the future of the Corporation. Half of them are nominees of the KwaZulu Cabinet and the remainder too, have the interests of the Zulus at heart.

The main objective of the new Corporation or K.D.C. as it is better known, is to further the economic development of KwaZulu. It is in fact the economic arm of my government.<sup>309</sup>

Although Buthelezi had earlier, in 1972, stated that a market economy would not necessarily be the system of choice, the KDC officially dedicated itself to the promotion of the "involvement of the people of KwaZulu in the market-orientated economy" and of a "market-orientated agricultural sector".<sup>310</sup> The KDC's objectives were in line with the KwaZulu government's stance, although it has to be noted

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307 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Its involvement and objectives in the development of KwaZulu, 1978. NLSA OP 11042, 7.

308 Ibid.

309 KwaZulu Development Corporation: KwaZulu '80, 1980. LSL X Z PAM 87, 2.

310 Ibid, 4.

that the government aimed to “promote private enterprise within the framework of Zulu tradition”, but this was not explained any further,<sup>311</sup> and the government also pursued conservation of KwaZulu’s nature.<sup>312</sup> Throughout the 1980s, the KwaZulu government’s development policy was strongly based on the recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission<sup>313</sup> that will be discussed in chapter 5.2.1, namely to foster the economic activity of Zulus in agriculture, commerce, and industry through improved education and training, loans, and assistance in cooperation with the central state and the private sector that should launch an “affirmative action programme”.<sup>314</sup> The private sector, however, would not have to do so for humanitarian reasons alone but it would “take its fair return on investment”.<sup>315</sup>

The KDC assisted with expertise and gave out loans to farmers, farming cooperatives, and entrepreneurs,<sup>316</sup> it supported the construction of houses and flats, of a hotel (the Holiday Inn Ulundi), of a huge bakery, of supermarkets, and of shopping centres (at KwaMashu

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- 311 KwaZulu Government Service: White paper on development policy, 1986. CC KCM01/2/27/3.
- 312 Buthelezi, M. G.: Launch of the KwaZulu Conservation Trust, 17.11.1989. DocAfr Acc 8; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 51.
- 313 KDC officials, in turn, had given input to the commission: KwaZulu Development Corporation: Submission to Buthelezi Commission: KDC strategy for agricultural development, ca. 1981. APC PC144/10/5/4; van Aardweg: Submission, 12.06.1981. APC PC126/6/2; Olivier, M. J.: Suggestions on policies to resolve various economic problems in KwaZulu, 18.06.1981. APC PC126/6/7; Buthelezi Commission: Summary of evidence given by Dr. M. Spies, 08.07.1981. APC PC140/2/5/1.
- 314 KwaZulu Government Service: White paper on development policy, 1986. CC KCM01/2/27/3, 10.
- 315 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: KwaZulu-Natal: a regional focus, 1987. APC PC126/15/1, foreword.
- 316 Already in 1978, grants had been made for a butchery, a café, a recording studio, a general dealer, a chemist, a hairdresser, a restaurant, a welder, a bottle store, a cartage agent, a broiler farmer, a contractor, a furniture dealer, a beer hall, a garage, manufacturers, a fruit shop, a dry cleaner, and others. Loans for industry were expected to be granted in the near future; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Its involvement and objectives in the development of KwaZulu, 1978. NLSA OP 11042, 37.



and Umlazi).<sup>317</sup> While most economic activity in KwaZulu remained under control of the private sector, the KDC ran some businesses itself on the directive that the “Corporation’s ventures are therefore restricted to those activities which the private sector cannot or will not undertake.”<sup>318</sup> In the first years, the KDC ran two sorghum beer breweries,<sup>319</sup> beer distribution,<sup>320</sup> hotels and holiday resorts,<sup>321</sup> and buildings for letting.<sup>322</sup> In its second year of operation, the KDC established an agriculture department to assist farmers with expertise, a training division for vocational training and the KwaZulu Training Trust (see below), a programme for training in bookkeeping and stock control for entrepreneurs, and a bursary programme for studies in “physical sciences, mathematics or related fields, as well as in commerce, agriculture, engineering or in a technical direction”.<sup>323</sup>

At first this was met with resistance because some companies paid less than what would have been paid in Natal. In the case of the bakery, complaints about the bread’s inferior quality were numerous and, even more, it was rivalling a nearby, long-established bakery which was reportedly pressured by the KwaZulu government to close down. Other cases of harmful competition or a surplus in supply were reported. Additionally, Inkatha supporters were integrated in the new companies and acted as strike breakers. Thus, it seems that some of KwaZulu’s traders and entrepreneurs (the middle class or *petty bour-*

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317 Bonnin, et al. 1996, 165–166; Cooper, et al. 1984, 381; Gordon/Horrell 1980, 358; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 48; Maré 1978, 305; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 107–111; Randall 1983, 444.

318 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1979. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

319 These were located at at Ngwelezana and Madadeni.

320 These beer halls were privatised from 1985 to remove “unfair competition” to the private sector; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Annual Report, 1986. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 20.

321 The Executive Hotel at Umlazi, the Madadeni Hotel, and a seaside holiday resort at Umgababa.

322 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1979. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

323 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1980. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

*geoisie*, as it was called at the time) at first resisted Inkatha's development policy because it created competition. This resistance, however, declined during the course of the 1980s. Gerhard Maré argues that Buthelezi and Inkatha brought them into line through displays of power and through coercion.<sup>324</sup>

Inkatha and Inyanda<sup>325</sup> (the Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce) founded Khulani Holdings in 1979 with borrowed capital from the KDC. Khulani Holdings owned, inter alia, shares in a wholesale trading company, a chain of bookstores, and Khulani Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd. It was led by Buthelezi's ally Simon Conco in the beginning 1980s and offered high returns (a dividend of 10% in 1984 and 12% in 1985) for its shareholders – among the customers of said companies was the KwaZulu government itself, buying from its own companies. From its shares, Khulani Holdings had a capital of R500,000 in 1982.<sup>326</sup>

McCrystal resigned from his post in early 1981. When he was appointed to the President's Council, an advisory body that made recommendations on reform to Botha (leading to the tricameral parliament), the KwaZulu cabinet urged him to resign as this position was seen as unacceptable.<sup>327</sup> Buthelezi further complained about McCrystal (allegedly) stating that African leaders did not care about the rising birth rates which were becoming highly problematic for the economy; Buthelezi called this arrogant and untrue.<sup>328</sup>

McCrystal, however, recalls a back story of how the conflict started even before he was appointed to the President's Council. He was also chairman of the council of the University of Zululand where

324 Maré 1978, 304–307; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 111–112; Sitas 1986, 90–92.

325 Inyanda had been associated with Inkatha since 1976; Maré 1978, 304–307; Sitas 1986, 90–92.

326 Buthelezi, M. G.: Khulani Holdings Annual General Meeting, 28.08.1985. EGM N968.300994 BUT; Dhlomo, O. D.: Secretary-General's annual report, tenth anniversary conference, 28.-30.06.1985. APC PC126/3/17, 22; Langner, E. J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 89–90; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 113–115; Randall 1983, 433; Robertson 1982.

327 Horrell 1982, 304.

328 Buthelezi, M. G.: Achievement despite handicaps and the road ahead. Women's Brigade annual conference, Ondini, 10.10.1981. CC KCM53988/305, 16.

students rioted and demanded that Buthelezi resigned as chancellor of the university. Together with the vice-chancellor Professor Abraham Nkabinde and other officials, McCrystal met the rioting students and told them that the council would discuss their demands. Council decided not to ask Buthelezi to resign, but some students told KwaZulu government officials that McCrystal himself had agreed to ask Buthelezi to resign, outraging Buthelezi.<sup>329</sup> When McCrystal was appointed to the President's Council, this made matters even worse and surely offered an opportunity to remove him. He was succeeded by Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu, former Bishop of Zululand, Inkatha chairman, speaker of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and a member of the KDC's board of directors from its inception, thus a close ally of Buthelezi.<sup>330</sup> Shortly afterwards, on 09 February 1982, the KDC's first senior general manager, Dr. M.J. Olivier, passed away and was succeeded by Dr. Marius Spies as senior general manager on 01 July 1982, a position in which he remained at least until 1999.<sup>331</sup>

From its inception, funding for the KDC had mainly come from the central government's Corporation for Economic Development<sup>332</sup> as its shareholder (but it did not control the KDC's day-to-day business), from borrowings from the private sector, but also from interests in loans and through its own business. Since 1981/82, the central government had cut its development funds, bringing the KDC into financial trouble and reducing its annual expenditure.<sup>333</sup> To alleviate financial strain, the KDC first sold or closed down some of its companies and then became the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation in 1985. From now on, shares in the corporation were no longer owned by the central state but by the KwaZulu government and they

329 McCrystal, Lawrence: E-mail, 21.05.2018.

330 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1981. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ. On A.H. Zulu, see annex.

331 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 1; Buthelezi 29.05.1999; Ngwenya 24.10.2017.

332 The Development Bank of Southern Africa took over in 1983, but financing was structured in the same way.

333 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 2; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1983. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 2.

could also be bought by the private sector which was, of course, interested in revenue. The KFC remained under control of the KwaZulu government and its board of directors remained largely the same. It continued its operations as before and managed to attract new factories, e.g. the KwaZulu Shoe Company (owned jointly by the Bata Shoe Group and the KFC) which opened a new factory. The KFC now also controlled the industrial hubs described below.<sup>334</sup>

Until 1989, R1.2 billion had been invested; R597,8 million of these came from the private sector according to official figures, allocated to small agricultural and commercial initiatives,<sup>335</sup> housing, infrastructure, education and training, and industrialisation (see below for more details).<sup>336</sup>

In the financial year ending on 31 March 1988, R29 million had been loaned for construction of houses and earlier loans of R103.7 million for the same purpose had been extended. Additionally, the KFC's construction division had built 706 houses on its own with a market value of R25.1 million and, at the same time, was a means of training builders that would later be employed in the private sector.<sup>337</sup> After A.H. Zulu's death on 29 February 1988, T.P. Dube became the new chairman.<sup>338</sup> The beginning 1990s put the KFC under new financial strain because of economic recession and fewer outside investments coupled with a rapid population growth and violent clashes.<sup>339</sup>

334 Cooper, et al. 1985, 616–617; Department of Information, KwaZulu Government Service: Foreign investment – KwaZulu, 10.11.1975. CC KCM98/3/55; Königkrämer/van den Aardweg 1986, 1; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1983. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 2–3; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1984. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 2.

335 Support was especially given to promising, hard-working traders that were then able to expand their businesses and acquire modest wealth; these traders could also rent spaces in the newly constructed shopping centres; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: KwaZulu Review of Commerce and Industry, ca. 1989. CC F 330.9684 KWA, 43–45; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: The Developer 23, April–July 1987. APC PC126/15/1, 15.

336 KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1989. APC PC126/3/20, 163–165.

337 Ibid, 169.

338 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Annual Report, 1991. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

339 Ibid, 10–11.

Nevertheless, the KFC survived the political changes of the 1990s and is known as Ithala Development Finance Corporation Limited since 1999.<sup>340</sup>

#### 4.3.1 Vocational Training and Small-Scale (Rural) Development

In 1980/81, the KwaZulu Training Trust was inaugurated by the KwaZulu government in cooperation with the KDC and, from its inception, headed by KwaZulu Minister of Education and Culture Oscar Dhlomo. One important slogan at its opening was: “We do not ask for bread... only for the skill to produce it.”<sup>341</sup> This again emphasised that through education and training, Blacks were to become independent from Whites, thus liberating themselves.

The KwaZulu Training Trust, centred at Umgababa, gathered donations, and it was planned to become financially independent by solely using the capital's interest. Apart from training civil engineers, draughtsmen, and agricultural engineers, the trust offered courses in accounting and leading a business. It further aimed at improving teacher education, school equipment, and libraries. At its inception, the construction of three technical high schools, three technical orientation centres, and five technical institutes was planned – three training centres were eventually built at Umgababa, Fundikhono, and Umlazi, supplemented by mobile training units.<sup>342</sup> Furthermore, the trust and Toyota ran the Project Blue Collar aimed at improving technical education. To this end, a training centre at Ogwini

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340 <http://www.ithala.co.za/ithala/about-us/history>, last access on 14.05.2019. Note the factual error stating that the KDC had initially been under control of the Corporation for Economic Development. Ithala has not responded to my requests regarding permission to access their archives.

341 Buthelezi, M.G.: Inauguration of the KwaZulu Training Trust, Durban, 12.10.1981. CC KCM53988/307, 5.

342 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Annual Report, 1991. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 18; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 88–91.

Comprehensive School at Umlazi township was established, receiving additional funding from the South African Motor Corporation.<sup>343</sup>

Until 1983, the trust was part of the KDC, but then it became operationally independent albeit still partially financed by the KDC/KFC (in 1988, the KFC's funds amounted to one quarter of the trust's income, R3.8 million<sup>344</sup>). The trust remained connected to the KwaZulu government and aimed at an improvement of living conditions of its trainees, based on a market economy and entrepreneurship. To this end, research was conducted and the courses evaluated which now also included welding and housekeeping. Until 1990, 20,000 people were trained by the trust, but according to its Managing Director Brian Stewart, this was by far not enough to eradicate poverty and misery.<sup>345</sup>

In an evaluation in 1992, Doug Tilton came to the conclusion that the business community supplied funding for such initiatives due to a shortage of skilled labourers while the KwaZulu government wanted to reduce unemployment and gain more loyal taxpayers. Importantly, though, this was also a measure to educate industrious workers that would not go on strike and remain loyal and thankful towards their employers and the government. Nevertheless, Tilton found that inequality was often reproduced because the poorest of the poor were still unable to afford attending training courses instead of working.<sup>346</sup>

Throughout the 1980s, the KDC/KFC opened various other vocational training centres throughout KwaZulu with the aid of the business community and, where needed, white teachers to supply both the business community and the KwaZulu government with qualified employees.<sup>347</sup> In the period from 1979 to 1988, 2714 farmers, 3799

343 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1980. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3–4; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 88–91; Tilton 1992, 175.

344 KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1989. APC PC126/3/20, 169–171.

345 Tilton 1992, 175–176.

346 Ibid, 176–180.

347 Buthelezi, M.G.: Official opening of the KwaZulu Development Corporation training centre, Umgababa, 22.05.1982. HPD A1045; Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening of Mpumalanga workshop and training complex, 06.09.1985. HPD A1045; Buthelezi, M.G.: Official opening of the Fundikhono training centre, Umbumbulu,

retail merchants, 4146 artisans, and 1189 technical trainees had been educated at the training centres.<sup>348</sup> At the KAF-funded Inhlungwane Co-Operative Development Centre, training was coupled with research in community development, and accommodation was provided for its employees.<sup>349</sup> Apart from technical training, another programme became extensive: the sewing circles.

At grass-roots level, sewing circles were organised by the KDC to enable women to produce clothing for their own families and, possibly, to sell clothes to other members of the community. Ultimately, it was hoped, some trainees with “entrepreneurial talents”<sup>350</sup> would start their own small businesses. Initially, the Singer Sewing Machine Company agreed to train Zulu women on the provision that the KDC bought at least ten Singer machines. The KDC expanded the programme and took it into its own hands: The Sewing Circle Development Centre at Umgababa was founded to train members of sewing circles who were meant to pass on their knowledge when returning to their respective circles. A Sewing Circle Development Officer (later called Cottage Industry Development Officer) of the KDC visited sewing circles all over KwaZulu and assisted them practically but also brokered low-priced sewing machines, accessories, and repair. Due to the circles’ increasing success, more and more was produced and an assistant to the development officer employed.<sup>351</sup>

An internal report evaluated that the “success achieved with the project can be ascribed to the involvement of the women. The women finance and manage their own projects. The only cost involvement for the KDC is tied up in the salaries and travelling cost of the staff.”<sup>352</sup>

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18.09.1986. HPD A1045.

348 KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1989. APC PC126/3/20, 169–171.

349 Dhlomo, O. D.: Secretary-General’s Annual Report, Annual General Conference, 03.–05.07.1987. APC PC126/3/17, 10–14.

350 Natrass, Nicoli: Like Chalk and Cheese: an Evaluation of two KwaZulu Development Corporation Projects in Natal, 1984. EGM T 338.9683 NAT, 122.

351 Erasmus, W. P.: Cottage industries in KwaZulu. Broad outline of a scheme based on sewing circles, ca. 1981. APC PC19/5/1/2; Natrass, Nicoli: Like Chalk and Cheese: an Evaluation of two KwaZulu Development Corporation Projects in Natal, 1984. EGM T 338.9683 NAT, 122–124.

352 Ibid, 124.

Nicoli Natrass presents the Umgababa Sewing Circle Development Centre in her Master's thesis in some detail, so an overview can be given here. After the KwaZulu Training Trust was launched, the training centre at Umgababa was erected and offered its first courses in August 1981. Natrass describes the centre as follows:

The sewing centre is at present housed in an old mining building which is cylindrical in shape, thick walled and dank. The roof leaks, the lighting is poor and elect[r]ic overloading of inadequate facilities results in frequent power-cuts. The place is unsuitable at best.

Apparently a learning centre at Illovo has been promised, but continually postponed. [...]

Despite the poor environment, the students appreciate the opportunity to learn, and apply themselves well to the full and demanding programme. They often work late and over weekends to keep up to date, and the better students help and encourage the weaker ones. (I certainly battled with the work-load and survived only by the kind help of a more adept student!) There is an air of determination and co-operation evident on every course.<sup>353</sup>

Participation in the course cost R60 including everything but accommodation, although the head of the centre, Mrs Evans, tried to keep it as low as possible. This sum was hard to procure for many participants, but they knew that they were gaining future income potential. The postcards presented on the centre's walls indeed showed the gratitude of many graduates who now earned (part of) a living through sewing. Natrass describes the teaching as of very high standard, comprising lectures, videos, and individual interaction:<sup>354</sup>

However the most important part of the teaching process is the personal tuition by the black teachers in the practical work. They are kind, encouraging and adept. [...]

<sup>353</sup> Ibid, 125.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid, 125–126.



The head of the centre too is an asset in the teaching process. Although her major contribution lies in course design, she gives slow and clear lectures (with the help of Mrs Mweli as translator) and personally checks the students work.<sup>355</sup>

According to Natrass' evaluation, some graduates indeed turned to full-time sewing while many others used it to clothe their families and for additional income; about half of the graduates passed their skills on to family members or neighbours. Especially important was the archive of sewing patterns that all graduates were allowed to use and make copies of.<sup>356</sup> Entrepreneurs and sewing circles were assisted by the KDC's KwaZulu Garment Industries which secured large contracts for delivery of garments that the entrepreneurs and circles never could have entered. The garments were decentrally produced, collected and controlled by the KwaZulu Garment Industries, and then delivered.<sup>357</sup>

Inkatha and the KwaZulu government through the KDC/KFC not only supported sewing clubs but also small farmers in their daily work. Extension officers, especially of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, visited already existing farming associations and cooperatives and assisted them through expertise and connections – but many other small-scale initiatives existed that were not connected to the KwaZulu government.<sup>358</sup> The Inkatha Development Office's staff followed a similar strategy (see below).<sup>359</sup> The KwaZulu government took over the KwaZulu Savings Bank from the South African Corporation for Economic Development and renamed it Ithala Savings Bank that administered savings and gave out loans to small cooperatives, merchants, and entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it was repeatedly accused of giving loans mostly to Inkatha members.<sup>360</sup>

355 Ibid, 126.

356 Ibid, 127–156.

357 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 5.

358 Nene 1982, 9–28.

359 Du Toit 1983, 390; Langner, E.J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 89.

360 Cooper, et al. 1985, 602; Mkhosi 2000, 5–6; Padayachee 2000, 8, 20; Padayachee 2002, 157–158; Sherbut 2008, 40.

While only 20 loans had been given out in the financial year 1981/82, this number rose to 1156 in 1984/85, amounting to R521,000 for seeds etc. and R879,000 for machinery, especially tractors.<sup>361</sup> It proved to be problematic, however, for some farmers and entrepreneurs alike to be successful enough to pay off the loans, partly due to high interests of up to 9%.<sup>362</sup> Small-scale farmers thus needed to provide security and a life insurance if they applied for a loan of more than R1000, keeping the poorest out of the programme.<sup>363</sup> For the timespan from 1979 to 1988, the KDC/KFC gave out loans for agriculture amounting to R32 million and trained 2714 farmers through the KwaZulu Training Trust.<sup>364</sup> Additionally, the KDC/KFC ran the Basic Agricultural Services Programme, storing and selling fertiliser, seeds, and insecticides close to farming communities at lower prices. This was meant to alleviate transport problems of small farmers and to give them the same opportunities that white farmers in other regions enjoyed, but it also allowed the KwaZulu government to control local agriculture and reduce harmful competition, at least before the programme was privatised some years later. Large agricultural enterprises from outside KwaZulu usually were not supported because this had proven unsuccessful in Bophuthatswana where the local population did not benefit at all from such enterprises.<sup>365</sup> Thus, in agriculture, the state interfered in the free market for the benefit of the locals.

Near Mfume, 20 kilometres from the KwaZulu Training Trust's training centre at Umgababa, the trust ran an "agricultural demonstration project"<sup>366</sup> aimed at training farmers in modern methods and financing itself through the sale of produce; the project was evaluated by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University

361 Königkrämer/van den Aardweg 1986, 4. No loans were granted for sugarcane production as this would have interfered with other programmes and undermined food production.

362 Cobbett 1984, 377; Mkhosi 2000, 44.

363 Bates 1996, 124–125.

364 KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1989. APC PC126/3/20, 169–171.

365 Königkrämer/van den Aardweg 1986, 1–4; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: 1972–1982, 1982. APC PC126/3/20, 45–46.

366 Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal 1985, 1.

of Natal, Durban, under Lawrence Schlemmer. This gives us the opportunity to take a closer look at the project.<sup>367</sup> The project is described as follows:

The project, a 2 ha demonstration ‘farm’ was established as a model for a cost effective, homestead centred, integrated agricultural production unit. Best described as an ‘assisted self-help’ programme it was established in a necessarily ‘top-down’ initiative from the KDC in 1981. The original concept was adapted from experiments and similar developments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Briefly, the main organising principles are:

- i) At a total capital cost of R1590 an individual might, through the implementation of the variety of the agricultural production techniques demonstrated, establish himself as a full-time small farmer on 1 to 2 ha of allotted land, producing sufficient to satisfy all household consumption requirements, as well as produce a marketable surplus for sale.
- ii) Integrated agricultural development at this scale includes the raising of poultry, rabbits, pigs, sheep and goats – the utilisation of animal and bird waste for fertilising a vegetable garden and fruit orchard, and the establishment of a wattle woodlot for both firewood and sale.<sup>368</sup>

The farm was constructed on land in Thoyana Ward under a contract with inkosi Charles Hlengwa of Umbumbulu District. In the area, traditional, communal farming, betterment schemes,<sup>369</sup> and individual,

367 Ibid. See also KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 3.

368 Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal 1985, 3.

369 Upon its perception that African methods supposedly were inferior, the South African government forced western methods of farming onto homeland dwellers to reduce soil erosion and overgrazing (to “save the Natives”; Ntsebeza 2005, 108); this came along with forced resettlements away from scattered homesteads towards central villages and with a change from communal land to individual or familial landownership. Although, in theory, each family was to receive enough land for successful subsistence farming, many allocations were too small and

freehold farming took place at the time. Apart from subsistence agriculture, sugar cane was heavily grown.<sup>370</sup>

Initially, groups of schoolchildren, members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, and locals visited the farm to learn about efficient agricultural methods through explanations and demonstrations. To this end, the trust had three workers stationed at the farm that kept it running and guided the tours together with extension officers of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry. At the time of its evaluation in about 1985, however, no demonstrations were taking place at all and the locals only used it as a place to buy produce, seeds, and chickens.<sup>371</sup>

The CASS found that the dependency on migrant labour or employment in nearby towns marginalised the role of farming for households that rather invested their resources in transport and in training that was relevant for employment. Full-time agriculture was usually only pursued by pensioners or people without prospect of employment, the latter having no capital for any investments. The assistance of the South African Sugar Association and the local sugar mill in ploughing, planting, and harvesting sugar cane as a cash crop further made locals unwilling to plant other crops requiring more of their own labour.<sup>372</sup>

Evaluators further found that even many of the locals were not properly informed about the project and its possibilities; not even the extension officers of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry working in the area informed the locals they were assisting. Thus, the CASS scientists found that the project had only limited effects, namely on some local households that had taken up some

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other families even lost every access to land where betterment schemes were introduced; Kelly 2018, 108–113; Letsoalo/Rogerson 1982; Ntsebeza 2005, 108–121.

370 Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal 1985, 3–4.

371 *Ibid.*, 4.

372 *Ibid.*, 6–7. It should be noted that the white sugar industry was situated in Natal; KwaZulu's farmers received quotas from the sugar industry on how much they would be allowed to sell, thus indirectly expanding the white sugar industry to KwaZulu; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: *The Developer* 31, April-June 1989. CR periodicals, 10.

ideas and methods to supplement incomes from migrant labour. They found no household that actually turned to full-time agriculture by adopting the model that the KDC/KFC was running. Even more: At the time of evaluation, locals merely saw the model farm as a commercial venture where they could buy produce. In conclusion, the project had not met its goals.<sup>373</sup>

The CASS scientists recommended to operate small demonstration plots (instead of a whole farm) and to spread them all over the countryside for easier, ad-hoc access of training and supplies; this would also lead to an improved dissemination of knowledge about the project itself. Closer cooperation with the KwaZulu government would also be needed.<sup>374</sup>

The aforementioned Inkatha Development Office (IDO) was, unlike the KwaZulu government departments and the KDC, not tied to KwaZulu and could act in the whole of South Africa. In 1984, it was headed by M.V. Ngema, trained by the Canadian Coady Institute. It offered courses on the running of credit unions, established connections with other institutions, helped sewing circles, and also gave out loans to farmers and bulk buying groups; most of the trainees and debtors were Inkatha members, but not all of them.<sup>375</sup> The credit unions were especially used by somewhat more affluent people who could provide securities and had some capital to invest.<sup>376</sup>

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373 Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal 1985, 8–9.

374 Ibid, 10.

375 Nevertheless, one case is reported when a person from Soweto had to join Inkatha to become member of a credit union that the IDO had helped to launch. This went so far as to the person believing Inkatha was a company.

376 Dhlomo, O.D.: Tenth Annual General Conference, Secretary General's annual report, 22.-24.06.1984. CC KCM98/3/53, 9–10; Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17, 10–13; McCaul, Colleen: Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 21–25, 40–41.

### 4.3.2 Industrialisation and Large-Scale Development

While the methods and projects described above often aimed at supporting and improving already existing small-scale businesses and farms,<sup>377</sup> the KwaZulu government and the KDC/KFC also wanted to create something new: large industrial hubs away from Natal's cities in rural KwaZulu by taking them over from the Corporation for Economic Development and heavily expanding them. As we have seen above, industrialisation had been planned from the KDC's inception, and a distinction was made between small industries run by locals and spread around KwaZulu wherever they found customers, and large industries concentrated in industrial hubs.<sup>378</sup>

Small industries were supported with loans, similar to farms and shops, but also with pre-built factory flats of 90 m<sup>2</sup> that could be rented from the KDC/KFC and concentrated a number of (possibly interdependent) small industries on one site. Handicraft centres offered smaller premises of 25 m<sup>2</sup> for even smaller workshops and service contractors. Nicoli Natrass found in her abovementioned study that all entrepreneurs she met in these centres had received formal education; women were mainly working with leather and clothing while men covered all other small industries and services. Entrepreneurs and their employees were usually quite young; more men were working at the premises than women. All businesses, whether industries or services, were of Western style, no (what Natrass calls) traditional businesses like herbalists could be found. During her study around 1984, 38% of the businesses were making losses, 40% made minor profits, and only 22% made profits larger than R500 a month. Industries were most risky, thus they could yield the largest profits but were also prone to make losses; services were safest and usually yielded

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377 There were, however, some new large-scale sugarcane and rice plantations erected with the assistance of the KwaZulu government in KwaZulu; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: *The Developer* 23, April-July 1987. APC PC126/15/1, 10; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: *Annual Report*, 1986. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 8.

378 KwaZulu Development Corporation: *KwaZulu '80*, 1980. LSL X Z PAM 87, 27-29.

small profits. Problematic was, additional to the usual risks of business like finding not enough clients or a badly-run business, that some factory flats were built like a laager or wagon fort, thus being very unwelcoming; some handicraft centres were badly situated where there were not enough customers and infrastructure available.<sup>379</sup>

One example of successful small industry was Isaac Sithole's production of building blocks at Mondlo, some 30 km from Vryheid. He had started as a sole worker with hardly any equipment supplying building material for badly needed houses. Due to a loan from the KDC, he was able to buy professional equipment, bought the land he was operating on, and in the end hired 15 employees to supply KwaZulu with building material (now including bricks) at a low cost. A similar story was the one of cabinet-maker Sibosiso Twala who had been trained in Pinetown and had since started his own business under difficult circumstances. The KDC/KFC rented a small factory unit to him and granted him a loan for better equipment. Due to his high skills, he managed to expand his business and even export to Natal, making a larger factory, a delivery vehicle, and more equipment necessary. Due to the high quality of and the high demand for his cabinets and permanent contracts with white building contractors, Twala was able to employ 28 workers.<sup>380</sup>

While the necessary capital for small industries and services could be raised by KwaZulu's citizens, often from the middle class, and the KDC/KFC, this was impossible for large industries. Thus, a scheme was developed that had already been mentioned at Buthelezi's trip to the US in 1972: tripartite companies, or tripcos. From about 1975, tripcos had been founded on the model that (ideally) half of the necessary capital was raised by an outside, usually white businessman or a company under white leadership and the other half by the KwaZulu government or later by the KDC/KFC. Once the com-

379 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: The Developer 24, July-September 1987. APC PC126/15/1, 2-4; Natrass, Nicoli: Like Chalk and Cheese: an Evaluation of two KwaZulu Development Corporation Projects in Natal, 1984. EGM T 338.9683 NAT, 44-89.

380 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: The Developer 24, July-September 1987. APC PC126/15/1, 5.

pany had become profitable, the KDC/KFC sold its shares to KwaZulu citizens.<sup>381</sup> This was meant to give Blacks a share in the economy and to give the economy a meaning for Blacks, as Buthelezi explained: “Industry and Commerce must agitate for the inclusion of Blacks in their Ventures even in the so-called White areas, as an insurance for them. People will not resort to burning projects in which they are shareholders.”<sup>382</sup> After 20 years, both the KDC/KFC and the white businessman or company were meant to have sold all their shares to KwaZulu citizens, making it a private company owned by Blacks only who had now acquired the necessary expertise. Tripco’s were, however, not restricted to industry, they could also be formed for the creation of large service contractors.<sup>383</sup> Although this would give Blacks a share in South Africa’s wealth, Buthelezi knew that the trickle-down effect would not work, making the development programme for (small) entrepreneurs (including farmers) as described above necessary.<sup>384</sup> In the 1970s, Buthelezi described his view of economic change poignantly:

Whites have hoarded the wealth of South Africa for themselves for far too long. The signs of the times should teach us that it is absolute suicide for them to continue this any longer. There are many people in industry and Commerce who criticise the Government for refusing to share decision-making power with us in

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381 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1981. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 4; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 7.

382 Buthelezi, M.G.: A brief statement on the signing of tri-partite company agreements, 06.06.1977. DocAfr Acc 8, 1.

383 For example, a shopping centre, The Ondini Plaza, was erected at Ulundi as a tripco; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: *The Developer* 30, January-March 1989. CR periodicals, 2–5.

384 Kane-Berman 1982, 161–162; KwaZulu Development Corporation: *Development Action 1*, 1980. UNISA libr. DEVE, 6–10; KwaZulu Development Corporation: *Its involvement and objectives in the development of KwaZulu*, 1978. NLSA OP 11042, 39–41; KwaZulu Development Corporation: *KwaZulu ‘80*, 1980. LSL X Z PAM 87, 43–46.



Parliament. It is equally important for us to share decision-making as far as the economy of this Country is concerned.<sup>385</sup>

During the 1980s, Buthelezi no longer used such harsh rhetorics when he enjoyed even closer relations to the business community. A look at the companies located at Isithebe industrial estate in 1983 confirms Buthelezi's analysis of economic relations: All companies were run or owned by Whites.<sup>386</sup> The focus was on the creation of entirely new factories and jobs, not on moving existing factories to KwaZulu. To this end, the KwaZulu government and the KDC/KFC offered incentives in the form of tax reductions, offered pre-built sites, and improved existing infrastructure to cater for easy transport.<sup>387</sup>

Until 1988, 229 companies were active on KFC sites, 22 of these were from foreign countries, according to official figures. Investments totalled R892 million of which R575.8 million (65%) were from the private sector; about 38,000 jobs had been created. 20 companies actually were tripcos in which Blacks had shares and that employed 1251 Blacks.<sup>388</sup>

Three industrial hubs were taken over from the Corporation for Economic Development at Ezakheni, Isithebe, and Madadeni where the KDC/KFC catered for infrastructure and pre-built factories. Another one at Ulundi was added later. Throughout the 1980s, the KDC/KFC observed that more and more investment was coming from the private sector once the sites had been established (under South African homeland legislation, investors from outside KwaZulu were not allowed to buy land in KwaZulu and thus needed guarantees and long-term letting). At its inception, the Isithebe industrial estate had been under the responsibility of the central state's Corporation for Economic Development which hardly catered for housing or infrastructure for the workers (a total of 36 houses had been constructed

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385 Buthelezi, M.G.: A brief statement on the signing of tri-partite company agreements, 06.06.1977. DocAfr Acc 8, 2.

386 Corporation for Economic Development Limited: Isithebe industrial township, ca. 1983. CC PAM 338 ISI.

387 KwaZulu Government: Diary, 1989. APC PC126/3/20, 167.

388 Ibid, 167–171.

until 1983). When the KDC took over the full responsibility for the estate (and the other two) in 1984, it aimed at improving the living conditions of workers and their families with the aid of the KwaZulu government. From this point, the rate of industrialisation increased rapidly. At Ezakheni near Ladysmith,<sup>389</sup> linked by road and rail to both the coast and the PWV triangle, only four factories employing 500 workers had been established at the KDC's takeover – this number rose to 44 factories employing 8834 workers in 1987.<sup>390</sup>

To attract business, the KFC agreed to subsidise employees' wages (up to 95%), interests, and rents (both up to 70%); it also financed moving to one of its estates with up to R600,000. On the long run, it also offered a rebate on transport costs, a housing subsidy, and training grants – all these incentives had already been offered by the Corporation for Economic Development and were continued by the KDC/KFC.<sup>391</sup> Additionally, the KDC/KFC organised smooth cooperation with the KwaZulu government and evaluated business prospects.<sup>392</sup>

Isithebe, the largest industrial estate, had been founded in 1970 and grown ever since; its 100 companies occupied 450 ha of land in 1986 and were connected by road and rail to both the coast and the PWV area. It boasted all necessary infrastructure for the factories (transport links, electricity, water, sewers) and two banks. Apart from

389 'Ezakheni', or 'zakheni', can be translated to "build yourself"; <https://isizulu.net/?zakheni>, last access on 13.05.2019.

390 Corporation for Economic Development Limited: Isithebe industrial township, ca. 1983. CC PAM 338 ISI; KwaZulu Development Corporation: The Developer 12, Special Edition: Industrial Development in KwaZulu, 06.1984. APC PC126/15/1, 13–18; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Industry in KwaZulu: Ezakheni, July-September 1987. APC PC126/15/1; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: The Developer 24, July-September 1987. APC PC126/15/1, 6.

391 Corporation for Economic Development Limited: Isithebe industrial township, ca. 1983. CC PAM 338 ISI, 21.

392 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Industry in KwaZulu: Ezakheni, July-September 1987. APC PC126/15/1; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: KwaZulu: The industrial estates, 07.09.1987. APC PC126/15/1; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation 1986; KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Industry in KwaZulu: the establishment factors, 08.1986. APC PC126/15/1.

recreational facilities and schools for white businesspeople and their families, the KFC also ran multiple housing projects and a clinic for the workers (schools were, as usual, under the responsibility of the KwaZulu government). Similar facilities were offered at Ezakheni, Madadeni, and Ulundi.<sup>393</sup>

Among the trade unions organised in the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Isithebe was heavily criticised. Working conditions were harsh and wages low, and when the workers organised themselves in unions, they were not recognised by the companies and the workers dismissed – an easy move due to the high rate of unemployment in the area. UWUSA, the Inkatha-aligned trade-union, was reported to mobilise against other trade unions violently, to break strikes, and consequently was popular among employers. Trade unions further reported that the KFC always sided with the employers.<sup>394</sup> Buthelezi reacted to these accusations by explaining that the KFC “essentially [was] a landlord”,<sup>395</sup> but it would draw up a code of conduct with employers.<sup>396</sup> Nevertheless, complaints and criticism continued to be voiced.

The United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA) was founded on 01 May 1986 as an officially independent union, but from its inception, it had close links to Inkatha which mobilised its own members to support and join UWUSA.<sup>397</sup> Originally, Buthelezi attempted to build up good relations to existing unions during the 1970s and workers could be members of both Inkatha and a union under the independent Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). But since the trade unions had become more and more critical of him during the first half of the 1980s, an alliance seemed impossible – Inkatha members were then prohibited to become members of

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393 Ibid, 7–19.

394 Soni 1989.

395 Buthelezi, M. G.: Address to the board of directors of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Limited, Umlazi, 19.04.1985. HPD A1045, 3.

396 Ibid.

397 Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General’s annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17, 8.

an independent union upon the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985.<sup>398</sup>

UWUSA can thus be interpreted as Inkatha's counter-movement to COSATU that was meant to replace independent unions in KwaZulu and control the workers for the benefit of the government and the business community. Reports of the KwaZulu government or Inkatha funding the nominally independent UWUSA were numerous; UWUSA was led by Inkatha members and, remarkably, dominated by businessmen in its leadership – not what one might expect from a “workers’ union”. UWUSA's first general secretary was Simon Conco who headed Khulani Holdings, at least in the beginning 1980s, and had been Inkatha's chief whip in the KLA.<sup>399</sup> UWUSA and COSATU supporters repeatedly clashed violently; UWUSA for example managed to take over control of Hlobane colliery near Vryheid from the National Union of Mineworkers by means of terror: Eleven miners were killed and 115 injured in the clashes between UWUSA/Inkatha and COSATU on 06 June 1986.<sup>400</sup> The Truth and Reconciliation Commission later found that UWUSA also received funds from the South African Police's Security Branch.<sup>401</sup>

In all, the economy of KwaZulu was to be developed by better training of the workforce, by aiding entrepreneurs and farmers, and by the injection of outside capital. Experts from outside, usually Whites, or trained at KwaZulu's own institutions were further meant to improve already existing ventures. The economic development was hoped to improve the everyday lives of KwaZulu's citizens and was part of liberation on all fronts: Blacks needed to be supported in the economy until they were eye to eye with Whites.

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398 Freund 1996, 181; Gordon/Horrell 1980, 325.

399 Conco 1986; Golan 1994, 13; Hopf 1987, 5–6; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 130–132; Schmidt 1992, 213; Sutcliffe/Wellings 1988, 335.

400 Matiko 1988; Schmidt 1992, 210–213; Villa-Vicencio 1999b, 237–238.

401 Villa-Vicencio 1999a, 469.

#### 4.4 Challenge and Cooperation: Inkatha and the NP Government

We have now seen some examples of how Inkatha worked within KwaZulu. As part of South Africa, however, it also had to engage with the central government in Pretoria on which this sub-chapter will focus. During the 1980s, Buthelezi and Inkatha repeatedly challenged the central government while at the same time cooperating within the homeland system. It was in this contradictory role that some perceived them as collaborators and some as peaceful fighters for liberation from within.

In his 2016 thesis, Adam Houldsworth concludes that Buthelezi and Inkatha had two central aims during the 1980s: to change apartheid policy and to prevent a radical, violent revolution. The latter became increasingly important during the second half of the 1980s when the ANC was waging the ‘people’s war’ which made Buthelezi and Inkatha turn to the state because they had a common aim. This explains the public perception of Inkatha as outlined above – although it opposed apartheid, it cooperated with the apartheid state more and more closely, leading to the state funding of Inkatha rallies (as revealed in the *Inkathagate* scandal) and the training of Inkatha fighters by the SADF at the Caprivi strip (*Operation Marion*, see chapter 3.3.4). During the late 1980s, the fight against the ANC and its allies pushed the opposition to the apartheid system in the background but Buthelezi and Inkatha still tried to change the system from within.<sup>402</sup>

This they did through various practices. The central government’s demands for full implementation of the homeland system – namely the acceptance of ‘independence’ – were met with inaction and just not done.<sup>403</sup> Also, they did not participate in various advisory and,

<sup>402</sup> Houldsworth 2016, 52–54.

<sup>403</sup> It has to be noted that Buthelezi had earlier, until the end of the 1970s, considered accepting independence as long as KwaZulu would be given additional land to form one single unit and to make it economically viable. His attitude changed in about 1979 from when he outright rejected independence and apartheid in general; Buthelezi, M. G.: ‘Independence’ offered Blacks through the homelands policy of the Republican Government, Prime Minister’s Office, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 06.03.1974. CC KCM30008/20; Buthelezi, M. G.: Visit to KwaZulu by the Honourable P. W. Botha, M.P., Prime Minister of South Africa and leader

thus, impotent institutions (which they explained publicly<sup>404</sup>) and openly rejected any initiative of the central state that was not favoured by Inkatha (like the tricameral parliament and a constellation of states). In turn, Buthelezi made harsh demands of Pretoria as a prerequisite for any real negotiations, namely the release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC, the repeal of several apartheid laws, and an acceptance to talk as equal partners.<sup>405</sup> When the NP policy had changed (it accepted that the homelands would not become independent) and several apartheid laws (e.g. the pass laws and the prohibition of mixed marriages act) had been lifted, this made closer association with the central government easier for Buthelezi, Houldsworth argues. Letting go of principles and demands, thus simply co-opting up with the ones in power, would have repelled his following.<sup>406</sup>

Consequently, Houldsworth assesses Inkatha's own initiatives like the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba as an attempt to influence NP policy through negotiation and cooperation, but also by having the better, more elaborate arguments. This made politics of small steps a necessity not to scare Whites. In a sense, Buthelezi wanted to form an alliance between Inkatha and the NP on his own conditions.<sup>407</sup> While Buthelezi surely was closer to the NP government than to the ANC during the 1980s out of a common interest, this did not make Buthelezi a stooge of the government. Although he indeed received a salary from the state, he was an inconvenient partner that followed his own agenda, to say the least. P. W. Botha later said that Buthelezi was "very much his own man".<sup>408</sup>

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of the Nationalist Party of South Africa, Ulundi War Memorial, 07.08.1979. CC KCM30020/172.

404 Buthelezi, M.G.: Aide-memoire used at the first meeting between the Prime Minister of South Africa, the Honourable P.W. Botha, 22.01.1979. CC KCM43082/220.

405 To this end, Buthelezi often compared the Zulu struggle for self-determination and equal rights to Afrikaner history; see, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: Memorandum read at meeting with Prime Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster, 08.10.1976. CC KCM30013/86; Buthelezi 1979a.

406 Houldsworth 2016, 54–61.

407 Ibid, 61–65.

408 Adam/Moodley 1992, 491.

For the NP, Buthelezi and Inkatha would have been the more moderate choice for (internal) negotiations, but this only became possible with the abandonment of the idea of 'independent' homelands. In 1989, a joint committee of the KwaZulu government and the South African government was formed to negotiate democratic reforms, consisting of Oscar Dhlomo, Frank Mdlalose, Rowley Arenstein, and S.J. Maphalala<sup>409</sup> on the Inkatha side and Stoffel Botha, Roelf Meyer, I.M. Rautenbach, and S.S. van der Merwe on the NP side.<sup>410</sup> While these negotiations might have been a useful rehearsal for the CODESA and MPNF negotiations, they did not bear any fruits.

I have already mentioned and we will further see that Buthelezi and Inkatha repeatedly demanded change from the government in Pretoria and averted one of the worst consequences of the homeland system, namely the loss of South African citizenship for all official inhabitants of KwaZulu, through inactivity and rejection. The NP government was largely unsuccessful in making a strong impact on Inkatha and its policies, but Buthelezi and other Inkatha leaders were increasingly willing to accept the state's help if it was in line with their own interests, as we have seen in chapter 3.3.4, through funding and training, especially in the case of *Inkathagate* and the fighters trained at the Caprivi strip (*Operation Marion*). Additionally, the central state invested into rural development of the homelands which was happily accepted as we have seen in chapter 4.3.

Indeed, I would strongly argue that Buthelezi was not a sell-out (as his critics called him) but pragmatically<sup>411</sup> used whatever aid was available to help Inkatha, its objectives, and his followers in the

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409 Lecturer at the University of Zululand and Inkatha Central Committee Member.

410 Clarion Call January 1989, 4–5; Houldsworth 2016, 205.

411 Adam Houldsworth has strong reservations to calling this 'pragmatic' because he sees this policy as part of Buthelezi's conservative worldview (in the sense that change would have to build upon what was already there instead of a 'clean slate'). As will further become obvious, I would not deny that Buthelezi had a political concept which integrated his actions, but after all, inside sources to prove this are rare. Buthelezi himself turned against rigid ideology and claimed to pursue a realistic and pragmatic strategy; see, e.g., Buthelezi 26.06.1984; Buthelezi, M. G.: Pragmatism in South African politics: an Inkatha view, 16.08.1984. APC PC126/3/13.

multi-strategy approach they employed – which included cooperation with the state's security apparatus as long as it helped combatting the ANC and its allies. Buthelezi, in turn, attempted to influence central government policy through initiatives like the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba that also were vehicles for other moderate, pragmatic opponents of apartheid, as will be discussed in chapter 5. There is, however, one especially interesting case in which Buthelezi not only rejected apartheid policy but actually took the central government to its own courts: the Ingwavuma land deal.

Since the 1960s, Swaziland had demanded the transfer of strips of land which were inhabited, so they argued, by Swazis to unite Swazi tribes and all Swazis in one nation. This referred to the region around Ingwavuma (ca. 7680 square kilometres) in the northeast of KwaZulu, bordering Swaziland and Mozambique, but also to the homeland KaNgwane on the northern border of Swaziland.<sup>412</sup> The cession of the whole homeland KaNgwane would have meant that all people who were declared Swazi by the apartheid state, no matter where in South Africa they lived, would have lost their South African citizenship, not only the actual inhabitants of KaNgwane. In all, this would have affected around 850,000 to 885,000 people. Indeed, people who felt that they belonged to the same tribe found themselves on both sides of the border, but KwaZulu citizens had also fled to Swaziland to evade oppression by the apartheid state and the KwaZulu government, including inkosi Ntunja who rather wanted to live in an absolute monarchy than in KwaZulu.<sup>413</sup>

The people in the area around Ingwavuma mostly were considered as *amaTonga* who had paid tributes to Shaka and Cetshwayo but were not completely subjected to Zulu rule and retained cultural autonomy. *amaTonga* had originally been a pejorative isiZulu term for the heterogenous people at the northern periphery of Zululand and thus an exonym, a name given by outsiders, and not an endonym, the way the people called themselves. It was only under colonial rule

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412 This chapter concentrates on the KwaZulu side. For more details on the KaNgwane side, see Ndlovu 2018.

413 Gerhart/Glaser 2010b, 22–23; Harries 1983, 1; Senftleben 1984, 493–495; Southern African Research Service 1982b, 3–9; Watt 1982, 5.



that this term was forced on the people around Ingwavuma for the sake of a clear ethnic taxonomy; the people then tried to change this exonym to ‘thonga’ or ‘tsonga’. Because the people in the area were so heterogenous, one can only speak of an actual group after linguistic homogenisation of the dialects in the area in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and not earlier.<sup>414</sup>

For the 1970s and 1980s, it was reported that people from the area, which belonged to the KwaZulu homeland, were denied pensions, trade licences, and even school attendance if they did not register as Zulus, even if they did not identify as Zulus (which many did not). Additionally, many men from the area pretended to be Zulus when looking for work because they hoped for better employment opportunities – Zulu men had the image of being especially strong and labourious – and did not want to be part of a minority inside KwaZulu.<sup>415</sup>

In 1979, King Sobhuza’s government repeated its claims to the strip of land around Ingwavuma and to the homeland of KaNgwane which would not only have united Swazis (including the ones that did not want to under the rule of the Swazi king) but also would have given Swaziland direct access to the sea. In turn, South Africa would have been allowed to attack ANC guerillas on Swazi soil that were infiltrating South Africa from Mozambique.<sup>416</sup>

The Council of Swazi Chiefs appreciated this motion, arguing that the connections to Swaziland were strong and conditions were better in Swaziland,<sup>417</sup> and the South African government was also willing to make a deal. Buthelezi and Inkatha, however, were critical of this undertaking. He offered talks between the KwaZulu government, the South African government and Swaziland in 1979, but Swaziland rejected to negotiate with a homeland leader and only accepted the

414 Harries 1983, 18–26; Maré 1992, 78.

415 Harries 1983, 26; Maré 1992, 78; Southern African Research Service 1982b, 9–10.

416 Gerhart/Glaser 2010b, 22; Maré 1992, 77; Waetjen/Maré 2009, 358.

417 Lukhele, David, Swazi Council of Chiefs of South Africa: Petition by Swazi chiefs, indunas, community leaders of South Africa and their followers for the unification of Swazis of South Africa and those of the Kingdom of Swaziland. “There can be only one Swazi Nation in the continent of Southern Africa, not two.” “United we stand – Divided we Fall”, 27.03.1983. APC PC126/3/23/1.

central government as a partner for negotiations. The latter was open for such discussions and proposed to compensate KwaZulu with other strips of land. Enos Mabuza and his Inyandza National Movement that governed KaNgwane outright rejected it, not least because they would have lost their power and would have needed to accept a subordinate role under the Swazi monarch.<sup>418</sup>

As no negotiations involving KwaZulu happened, Buthelezi turned from criticism to rejection as well. He and Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini argued that, even if the amaTonga were no ‘real’ Zulu, they had been under Zulu control in the past.<sup>419</sup> Furthermore, past Zulu King Dingane was buried in the area around Ingwavuma and, therefore, it should remain under KwaZulu’s control. Dingane, who killed his brother King Shaka, had not been favoured by Buthelezi and had hardly ever been mentioned for this obvious reason. Dingane was officially rehabilitated – but not as an especially laudable character – and brought back into public memory at this occasion to justify KwaZulu’s claims to Ingwavuma.<sup>420</sup> For example, Dingane was characterised as “clearly mediocre compared to King Shaka.”<sup>421</sup> Buthelezi also said about Dingane at the unveiling of a memorial honouring Dingane in 1983:

King Dingane was not known for any spectacular bravery as a young man. It is know[n] that he was someone who prized clean-

418 Buthelezi, M. G.: Notes of a private discussion between the Minister of Cooperation and Development the Hon. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu the Hon. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at the Registrar’s Office, University of Zululand, 11.07.1982. CC KCM98/3/61; Cooper, et al. 1984, 326–327; Randall 1983, 375–376; Senftleben 1984, 494.

419 Arguments referring to historic rights to rule were also brought forth when townships were incorporated into KwaZulu. Buthelezi then argued that basically Natal itself belonged to the Zulus, so at least the parts inhabited by Zulus should come under Zulu control; Waetjen 1999, 665. With this strategy, it was also (unsuccessfully) attempted to gain territory from Transkei and the Orange Free State; Maré 1992, 78.

420 Dlamini 2002, 22–24; Waetjen/Maré 2009, 358.

421 Buthelezi, M. G.: King Shaka Memorial Celebrations, Stanger, 24.09.1981. EGM N968.300994 BUT, 4.

liness above every other thing. He never relieved himself in the presence of anyone else out of consideration for other people as he never wanted to expose anyone to the filth and the fouling which is part and parcel of the process of relieving one self. He in turn expected others to give him the same consideration. The story is that he would vomit at the sight of human faeces. He bathed himself regularly smearing fat on his bronze and plumpish body. Like other members of the royal family he had a weakness for beautiful women. He once almost lost his life during King Shaka's lifetime when he established some relationship with one of King Shaka's seraglio girls.<sup>422</sup>

At least, Buthelezi said, Dingane fulfilled his military duties, and it was "difficult for us to say whether placed in his shoes we may have acted differently."<sup>423</sup> Buthelezi and other Inkatha officials also travelled to the Ingwavuma area and spoke to the locals, telling them that the area had never been under Swazi rule and that they were better off in KwaZulu which had legitimate claims.<sup>424</sup> It was reported that the IYB became very active at the time in recruiting members and convincing the Ingwavuma youth of Inkatha and of identifying themselves as Zulus.<sup>425</sup> In protesting the plans, Inkatha had the support of the Progressive Federal Party, the official opposition in parliament.<sup>426</sup>

422 Buthelezi, M.G.: King Dingane ka Senzagakhona – second King of the Zulu Nation. Unveiling of a memorial near the spot where he was assassinated and of a stone on his grave by King Zwelithini Goodwill ka Bhhekuzulu – the eighth King of the Zulus, 18.06.1983. EGM N968.300994 BUT, 2.

423 Ibid, 31.

424 Buthelezi, M.G.: Visit of members of the KLA to Maputa (the Tembe Tribal Area) to report to the people on Pretoria's intention to excise Ingwavuma District and hand it over with its people to Swaziland, 27.05.1982. APC PC144/10/6/3; Buthelezi, M.G.: A report to members of the Mngomezulu, Nyawo and Mathenjwa tribes on the South African Government's decision to excise Ingwavuma District and hand it over to Swaziland, 25.06.1982. APC PC144/10/6/3.

425 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 76.

426 Buthelezi, M.G.: Inkatha – Progressive Federal Party protest meeting concerning the proposed excision of KaNgwane and Ingwavuma from the sovereign area of South Africa for handing over to the Kingdom of Swaziland, 12.07.1982. APC PC144/10/6/3; Buthelezi, M.G.: Address delivered at a combined protest

In June 1980, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof, publicly announced that the area around Ingwavuma and the homeland KaNgwane were to be ceded to Swaziland. Subsequently, the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was dissolved and the Ingwavuma strip brought under direct control of Pretoria, both by presidential proclamation on 18 June 1982 based on the National States Constitution Act of 1971.<sup>427</sup>

KwaZulu and KaNgwane both went to court in two separate lawsuits. The KwaZulu government sued the South African government and the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof, on the grounds that the proclamation did not state the truth when saying that the KLA “has been duly consulted”.<sup>428</sup> The KwaZulu government did not have to agree to the proclamation for it to become valid, but it needed to be consulted which had not taken place.<sup>429</sup> Indeed, according to the notes from a meeting on 03 May 1982, the South African government had discussed the matter with a KwaZulu delegation but had not mentioned that any legal action would be taken soon. An urgent motion (including an affidavit by Oscar Dhlomo and said notes) was therefore supplied to the Durban and Coast local division of the Supreme Court to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.<sup>430</sup>

Rudolph Johannes Raath of the South African government replied to the court, questioning the correctness of the notes and explaining that the Ingwavuma issue had been discussed duly; he also included notes of the cabinet meeting at which the decisions for the proclamation had been made. Even more, he argued that the KwaZulu government as a subordinate organ of the state did not have the competences

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meeting of the Progressive Federal Party and Inkatha over the proposed South Africa/Swaziland deal, Durban, 13.07.1982. HPD A1045.

427 Randall 1983, 375–376. For a more detailed chronology of the KaNgwane and Swaziland sides, see Southern African Research Service 1982b. This chapter here will focus on the KwaZulu side.

428 Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Applicant’s heads of argument. DAR 3762/82, 2.

429 Ibid.

430 Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Motion, 23.06.1982. DAR 3762/82.

to sue the central government. Therefore, the proclamation was valid, he argued.<sup>431</sup>

On 25 June 1982, judge Shearer decided that the KwaZulu government had every right to apply to the court in this matter. From the supplied notes, Shearer had concluded that when the central government had discussed the Ingwavuma issue with the KwaZulu government, decisions had already been made and therefore KwaZulu was not consulted but merely informed. Thus, he decided as a rule nisi that the proclamation was invalid, meaning that the central government would have to submit additional causes for further investigations into the matter. If the government did not do so, the rule would be valid a week later.<sup>432</sup>

The rule nisi was subsequently extended to 03 December 1982 when both parties agreed to a settlement (without giving up their arguments and positions). Matters would be in favour of KwaZulu as judge Shearer had ruled, provided that a commission inquired into the matter of Ingwavuma (see below). Thus, the central government also had to pay all of KwaZulu's expenses regarding the court case.<sup>433</sup>

The Ingwavuma land strip was returned to KwaZulu as a consequence. Nevertheless, while this court case was still open, further developments had taken place. The president issued a second proclamation for the excision of Ingwavuma from KwaZulu based on Black Administration Act of 1927 on 28 June (applicable from 18 June). But deputy judge president Milne and judges van Heeren and Kriek of the

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431 Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Answering affidavit, 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82; Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Respondent's heads of argument, 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82; Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Respondents' heads of argument on points in limine, 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82.

432 Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Judgment, 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82; Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Judgment on the point in limine (draft), 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82; Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Orders, 25.06.1982. DAR 3762/82.

433 Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Deed of settlement, 02.12.1982. DAR 3762/82; Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division: Confirmation of rule nisi, 03.12.1982. DAR 3762/82.

Natal provincial division of the Supreme Court again ruled this proclamation null and void on 30 June because the president had exceeded his powers by changing the composition of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (by effectively removing the Ingwavuma representatives). The government appealed against this judgment, but the Ingwavuma strip was again returned to KwaZulu on 05 July 1982. The appeal court in Bloemfontein under judge Rabie confirmed this decision on 30 September because the 1971 act had made consultations mandatory (which had not taken place), overriding the 1927 act.<sup>434</sup> The central government accepted this decision but wanted to look for other ways to legalise the cessions of land. KaNgwane and the central government then also agreed to return to the status quo ante.<sup>435</sup>

While the courts were working, delegations of the KwaZulu government and the South African government repeatedly met to convince their respective counterparts of the right course (but not all meetings were documented<sup>436</sup>). Nic Wiehahn, chairman of the council of the University of Zululand, arranged a meeting between Buthelezi and Koornhof on 11 July 1982 at which Koornhof aimed for compromise and portrayed Swaziland's demands as justified. Buthelezi was upset and assessed Koornhof's actions as impairing the good, explicitly Christian relations between Buthelezi and Koornhof. He argued that the people of Ingwavuma belonged to KwaZulu as *Blacks* and not to Swaziland where there was no constitution and they would have no rights. Even more, the government's decision would lead to clashes between Zulus and Swazis which would inevitably end in a destruction of the Swazi regime. Buthelezi then accused Koornhof of lying

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434 Supreme Court of South Africa, Appellate Division: Judgment in the matter between the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Cooperation and Development and the Government of KwaZulu, Mfaba Eric Gubane: Ingwavuma, 30.09.1982. ABI.

435 Heunis 2007, 48–51; Randall 1983, 376–377; Senftleben 1984, 497; Southern African Research Service 1982b.

436 For example, the KLA's formal response was presented to Koornhof on 14 June 1982, but no documents regarding the responses or discussions could be found; Buthelezi, M. G.: Presentation of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly's formal response to the South African government's suggestion that Ingwavuma be excised and incorporated in Swaziland, to P.G.J. Koornhof, 14.06.1982. HPD A1045.

because he had promised not to make decisions on the matter behind Buthelezi's back, but the proclamations had been made without consultation. Koornhof replied that he had not lied but was in a minority position and the only friend of the Zulus in cabinet. The only alternative, Koornhof argued, was for him to resign which would have left KwaZulu without an ally in cabinet. Buthelezi, Koornhof, and Wiehahn closed the meeting without having found a solution.<sup>437</sup>

On 02 August, an official meeting of a KwaZulu delegation and one of the central government took place. The KwaZulu delegation was led by King Goodwill Zwelithini (Buthelezi chose not to attend) and the other delegation was led by P. W. Botha, also attending were Koornhof and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roelof Frederik (Pik) Botha. Goodwill Zwelithini explained that the whole matter was especially unpleasant for him because he was married to a Swazi princess. Therefore, he wished to resolve the matter as soon as possible. The South African government's delegates repeated the arguments already outlined above and accepted Swaziland's demands as justified; nevertheless, they requested input from the KwaZulu delegation to find a solution. KwaZulu's Minister of Justice Celani Jeffrey Mtetwa complained that the South African government had been illoyal towards KwaZulu and preferred another nation over its own; nevertheless, they were keen to find a compromise. P. W. Botha commented this with the words: "This is the spirit I would like to see in South Africa. I believe in discussion and negotiation."<sup>438</sup> He further stressed that nothing had been decided yet and the proclamations only had been means to gain direct government control. At this occasion, the Rumpff Commission was announced that would inquire into the matter and find a compromise before closing the meeting.<sup>439</sup>

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437 Buthelezi, M.G.: Notes of a private discussion between the Minister of Cooperation and Development the Hon. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu the Hon. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at the Registrar's Office, University of Zululand, 11.07.1982. CC KCM98/3/61.

438 Dhlomo, O.D.: Record of proceedings at the meeting between his Majesty the King of the Zulus and the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa in the Union Buildings, Pretoria, 02.08.1982. CC KCM98/3/61, 10.

439 Ibid.

Said commission was composed of representatives from KwaZulu, KaNgwane, and the central state in which the KaNgwane delegation was especially vocal in rejecting the whole matter. The commission recommended a referendum among all affected people in KaNgwane and the Ingwavuma area which the central government rejected on the grounds that such a referendum would never be free and fair. Swaziland, KaNgwane, and KwaZulu were then meant to negotiate the matter but Swaziland again rejected to talk to homeland delegations. The commission was subsequently disbanded without having solved the issue. Later, on 31 October 1984, the KwaZulu government published documents stating that the central government was planning to form a new homeland in the Ingwavuma area called Tembe after the tribe and past kingdom of the Tembe.<sup>440</sup>

Buthelezi and Inkatha presented their victory as successful resistance from within the system, surely with good reason, and a huge increase in membership figures was reported.<sup>441</sup> Nevertheless, one should also note that the cases were not won due to political (mass) action but because the apartheid government failed to obey (or change) its own laws.

#### 4.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Inkatha and the KwaZulu government were active on numerous fields in KwaZulu, surely aided by the homeland's administrative institutions. Thus, Inkatha was able to realise projects for the improvement of living conditions and future prospects under the aims of stability/order and development. This multi-strategy approach was pursued continuously and was indeed successful in making improvements step by step. Nevertheless, due to limited funding, ongoing exploitation of black migrant labour and a simultaneous increase in birth rates, it is questionable whether this actually met Buthelezi's own goals of delivering to his constituency.

440 Cooper, et al. 1985, 505–508.

441 Buthelezi, M.G.: Address to the community of Ingwavuma, 15.10.1988. HPD A1045; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 73–75.



Interwoven in this strategy were measures for the extension and safeguarding of Buthelezi's and his allies' power which, unsurprisingly, drew a lot of criticism on Buthelezi and Inkatha for being authoritarian and for indoctrination of the youth. This got more intense during the 1980s in conflict with the ANC and its allies. We can cautiously conclude that there was good reason for this criticism, but from Buthelezi's point of view, it was also logical to act the way he did when the ANC and its allies not only threatened his power but also his identity and culture as Buthelezi understood it. Many of his followers surely felt the same, but for others, joining Inkatha was actually a progressive move or driven by economic interests.

The first sub-chapter, *Development of the Society*, has shown that rituals and customs as well as history were employed politically to pursue the aims of abolishing apartheid from within and of preventing a revolution that would have endangered about everything that was sacred to Buthelezi. His approach to Zulu culture could, on the other hand, be seen as a means of psychological liberation by 'restoring' Zulu pride in the face of apartheid oppression. This was done on an explicit, verbal level in speeches and in schools but also with the use of rituals that bolstered Zulu identity in the fashion that Buthelezi preferred (because it suited his strategy) and, simultaneously, secured his position. History, therefore, did not have to be accurate, but it had to offer a rather simple, compelling explanation of the past, present, and future. Education in schools also followed these aims, but it was further meant to educate a future middle class, combining cultural and economic development, a thread so often cited by Buthelezi.

History and culture, thus, were imagined along empirical lines but given new nuances, driven by political aims. Especially the Reed Dance serves as a prime example of an imagined tradition as outlined by Terence Ranger (see chapter 2.3). It combined familiar elements and conveyed them with a new meaning while pretending to be old and, at the same time, projected Buthelezi's understanding of Zulu history and tradition on the present and future. This way, a different present and future were imagined practically through rituals that showed a clear social order in which Buthelezi and the king were on

top. Participants, on the other hand, accepted this order usually unconsciously when the rituals became routines.

The second sub-chapter, *Organising the Masses in Development*, focused on Inkatha's Youth and Women's Brigades that were also active in various self-help development projects but, on the other hand, worked as forces upholding order and discipline in chaotic times. While it is understandable that the IYB was seen as a paramilitary force oppressing unrest, others had a desire for security and stability. Especially in the case of the IWB, it could be demonstrated that individuals joined to pursue their own ends.

The economic policy of Buthelezi and the KwaZulu government, analysed in the third sub-chapter, *Development of the Economy*, was part of their programme for liberation on *all* fronts. This, in turn, meant that Inkatha was to play a role in every aspect of life. Political liberation *alone* would not make Blacks really independent, it was argued, and Blacks would need to be uplifted to become equal partners in the existing South African economy. To this end, Blacks were trained for skilled jobs and to become entrepreneurs; although the KDC/KFC and other institutions offered assistance, this mainly had to be done through hard work of Blacks themselves.<sup>442</sup>

This development was meant to improve living conditions for all KwaZulu citizens through higher incomes and housing, and led to an enlargement of the middle class of traders and entrepreneurs who were seen as the main motors of development and had an interest in securing capitalism.<sup>443</sup> On the other hand, this also offered the opportunity for a remuneration of Inkatha loyalists in well-paid positions.<sup>444</sup> Development in this sense – a steadily growing market economy coupled with industrialisation – was perfectly in line with international and South African development discourses, explaining the success in acquiring capital from outside KwaZulu, not to mention the business

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442 The Black Consciousness Movement also included this thread of liberation, but it was run at grassroots level and not coordinated from above; Hadfield 2016.

443 Olivier, M. J.: A consideration of the past, current and future transport strategy in respect of the development of KwaZulu, ca. 1981. APC PC144/10/2/2.

444 Southall 1981, 466.

community's interest in securing capitalism under an ANC threat.<sup>445</sup> White investors were offered a purportedly safe environment for production away from the cities with many industrious workers at hand – this surely convinced many to move to KwaZulu's industrial hubs, explaining their rapid growth in a context of recession. As Jens Beckert remarked, a compelling narrative is more important when investments are made than actual calculations.<sup>446</sup>

In explaining poverty, this shifted the focus away from exploitation, whether as a consequence of colonialism and imperialism internationally, of capitalism, or of apartheid in South Africa, to a general 'underdevelopment' of Africa. Africans, it was thought, needed Western expertise to improve their agriculture, commerce, and industry. Consequently, development workers were sent from Europe and Northern America to Africa, and a quite similar pattern could be observed in KwaZulu: White 'experts' taught in training programmes and schools or assisted with research,<sup>447</sup> many secretaries in the KwaZulu government were Whites, and the KDC's/KFC's day-to-day business was run by a white CEO and white department managers.<sup>448</sup> Because Buthelezi saw Western economy and methods as the role model per se, these were welcomed and surely helped to improve agriculture and industry in the desired direction.

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445 Buthelezi, M. G.: Address to the board of directors of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Limited, Umlazi, 19.04.1985. HPD A1045; Buthelezi, M. G.: A few remarks on the occasion of the official opening of the joint KwaZulu government/KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation exhibit at the Durban Expo 85 exhibition, 26.09.1985. HPD A1045; Teague 1983, 16.

446 Beckert 2013, 231–233.

447 The Inkatha Institute, the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University of Natal), and the Institute of Natural Resources (University of Natal) all conducted research for or on the KDC/KFC at various points; Inkatha Institute: Proposal for a black informal sector support programme; annual report, 06.1983. APC PC126/3/13; Cross/Fourie/Bacon 1982; Ardington 1984; Gandar/Bromberger 1984; Zingel 1985; Mpanza/Natgrass 1987; KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 5.

448 KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation: Annual Report, 1986. UNISA libr. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 4.

Although Buthelezi and the KDC/KFC subscribed to the free market, they heavily interfered with it. In general, they thought that it was the best system for an improvement in living conditions, but because it had been distorted by apartheid, affirmative action was carried out. Essentially, the programmes described above aimed at lifting Blacks through training, capital, and their own hard work to the same level that Whites were enjoying. Once the field was levelled, the market would have been allowed to be free again.

In its approach to development, Inkatha's policy differed notably from earlier programmes that had been run by the government in Pretoria. The example of the betterment schemes (and succeeding, similar schemes) as mentioned above makes this especially striking. In the past, Western methods of farming (and industry in other cases) had been forced onto the so-called 'natives' largely without differentiation and variation according to the local circumstances and largely without the involvement of the affected people. Whites thought that they knew what was best for everyone, so they proscribed how agriculture had to be done. Homesteads were relocated and the farmers taken to model farms where they could see how they were obliged to work.<sup>449</sup> The KwaZulu Training Trust also ran a model farm, as we have seen above. Farmers were meant to learn more efficient ways of farming from this model farm and from the extension officers of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry. Although the hierarchy between the government and its experts on one side and the local people on the other side was still in place, there are no signs that anyone was forced to change farming methods (but there were incentives). Farmers were free to choose for themselves which methods to use which, on the other hand, led to a limited implementation.<sup>450</sup>

Nevertheless, the KDC/KFC was regarded as one of the most successful development corporations.<sup>451</sup> Although there were indeed many success stories that were presented in public and many people

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449 Ntsebeza 2005, 108–121.

450 It should be noted that the implementation (by force) of the betterment schemes had also been limited due to rejection, lack of interest, or weak government structures.

451 Mkhosi 2000, 36.

surely experienced (major or minor) improvements, it has become obvious that not all programmes and initiatives were successful. Some farmers and entrepreneurs experienced difficulties when time had come to pay back their loans, some programmes were not effective, and the KDC/KFC had funding issues itself. Thus, not all KwaZulu citizens could be reached or helped – it was just not enough that was done, but it was all that *could* be done.

It seems that in the eyes of Buthelezi and the KDC/KFC it was better to have a hard, low-paying job (especially in the industrial hubs) than no job at all. Although this is surely understandable, it also invited criticism, especially by independent trade unions. To continue good relations with Buthelezi and the business community, strikes were met with strikebreakers, oppression, and violence, increasingly so since the launch of UWUSA in 1986. Numerous complaints of workers make it reasonable to ask whether the wealth of the Zulu middle class (and white investors) was earned on the backs of Zulu workers.

The fourth and last sub-chapter, *Challenge and Cooperation*, looked more closely at Inkatha's role inside the apartheid system. While it is true that the KwaZulu government officials were on the payroll of the apartheid state, neither did this make them stooges of the government nor was Inkatha a "full-fledged surrogate of the apartheid regime".<sup>452</sup> Buthelezi and Inkatha obviously followed their own agenda, repeatedly challenging the government, but never so much that the state would actually intervene and clamp down on Inkatha. After all, the mass movement's leadership was working within the apartheid structures that masqueraded subordination as 'separate development' and limited its possibilities. Through inactivity, rejection, and taking the government to its own courts, Inkatha could indeed avert the worst for its followers, namely the loss of South African citizenship by becoming 'independent' or by being transferred to Swaziland. These were demonstrations that resistance could come from within the apartheid structures. This was hardly recognised by the ANC and its allies because of the fundamentally different futures which they had in mind. It was often said that ANC and Inkatha had

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452 Kelly 2018, xxix.

the same aims, namely the abolition of apartheid, just by different (violent/non-violent) means. While this is surely true, they differed on the question what was to be *instead of* apartheid. So even when Buthelezi and Inkatha were doing something to abolish apartheid, the ANC could not recognise it because it still worked against the ANC's vision of the future (and vice versa).

Nevertheless, Buthelezi and Inkatha also relied on the apartheid state, making their role ambivalent in the eyes of many contemporaries – they actually accused Inkatha of upholding the apartheid state. Based on what we have seen, I argue that Buthelezi and Inkatha sincerely wanted to abolish apartheid, but they did not want to abolish the state. With such a focus on tradition, including traditional hierarchies and structures, they could hardly take the side of the ANC in the pursuit of a revolution. Taking what they could get from the apartheid state and its security apparatus to secure traditional leadership – and capitalism – was by far the obvious choice, even if this included support in a violent struggle. Indeed, Buthelezi did not really take the side of the apartheid state, but he wanted the central government to move the state onto *his* side on *his* conditions. This became even more obvious in the networking activities covered in the next chapter.

This chapter has also hinted at Buthelezi's and other Inkatha leaders' and members' perception of the 1980s in South Africa. As we have seen in chapter 3.1, the 1980s were a contingent setting not only from an analytical perspective but also in the eyes of many of the contemporaries. This brought many risks with it but also opened up opportunities for change. Buthelezi and his inner circle saw the possibility for reasonable negotiations with the South African government that faced increasing difficulties in securing its power and might have been willing to enter an alliance (on Buthelezi's terms). Thus, Buthelezi repeatedly made demands, but also negotiated with the government and even took it to court when it proved unwilling to accept him as an equal partner. While the activities in this chapter were all happening inside the system, the several initiatives attempting to abolish apartheid structures themselves only became possible in such a contingent setting. The following chapter will show how Buthelezi and his allies joined forces to realise the future(s) they envisioned.

## 5. Working Outside the System: Networking

As we have seen in the chapter before, Inkatha functioned like a party with rather typical party work and also a tight grip on KwaZulu's institutions, suppressing all opposition movements. In the form of the KwaZulu government, its activities were widespread and only a glimpse at selected topics was possible. But as this would have confined Buthelezi's and Inkatha's power to KwaZulu and some migrant workers in the townships around the bigger cities, Inkatha and Buthelezi pursued a strategy of linking up with possible allies that were in (peaceful) opposition to the apartheid state. This extensive networking activity in which development issues played a crucial role will be discussed in this chapter. Although Inkatha personnel played a role in many of the developments depicted below, this will also result in a shift in focus away from Buthelezi.

The chapter in general is structured chronologically when possible and begins with the South African Black Alliance, an alliance of reformist, more conservative black leaders formed in 1978. This is followed by the extensive networking activity of Buthelezi and Inkatha during the 1980s, beginning with the Buthelezi Commission, a scientific endeavour of finding a reform solution (i.e. a new regional constitution) for KwaZulu and Natal in 1980/81. The KwaZulu Natal Indaba of 1986 pursued the same aim, albeit dominated by the business community which convened with scientists and politicians to negotiate a new dispensation. The Indaba's constitutional proposals were then promoted in a public campaign by a business-funded foundation until 1990. During this decade, Buthelezi's and Inkatha's networking was facilitated by the Inkatha Institute, a think-tank which will be analysed before the Joint Executive Authority of KwaZulu and Natal, the joint administration of said regions, shifts into focus, showing the limited (development) earnings of networking and cooperation. At last, a look outside South Africa will question Buthelezi's and Inkatha's ties to Germany.

In the course of this chapter, it will be asked how and why Buthelezi and Inkatha pursued this extensive networking activity, to which extent it was directed at the future, and to which kind of future.

We will see that the alliances shifted from other political movements in the late 1970s to the scientific community in the beginning 1980s. Then, Buthelezi and Inkatha turned to the business community during the mid-1980s while, all the time, remaining in touch with the white opposition and with the state. Through all of these alliances, combined pressure was to be applied on the South African government for reforms. This also applied to international relations with many countries and governments, but because Buthelezi acquired significant funding for projects in KwaZulu through his relations to Germany, this example is most interesting.

### 5.1 A First Attempt: *The South African Black Alliance*

One of Inkatha's first attempts of cooperation between various groups, divided by apartheid policy, was the South African Black Alliance (SABA). As there are not many sources on this topic, the following remarks will be quite brief.

Already in the first half of the 1970s, Buthelezi and Inkatha had good links to Coloured and Indian movements.<sup>1</sup> In 1973, Buthelezi spoke at the (Coloured) Labour Party's annual conference, choosing a radical tone by comparing apartheid to slavery, albeit a slavery of the mind that does not need chains, an argument very similar to that of Black Consciousness. Buthelezi emphasised that all Blacks, by which he meant all oppressed South Africans, were fighting for the same cause, shared a common destiny, and had to rediscover their own cultural values. Coloureds, therefore, should not try to become accepted as Whites as some did, according to Buthelezi, but fight against apart-

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1 Additional to such ties, the Indian community of Durban made donations to KwaZulu and Buthelezi's daughter Mandisi lived at an Ashram for more than a year; Buthelezi, M. G.: Speech of thanks to the Indian community for the donation of R25,000 for school buildings in KwaZulu, Durban, 12.10.1974. HPD A1045; Buthelezi, M. G.: Address: official opening of Sivananda school, Mahlabatini, 02.04.1977. HPD A1045; KwaZulu Legislative Assembly: Minutes of special session, Nongoma, 19.01.1976. HPD A1045, 1.



heid. Although all Blacks were meant to fight a common battle, Buthelezi did not mention the possibility of actually joining forces yet.<sup>2</sup>

A year later, however, speaking at the annual conference of the Natal Indian Congress, Buthelezi recalled the history of African and Indian cooperation from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to his day, stressing that this cooperation should continue. Wherever possible, all Blacks should join forces and use whatever help they might get, even in the form of apartheid institutions as the homelands or the education system.<sup>3</sup>

Parallel to keeping good relations to Coloureds and Indians, Buthelezi also conferred with other homeland leaders from the mid-1970s, but this only happened once in a while and was by no means as intense as the South African Black Alliance.<sup>4</sup> At a meeting of homeland leaders in 1974, they resolved that Blacks, whether urban or rural, belonged together and should not be divided, and that basic freedoms of movement, residence and trade should be secured, especially in the cities. Living conditions should be improved and wages raised. While most participating homeland leaders rejected independence, they granted the Transkei the right to pursue independence, and a South African federation of the homelands and designated 'white' territories was seen as a possible option.<sup>5</sup>

At a meeting in 1976, these demands were repeated, but it was also stressed that the homeland leaders would only seek non-violent means of resistance, condemning the Soweto uprising.<sup>6</sup> In the same year, all homeland leaders except Transkei's Botha Sigcau had met B.J. Vorster but as the meeting was disappointing for most, Buthelezi, Hudson Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu), Cedric Phatudi (Lebowa), and other

2 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening address at the annual conference of the Labour Party, Durban, 20.03.1973. CC KCM30008/7.

3 Buthelezi, M.G.: "Where do we go from here?" Message at the annual conference of the Natal Indian Congress, Durban, 20.09.1974. HPD A1045.

4 Buthelezi seems to have enjoyed especially good relations to Cedric Phatudi; see, e.g., Buthelezi, M.G.: Banquet in honour of the Hon. Dr. C.M. Phatudi, Ulundi, 11.06.1984. HPD A1045.

5 Phatudi, Cedric: Meeting of the homeland leaders, 15.11.1974. CC KCM30009/40.

6 Homeland Leaders: Joint communique issued after the meeting of black leaders, 21.08.1976. CC KCM30013/74.

leaders founded the Black Unity Front, its committee led by Inkatha member Dr S.M. Nyembezi. The movement tried to bring urban and rural people together to achieve national unity and majority rule, but no further activity could be found in the sources.<sup>7</sup>

In 1979, homeland leaders met again, discussing a possible consensus solution for South Africa. They showed the will to find a compromise between Blacks and Whites, although some aspects (like the homelands remaining part of South Africa and equal human rights) were not negotiable. The economy was to be as free as possible, but at the same time, Blacks should receive development aid to balance the unequal economic situation.<sup>8</sup> This way, the homeland leaders offered a peaceful compromise, starting a pattern that would be repeated during the 1980s as we will see below.

In the end of December 1977, Inkatha secretary-general Sibusiso Bengu spoke at the (Coloured) Labour Party's (LP) annual conference. Bengu suggested that the LP should become a mass movement and cooperate more closely with Inkatha. Both the LP's and Inkatha's internal rejection of apartheid were seen as a good starting point (and Buthelezi had called for a national convention before), but Bengu emphasised that the LP would have to identify with the "African cause", ruling out any participation in a political dispensation that excluded Blacks (like the tricameral parliament later did). Bengu further stressed the need for cultural self-determination in a non-racial society.<sup>9</sup>

Representatives of the LP, Inkatha, and the (Indian) Reform Party (RP)<sup>10</sup> met on 11 January 1978 at Nongoma, KwaZulu, to form the South African Black Alliance as a body to organise joint politics,

7 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 157–158.

8 Homeland Leaders: Statement of intent regarding a possible consensus solution in respect of South Africa's future, 11.02.1979. CC KCM43083/246.2. This stance was repeated by Buthelezi and Phatudi in 1984; Buthelezi, M. G./Phatudi, Cedric: Joint declaration, 12.06.1984. CC KCM98/3/54.

9 Argus Staff Reporter 1977.

10 Relations to the Natal Indian Congress had worsened, even more so after the formation of the UDF in 1983. Early in 1977, Inkatha had already reached out to the (Indian) Reform Party, but at this time, Buthelezi was still calling for a convention of all movements opposing apartheid; The Argus Correspondent 1977.

but the parties/organisations remained separate (merging them would have been illegal under apartheid laws).<sup>11</sup> Buthelezi, who again stressed the need for equal cooperation and psychological liberation,<sup>12</sup> was elected chairman of SABA on the same day and announced that SABA would be open to all organisations and work as a forerunner of a possible future national convention. He also stressed that SABA was not against Whites: “We are not here to gang up against anyone. We are here only to gang up against apartheid. This we have every right to get together to dismantle whatever the cost.”<sup>13</sup> In the following years, SABA met regularly for (sometimes public) discussions of its aims and strategies and also for prayer, but most of the time, only Buthelezi’s speeches survive as sources.<sup>14</sup>

SABA’s Statement of Belief emphasises both individual and group rights as progress towards a stable society, but also calls for (limited) redistribution by the state to cater for equal opportunities. Boycotts and protests are ruled out. SABA demanded that “all men join hands and enter into a partnership with the State” instead to maximise productivity, growth, and development. Regarding the police, SABA called for transparency and an end to police brutality; the Group Areas Act, in effect, should have been abolished and people should have been able to live and go to school wherever they wished to. The document closed with commenting on the political situation as the “eleventh hour of South Africa” and with a call to leaders to

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- 11 The representatives of the Labour Party were Sonny Leon, Allan Hendrickse, and Norman Middleton, the Reform Party was represented by Yellan Chinsamy and two further representatives. After its foundation, a coordinating committee was formed, consisting of D.R.B. Madide, Gibson Thula, and M.Z. Khumalo for Inkatha, Allan Hendrickse, David Curry, and Fred Peters for the LP and Yellan Chinsamy, Amichand Rajbansi, and M. Mayet for the RP; Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 209.
  - 12 Buthelezi, M.G.: Leadership consultation between leaders of the Reform Party, the Labour Party and the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha YeNkululeko yeSizwe), Ondini, speech, 11.01.1978. HPD A1045.
  - 13 The Argus Correspondent 1978b; see also Mann 1978.
  - 14 See Buthelezi’s speeches at SABA meetings in HPD A1045, ranging from 1978 to 1985.

take responsibility to prevent a “race war” in South Africa.<sup>15</sup> This statement of intent, therefore, stated that SABA would work within the system and for the benefit of all South Africans when the future had become uncertain. It was further made clear that SABA was a forerunner for a national convention at which all groups were to be represented and which was to discuss South Africa’s future. SABA itself did not make any constitutional proposals although its members were free to do so; the LP commissioned the Du Preez Commission’s report<sup>16</sup> and Inkatha convened the Buthelezi Commission (see chapter 5.2.1).<sup>17</sup>

Just like Inkatha, the LP and the RP claimed to represent the majority of, if not all Coloureds and Indians, respectively. The (Coloured) Freedom Party’s leader W.J. Bergins commented that the majority of Coloureds did not vote in the last Coloured Person’s Representative Council’s elections at all (and the ones who did also voted for other parties); the LP, therefore, could not represent most Coloureds.<sup>18</sup> The Natal Indian Congress also objected and announced that it, among with many Indians, would neither support SABA nor accept any constitutional dispensation dominated by Whites.<sup>19</sup>

The leading movements of KaNgwane (the Inyandza Movement led by Enos Mabuza) and QwaQwa (the Dikwankwetla Party led by Tsiamé Kenneth Mopeli) later joined SABA.<sup>20</sup> Mopeli left SABA in June 1981 after not attending meetings and showing little interest, according to Buthelezi.<sup>21</sup> Tensions arose between the LP and Inkatha on the matter of sanctions (that Inkatha rigorously opposed),

15 Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 286–288; see also the resolutions of SABA’s third general meeting in Thula 1980, 46, that emphasise nonviolence and the need for a conference of all states in southern Africa to end the crisis.

16 Du Preez 1979; see also Du Pré 1994, 239–241.

17 Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 210.

18 *The Argus Correspondent* 1978a.

19 *Maré/Hamilton* 1987, 158.

20 Kane-Berman 1982, 161.

21 Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 211.

but when the LP considered participating in the tricameral parliament (that excluded all people classified as Africans) in 1983, relations deteriorated seriously. Buthelezi threatened that the LP would become an enemy of all Blacks if it participated in the new dispensation and called on Coloureds and Indians to boycott the elections.<sup>22</sup>

The LP participated anyway, calling it a possibility to strengthen black resistance, and thus was excluded from SABA. Additionally, a minor split in the LP occurred due to some LP members rejecting the participation in the tricameral parliament. After this expulsion in 1983 and due to a growing distance to ANC-friendly Enos Mabuza, it became quiet around SABA that had not reached any of its goals.<sup>23</sup> The Reform Party, however, kept its links to Inkatha and, after dissolving the RP in 1990, many RP officials joined Inkatha.<sup>24</sup> Although SABA had been an alliance by officially equal partners, Inkatha clearly dominated it. Buthelezi was the chairman and the other partners had to follow his line or were expelled; furthermore, public SABA gatherings even in Durban had hardly any Indian visitors according to newspaper reports.<sup>25</sup>

SABA was founded three months after Steve Biko had been killed by the South African Police and two months after all groups associated with the Black Consciousness Movement had been banned. This timing could hardly be a coincidence. SABA was a move by Inkatha to pose as the more moderate (and legal) heir of Black Consciousness by forming a multi-racial alliance officially committed to non-violence and opposed to apartheid segregation. Inkatha's Secretary-General Sibusiso Bengu even stated in 1978: "In 1975 already we emphasised that INKATHA was a Black Consciousness Movement".<sup>26</sup> At

22 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opening address to the Labour Party conference, 03.01.1983. DocAfr Acc 8, 8.

23 Inkatha: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 25.-26.06.1983. EGM N968.3 INK, 1-2; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 159-163. For the time after 1983, I could only identify one meeting in 1985 and no further activity could be found in the sources.

24 Thumbrian 1990.

25 Langner, E.J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 212.

26 Bengu, Sibusiso M.E.: A summary of address on: "The role of Inkatha and the

the time, many young Coloureds and Indians considered themselves as Blacks that SABA tried to win as supporters,<sup>27</sup> but SABA encountered resistance from former Black Consciousness supporters, especially for working inside the apartheid system.<sup>28</sup>

The alliance, however, did not work out; while it lasted for a few years, there are no signs that it actually achieved anything apart from symbolic unity – but this was in hindsight annihilated when the LP was expelled. In 1985, Buthelezi once again turned to other homeland leaders to form the South African Federal Union, opposing the government's plans for a confederation and promoting a federal plan in which the homelands would have remained parts of South Africa.<sup>29</sup> This initiative, however, was short-lived.

## 5.2 Politics, Science, and Business Entangled

After political alliances alone had not achieved progress, Buthelezi and Inkatha turned to other possible allies. The Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba were gatherings of scientists, politicians, and representatives of big business which met in plenary sessions to discuss or negotiate a new regional constitution but also met in specialised work groups that prepared proposals for the plenary sessions. Consequently, both sub-chapters will have parallels in structure, taking a chronological look at the general proceedings, but also taking systematic approaches to the difficult work. Oftentimes, Inkatha plays only a marginal role, but sub-chapters on Inkatha are added to make its role more explicit.

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youth in the black liberation struggle in South Africa", Youth Brigade conference, Ulundi, 11.02.1978. HPD A1045, 1.

27 Welsh 1984.

28 Buthelezi, M.G.: The South African Black Alliance prayer meeting, 23.07.1978. DocAfr Acc 8.

29 Cooper, et al. 1985, 491.

### 5.2.1 Researching a Constitution: *The Buthelezi Commission*

South Africa's future, especially in constitutional terms, had already been discussed in academic circles in the late 1970s, as has been shown in chapter 2.5.2. One further conference where these questions were discussed was the "Conference on Constitutional Models and Constitutional Change in South Africa" at the Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of Natal in 1978, a major conference with participants from all renowned South African universities. The conference was organised by George Deneys Lyndall Schreiner, a liberal-minded professor of Inorganic Chemistry and vice-chancellor of the University of Natal's Pietermaritzburg campus who in 1961 was among the organisers of the Natal Convention, a meeting of hundreds of dissenters calling for an inclusive national convention and an end to apartheid. Other participants that will be of importance in the following chapters were Marinus Wiechers, Jill Natrass, Lawrence Schlemmer, and Colin de Berri Webb, all more liberal-minded scientists with an interest in politics;<sup>30</sup> the KwaZulu government sent inkosi Owen Sithole (KwaZulu Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) and Professor S.B. Ngcobo (an economist).<sup>31</sup> The conference received R9,000 to cover expenditures from the Anglo American Corporation – an early sign that the business community involved itself in the quest for a new dispensation and that people moved in between business, government, and science as explained in chapter 2.5.2.<sup>32</sup> At this point, several scientists that would later play an important role in the Buthelezi Commission had already met representatives of the KwaZulu government.

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30 University of Natal: Conference on Constitutional Models and Constitutional Change in South Africa – programme, 14.-16.02.1978. APC PC140/1/1/1/1; Webb, Colin de Berri: Thanks for invitation (to Deneys Schreiner), 23.10.1978. APC PC140/1/1/4/16; for more detailed biographies, see annex.

31 KwaZulu Government: Attending conference (telegraph to organising secretary), 09.02.1978. APC PC140/1/1/4/47.

32 Group Chairman's Fund, Anglo American Corporation: Donations for conference (to Deneys Schreiner), 11.10./17.10.1977. APC PC140/1/3/2/13.

The Buthelezi Commission probably was first mentioned publicly at a dinner convened by the Anglo American Corporation where Buthelezi spoke of a “Commission of Enquiry into the future of Natal and KwaZulu within the context of South Africa as a whole.”<sup>33</sup> At a time when the President’s Council was discussing a possible new constitution without the involvement of homeland leaders, Buthelezi had planned to start his own initiative to devise another possible future constitution, thus actively pursuing a different future.<sup>34</sup>

The commission’s draft aims, written by Lawrence Schlemmer, began with the observation that, after the independence of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia were the only African countries where the majority were not part of the decision-making process. Two other commissions were already investigating the constitutional future of South Africa and the realignment of homeland boundaries, respectively. Therefore, they concluded, South Africa stood “on the threshold of a new era”<sup>35</sup> and change was about to come, whatever change this might be. The key problem of South Africa’s present politics was, according to the draft aims, the perspective of proposed solutions, namely a purely white perspective, even on matters concerning the whole of South Africa. As the politics of protest weren’t bringing about any change, they thought the time had come “for a formal black initiative in planning the collective political future.”<sup>36</sup> Buthelezi believed that African traditions, especially communalism, could help solving South Africa’s problems. The commission consisted of and was looking into the future of all South African groups and included everything political; it was meant to be creative and to look beyond the conventional paths of thought while making pragmatic propositions.<sup>37</sup>

33 Buthelezi Commission: Draft aims, structure, and terms of reference, 22.04.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1, 1; see also Schreiner, G.D.L.: Appointment (to Colin de Berri Webb), 07.07.1980. APC PC144/10/1/1.

34 KwaZulu Cabinet 1986.

35 Buthelezi Commission: Draft aims, structure, and terms of reference, 22.04.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1, 2.

36 Ibid, 3, (original emphasis).

37 Ibid, 2–5.



It is questionable, however, to which extent the Buthelezi Commission actually was radically new. South Africa had an extensive history of commissions of enquiry – not only in general, but also when investigating a new constitution, there were numerous others.<sup>38</sup> Not only the Buthelezi Commission's routine structure, but also its content was not new when compared to others; the extent of its work, however, may be seen as a novelty.

Leaving the 'conventional paths' already points to the intention of doing something new. Buthelezi, Schlemmer, and the other people involved perceived the South Africa of 1981 as contingent and decided that they should use their chance and steer the political development in a more favourable direction; the structures of power seemed alterable, opening up new possibilities. They intentionally started a project that should work for this goal, the Buthelezi Commission, and that also worked against structured routines: For decades, Whites had made decisions for Blacks often without even consulting the latter; now, representatives from all group would come together invited by Blacks, decide together, and push for change.

The Buthelezi Commission met in plenary sessions regularly and appointed smaller working groups that conducted or commissioned research, heard evidence, and invited written evidence. After one year, a report was planned to be produced. A secretariat was provided at the Inkatha Institute (see chapter 5.2.4) while funding came from the KLA. The tasks of the commission were to evaluate KwaZulu's and Natal's present position and make recommendations based on these findings that could then be related to South Africa as a whole. Special fields of interest were the interdependence of KwaZulu and Natal, economic development, planning, social services, education and training, and housing. The name was meant to reflect KwaZulu and Natal as well as Inkatha, so the name Buthelezi Commission was chosen as seen to be linking all three.<sup>39</sup>

To recruit a chairman, Schlemmer sent G.D.L. Schreiner the draft terms of reference on 21 April 1980 as he was a candidate for becoming

38 Ashforth 1990.

39 Buthelezi Commission: Draft aims, structure, and terms of reference, 22.04.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1, 8–11.

chairman, but the nomination was not fixed yet and the commission had still to be formally agreed on by the KLA.<sup>40</sup> It is not clear from the sources why Buthelezi chose Schreiner, but Graham Dominy argues that Buthelezi made this decision because Schreiner was the grandson of W.P. Schreiner who had defended Buthelezi's grandfather King Dinuzulu when accused of treason. Dominy also claims that Schreiner was the one who proposed the name 'Buthelezi Commission' and only agreed to become chairman on the condition of this name being adopted.<sup>41</sup> Alas, Schreiner – who had experience in organising political and academic conferences, as mentioned above – responded on 30 April 1980 in an enthusiastic tone but pointed out that the chairman of a black initiative should be black. However, he was happy to support the commission in any way he could.<sup>42</sup>

Buthelezi tried to involve the national government from very early on. On 16 May 1980, he met Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-Operation and Development, to convince the national government of participating in the Buthelezi Commission. In Buthelezi's aide memoire for the meeting, after explaining that every participant's prerequisites would be safeguarded (inter alia to comfort concerned Whites) while finding a consensus, Buthelezi stated:

The Buthelezi Commission aims to establish where consensus lies in one Province of the Republic about the extent to which deviations from National Party policy and principles are both desirable and practicable. It will also explore where consensus lies in one Province on what Blacks can reasonably be expected to forego in the short or medium term in the way of political rights as they strive to accommodate white fears and suspicions. We know we must give whites time to come to terms with a multiracial future. We believe that they must ultimately do so.

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40 Schlemmer, Lawrence: Sending draft terms of reference (to Deneys Schreiner), 21.04.1980. APC PC140/2/10/1.

41 Dominy 2017, 46–47.

42 Schreiner, G.D.L.: Support of the proposed Buthelezi Commission (to Lawrence Schlemmer), 30.04.1980. APC PC140/2/10/1.

I make an impassioned plea for National Party participation in the Commission. Recognising the importance to this Commission of National Party participation I have invited two members from the National Party to take their seats.<sup>43</sup>

This makes it already clear that neither the NP nor anyone else was to be outnumbered during the commission's work and that consensus was seen as a possible future mode of decision making. Furthermore, Buthelezi stressed that it was the NP government that had created homeland institutions and should now take these very institutions seriously.<sup>44</sup> He therefore firmly demanded negotiations (although scientific research actually dominated the commission) on the political and constitutional future of KwaZulu and Natal while at the same time assuring the national government of his loyalty to the South African state and of the commission's limitation to matters concerning KwaZulu and Natal. By confining themselves to limited change, the organisers attempted to reduce contingency emanating from the commission.

After the basics had been settled and the commission instated according to the Commissions Act No. 8 of 1947,<sup>45</sup> Buthelezi sent invitations to the numerous proposed commissioners. Schreiner was formally invited as chairman on 13 June 1980.<sup>46</sup> Other scientists were invited and accepted, among these were Heribert Adam (whom Buthelezi admired and called "one of us in the sense that he is married to one of our Indian girls from Durban"<sup>47</sup>) and Arend Lijphart.<sup>48</sup> Both

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43 Buthelezi, M.G.: Aide-Memoire for discussion with the Hon. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development regarding the Buthelezi Commission, 16.05.1980. DocAfr Acc 8, 3.

44 Ibid, 1-3.

45 Republic of South Africa: Commissions Act No. 8 of 1947, 18.04.1947. APC PC140/2/10/1.

46 Buthelezi, M.G.: Invitation to become chairman (to Deneys Schreiner), 13.06.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1.

47 Buthelezi, M.G.: Speech of thanks to the Indian community for the donation of R25,000 for school buildings in KwaZulu, Durban, 12.10.1974. HPD A1045, 2.

48 Lijphart, Arend: Accepting invitation (to Deneys Schreiner), 11.09.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Schlemmer, Lawrence: Suggestions for invitation, 19.09.1980.

were also part of the abovementioned network of scientists (see chapter 2.5.2); with Lijphart, an internationally renowned scientist publishing on conflict resolution through constitutional development was invited. The fact that Lijphart was invited before the beginning of the commission's work points to the assumption that consociationalism was already tabled as a topic for discussion.

Buthelezi sent another invitation to Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, to nominate a representative that would serve on the *Commission of Enquiry into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu*.<sup>49</sup> Colin Webb, the prominent Natal historian whom Buthelezi wanted to include, was also invited and accepted, as well as Oscar Dhlomo of Inkatha. The National Party declined to nominate a representative.<sup>50</sup> Apart from scientists and politicians, church representatives (including Archbishop of Durban Denis Hurley who accepted the invitation) were invited as well as representatives from business and development agencies, making the network of scientists, businessmen, and politicians complete.<sup>51</sup>

To create some fresh input for the commission, a "Workshop on Constitutional Issues in KwaZulu and Natal [was] held in Durban on

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APC PC140/2/1/1; Fannin, D. G.: Accepting invitation (to M.G. Buthelezi), 24.09.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Adam, Heribert: Accepting nomination to Buthelezi Commission (to M.G. Buthelezi), 24.10.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1.

49 Buthelezi, M. G.: Inviting a nominee of the ANC (to Oliver Tambo), 1980. APC PC140/2/1/1.

50 Buthelezi, M. G.: Invitation to Buthelezi Commission (to Colin Webb), 13.08.1980. APC PC144/10/5/1; Buthelezi, M. G.: Invitation to Buthelezi Commission (to Oscar Dhlomo), 21.08.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Dhlomo, O. D.: Accepting invitation to Buthelezi Commission (to Mangosuthu Buthelezi), 09.09.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Buthelezi, M. G.: Invitation to nominate representatives of the NP (to P. W. Botha), 21.08.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Botha, P. W.: Reply (to Deney Schreiner), 10.09.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1.

51 Hurley, Denis, Archbishop of Durban: Accepting invitation (to M. G. Buthelezi), 17.09.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; Schreiner, G. D. L.: Invitation of a nominee (to R. Parsons, Chief Executive, Associated Chamber of Commerce of South Africa), 07.10.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1; McCrystal, Lawrence Patrick, Chairman KwaZulu Development Corporation Limited: Nomination for Buthelezi Commission (to Deney Schreiner), 08.10.1980. APC PC140/2/1/1.

27 and 28 October 1980”,<sup>52</sup> chaired by Laurence Boule and Lawrence Baxter of the University of Natal.<sup>53</sup> The organisers received, inter alia, donations from the South African Sugar Association.<sup>54</sup> From this and from the 1978 conference it should become clear that the Buthelezi Commission did not start from scratch, but was positioned in elaborate discourses and could rely on experienced academic personnel (and on financial assistance from the private sector).

The following paragraphs will cover the meetings of the Buthelezi Commission and its working groups, followed by an analysis of the public resonance to its report, successive developments, and of Inkatha’s role.

The first plenary session of the Buthelezi Commission took place at the University of Natal’s council chamber in Durban from 30 October to 01 November 1980. The plans for the first day were, after an introduction by Schreiner, to discuss the commission’s membership and terms of reference,<sup>55</sup> further to compose the central working group and the specialist groups. In the afternoon, a discussion on the Quail Commission,<sup>56</sup> the Lombard Commission,<sup>57</sup> and the aforemen-

52 Boule/Baxter 1980, front page.

53 Attending were, among others, Jill Natrass, Marinus Wiechers, Lawrence Schlemmer, G.D.L. Schreiner, and Walter Felgate as a representative of Inkatha.

54 Ibid, front page-viii; Buthelezi Commission: Workshop on constitutional issues in KwaZulu and Natal, 27.-28.10.1980. APC PC140/2/3/3.

55 Buthelezi Commission: Motivation and terms of reference, 1981. DocAfr Acc 247.

56 This commission was an initiative of the Ciskei government to investigate into the upcoming independence of the Ciskei regarding social, political, and economic matters. The commission heard evidence, collected scientific data and analysed attitude surveys; it came to the conclusion that independence would not be favourable and would probably harm Ciskei’s citizens and economy. The Ciskei government accepted independence anyway; Woodward 1982.

57 This investigation was commissioned by the South African Sugar Association to find alternatives to the consolidation of KwaZulu – the SASA feared the loss of valuable farmland in case this was handed over to KwaZulu. The Lombard Report recommended cooperation of the institutions of Natal and KwaZulu as well as a consociational model in which KwaZulu, the Durban metropolitan area and the rest of Natal would form three areas with equal rights. Unsurprisingly, the Lombard Report recommended, among a Bill of Rights, the protection of pri-

tioned workshop was to take place. The second day was reserved for the specialist groups which devised working plans and outlined their topics of interest; the groups reported back to the plenary session in the afternoon. On the third day, the groups finalised their initial work and returned to a short session of the central working group, after which the commission adjourned.<sup>58</sup>

In his opening address, Schreiner remarked that “potentially, the work of this Commission and its ultimate findings and recommendations may be of very great significance in South African Development”.<sup>59</sup> This significance would be subject to its acceptance by the majority of South Africans, the South African government, and the international community. Schreiner emphasized that it would be a compromise to every participant:

This acceptability is unlikely, of course, to be absolute to any one of the groups for it must arise from compromise, but it may be found to be acceptable to some, not because of its immediate merits but because a real consideration of the alternatives shows that if it is not accepted a worse situation must result.<sup>60</sup>

Therefore, Schreiner hoped that the majority of South Africans would accept the commission’s proposals, not because they reflected each group’s or individual’s wishes, but because it would be the best – maybe the only – compromise based on scientific findings to prevent a much worse situation that Schreiner did not spell out at this point. A contingent situation as perceived by Schreiner needed to be managed if one wanted to prevent others from realising their desired future(s).

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vate property; Du Pisani, et al. 1979. Prof Johannes Anthonie Lombard himself saw his report as primarily economic and not political; Daily Dispatch 1980b; making it another example of seemingly depoliticised, scientific approaches to foster development, i.e. economic growth, and tackle the problems of ‘underdevelopment’.

58 Buthelezi Commission: Agenda, first plenary session, 30.10.-01.11.1980. APC PC140/2/2/2.

59 Schreiner, G.D.L.: Chairman’s address to the first plenary session, 30.10.1980. APC PC140/2/2/2, 1.

60 Ibid.

Later in his speech, he characterised the Buthelezi Commission as a chance to prevent violent leaders from taking the initiative, therefore Schreiner probably saw the Buthelezi Commission as a chance to prevent a violent revolution.<sup>61</sup>

The first step for the commission's work was the collection of data to have a "minimum background of the irreducible facts about the area and the people we are talking about".<sup>62</sup> The second step was an analysis of the collected data to find out in which direction KwaZulu's and Natal's development should lead and which would be the best institutional structure to influence this development. It was very important for Schreiner that these recommendations "should be based on and arise as the consequence of the analysis of the optimum direction of development",<sup>63</sup> therefore giving empirical, scientific legitimacy to the recommendations, especially concerning constitutional matters. Schreiner and the other participants showed the will to imagine (in the sense as explained in chapter 2.3) a different future but still lacked the empirical data. Therefore, they first had to gather said data to become able to imagine a realistic alternative which they would try to realise.

Legitimacy should also be added by seeking submissions by the National Party, that refused to serve on the commission, as well as submissions by the ANC. The ANC had been invited, as stated above, but according to Schreiner, no reply was ever received. The ANC, as a banned organisation, would not have been able to send a commissioner anyway, but the commission "should anticipate that some of its members might have to visit neighbouring countries so that all relevant views may be before the Commission".<sup>64</sup>

This first plenary session was recorded in a verbatim report of 125 pages, but this record could not be found during research. However, a summary of the first session was written that provides some information on the discussions and decisions of the first plenary session. Five specialist groups were established: Constitutional & Legal,

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61 Ibid, 2.

62 Ibid, 6–12.

63 Ibid, 12.

64 Ibid, 14.

Economic Development, Administration & Planning, Education, and Social Services.<sup>65</sup>

The groups comprised of people perceived as experts or important agents on the topic, but they also collected a lot of data by gathering literature or hearing other experts, oftentimes scientists. Some of the groups were quite diverse, others were rather homogenous like the Economic Development Working Group (comprised of scientists and business representatives, although for a period of time a trade union representative was part of the group). The groups at first identified their tasks, then collected data (including verbal evidence) and, on this basis, drafted recommendations on how their goals, set by the plenary session and the terms of reference, could be achieved. These recommendations were then discussed in the plenary sessions, revised, discussed and revised again. Especially when dissent was reached, evidence was used and/or a compromise sought. The working groups positioned themselves in an elaborate discourse with special reference to similar commissions like the Lombard or Quail Commission.<sup>66</sup>

On 2 February 1981, the commission convened for the second plenary session, scheduled to last until 5 February 1981. Its main goal was to review the commission's goals and to discuss the progress of the specialist groups, but a tour through peri-urban areas around Durban was also made as well as a presentation held by Johannes Anthonie (Jan) Lombard,<sup>67</sup> head of the aforementioned Lombard Commission, on "Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu". In the end, the specialist groups and the commission as a whole revised

65 Buthelezi Commission: Summary of first plenary session, 30.10.-01.11.1980. APC PC144/10/1/3, 1-4.

66 See files in APC PC19/5/, PC126/6/, PC140/2/, PC144/10/; DocAfr Acc 247.

67 Prof Lombard was head of the Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria since 1961, before this appointment he had worked for the Central Bank and the Department of Commerce and Industry, and he had been an adviser to the government; Rossouw/Parsons 2017. When the Lombard Report was discussed in public, his office in Pretoria was bombed for which the right-wing Wit Kommando claimed to be responsible, explaining that they would not tolerate anyone who worked against racial segregation; Daily Dispatch 1980a; Herald Correspondent 1980.



their aims and tasks and identified evidence that still needed to be collected.<sup>68</sup>

Concerning the final report, Schreiner suggested during this session to separate it into two parts, the first containing recommendations for the near future that could be implemented without major changes to the constitutional arrangement of KwaZulu and Natal (e.g. cooperation between the two separate administrations and social services), the second containing long-term plans that would be harder to sell to the public (but still be based on attitude surveys) and include fundamental changes (e.g. fusing KwaZulu and Natal into one province).<sup>69</sup> This means that the commission now imagined different futures, a most realistic, near future with only a few changes made and a distant future that would be different but also harder to legitimise on an empirical basis. Closing his speech, Schreiner defined the aims of the Buthelezi Commission as follows:

To make recommendations which would lead to the establishment of a system of governance and administration of the area KwaZulu/Natal which would

- i) Promote stability of government and maximum economic progress for all the peoples living in the area Natal/KwaZulu
- ii) Allow all people in this area to influence, through political processes, those who make decisions which affect their well-being and prosperity
- iii) Ensure that these developments in the localised region KwaZulu/Natal occur within the wider framework of the Republic of South Africa.<sup>70</sup>

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68 Buthelezi Commission: Agenda, second plenary session, 02.-05.02.1981. APC PC140/2/2/2.

69 Schreiner, G.D.L.: Chairman's address at second plenary session, 29.01.1981. DocAfr Acc 247, 5–6.

70 Ibid, 7.

This already shows the understanding of democracy as merely a mode of decision-making and not as a trait of society. Lengthy discussions of the specialist groups' interim reports followed. An important aspect during the discussions were the Lombard Commission's findings that the groups in KwaZulu and Natal had not enough in common to pursue a common goal; instead, every group should be granted cultural self-determination, including the decision to follow a "traditional" or a "western" law system. This could, according to the discussion, be guaranteed by a federal system. The chairman of the Economics Working Group, Anthony John Ardington of the South African Cane Growers' Association, noted that the Lombard Report was based on capitalist principles and therefore non-racial; instead of organising the land along ethnic or racial lines, it could be organised along the ways the local economy worked. Lombard recognised economic growth as a prerequisite for a peaceful dispensation, especially free enterprise would bring different people together.<sup>71</sup> Capitalism, therefore, was seen as a cure for racism and apartheid. After further discussions of the specialist groups' interim reports, the second plenary session ended.

The third plenary session, held at the Capital Towers Hotel, Pietermaritzburg, lasted from 8 July to 18 July 1981 and its main business was to discuss the specialist groups' reports in the light of recently heard evidence and preliminary results of attitude surveys. A few interviews were part of this plenary session, inter alia with Dr Marius Spies of the KwaZulu Development Corporation and with Buthelezi.<sup>72</sup>

Schreiner's address to the third plenary session summed up the oral evidence that the central working group had received, transcribed and distributed among the commissioners; although the hearing of evidence was not yet finished, a substantial amount had already been recorded. Schreiner drew the commission's attention to the most

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71 Buthelezi Commission: Synopsis of the second plenary session, 02.-05.02.1981. APC PC144/10/1/3, 21-27.

72 Buthelezi Commission: Agenda, third plenary session, 08.-18.07.1981. APC PC140/2/2/4.

important and conflicting conclusions that the specialist groups in turn could enlarge upon in their discussions.<sup>73</sup>

Of special interest is that Schreiner, along with most of the witnesses, regarded free enterprise as the “best and quickest method of improving the economic position of the region”.<sup>74</sup> It was also noted that a certain degree of social engineering was needed to create infrastructure and jobs in areas where they were most desperately needed and not where the infrastructure (and other companies) were already in place. KwaZulu needed a broader tax base if it really was to foster economic development.<sup>75</sup> Even though the business representatives argued for totally free enterprise, Schreiner and many witnesses saw the need for some government control.

Schreiner explained that a more detailed analysis of the evidence would be done by the working groups and that their recommendations should be tested against the collected evidence.<sup>76</sup> Afterwards, the working groups presented their interim results and the delegates discussed these in the light of evidence. Then the working groups revised their reports and proposals that were, as the last step, discussed and synthesised again.<sup>77</sup>

The fourth and last plenary session took place from 21 to 25 September 1981 to compile the final report and reach a final agreement of the commissioners, although Schlemmer’s attitude survey’s analysis had not been finished yet.<sup>78</sup> Said attitude surveys were performed for the Buthelezi Commission by IMSA, a Johannesburg-based company specialised on attitude research. Separate questionnaires were produced for Blacks (meaning all people classified as Africans by the apartheid state) and “Non-Africans” that were quite different from each another. Notably, none of the questionnaires mentioned neither

73 Schreiner, G.D.L.: Chairman’s address, third plenary session, 08.07.1981. Doc-Afr Acc 247, 1.

74 Ibid, 12.

75 Ibid, 12–13.

76 Ibid, 18.

77 Buthelezi Commission: Agenda, third plenary session, 08.-18.07.1981. APC PC140/2/2/4.

78 Buthelezi Commission: Synopsis of fourth plenary session, 21.-25.09.1981. APC PC144/10/5/2.

Inkatha nor the Buthelezi Commission, but the one for “Non-Africans” mentioned Buthelezi. The interviewers were instructed to present themselves as employees of IMSA and to stress the anonymity of the survey. The questionnaire for ‘Blacks’ focused on political questions about South Africa, KwaZulu, and the resistance movements in South Africa and in neighbouring countries, but also on the interviewees’ worldview and identity or ethnicity. Questions were also asked about other African states that had several ethnic majorities and minorities and whether the majorities should dominate the country or all ethnic groups should have equal rights and powers – clearly questions to find out if power-sharing would be acceptable for KwaZulu and Natal. While this questionnaire contained many closed questions so the interviewees just needed to pick one option in most cases, the other one for “Non-Africans” contained open questions leaving room for free, spontaneous answers alongside closed questions covering the same aspects as the other questionnaire, but it asked more questions concerning anxiety about the future and personal data.<sup>79</sup> One might assume that Schlemmer expected more elaborate answers from “Non-Africans” than from Africans due to the harsh inequalities in South Africa’s education system. The analysis had not been finished on the fourth plenary session, but preliminary results could be presented.<sup>80</sup>

To compile the final report, each specialist group reported again and some minor changes were made to each group’s report; furthermore, the draft report as a whole was discussed and some facts and phrasings corrected. This was mainly done by involved scientists and working group chairmen, namely Schlemmer, Schreiner, Webb, and especially Jill Natrass, but the involved politicians Dhlomo and Colin Eglin (Progressive Federal Party) also contributed to the final corrections.<sup>81</sup>

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79 Buthelezi Commission: Attitude survey (Blacks) questionnaire. APC PC144/10/1/2; Buthelezi Commission: Attitude survey (non-Africans) questionnaire. APC PC19/5/5/1.

80 Buthelezi Commission Surveys: Abridged attitude survey results (for fourth plenary session). APC PC19/5/5/1.

81 Buthelezi Commission: General discussion of the main report at the fourth ple-

The signing ceremony of the commission's report took place on 28 September 1981<sup>82</sup> with most of the commissioners signing.<sup>83</sup> After some delays, it was sent to the press for a press conference on 08 March 1982. It was subsequently published in two volumes of 455 and 483 pages respectively<sup>84</sup> and the main report translated to German and published by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.<sup>85</sup> Buthelezi received the report on 02 March 1982 which was then discussed by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in specialist groups and accepted as the basis for future negotiation with the South African government. For a more detailed statement, white papers were planned to be produced commenting on the commission's recommendations.<sup>86</sup>

The whole of the Buthelezi Commission's report cannot be analysed in detail in this thesis. It is notable, however, that the attitude surveys found a majority support for Buthelezi and Inkatha in Natal and KwaZulu; they found reasonable support even on the Witwatersrand. The attitude surveys also found a majority support for a regional political solution that included power-sharing of a consociational style as an interim measure.<sup>87</sup>

The chapter on political and constitutional findings and recommendations assesses all kinds of possible structures but dismisses most of them. In the long term, the commission favoured a model in which Natal and KwaZulu merged and developed a regional structure of government by mutual agreement. The regions varied in their decision-making process, but KwaZulu and Natal were to be governed with a consociational model representing all groups in the region equally. The legislative assembly would have been elected with a universal adult suffrage in every regional area; the assembly would

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nary session, 23.09.1981. APC PC140/2/2/5.

82 Schreiner, G. D. L.: Invitation to signing ceremony, 28.09.1981. APC PC144/10/6/1.

83 Buthelezi Commission Central Working Group: Synopsis of meeting, 31.10.1981. APC PC126/6/23.

84 Buthelezi Commission 1981a; Buthelezi Commission 1981b.

85 Buthelezi 1982. Notably, the German National Library lists this book as authored by Buthelezi himself (which is obviously not correct).

86 Buthelezi, M. G.: The initial response of the KwaZulu Government to the report of the Buthelezi Commission, 03.12.1982. APC PC19/5/7/3, 6–7.

87 Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 101–103.

have contained a proportional representation of the votes from all regions (instead of winner-takes-all constituencies) but would also have had a minimum group representation built-in. On the way to this goal, as a short- to medium-term measure, cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal was recommended be enhanced to its maximum; not only meaning combined civil services but also a combined executive committee.<sup>88</sup> This could have been seen as a continuation of the ethnically based homeland system's divide-and-rule strategy, however, because KwaZulu would continue to exist for quite some time.

Individuals and organisations from the left, especially with Marxist/socialist background, had refused to participate in the Buthelezi Commission. As the relations between Inkatha and the ANC were bad since 1979, the obvious decision was to reject the invitation to cooperate with the commission (sending a representative would have been impossible anyway). It seems safe to say, however, that the involved scientists largely came from a liberal or somewhat conservative background. Left-wing organisations and scientists mainly rejected the Buthelezi Commission for giving credibility to the homeland structures and to Buthelezi in particular.<sup>89</sup>

Only some trade unions agreed to meet with representatives of the Buthelezi Commission; among these unions was the Urban Training Project (represented by Michael Faya), a parent organisation in the establishment of many other unions that limited its activities to matters of labour and wanted to keep itself and its workers out of politics.<sup>90</sup> Talks were also held with P.S. Khumalo of the African Workers' Association and with E. Nsibande of the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Employees Union. The discussions between trade unions and Buthelezi Commission representatives were mainly centred around administrative questions, but complaints about Inkatha's action against independent trade unions in KwaZulu were also heard.<sup>91</sup>

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88 Ibid, 106–115.

89 Glaser 1986, 7–12.

90 Sithole/Ndlovu 2006, 200–201.

91 Buthelezi Commission: Synopsis of meetings with trade union leaders, 05.07.1981. APC PC144/10/2/1; Buthelezi Commission: Synopsis of meeting with trade union leaders, 26.07.1981. APC PC144/10/2/1.

The Economic Development Working Group further included a representative by FOSATU but only until March 1981 when N. Dlamini resigned and no replacement seems to have been appointed. The final report lists interviews with Alec Erwin of FOSATU and Phiroshaw Camay of the Confederation of Unions of South Africa,<sup>92</sup> a parent organisation of unions close to Black Consciousness but not pursuing a confrontational course.<sup>93</sup> No records of these talks could be obtained.

On the other end of the political spectrum, the South African government rejected the Buthelezi Commission because it was investigating matters relating to Natal and the Republic of South Africa, exceeding its competences in the eyes of the South African government.<sup>94</sup> Some NP verligtes, however, regarded the commission's proposals as daring but an option for the future; Natal's ruling party, the New Republic Party, rejected any political fusing of Natal and KwaZulu (that would have threatened its power base) and only wished to cooperate on an administrative level. The NRP had enjoyed good relations to Buthelezi and Inkatha up to this point, but its rejection of the commission's proposals led to a severe deterioration.<sup>95</sup> Right-wing organisations at the time were not interested in cooperating with Inkatha anyway.<sup>96</sup>

On 02 November 1980, rather liberal-conservative Afrikaans-speaking *Die Transvaler* titled "Buthelezi-kommissie verdien geesdrif" (Buthelezi Commission deserves enthusiasm) and assessed the commission's aims as way to improve (but keep) separate development;<sup>97</sup> other newspapers reported quite positively as well.<sup>98</sup>

Reception among scientists was mixed. Some, especially the ones involved in the Buthelezi Commission, lauded it, but others were

92 Buthelezi Commission 1981a, 124–127.

93 Lodge 1983, 345–346.

94 Botha, P. W.: Letter (to M. G. Buthelezi), 10.09.1980. CC KCM43083/258.1.

95 Glaser 1986, 7–12.

96 Buthelezi Commission Central Working Group: Minutes of meeting, 12.-13.03.1981. APC PC19/5/3/2; Buthelezi Commission Central Working Group: Synopsis of meeting, 05.-06.06.1981. APC PC126/6/10.

97 Munger 1980, 9.

98 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 166.

critical.<sup>99</sup> Louwrens Pretorius<sup>100</sup> criticised the Buthelezi Commission's constitutional recommendations for delivering an incomplete discussion of consociationalism (namely lacking any comment of consociationalism reinforcing ethnic boundaries, blocking progress and securing minority domination by minority vetoes). Pretorius argued that the commission could show no reason why consociationalism should work in KwaZulu and Natal and that consociationalism itself was not proven to work:

Note that these are all assumptions and assertions tied together by dubious argumentative ploys. There is no attempt anywhere in the report to show why consociation might work or why we should accept the assumptions and assertions.<sup>101</sup>

Roger Southall assessed consociationalism as Buthelezi's plan for closer cooperation with liberal and conservative white politicians including the South African government during Buthelezi's move to the political right. In Southall's eyes, the commission's recommendations were, for Buthelezi, a means to become the head of a reformed, power-sharing government in KwaZulu and Natal, therefore strengthening his position against his ANC rivals. Buthelezi would distance himself from outright collaborators while still being co-opted in a racist system.<sup>102</sup>

After the report had been published, members of the commission promoted it publicly. Professors Marinus Wiechers and Schlemmer tried to carry on the Buthelezi Commission's constitutional proposals by updating them in the new context of the 1983 constitution via the President's Council Advisory Committee. The KwaZulu Sub-Committee was made up of Dhlomo, Schreiner, and Schlemmer and met at least twice in 1983 and 1984, but no further progress could be found

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99 On positive reception, see Boulle 1982, but also Munger 1980, Venter 1982, Welsh 1982.

100 Sociologist, University of South Africa; Goodwin/Schiff 1995, 126.

101 Pretorius 1981, 61.

102 Southall 1983, 110–112.



in the sources consulted.<sup>103</sup> The commission's chairman, Schreiner, wrote newspaper articles,<sup>104</sup> visited various organisations and held speeches promoting the commission's report.<sup>105</sup> Buthelezi showed a similar promotional activity.<sup>106</sup>

Schreiner ceased his cooperation with Buthelezi and Inkatha after two incidents in December 1983. Violent clashes occurred at the University of Zululand in 1983 between Inkatha and UDF activists. On 02 December 1983, Professors Schreiner, Schlemmer, Jill Nattrass, and Hugh Philpott<sup>107</sup> travelled to Ulundi for a talk with Buthelezi on this matter. They started with telling Buthelezi that they were urged to dissociate from Inkatha at their university because academic freedom (and academics) were threatened at the University of Zululand where Buthelezi was chancellor. This provoked, Schreiner reported in a letter to a colleague, a response of a

semi-angry nature. His explanation of the events was that of the injured party, in which the supporters of U.D.F. and further left bodies had deliberately provoked first the Inkatha students and then the Inkatha Youth movement by insulting them and insulting himself, using words which are real and marked insults in the

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103 Wiechers, Marinus: The Buthelezi Commission and present constitutional development: some thoughts on the way to proceed, 07.1983. APC PC140/2/9/1/9; Political/Constitutional Sub-Committee of the P.C.A.C.: Meeting in Ulundi, 11.10.1983. APC PC140/2/3/3; Political/Constitutional Sub-Committee of the P.C.A.C.: Meeting in Durban, 20.03.1984. APC PC140/2/3/3.

104 See, e.g., Schreiner 1981.

105 Raath, B.A., South African Institute of Chemical Engineers: Thanks for accepting invitation as guest speaker at banquet (to Deneys Schreiner), 07.07.1982. APC PC140/2/10/3; Millar, M.M., Secretary Programme Committee, Rotary Club of Durban: Confirming date for address (to Deneys Schreiner), 13.07.1982. APC PC140/2/10/3; Hobson, K.W., General Manager, Durban Chamber of Commerce: Thanks for address (to Deneys Schreiner), 29.07.1982. APC PC140/2/10/3; Schreiner 1982.

106 Buthelezi, M.G.: Why the Buthelezi Commission? Address to the annual conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Pietermaritzburg, 08.07.1982. ABI; Buthelezi, M.G.: The initial response of the KwaZulu Government to the report of the Buthelezi Commission, 03.12.1982. APC PC19/5/7/3.

107 Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of Natal; Guest 2017, 326.

Zulu language. He claimed that it was a ‘put up job’, reinforced by two Kombi loads of Wits students from Soweto, who had spent the Friday night in residence and had organised the anti-Inkatha movement. He said that he regretted the force that was used, but at no stage would he ever say to his people that you may not ‘defend yourself against such insults.’<sup>108</sup>

Schlemmer and Natrass were both involved in several committees in KwaZulu and explained the problems arising from this aggressive resistance; Schreiner thought that Buthelezi understood how serious the situation was and might react differently in the future. They also had lunch with five cabinet ministers, a senior student, and a registrar of the university who told them their pro-Inkatha view of the incidents. Although Schreiner in principle supported Inkatha and aggressions were indeed coming from both sides, he inferred that “the balance of injuries indicates that Inkatha was the armed and damaging body” and that academic freedom at the University of Zululand meant that students were out of control.<sup>109</sup>

The second incident, only days later, finally made Schreiner cut his ties with Buthelezi and Inkatha: KwaZulu had adopted South Africa’s oppressive security legislation. Schreiner wrote a letter to Buthelezi on 09 December 1983 expressing his discontent, stating that – if the newspaper reports were correct – he would no longer “be party to any further efforts to further the concept of consensus government in Natal/KwaZulu”. Schreiner argued that the Buthelezi Commission had had a Bill of Rights in mind that would protect the rights of the individual; although this Bill of Rights was not spelt out, all of the commissioners agreed on these basic thoughts, he argued.<sup>110</sup> As we will see, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba had learned from this experience and wrote and promoted a detailed Bill of Rights.

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108 Schreiner, G. D. L.: Visit to Ulundi (to J. V. O. Reid), 20.12.1983. APC PC140/2/10/4, 1.

109 Ibid, 3.

110 Schreiner, G. D. L.: Letter of discontent (to M. G. Buthelezi), 09.12.1983. APC PC140/2/10/4, 2.

In the following paragraphs, Buthelezi's and Inkatha's role in the commission will be explicated. The Buthelezi Commission was, as mentioned above, officially an initiative by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, but Buthelezi had spoken about a commission of enquiry into the future of Natal and KwaZulu months before it was sanctioned by the KLA. Buthelezi also participated in the drafting of the commission's terms of reference (although mainly done by Schlemmer) and in the process of finding and inviting commissioners.

Buthelezi, lending his name to the commission, launched the Buthelezi Commission on 29 October 1980, one day before the first plenary session, with a speech stressing the "enormously challenging" work the commission would do in "paving a new road to a shared future of peace and stability"<sup>111</sup> for South Africa. Buthelezi also stated that he was not going to guide or influence the commission's work and that Inkatha's representatives would be equal to all other commissioners.<sup>112</sup> From this point, Buthelezi himself retreated to the background and other Inkatha members took over the work at the commission, participating in the working groups and supplying input, therefore playing an important role.<sup>113</sup>

Buthelezi's allies from the South African Black Alliance (see chapter 5.1) also participated: Yellan S. Chinsamy of the Reform Party was present during the plenary sessions, Carter Ebrahim of the Labour Party was part of the Constitutional & Legal Working Group. Businessman Bobby Godsell even saw the Buthelezi Commission as an extension of the South African Black Alliance, linking it with the Progressive Federal Party and "the other (unofficial) centre of white power outside government, the business community."<sup>114</sup>

111 Buthelezi, M.G.: Address at the function to launch the Buthelezi Commission into the future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29.10.1980. APC PC144/10/6/2, 1.

112 Ibid, 1–2.

113 Gibson Thula in the Constitutional and Legal Working Group, Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu and Lawrence McCrystal (KDC) in Administration and Planning (later replaced by M.J. Olivier), Oscar Dhlomo in Education, Alpheus P.E. Mkhwanazi (later KwaZulu's Secretary for Economic Affairs) in Economic Development. For details on some persons, see annex.

114 Godsell 1982, 18.

Oscar Dhlomo brought in his expertise and his viewpoints as a member of the KwaZulu executive and as an educationalist. In December 1980, he sent a paper called *The effects of the division of the geographical area of KwaZulu/Natal into separate regions of Natal and KwaZulu on the efficient operation of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly* to Schreiner. Dhlomo explicitly called for unity of KwaZulu and Natal (as well as remaining a part of the Republic of South Africa) and pointed out the many problems arising from the partition.<sup>115</sup> In another document for the Buthelezi Commission, Dhlomo described what his department was doing to improve education in KwaZulu and what it would have done if more funds had been available (e.g., hiring more teachers, improving facilities for teachers and students).<sup>116</sup> In his capacity as Minister of Education and Culture, Dhlomo also supplied statistical data on KwaZulu's education to the Buthelezi Commission.<sup>117</sup>

KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, Frank Mdlalose, also wrote a paper for the commission on educational matters calling for integrated (instead of segregated) schooling of all groups, including a detailed plan how this could have been realised if the central government had agreed.<sup>118</sup> Alpheus P.E. Mkhwanazi (later KwaZulu's Secretary for Economic Affairs) wrote several papers for the Buthelezi Commission, one on *Local Government in KwaZulu*, one on the same topic as Dhlomo, and another on *The Flow of Funds through KwaZulu* focussing on the financing of KwaZulu's economic

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115 Dhlomo, O.D.: The effects of the division of the geographical area of KwaZulu/Natal into separate regions of Natal and KwaZulu on the efficient operation of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 12.1980. APC PC19/5/7/2.

116 Dhlomo, O.D.: Strategies for improving the efficiency and qualifications of members of the existing teaching force. APC PC144/10/5/2.

117 Fannin, D. G.: Data on KwaZulu (to Oscar D. Dhlomo), 06.01.1981. APC PC144/10/3/2; Schlemmer, Lawrence: Education enquiry (statistics) (to Oscar D. Dhlomo), 16.03.1981. APC PC144/10/4/2.

118 Mdlalose, F.T.: Report on integrated schooling in Natal/KwaZulu. APC PC144/10/3/2.

development.<sup>119</sup> Bishop Zulu wrote a paper on *The Church and Social Services*.<sup>120</sup>

One document, *Co-Operation between Natal and KwaZulu – an Inkatha View*, was written to represent Inkatha's viewpoint (or at least its Central Committee's) in front of the commission and bears no author. In this document, it is made clear that Inkatha saw a democracy with mechanisms of "power-sharing between individuals, groups and regions" as its goal without further defining this goal. The document claimed that Inkatha, "together with other black organisations, had not adopted a fixed constitutional position" and stressed that Inkatha was a black organisation, part of the resistance, and was fighting for one united South Africa. Its political proposals in this document centred around which discriminatory laws should be abolished. The document proposed, however, a regionalism not being based on ethnicity but on geography. Protection of minority rights was acknowledged, but these should have been treated primarily as individual rights and not as group rights, therefore including not only ethnicity, but also gender and religion.<sup>121</sup>

While Buthelezi was not taking part in the commission's day-to-day work, he did appear in front of the commission on 13 July 1981 to give verbal evidence. His speech began with a section explaining his connections to the Zulu royal house and the ANC after which Buthelezi explained why the Buthelezi Commission as a black initiative was important and should have been accepted by the South African government. This was followed by a lengthy description of KwaZulu's complicated financial situation and its need for farmland and qualified personnel. Closing his speech, Buthelezi called for

119 Mkhwanazi, A. P. E.: Local government in KwaZulu, 1981. APC PC140/2/8/1, Mkhwanazi, A. P. E.: The existing effects of the division of the geographical area of KwaZulu/Natal into separate regions of Natal and KwaZulu (on behalf of the KwaZulu Planning, Coordinating and Advisory Committee), 29.01.1981. APC PC140/2/3/2, Mkhwanazi, A. P. E.: The flow of funds through KwaZulu, 29.01.1981. APC PC126/6/5.

120 Zulu, Alphaeus Hamilton: The church and social services (to G.D.L. Schreiner). APC PC126/6/15.

121 Inkatha: Co-Operation between Natal and KwaZulu – an Inkatha view. APC PC140/2/3/3.

close cooperation between Natal and KwaZulu for a more effective civil service and to lift KwaZulu's standards of living.<sup>122</sup> The speech was followed by an interview that did not touch any new aspects; only details on what had been said were requested. Notably, on one question concerning the future constitutional development of KwaZulu and Natal, Buthelezi refused to answer as the commission was meant to investigate all options without being influenced by him.<sup>123</sup> Other Inkatha members were also interviewed by the commission<sup>124</sup> and public statements or papers by Buthelezi and Inkatha analysed.<sup>125</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that the Buthelezi Commission was an initiative by Buthelezi and the KLA which from the very beginning influenced the commission's composition because individuals and organisations from the left and from the far right refused to cooperate. However, it appears that the commission developed a life of its own rather than just producing predetermined results: Chairman Schreiner had a huge influence (as many of his proposals were accepted by the commission) but all the other members influenced the

122 Buthelezi Commission: Evidence given to the Buthelezi Commission by M.G. Buthelezi, 13.07.1981. DocAfr Acc 247.

123 Buthelezi Commission: Synopsis of interview with His Excellency Chief Mangosutu [sic] Gatsha Buthelezi, 13.07.1981. APC PC140/2/5/1.

124 Central Committee member Jordan Kush Ngubane gave verbal evidence in front of the commission on 04.06.1981. He gave a general overview of his assessment of the South African situation with an emphasis on Afrikaners and on a political change that should have been based on consensus and included redistribution of wealth as well as integrative schooling. He also mentioned the possibility of a federal unit with Natal and KwaZulu forming one province; Buthelezi Commission: Summary of evidence given by Dr. J. Ngubane, 04.06.1981. APC PC144/10/5/4; Buthelezi Commission: Summary report on interviews with senior officials, KwaZulu Administration, 26.01.1981. APC PC140/2/5/1; Buthelezi Commission Social Services Working Group: Minutes of meeting with KwaZulu Department of Health and Welfare, 29.06.1981. APC PC140/2/4/1.

125 Buthelezi, M.G.: Viewpoint expressed at a conference to the Prime Minister, 15.02.1980. DocAfr Acc 247; Buthelezi, M.G.: Comments on the South African Sugar Association's Progress Report No. 1 on Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu, 09.07.1980. APC PC19/5/7/1; Buthelezi, M.G.: Memorandum to the Prime Minister, 08.08.1980. DocAfr Acc 247; Inkatha: Evidence submitted to the Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution, 16.01.1980. DocAfr Acc 247.

course of the discussions as well. The opinions of politicians as well as scientists and other involved parties were taken seriously and the recommendations amended according to all objections while checking the factual findings. In the end, almost all commissioners signed the report which is a sign of a quite successful search for compromise based on empirical, scientific data. Compromise, on the other hand, means that the recommendations could hardly include demands for radical change, especially as it was meant to reduce contingency for Whites.

The commission's recommendations were not made from scratch but were part of an elaborate discourse in which the commissioners positioned themselves and which supplied the commission with a huge variety of opinions and options. The Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution, also termed Schlebusch Commission, had been tasked by the South African government with devising a new constitution for South Africa of which, after further deliberations, the new South African constitution from 1983 arose.<sup>126</sup> The President's Council, an advising body to the South African President, also had a Constitutional Committee that deliberated on constitutional dispensations for South Africa and the provinces.<sup>127</sup> The aforementioned Lombard and Quail Commissions had already dealt with the situation of South African homelands; the Lombard Report even proposed power-sharing and decentralisation like the Buthelezi Commission, albeit to a lesser extent.<sup>128</sup> From a very different perspective, the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid (SPRO-CAS) had also devised a plan for a drastic transition based on research by commissions (and Schlemmer and Buthelezi had been part of this endeavour).<sup>129</sup> The recommendations were made at a time of regained authority of the South African state that had quelled unrest after the Soweto riots. The delegates, thus, saw the opportunity for reform from above that needed to be seized before future developments might render them impossible.

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126 Schoeman 1980.

127 Constitutional Committee of the President's Council 1982; Constitutional Committee of the President's Council 1984; see also Dean 1984; Schoeman 1980.

128 Du Pisani, et al. 1979; Schoeman 1982.

129 Randall 1973, 113–116.

These commissions were part of a long history of planning and commissions in South Africa (although it can be argued that the Buthelezi Commission was quite unique in aspirations). Commissions had for long been a government tool to devise new plans for future action;<sup>130</sup> territorial apartheid, after all, was another fruit of extensive planning. Planning of land use was of crucial importance in a region where cash crops were grown and planning usually took place in favour of white South Africans, first as colonisers and later as rulers. Planning, especially of land use, became extensive in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and found its way into legislation especially via the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, restricting the land allocated to the 'reserves' to 7% and then to 13% which later led to the homeland system. Town planning began from the 1920s, later also as part of apartheid, and Town and Regional Planning was a respected profession during the 1980s. The extensive planning of the apartheid era had led to fragmented, complicated structures that the numerous commissions of the late 1970s and the 1980s had tried to change and make sense of; the first democratic government from 1994 countered this problem with further planning, this time for transformation and not for segregation.<sup>131</sup>

Although the participants of the Buthelezi Commission intentionally pursued a new, maybe ground-breaking project, they did this (like Giddens described it) by using the same unintentional routines, namely by working in yet another commission that was conducted like scientists usually do when they meet: They held a conference (albeit huge) from which research projects emanated; in the end, one could say, they tried to break routines with routines.

In the example of the Buthelezi Commission, the commissioners split the work between working groups. They wanted to imagine another future or different futures guided by their interests, but the empirical basis or connection (as explained in chapter 2.3) was missing – so they first had to generate enough data. Not only did they ask what they themselves would find appropriate but also what other indi-

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130 For examples, see Ashforth 1990.

131 Drake 1993; Joscelyne 2015, 22–24; Mabin 1995; van Wyk/Oranje 2013.



viduals and groups demanded; an imagination, therefore, that included as many people's wishes and demands as possible and constructed an image from many small proposals. The working groups referred to each other and the attitude surveys in their recommendations, even when the other group's work was still subject to changes.

The commission's short-term proposals were very practical and oriented on what could realistically be achieved in the near future; this near future seemed to be predictable, at least in parts. A catastrophe that might occur in South Africa was seen in a more distant future for which, apart from a constitutional model, no precise long-term plans (to avoid the catastrophe) were made. In general, the recommendations wished to improve the standard of living by economic development and counted on the responsibility of the free market, given directions by the state which even some business representatives demanded – it seems that they demanded an organising force to protect the otherwise free market in contingent times.<sup>132</sup> Development was reduced to economic matters but, against the current trend (see chapter 2.4), not depoliticised and its roots in apartheid structures addressed. The quest for economic development was quite in line with Inkatha's work in economic development and self-help (see chapter 4.3). The (near) future, therefore, was expected as peaceful and capitalist and to be governed by a power-sharing, consociational government if the proposals were implemented. A vision for a distant future was not developed or could not be developed with the available data due to the uncertainty or contingency that the commissioners perceived.

Although the Buthelezi Commission's report received good press coverage and was welcomed by many scientists, it did not have a direct, lasting effect on the national government's policy or on the public in general. It did influence Inkatha's policy, however. As was shown, official Inkatha policy had mentioned some form of power-sharing based on individual rights which differs from consociationalism. Buthelezi and the KLA accepted the commission's recommendations,

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132 Buthelezi Commission Education Working Group: Educational responsibilities of the private sector, 04.09.1981. APC PC144/10/5/2.

and consociationalism became Inkatha policy<sup>133</sup> instead of Buthelezi forcing consociationalism on the commission as was the accusation. Buthelezi and Inkatha actually realised the short-term proposal of a closer association between Natal's and KwaZulu's executives in the form of the Joint Executive Authority (see chapter 5.3). Before this was realised in 1986, the relations to the NRP worsened heavily as a result of the commission's findings and its rejection by the NRP, showing that the 'generator of contingency' (scientific) *research* created new contingencies. Also unknown was what might, in the end, be done with the commission's results in politics.

### 5.2.2 Bargaining a Constitution: *The KwaZulu Natal Indaba*

As we have seen, the Buthelezi Commission was a scientific endeavour to find a new constitution for KwaZulu and Natal. While the structures of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba of 1986 were very similar, the actual proceedings and decision-making processes were different, as I will explicate below. Now, the business community bargained for a new constitution – it was not about finding the one that fit best according to scientific findings (including data on the attitudes of all South Africans) but about finding the one that most participants could agree on and that could be 'sold' to the public.

In the six years since the Buthelezi Commission had been convened, the situation in South Africa had changed. While the BC had worked in a moment of stability and strength in which the state could have used its position to spearhead change through reforms from above, things had gotten more urgent now. The state was, as seen in chapter 3.1, losing legitimacy – a prerequisite for reforms to be accepted – and showed signs of weakness as it could no longer quell unrest and open opposition. As we will see, there was the perception of an urgent need for action *now* or future developments were to get out of control.

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133 In exchange for this, it seems that Buthelezi dropped his call for a national convention; Horrell 1982, 27.

In 1986, both the South African Minister of Justice, Hendrik Jacobus (Kobie) Coetsee, and the ANC started investigations into a new constitutional dispensation. In the government's case, this was done by the Statutory Law Commission, and in the ANC's, case by a Constitutional Committee under Jack Simons. The Statutory Law Commission took until 1989 to submit its proposals, but when it finally did, the proposals' content came with surprise. The commission recommended a Bill of Rights containing "basic civic and political freedoms"<sup>134</sup> and rejected any notion of group rights, contrary to official government and NP policy that would have secured white domination (see chapter 2.5.2). The ANC also opted for individual rights and freedoms and not for group rights, although parts of the ANC saw individual rights as bourgeois.<sup>135</sup>

The *KwaZulu Natal Indaba*<sup>136</sup> was organised jointly by the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Council (Natal's government with very limited powers, dominated by the New Republic Party) after their relations had improved again. Its official organisers were Oscar Dhloho (Inkatha) and Frank Martin (NRP). The Indaba was designed to be a series of weekly meetings starting on 17 March 1986<sup>137</sup> at Durban City Hall between representatives of various organisations: political parties, trade unions, chambers of commerce and employer associations, city councils, and religious groups.<sup>138</sup> They were invited "to reach consensus (or as near consensus as possible) regarding the formulation of proposals to be put to the Central Government regarding the creation of a single legislative body

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134 Dubow 2014, 247.

135 Ibid, 247–249.

136 This is the way it is named and written in official documents; other spellings and names like KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, KwaNatal Indaba, or Natal/KwaZulu Indaba can also be observed, they all refer to the same Indaba. 'Indaba' can be translated to 'affair' or 'serious affair', but also refers to a conference of izinDuna where said matters were discussed; Doke/Malcolm/Sikakana [1958] 1971, 38; Murray 1987a, 12–13; <https://isizulu.net/?indaba>, last access on 05.06.2019.

137 Earlier plans had targeted January 1986; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 27.11.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/12, 3.

138 It should be stressed that no individuals were invited, only organisations which then chose their representatives.

to govern the combined area of Natal and KwaZulu.” As with the Buthelezi Commission, organisations from the left of the political spectrum largely declined the invitations or could not participate; so did the organisations on the extreme right. The designated chairman was a former judge of the Natal provincial division of the Supreme Court, S. Miller. A respected judge was seen as standing above party politics and, therefore, as a good mediator.<sup>139</sup>

This chapter will analyse the work of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and its committees to show how discussions were led, whose views were most important, and how Inkatha influenced the negotiations and the results. After summarising the Indaba’s proposals, the Indaba will further be contextualised and its impact on South African discussions on the (constitutional) future assessed.

The thought of calling an Indaba was not entirely new. Frank Martin recalled that the thought of joining the two regional governments of KwaZulu and Natal had been around in 1977 and had been favoured by him, so he briefed then Prime Minister John Vorster about it who seemed interested. But after ‘Muldergate’ and P. W. Botha’s rise to power, this was not continued. Also in 1977, the Natal Local Government Indaba was convened under the chairmanship of Derrick Watterson and attended by Coloured, Indian, and white representatives – South Africans categorised as Africans by the apartheid state were only allowed as observers. It sought a consensus solution for the reordering of local government and ultimately proposed joint local government in places where people from different groups were living closely together anyway.<sup>140</sup>

During the preparations for the Indaba, an advisory committee was working to assist the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Council. Many of its members were scientists and businessmen, of whom most had been part of the Buthelezi Commission.<sup>141</sup> These men drew up the concept of the Indaba, relying on their experience from the Buthelezi Commission, and also proposed organisations (not

139 KZN Indaba: Exemplary invitation, 28.02.1986. APC PC142/1/1/1.

140 Linscott/Königkrämer 1987.

141 Among them were Lawrence Schlemmer, George Deneys Lyndall Schreiner, Colin Webb, Peter Mansfield. For more information on them, see annex.

individuals) that Dhlomo and Martin would then invite. The advisory committee predefined the role of the KwaZulu government and of the Natal Provincial Council by stating that none of those bodies should make any public propositions or submissions before the work of the Indaba had started (to make them equal partners to all other groups in the process of finding a compromise). This way, it was thought, the outcome would not be predetermined. Furthermore, the KwaZulu government was asked not to submit the Buthelezi Commission's results as their point of view to the Indaba because these were a lot more elaborate than everything the other parties could submit during the Indaba and were four years old already.<sup>142</sup>

During its further work, the advisory committee also discussed the submission which the KwaZulu government was preparing for the Indaba, heavily modifying it and changing the official author from 'Inkatha' to 'KwaZulu Government', yet another sign showing how KwaZulu government and Inkatha could hardly be separated from each other.<sup>143</sup> On a later meeting, it also had to be made clear that Dhlomo was representing the KwaZulu government and not Inkatha.<sup>144</sup>

Financing of the Indaba was planned to be shared between KwaZulu and Natal, but a detailed discussion on this topic was postponed repeatedly.<sup>145</sup> When the topic was finally addressed on 05 February 1986, three months after the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, the committee's members realised that additional funding from the private sector was needed. On the same day, Martin accepted the committee's proposed organisations that were to be invited, and the first plenary session was scheduled for 17 March 1986.<sup>146</sup>

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142 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 13.11.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/11; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 11.12.1985.

143 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 18.12.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/15; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 15.01.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/18.

144 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 16.03.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/23.

145 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 13.11.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/11; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 27.1.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/12; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 11.12.1985; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 15.01.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/18.

146 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 05.02.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/20.

The first plenary session was delayed and took place on 03 and 04 April 1986 in Durban's City Hall. The Indaba's chairman was, also deviating from original plans, Noel Desmond Clarence, the former vice-chairman, after the resignation of Miller.<sup>147</sup> Clarence was Professor of Experimental Physics at the University of Natal, Durban, and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal since 1977; apart from being a renowned researcher, he was known for being a passionate teacher.<sup>148</sup> The opening was public but the following discussions to find basic preconditions for negotiations about a constitution were private, albeit recorded on tape. The (public) meeting on 03 April began with an opening prayer by Reverend Bekizipho Khulekani Dlodla<sup>149</sup> after which the mayor of Durban, Councillor Stanley H. Lange, welcomed the guests. Clarence, the chairman, then delivered the opening address, followed by addresses of the co-convenors, Buthelezi and Martin.<sup>150</sup> Of these speeches, only Martin's text survives.

Martin opened his address by citing a speech by Edgar Brookes, senator for Zululand 1937–1953, national chairman of the Liberal Party 1963–1968, and Professor of History and Political Science at the University of Natal.<sup>151</sup> This speech had been held 25 years earlier when Brookes opened the aforementioned Natal Convention as its president, a meeting of hundreds of dissenters, predominantly liberals, opposing apartheid in 1961 and calling for a national convention – a meeting at which G. D. L. Schreiner had also been present.<sup>152</sup> The Natal Convention was structured like a conference in working groups and plenary sessions, rather similar to the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, but on a smaller scale, and drew

147 John Kane-Berman, CEO of the South African Institute of Race Relations, became the new vice-chairman; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 16.03.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/23; <http://whoswho.co.za/john-kane-berman-3814>, last access on 20.02.2018.

148 See annex.

149 Chair of the Inanda Seminary 1965–1981; Healy 20.03.2009.

150 KZN Indaba: Pre-Indaba organisation checklist, 26.03.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1; KZN Indaba: Indaba opening session, 03.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1; KZN Indaba: Opening brochure, 03.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1.

151 Webb 1979.

152 Vigne 1997, 145–146.

on scientific expertise of scientists like Brookes and Leo Kuper, but prominent Archbishop of Durban Denis Hurley was also participating among many others.<sup>153</sup>

In said opening speech from 17 April 1961, Brookes stressed that it was time to act against apartheid and for the good of South Africa, and that the enemy was not the National Party nor Afrikanerdom but poverty, disease and misery that had to be tackled. The organisers of the Natal Convention had not prepared any reports, so it was completely up to the participants to discuss and find a common ground. Frank Martin, citing the speech 25 years after it had originally been delivered, highlighted the similarities of the Natal Convention and the Indaba, locating the latter in an already existing liberal discourse (which liked to de-politicise poverty) and showing that the same problems, albeit worse than 25 years ago, still existed. The important difference was, according to Martin, that in 1986 two regional governments backed the negotiations, giving the Indaba a much better chance of success.<sup>154</sup>

At this first plenary session, the delegates compiled their *Points of Agreement and Resolutions* as a starting point of the negotiations. The delegates were “aware of the inseparable common destiny of people of KwaZulu/Natal – geographically, economically, socially and strategically” and “aware of the patriotism of its people to their fatherland” South Africa. They therefore resolved “that a single Legislative Assembly must be established for the (KwaZulu/Natal) region” and “that the second tier Legislative Assembly must be part of the Constitution of the R.S.A.”<sup>155</sup> This way, the delegates tried to refute the accusations of the Indaba being a new attempt of Natal separatism.<sup>156</sup> The delegates furthermore committed themselves to democratic principles which they understood as all adults being represented in a legislative assembly (itself vested in a strong federalism) and everybody

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153 Natal Convention Committee 1961.

154 Martin, Frank: Address, 03.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1.

155 All quotations KZN Indaba: Points of agreement and resolutions, 04.04.1986. APC PC126/7/4, 1.

156 On the long history of Natal separatism and the alienation of Boers and Brits, see Haas/Zulu 1994, 433–434; Marks 1986a, 2–3; Thompson 1990.

enjoying freedoms of association, equality before the law, and justice in the distribution of resources. As a consequence, the Indaba delegates resolved that the rights of the individual were to be protected by a Bill of Rights while group rights were to be protected by consensus in political decision-making.<sup>157</sup>

The Indaba met almost weekly, sometimes biweekly, in plenary sessions indeed. The same seems to be the case with the sub-committees that were established for a more efficient division of labour, although in some instances this can only be assumed due to a lack of sources. There are no minutes or summaries of the plenary sessions, only short agendas and records of resolutions, so only the general process of the Indaba's work will be described. The fact that the discussions led to resolutions at many plenary sessions points to the conclusion that there was a general agreement among the delegates on the passed resolutions,<sup>158</sup> although dissent was also encountered.<sup>159</sup>

From early on, the plenary sessions centred around broad constitutional questions; the Indaba delegates clearly advocated a devolution of power and a strong federalism. Although the official name was 'KwaZulu Natal Indaba', the delegates chose that the combined area should be named 'The Province of Natal' and rejected the homeland policy of ethnic segregation (see chapter 3.2). In cases of uncertainty and/or dispute, specialist committees were appointed to gather further information on a specific topic and to report back to the plenary sessions.<sup>160</sup>

The committees that the delegates appointed were: local government, economy, education, and constitution.<sup>161</sup> Once the basics had

157 KZN Indaba: Points of agreement and resolutions, 04.04.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

158 The KwaZulu Natal Indaba did not pass resolutions on a majority vote but sought, as mentioned, consensus – this was surely facilitated by the absence of left- or far-right-wing organisations.

159 Cameron 1986a.

160 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 24.04.1986. APC PC126/7/4; KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 25.04.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

161 Complementary to these long-living committees, other committees were established for short periods of time to provide insights on one very specific aspect, e.g. the Boerestaats Committee; KZN Indaba: Proposed agenda, 30.05.1986. APC PC126/7/4; KZN Indaba: Proposed agenda, 29.-30.05.1986. APC PC19/7/3; KZN



been settled and the committees were working, the plenary sessions were used to discuss the committees' progress to give an early feedback on their findings and proposals. Additionally, guest experts were invited to hold presentations on topics the delegates deemed important.<sup>162</sup> These presentations were then regarded as evidence complementing written submissions by the participating organisations and other important individuals or groups. Also in May, the delegates decided to invite an advertising agency to 'sell' their work and their constitutional proposals to the public;<sup>163</sup> they therefore perceived a need to involve the public and convince it through clever marketing, mainly based on the authority of the people involved, to legitimise its demands – an often used strategy in marketing (see chapter 2.6).

The committees were assembled so that the delegates, often (perceived) experts on the respective topic, represented diverse organisations. The groups negotiated how a future state should be constituted and how society was to be influenced by official policy. The discussions went into detail and scientific findings were used for reference, but most important was that the delegates found a compromise or consensus among themselves, usually led by business representatives.<sup>164</sup> This made the Indaba differ from the Buthelezi Commission where scientific data had first priority, including attitude surveys on the opinions of all South Africans, not just the ones represented in the discussions.

One example that the present scientists could nevertheless avert what they deemed totally inadequate shall be mentioned. When the Economics Committee discussed the expenditure for public schooling, Leon Louw intervened. Louw was a lawyer, the founder of the Free Market Foundation (a market-liberal think-tank) and a political activist; in 1986 he (together with Frances Kendall) published a

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Indaba: Record of resolutions, 29.05.1986. APC PC19/7/3; Roberts/Howe 1987, 12.

162 E.g. a presentation on US-American federalism by Harris Llewellyn Wofford Jnr. (US-American lawyer and politician of the Democratic Party); KZN Indaba: Proposed agenda, 12., 13., 19., 20., 26.06.1986. APC PC19/7/3.

163 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 29.05.1986. APC PC19/7/3.

164 See files in APC PC19/7/; PC126/7/; PC144/11/; CC KCM01/2/.

book called *South Africa: The Solution*, calling for a cantonal, capitalist state with minimal intervention by the state (i.e. there would be no welfare and no public schools).<sup>165</sup> Louw stated that the whole discussion was based on assumptions that needed to be questioned. He explained that education would not have to be “totally free, or a responsibility of the state”. The committee, in turn, discussed these statements and decided that privatisation needed further attention.<sup>166</sup>

During the committee’s next meeting, equalisation of social services and infrastructure for Blacks and Whites was discussed, again prompting Louw to demand more privatisation. This was strongly opposed by Ossie D. Gorven, former City Treasurer of Durban, who argued that cities and provinces first would have had to pay back loans (e.g. when they sold buses they had bought with a loan) and that the revenue of privatisation would be minimal. Another delegate, Anthony M. Kedzierski of the Small Business Development Corporation, seconded this and presented his calculations of a possible harbour privatisation. J. van Coller of the Natal Chamber of Industries mentioned that in turn for privatisation rents would be lost; Louw, however, repeated his claims without addressing any of the above arguments. The majority of the delegates, however, remained positive towards privatisation despite these arguments. On this issue, the committee resolved to gather more information on the potentials of privatisation, although Gorven called privatisation an “act of faith”.<sup>167</sup>

When the committee met the next time, the issue of privatisation arose again. Economist Jill Natrass, who had missed the meeting before, called privatisation in poor, rural areas “immoral and perhaps criminal”. She convinced the majority of delegates – who had been in favour of privatisation two weeks earlier – that the discussion on privatisation had been “simplistic”, i.e. only considering numbers and not implications for the affected people. The spokesman for privatisation, Leon Louw, was absent on this meeting and therefore could

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165 The second edition had a foreword by Winnie Mandela; Louw/Kendall 1987.

166 KZN Indaba Economic Committee: Minutes of meetings, 12.09.1986. APC PC126/7/3.

167 KZN Indaba Economic Committee: Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Economics Sub Committee, 02.10.1986. CC KCM01/2/26/9.

not reply directly. The committee agreed that the Indaba should commission its own research on privatisation including all aspects of the discussion and not just the financial ones.<sup>168</sup>

Because the constitutional proposals were the most important part of the Indaba, a few remarks on the Constitutional Committee and its uniqueness in its operations have to be made. Its members were largely lawyers and outspoken experts on the topic. The committee was involved in the drafting and re-drafting of the Indaba's Bill of Rights, making propositions on what to change to the Indaba plenary sessions, especially phrasing and details. Before drafting a constitution, the committee looked at various constitutional models and discussed basic questions; it also looked at how cultural groups could be integrated into legislation.<sup>169</sup>

Based on their research and the discussions at the plenary sessions, the Constitutional Committee wrote five draft constitutions for KwaZulu and Natal with different compositions regarding the tiers of government, the legislature, and cultural councils (also listing the respective advantages and disadvantages) which were in turn presented to the Indaba. All Indaba delegates received questionnaires asking for their opinions on each of the five proposed constitutions; preferences were then calculated using the answers to the questionnaires, narrowing it down to three proposed constitutions which were, again, discussed during the Indaba plenary sessions. From all these discussions, one proposed constitution arose that was discussed and amended according to all discussions and submissions and, finally, accepted by the KwaZulu Natal Indaba.<sup>170</sup> This means that, differing from the procedure of the Buthelezi Commission, the final decision

168 KZN Indaba Economic Committee: Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Economic Sub Committee, 16.10.1986. CC KCM01/2/26/11.

169 KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 10.-11.07.1986. APC PC19/7/5/1.

170 KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 07.-08.08.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 14.-15.08.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 28.-29.08.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 11.-12.09.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Revised report, 30.09.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba Constitutional Committee: Report, 06.-07.11.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

on the proposed constitution was not made by scientists but by all involved delegations through their evaluations of what they deemed desirable (and not necessarily what would have been chosen on a scientific basis).

The Natal Provincial Council was disbanded from 01 July 1986 and the Province of Natal, therefore, no longer had an elected (by Whites only) provincial government. It was replaced by a provincial executive appointed by the State President P. W. Botha, thus not directly accountable to anyone in the Province of Natal.<sup>171</sup> It was then decided that the Council's delegates should remain part of the Indaba, albeit under a different name, although part of the Indaba's institutional backing was lost.<sup>172</sup> The report of the Constitution Committee and its discussion formed the main part of the plenary sessions in July 1986 while some aspects like the Swiss canton system were discussed complementing the discussion about South Africa's constitutional future.<sup>173</sup> The months from August to October passed discussing the constitutional proposals, the committees' work and every group's submissions until a consensus was found that almost everybody could agree on.<sup>174</sup> After the Indaba organisers had delivered their final report to the South African government, the Indaba delegates decided to continue their work to promote the constitutional proposals;<sup>175</sup> this led to the formation of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation that worked until 1990 (see chapter 5.2.3).

Part of the Indaba's proposals was a Bill of Rights which was adopted by the KwaZulu Natal Indaba on 10 July 1986, well before the constitutional proposals were finished.<sup>176</sup> The Bill of Rights was designed to be a part of the constitution of a new Province of Natal integrating KwaZulu. It protected human dignity, equality before the

171 Bozas 1986.

172 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 19.-20.06.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

173 KZN Indaba: Proposed agenda, 10.07.1986. APC PC126/7/4; KZN Indaba: Agenda, 17.-18.07.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

174 KZN Indaba: Agenda, 07.08.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KZN Indaba: Agenda, 02.-03.10.1986. APC PC126/7/4; KZN Indaba: Agenda, 30.-31.10.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

175 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 27.11.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

176 Roberts/Howe 1987, 12.

law, personal and associational liberties (stressing the rights to free thought, privacy, property, and free movement), and cultural and religious rights. It outlawed detention without trial, torture, and slavery/forced work.<sup>177</sup>

The constitutional proposals were accepted by the Indaba on 28 November 1986 with 82% accepting them, 9% (mainly the Afrikaner organisations) rejecting them and 9% abstaining from the vote.<sup>178</sup> This constitution would have stripped the central government and the province's governor (appointed by the president) of much of its power in Natal, making the governor a mere titular figure. Other than that, the proposals referred to provincial and local government only. The province's legislative assembly consisted of two chambers with 50 seats each, the first being elected on a proportional system in 15 constituencies by all adults of the province, the second split in five groups (African, Afrikaans, Asian, and English "background groups" and a South African group) of ten members each. In the case of the first four groups, a voter needed to belong to one of these groups to be able to vote in it. Voters who did not wish to associate with one of these groups could instead vote in the fifth group open for all South Africans (residing in Natal) who did not vote in one of the other groups. The four cultural groups also had a veto on any legislation that affected them, especially concerning religion, language, and culture. Whether or not a proposed law actually fell into this category was decided by a majority vote of all members of the second chamber or, if the affected group did not agree with the majority vote, by the Supreme Court.<sup>179</sup>

The executive should have been led by a prime minister, usually from the strongest party in the first chamber. If this party gained more than 50 percent of the votes, half of the ministers would have been

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177 KZN Indaba: Constitutional proposals (including the Bill of Rights), 28.11.1986. CC KCM01/2/23/1, 4–9. It seems that Marinus Wiechers played an important part in writing the Bill of Rights; Ramsden, W. A.: Comments on the second draft of the Bill of Rights, 02.06.1986. APC PC19/7/1/2).

178 Clarence, N. D.: Indaba chairman's memorandum, 1986. APC PC142/2/2/1, 7.

179 KZN Indaba: Constitutional proposals (including the Bill of Rights), 28.11.1986. CC KCM01/2/23/1, 1–20.

appointed by the prime minister and the other half would have been elected by both chambers; if the strongest party gained less than 50 percent, all ministers would have been elected. Each group of the second chamber would have been represented in the executive by at least one minister, and decisions should have been based on consensus as far as possible. Local authorities and traditional/tribal authorities on the third tier of government should have remained unchanged for the moment. Legislature and executive further would have been complemented by cultural councils representing the interests of cultural groups, advising the aforementioned and given the possibility to appeal to the Supreme Court. In the case of tribal authorities, these were to be grouped in a 'council of chiefs'.<sup>180</sup> After the adoption, the proposals were released to the public, but it took until January 1987 until they were officially supplied to the South African government.

Notably, these constitutional proposals, somewhere in between majority rule and consociationalism,<sup>181</sup> do not make any reference to ethnicity or race. Instead, they speak of individuals and cultural groups enjoying specific rights; individuals who did not wish to associate with a cultural group could vote as South Africans, although it is not exactly clear whether this group would have enjoyed special rights as well. The focus on cultural groups seems to have been the attempt of providing a non-racist solution overcoming the ethnicity-based homeland system of divide and rule by replacing these categories with cultural groups.<sup>182</sup>

This, however, produced new problems. The cultural groups are defined in the constitution as four of the five groups in the second chamber: African, Afrikaans, Asian, and English 'background groups'. The constitution gives no sufficient explanation why the two white groups, Afrikaans and English, should have been more distinct from each other than, e.g., Zulus, Swazis, and Xhosas (as Zulus were by far the largest 'African' group in Kwazulu-Natal, but not the only

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180 Ibid, 21–27.

181 Harris 1988.

182 This was a move towards the discourse of the ruling National Party that, from about 1986, had begun to discuss group rights and group protection as a way for change in South Africa (see chapter 2.5.2).



**Figure 22: Celebrating the KwaZulu Natal Indaba.**

one, and even many ‘official’ Zulus had cultural differences from other Zulus as described in chapter 3.3.1). By this arrangement, Whites would have constituted two fifths of the second chamber, but Zulus, Swazis, Xhosas and other ‘Africans’ living in KwaZulu-Natal only one fifth. Additionally, the group of Asians – in the case of KwaZulu-Natal mostly Indians, but also some Chinese – was subsuming quite diverse people as well. The question of mixed heritage raised even more problems. This somewhat vague arrangement in the second chamber, coupled with the possibility of minority vetoes and a referral to a probably still white Supreme Court, was an invitation for criticism regarding the KwaZulu Natal Indaba as a method of continuing white dominance.

During the Indaba’s negotiation process, contact to the public (via the press) and the South African government had already been sought.<sup>183</sup> With regular press statements, written specifically for this

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183 KZN Indaba: Image Management Sub-Committee membership and member-

reason, the Indaba wanted to inform the public about the broad progress of events, the ‘Indaba spirit’ of cooperation, and the details it wanted the public to know.<sup>184</sup> The Indaba’s sessions, however, were not open to the public.<sup>185</sup> For publicity, the Indaba was photographed and filmed, but without audio footage to keep the negotiations secret.<sup>186</sup>

The constitutional proposals were delivered to Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, to Radclyffe Cadman, the Administrator of Natal, and to Buthelezi in January 1987.<sup>187</sup> The volume given to Heunis contained, among the proposals and the Bill of Rights, a memorandum by Clarence explaining the KwaZulu Natal Indaba’s work, its aims and its proposals, naming its participants (and the organisations which rejected it). The volume also included all the original signatures as a sign of validity.<sup>188</sup> But the volume presented the other side as well, including the minority report by the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge, and the Junior Rapportryerbeweging. They stated that group rights were not protected well enough in these proposals and they feared black domination, so they could not sign the constitutional proposals and instead wished to leave negotiations to political parties.<sup>189</sup> It has to be noted, however, that significant concessions to these positions had already been made during the negotiation process.

Minister Heunis, belonging to the National Party’s reformist (‘verligte’) wing, assessed the recommendations, as he had promised before,<sup>190</sup> but the government did not accept them as it had already rejected the invitation to participate in the Indaba as a full member (it

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ship proposals, 15.07.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

184 See, e.g., KZN Indaba: Progress report, 30.05.1986. APC PC19/7/3; van Wyk, Dawid: The spirit of the Indaba, 1986. APC PC142/1/1/1.

185 Van Wyk, Dawid: Notice to all delegations, 11.09.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

186 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 27.11.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

187 Roberts/Howe 1987, 12.

188 Clarence, N. D.: Indaba chairman’s memorandum, 1986. APC PC142/2/2/1; KZN Indaba: Record of signatories, 1986. APC PC142/2/2/1.

189 Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut/Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge/Junior Rapportryerbeweging: Minority report, 1986. APC PC142/2/2/1.

190 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 27.11.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/12, 2.



A. The following delegates with full participatory status signed a declaration in support of the proposals:

1. W.D. Clarence (Chairman)
2. Harry Jensen (Deputy Chairman)
3. John Lee (Chairman)
4. Arthur H. Brown (W. Man. Bureau of S.A.)
5. W.D.C. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
6. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Wyalapa)
7. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Dunbar Melanesian Chamber of Commerce)
8. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Happim Party)
9. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Kabar Party of S.A.)
10. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (SOLIDARITY)
11. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (SOUTH AMERICAN HINDU MAHASABHAM)
12. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (INKATHA)
13. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (INYANA)
14. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (KUZULU C. CROWEES)
15. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Kwaka)
16. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Kwa. Soc. Committee)
17. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Representative of Durban City Council)
18. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Pretoria City Council)
19. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (KwaZulu Government)
20. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Progressive Federal of KwaZulu Council of South Africa)
21. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (KwaZulu Council of South Africa)
22. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY)
23. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (Co. Founders)
24. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (KwaZulu Council of South Africa)
25. Alex Hamilton (N.C.I.)
26. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (S.A.S.A.)
27. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce)
28. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (B.A.W.U.)
29. W.D.C. Chamber of Commerce (N.R.P.)

Figure 23: Signatories of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba.

had sent an observer instead).<sup>191</sup> Stoffel Botha, the Minister of Home Affairs, remarked in a speech on 03 February 1987 that the Indaba had been a good idea but he regretted that 9% of the delegates rejected it and, therefore, no true consensus had been found. The South African government, thus, was not able to accept the Indaba's proposals.<sup>192</sup> One could argue quite the opposite, namely that it undermined the negotiations and the consensus through the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge ("the 'visible arm' of the Broederbond"<sup>193</sup>) and the Junior Rapportryerbeweging to which they had very close connections.

The United Democratic Front declined the invitation to participate in the Indaba because it, as its president Archibald Jacob "Archie" Gumede explained, rejected the separation of KwaZulu-Natal from the rest of South Africa, therefore undermining the national struggle and not working on the issue of apartheid itself.<sup>194</sup> The ANC saw the Indaba as a means to continue apartheid under a new name and rejected participation as well, a special problem being Buthelezi's "ethnic chauvinism".<sup>195</sup> The moderate (Coloured) Labour Party, an ally of Inkatha in the South African Black Alliance some years earlier, rejected the second chamber as the party saw itself committed to non-racialism.<sup>196</sup>

Alec Erwin of the Congress of South African Trade Unions criticised the Indaba for being an undemocratic process as most had happened behind closed doors, delegates had not been elected and were not accountable. The purpose, he worried, was rather to protect the interest of big business than to bring about democratic change. Its proposals, on the other hand, were not democratic either, Erwin argued, because equality before the law was not given and the division into

191 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 18.02.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/21, 2.

192 Botha, Stoffel: Speech during the No-Confidence Debate, 03.02.1987. APC PC126/7/5; see also Botha, Stoffel: Interview (in Network), 24.03.1987. CC KCM01/2/32/3.

193 Marx 2011.

194 Gumede, Archie J.: Declining invitation on behalf of UDF, 25.03.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1.

195 IPSA Research 1987.

196 Lewis, Maurice: Statement Labour Party delegation (to Dawid van Wyk), 07.12.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1.

groups was based on notions of race and ethnicity.<sup>197</sup> Mewa Ramgobin of the Natal Indian Congress voiced quite similar concerns.<sup>198</sup>

During the Indaba negotiations, an Indaba Support Group was founded with R. Dirk Kemp as chairman<sup>199</sup> as a “voluntary association by concerned individuals living in Natal and KwaZulu who share the Indaba’s ideals”.<sup>200</sup> It promoted the Indaba through public meetings and bumper stickers, etc., and offered a platform for individuals (who could not join the Indaba itself) to cooperate with the Indaba.<sup>201</sup> Furthermore, they initiated an advertising campaign with a professional marketing firm,<sup>202</sup> again stressing the need to convince the public through the authority of the groups and experts and also through a narrative of a better future.

The KwaZulu Natal Indaba continued working after the publication of its proposals. Its representatives gave many interviews for the press but also informed interested associations and civil society groups; to make this easier and to present a uniform image of the Indaba at every occasion, a speaker’s manual and a compilation of frequently asked questions were produced.<sup>203</sup> This part of the Indaba’s work, later under the Indaba Foundation, will be covered in greater detail in the next chapter. Apart from the Indaba delegates, other prominent thinkers also advertised the Indaba, especially Alan Paton.<sup>204</sup>

Press coverage in general was extensive in Natal and quite positive, the Natal Mercury called the Indaba “historic”,<sup>205</sup> the “key to

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197 Erwin 1987.

198 Ramgobin 1987.

199 African Affairs Correspondent 1986.

200 Indaba Support Group: Constitution, 10.1986. APC PC142/1/1/1.

201 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba information sheet (including a form to join the Indaba support group). CC boxes 41–43.

202 James Brown & Associates: Constitutional proposals advertising campaign (for Indaba Support Group), 26.11.1986. APC PC142/3/4/1.

203 KZN Indaba: Speaker’s manual. A guide to representing the Indaba proposals including questions most commonly encountered and their answers. APC PC142/2/3/1; Mahomed, Ayesha/KZN Indaba Foundation: Questions and answers on Indaba. APC PC142/1/1/1.

204 See, e.g., Paton 1986.

205 Mercury Reporter 1986.

deadlock”,<sup>206</sup> and the “best compromise”.<sup>207</sup> The Daily News called the Indaba a “milestone”<sup>208</sup> but became critical of its secrecy during the Indaba’s late phase, recommending going public to win supporters.<sup>209</sup>

Scientists commented extensively on the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, covering a wide spectrum of opinions. For many scientists, the main problem was the impossibility of financing the proposals. Unsurprisingly, the scientists who were involved in the Indaba strongly endorsed the proposals.<sup>210</sup>

Not only did the Indaba cause supporters to organise, but also opponents of the Indaba proposals started organising themselves. The Natal Anti-Indaba League (NAIL), made up of Whites and Indians, criticised the Indaba for its secrecy during the negotiations leading to an uninformed public and saw the Indaba as the ultimate destruction of Whites and Indians in Natal, ‘surrendering’ to a black majority.<sup>211</sup> The Action White Natal, led by Chris Wolmarans and supported by the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (both far-right-wing), also rejected the Indaba as a threat to “the right of the Whites to self determination” (it supported racial segregation as the return to a “natural” condition).<sup>212</sup> The Conservative Party itself saw the Indaba as the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning’s plot to “get rid of Natal”.<sup>213</sup> Eugene Terre’Blanche of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging commented on power-sharing as proposed in the Indaba: “We do not know the word surrender, we will

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206 Cameron 1986b.

207 Natal Mercury 1986.

208 Daily News 1986a.

209 Daily News 1986b.

210 Boule 1987; Corbett 1988; Maré, Gerhard: Political Realities underlying the Indaba, ca. 1987. APC PC126/7/4; Maré 1987a; Maré 1987b; May 1988; Natrass/May 1988; Schlemmer 1987; Schoeman 1987; Sutcliffe, Michael: The KwaZulu Natal Indaba: an Analysis of Opinions of Residents Living in Natal-KwaZulu, 1986. APC PC144/11/1/2; van Wyk 1987; Wiechers 1987.

211 Reddy, Rama/Morris, A. G.: Natal Anti-Indaba League, 02.1987. APC PC126/7/4.

212 Wolmarans, J. L. C.: Press release: Action White Natal, 20.10.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

213 Political Correspondent: CP to launch full probe into indaba, 27.10.1986. CC box 44, sheet 198.

fight and we will struggle [...]. If we do not fight, we will end up as the slaves of other people.”<sup>214</sup>

The following paragraphs will explicate Buthelezi’s and Inkatha’s role during the Indaba. As mentioned earlier, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was a joint initiative by the Natal Provincial Council and the KwaZulu government, the latter formed by Inkatha members and headed by Buthelezi. Although these governments started the Indaba, the business representatives had the largest influence. Inkatha nevertheless played an important role: That the Indaba was an initiative by the KwaZulu government meant that ANC, UDF, COSATU and other resistance movements obviously would not participate, the same applied to left-leaning scientists. Additionally, the Buthelezi Commission’s report influenced the negotiations as stated above, and delegations by Inkatha (led by Minister of Health and Welfare Frank Mdlalose) and the KwaZulu government (led by Minister of Education and Culture and Inkatha Secretary-General Oscar Dhlomo) participated in the negotiation process.

During the preparations for the Indaba, the KwaZulu government already drafted a brief position paper that was also discussed and edited by the advisory committee. Although it is true that this document was not released to the public, the advisory committee then had deeper insight in the KwaZulu positions than into any other participant’s opinions. It cannot be ruled out that this might have influenced the advisory committee in favour of the KwaZulu government. After all, the committee consisted of key players of the Indaba and three members (D.C. Grice, Peter Mansfield, Schlemmer) that were Inkatha or KwaZulu government advisors.<sup>215</sup>

In this document, the KwaZulu government stated that it was willing to participate in the Indaba because it believed it to be possible to find a regional solution for KwaZulu and Natal that would ensure “participation by all the people of the region in the government of the region.”<sup>216</sup> It also made clear that participation in a strong, inclu-

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214 Sowetan 1987.

215 KZN Indaba: Members, 1986. APC PC19/7/1/1.

216 KwaZulu Government: The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba – the KwaZulu Position. Ten-point summary, 27.01.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/5.

sive, and regional government would not be enough but only a step to a representation of Blacks at national level. The Indaba, therefore, could not have been a step to separating KwaZulu-Natal from the rest of South Africa. Concerning minority rights, the KwaZulu government stated that it endorsed proportional representation and a Bill of Rights protecting individual and group rights (but it rejected any laws based on race or ethnicity, so group membership would have needed to be voluntary). The KwaZulu government further committed itself to free enterprise complemented by state-driven economic development for poor, rural areas.<sup>217</sup> Additionally, the KwaZulu government supplied information on expenditure and local government in KwaZulu to the Indaba.<sup>218</sup>

In a speech in front of business representatives on 04 February 1986, Buthelezi even explained that a one-man-one-vote system was still his ideal because it would work with individual rights protected by a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary (which would in turn make special group protection mechanisms obsolete). But as Whites would never have accepted this, he looked for alternatives in the form of power-sharing where Whites and Blacks would have needed to find a compromise.<sup>219</sup> Indeed, Inkatha's own loud insistence on federalism instead of accepting it as a compromise only began during the CODESA negotiations when it was sidelined by the NP and the ANC.<sup>220</sup>

Prior to the Indaba and during the initial phase of the Indaba, the Inkatha and KwaZulu government delegations met and coordinated their work regarding content (by discussing their written statements) but also regarding organisational questions. A special demand for expert advisors was expressed by the delegates but also to speak in

217 Ibid; see also the 1978 Statement of Belief that was also supplied to the Indaba; KwaZulu Government: The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba – the KwaZulu Position. Ten-point summary, 04.1986. APC PC19/7/3.

218 KwaZulu Government: KwaZulu land tenure, tribal system of government in KwaZulu, 06.1986. APC PC19/7/4; KwaZulu Government: Estimate of the expenditure for the year ending 31.03.1987, 1986. APC PC126/7/3.

219 Buthelezi, M.G.: Power sharing in RSA – the options, 04.02.1986. BArch B 213/30371.

220 Asmal 1994, 49.

front of the Indaba. Particular attention was directed at the delegations' composition to look "as multi-racial as possible"<sup>221</sup> during the debates.<sup>222</sup>

Despite the cautionary measures, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was soon criticised as Buthelezi's "pet project"<sup>223</sup> and a forum where political parties would re-state their programmes. This led Buthelezi to send a letter to the Indaba's chairman, Clarence, stressing that neither Inkatha nor the KwaZulu government would intend to manipulate the Indaba. Instead, the intention of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government was, according to Buthelezi, to tear down barriers and reach consensus. In this sense, he urged Clarence to throw in all of his wisdom when mediating the various interests represented in the Indaba.<sup>224</sup>

On 23 October 1986, shortly before the end of the Indaba negotiations, Inkatha and the KwaZulu government jointly submitted their constitutional proposals (like many delegations issued a final statement). In this brief description of principles, it is made clear that no racial voting system is deemed acceptable and that minority protections would need to be made outside of the voting system. To this end, outside the legislative assembly, 'Special Interest Councils' would have been allowed to be constituted advising the assembly and vested with a veto right on matters concerning the groups they represented. The legislative assembly should have been elected by all adults living in the area of KwaZulu and Natal based on proportional representation in a single constituency, comprising 100 members. Minority groups (including ethnic minorities) could have been represented by political parties, as was not unusual in South African politics, but Inkatha and the KwaZulu government saw it as more

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221 KwaZulu Delegation/Inkatha Delegation: Meeting, 02.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1, 2.

222 Ibid; KwaZulu Delegation/Inkatha Delegation: Meeting, 09.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1; KwaZulu Delegation/Inkatha Delegation: Meeting, 16.04.1986. APC PC19/7/1/1.

223 Buthelezi, M.G.: Relationship to Indaba (to Desmond Clarence), 11.04.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1, 1.

224 Ibid, 1–2.

desirable that parties were based on ideological principles instead of ethnicity. Interestingly enough, Inkatha saw itself as the only party representing Africans in KwaZulu and Natal, completely ignoring the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress. This was also contrary to the point that Inkatha had been founded as a cultural liberation movement, not as a party, and had a strong ethnic stance itself. The delegations further proposed 'KwaZulu-Natal' or 'KwaNa-Zulu' as the name of the new province.<sup>225</sup>

Although the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's proposals differed from the submission by Inkatha and the KwaZulu government, both delegations accepted the final proposals; the endorsement was confirmed by a KwaZulu government decision several months later.<sup>226</sup> One might argue that Inkatha tried to obscure its own position by sounding more radical than it actually was, but as the documents were not public, it is hard to see a reason for this assumption.

In conclusion, it can be said that the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was a conference, mainly led by big business, that wrote constitutional proposals for a new KwaZulu-Natal, hoping that the South African government would accept and implement these. It was an initiative by the Natal Provincial Council and by the KwaZulu government that both wished for a closer cooperation of their respective bodies, but this meant that key organisations in the South African political scene either did not want to participate (e.g. COSATU, UDF) or could not participate anyways as they were banned (e.g. ANC, PAC). The participating organisations and their representatives were aware of the contingency of the mid-1980s; they realised that the present and the future could be different, but they could not know whether it would be better or worse. Therefore, they preferred gradual, predictable changes over changing the whole system, and to make these gradual changes happen, they needed to take the initiative.

While politicians participated in and scientists assisted (and a university's vice-chancellor moderated) the negotiations, big business representatives had the greatest influence and drafted constitutional

225 Inkatha: KwaZulu/Inkatha final proposals for a future constitutional dispensation for KwaZulu-Natal, 23.10.1986. APC PC19/7/4.

226 Natal Mercury 1987.



proposals that were culturally more conservative and economically more liberal than what Inkatha had had in mind (although privatisation was ruled out on a scientific basis). It is interesting to see how closely the drafting of a new constitution resembles a business bargaining: almost all parties agree to invest something (which can also mean giving something up, e.g. total white domination) in order to gain a good, namely a predictable future in this case that safeguards material interests. Experts, i.e. scientists, gave advice during the negotiations. Thus, one could argue, big business representatives intentionally used a routine for different means than usual, intentionally striving for change through bargaining – although in a second step, the other side, the South African government, never actually agreed to consider any offers. To apply pressure on the government and to save most of their power, they teamed up with many others and negotiated constitutional proposals that were acceptable for almost all participants. This attempt to save power is quite similar to the west's development programmes during the Cold War: Concessions and improvements in the living standard were hardly enough to actually end poverty and misery (these would have needed more radical redistribution); instead, poverty was managed so it would not become a threat to capitalism (see chapter 2.4).

For Buthelezi and Inkatha, on the other hand, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was a chance to be part of an (at least) acceptable solution and to secure a good position should it be realised; additionally, they could establish and maintain good contacts to the business community.

The Indaba proposed a problematic second chamber made up of groups that would have prevented any significant change to the status quo; it furthermore wrote a Bill of Rights containing special protections for groups. The KwaZulu government/Inkatha submission, on the other hand, had proposed a colour-blind legislative assembly only with extra-parliamentary, voluntary groups. Buthelezi himself even said that special group protections were not necessary, but it seems that white fears of black domination made their way into the proposals. Thus, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's results were by no means predetermined by Inkatha as was the accusation; instead, real negotiations took place and bore fruit to proposals more conservative than

Inkatha's policy (but still not conservative enough especially for Afrikaner organisations). As mentioned before, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge and the Junior Rapportryerbeweging were connected to the Broederbond and through this to the NP. Although the NP did not participate directly, two organisations which it influenced widely did participate, indirectly bringing the NP to the table. One can argue that the NP undermined the Indaba's work and the consensus, and then complained that no consensus had been found.

On the general method of working, it can be said that the plenary sessions defined the broad guidelines and served as a room for discussion while the committees gave input to the plenary sessions. Although the committees claimed that they were experts on their topics, the plenary sessions' resolutions could predetermine which aspects should be analysed and what should be the result. During the plenary sessions, the participants imagined a new constitution and, on that, more vaguely a different society. This imagination was not as much based on empirical data as the Buthelezi Commission, but some aspects were still ruled out when they did not fit experts' observations at all as was the case with Louw's stance for privatisation. Many of the Indaba's participants then tried to realise the proposals through public relations aimed at convincing the people and the government.

Not surprisingly for this initiative, the Constitutional Committee was the most important one, e.g. when it could not report any new progress, a plenary session was postponed,<sup>227</sup> and discussions on their reports usually lasted longer than the others.<sup>228</sup> This makes also clear that 'democracy' was largely defined via a constitutional model, but the Natal Teachers' Society also brought in the aspect of responsible, democratic citizens.<sup>229</sup>

In the end, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's proposals were never implemented. During the following years, however, the discourse on the Indaba was kept alive by Buthelezi, who frequently referred to a

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227 KZN Indaba: Record of resolutions, 30.05.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

228 KZN Indaba: Proposed agenda, 10.07.1986. APC PC126/7/4.

229 Natal Teachers' Society: A philosophy of education for KwaZulu-Natal, 17.07.1986. APC PC144/11/1/1.

‘regional option’,<sup>230</sup> and by the Indaba Foundation, extensively promoting the Indaba’s proposals in the hope that they might someday be implemented, as we will see in the following chapter.

### 5.2.3 Promoting a Constitution:

#### *The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation*

When the KwaZulu Natal Indaba negotiations were reaching their end, it was decided to continue the promotional activity by the means of a foundation. As its name, *KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation* was chosen by about October 1986.<sup>231</sup> Its main aims were “to promote the social, economic, cultural and political welfare and advancement of all of the people of the Natal KwaZulu area of the Republic of South Africa.”<sup>232</sup> This was supposed to be done by promoting the KwaZulu Natal Indaba’s proposals and concepts by emphasising the common destiny of all people in KwaZulu and Natal, and by financially assisting pupils and small entrepreneurs.<sup>233</sup>

During its operation, the Indaba Foundation was controlled by a Steering Committee and an Executive Committee. The Steering Committee, ‘Steerco’, was the supreme body, to which all were accountable, and usually met monthly. Initially it comprised of 49 members of whom most had already been part of the Indaba negotiations, oftentimes being the alternates or advisors of the delegates in the front row. Its composition, therefore, closely resembled the Indaba.<sup>234</sup> The Executive Committee (‘Exco’) was a smaller body, consisting of about 20 members,<sup>235</sup> subordinate to the Steering Committee and on

230 Maré 1993; Haas/Zulu 1994; Robinson 2015, 960.

231 The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation was successfully registered as a Section 21 Company from about March 1987; KZN Indaba Fund-Raising Committee: Minutes of fourth meeting, 20.03.1987. APC PC142/3/4/2; KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Ninth Meeting, 23.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/1.

232 KZN Indaba: KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation, 24.10.1986. APC PC142/1/1/1.

233 Ibid.

234 KZN Indaba: Notes on meeting concerning establishment of Steering Committee, 11.12.1986. APC PC142/3/4/1.

235 Its size was reduced in 1987 to about 15; KZN Indaba Executive Committee:

one level with the Indaba Foundation's director. Many of the Exco's members were also part of the Steering Committee, so it comprised a quite similar mix of scientists, business representatives, and politicians, but the (probably busier and older) professors largely were not a part of the Exco that met mostly bi-weekly.<sup>236</sup>

The day-to-day work of the Indaba Foundation was managed by the director, initially Professor Dawid van Wyk, and the associate director.<sup>237</sup> Van Wyk had already been involved in the Indaba negotiations as the Constitutional Committee's secretary and was Professor in the Department of Constitutional and Public International Law at the University of South Africa, making him an academic expert on the topic of constitutions.<sup>238</sup> His Afrikaner background (and his sociable character) might also have been advantageous for approaching Afrikaners who, among the Whites, probably needed to be convinced the most because of the Afrikaner insistence on self-determination.<sup>239</sup>

The foundation, registered as a tax-exempt company from March 1987, was housed at offices belonging to Anglo American Property Service.<sup>240</sup> The office seems to have evolved a lively spirit, including its own office newspaper, the *Grapevine*, and drew many enthusiastic workers to support the Indaba. At its peak, the foundation employed at least 64 people. Apart from the staff directly employed by the Indaba, big business also seconded staff for support, e.g. the Tongaat-Hulett Group, a sugar giant, sent R. Dirk Kemp to work at the Indaba as fundraising director until the end of 1987. At the same time, some

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Minutes of Sixth Meeting, 23.11.1987. APC PC142/3/4/3.

236 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes of fourth meeting, 13.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/2; KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Sixth Meeting, 23.11.1987. APC PC142/3/4/3.

237 Apart from the aforementioned fundraising and finance departments, the foundation also had a Communications Coordinator, an Outreach Coordinator, a Regional Needs Analysis Task Force, and an administration.

238 Hosten 1994, 38.

239 KZN Indaba Foundation: Structure, 17.08.1987. APC PC142/3/4/3.

240 Deavin, R.J., Branch Manager Anglo American Property Services (Pty) Ltd/van Wyk, Dawid: Introducing Tracy Benporath in Anglo American's building, 28.10.1987/15.12.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/109.

Indaba official had given negative internals to the press.<sup>241</sup> This leak was due to 14 staff members losing their jobs; one anonymous staff member told the press that the Indaba Foundation was in financial trouble and that its management had broken promises of employing them for four or five years. The associate director Peter Mansfield denied this and stated that it had been clear from the beginning that contracts would only last for about a year. Mansfield further denied the financial trouble the foundation was in and portrayed the reorganisation of the Indaba as due to a new policy, focusing on implementation and negotiation, in which there was just no need for the members of staff that had been released from their contracts.<sup>242</sup> Dawid van Wyk remained as the Indaba director until 31 December 1988 when his secondment from the University of South Africa (for which the foundation had paid UNISA) ended;<sup>243</sup> his successor was former associate director Mansfield.<sup>244</sup>

The office also found volunteers to help, e.g. for handling mail, among these many Blacks. Office staff itself was largely white, but some Blacks were employed, e.g. Perfect Malimela, promoting the Indaba among Zulus.<sup>245</sup> In general, the Indaba Foundation seems to have been work-intensive (especially for the promoters travelling Natal and KwaZulu) and brought people from many professions (scientists, clerks/secretaries, teachers, journalists, politicians, and many more) together.<sup>246</sup> The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation was further

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241 Kemp, R. Dirk: Resignation (to Desmond Clarence), 18.01.1988. APC PC142/5/9/1.

242 Broughton 1988.

243 Dawid van Wyk was later also participating in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa and Multi-Party Negotiation Forum negotiations (see Licht/Viliers 1994, 9–10).

244 Van Wyk, Dawid: Paying UNISA (to Laura Lubbe), 17.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/81; KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 21.11.1988. APC PC142/3/5/1; van Wyk, Dawid: Returning to UNISA (to Steve Fourie), 12.12.1988. CC KCM01/2/8/47.

245 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 1, 04.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/1, 3; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 2, 05.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/2, 5.

246 Mansfield, Peter: Stressful work at Indaba (to Thembeke Mkhize), 03.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/28/27; Hellberg, Jon: CVs of Indaba ladies (to Roz Wrottesley,

approached by many black supporters for a job because they wanted to be part of a movement they deemed important and by some due to sheer (economic) despair.<sup>247</sup>

As mentioned before, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation had set out to promote the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and its proposals among the public which is the way the foundation became visible for the public. The analysis of the foundation's work, thus, begins with this, followed by the extensive and often convincing networking (and acquiring of donations via the Indaba's trust<sup>248</sup>) which the foundation practiced, including the foundation's programmes. Afterwards, the focus will turn to the relationship with governments and parties within South Africa. A look at the cessation of operations will close the chapter.

The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation used many forms of reaching out to the public in person at public meetings and by word-of-mouth recommendation to interested people. This included both people from the cities and townships as well as the countryside; people from diverse backgrounds were reached. From January to October 1987, the Indaba Foundation's staff attended 555 meetings and addressed at least 300,000 people according to official figures.<sup>249</sup> But the foundation's staff also had stands at many shows and trade fairs that were not events of a political nature.<sup>250</sup>

Assistant Editor *Cosmopolitan*), 16.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/29.

247 See the unsolicited applications in CC KCM01/2/9.

248 KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Ninth Meeting, 23.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/1.

249 KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Sixth Meeting, 23.11.1987. APC PC142/3/4/3.

250 Among these shows and fairs were, e.g., the Rand Show, Jaycee Trade Fair Port Shepstone, Cape Show, Ladysmith Trade Fair, Pietermaritzburg Royal Show, and NBS House & Garden Show. Dube, Gerald: Report on the Rand Show (to Geraldine Jeffrey). CC KCM01/2/31/11; Moore, Lynda: Stand at Jaycee Trade Fair (to Jaycee Port Shepstone). CC KCM01/2/13/9; Moore, Lynda: Stand at Cape Show (to Western Province Agricultural Society), 26.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/58; Moore, Lynda: Stand at Witbank Show (to B. J. Pieters, Witbank), 26.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/60; Moore, Lynda: Licence for Cape Show (to Cape Town City Council Licencing Department), 10.12.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/98; Moore, Lynda: Application to Ladysmith Trade Fair (to Y. Williams, Ladysmith Trade



Figure 24: The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation's stand at the Pietermaritzburg Royal Show, 1987.

For meetings with the public, the Indaba staff was trained to give simple, quick, and consistent answers, not only on the Indaba but also on very basic questions – as Lynn Oakley recalls a question by an elderly Zulu man: “What is a vote? Can I plant it? Can I eat it? Why would I want it?”<sup>251</sup> This was done by means of written material containing frequently asked questions and training courses at the Indaba offices.<sup>252</sup> The aim of these courses was to train the Indaba staff and

Fair), 26.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/1; Moore, Lynda: Application for additional security at Rand Show (to Marge de Wet, Witwatersrand Agricultural Society), 17.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/49; Moore, Lynda: Pietermaritzburg Royal Show, 20.05.1988. CC KCM01/2/30/2; Moore, Lynda: NBS House & Garden Show, 05.07.1988. CC KCM01/2/30/37.

251 Oakley, Lynn: E-mail, 09.08.2018.

252 KZN Indaba: Speaker's manual. A guide to representing the Indaba propos-



**Figure 25: Perfect Malimela addressing the audience at KwaHlongwa.  
Photographer: Lynn Oakley.**

Steering Committee members in communication and presentation skills so they would be able to deliver the Indaba's contents convincingly.<sup>253</sup> Additionally, the staff were trained in fundraising techniques to secure donations.<sup>254</sup>

At all kinds of public meetings, various leaflets and fliers were handed out to interested persons, groups, and companies (private meetings and correspondence were so extensive that they will be addressed separately, see below). Additionally, information material was

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als including questions most commonly encountered and their answers. APC PC142/2/3/1; Mahomed, Ayesha/KZN Indaba Foundation: Questions and answers on Indaba. APC PC142/1/1/1; KZN Indaba Foundation: Questions Regarding Inkatha and its proposals, 03.1987. APC PC126/7/4.

253 Mansfield, Peter/Hayes, Joanne: Attending workshops (to Desmond Clarence), 30.07.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

254 Cuthberg, David L., Marketing Ministries Director, World Vision/Hayes, Joanne: Fundraising seminar to Indaba staff, Indaba statement, 10.12.1987/29.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/3/98.





Figure 26: The audience at KwaHlongwa. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

mailed to many households (350,000 households as of April 1987<sup>255</sup>). The foundation of all work, the Indaba's constitutional proposals and Bill of Rights, were printed as a 28-page booklet and handed out regularly.<sup>256</sup> But because this was, for promotional purposes, still a rather long document, shorter fliers were produced, like the *Indaba information sheet – constitutional proposals for peace and prosperity*. This flier was just one A4 page, professionally printed on both sides and folded, giving the basic information. It was written in a somewhat simpler language, but still complicated for anyone not familiar with legal or constitutional terminology. Like much of the Indaba Foundation's material, it included a form to request more material by

255 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes of fourth meeting, 13.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/2.

256 Indeed, this booklet could be found in various collections at the Alan Paton Centre & Struggle Archives as well as at the Campbell Collections; see, e.g., KZN Indaba: Constitutional proposals (including the Bill of Rights), 28.11.1986. CC KCM01/2/23/1.

post and join as an Indaba supporter. The Indaba Foundation's flier also found its supporters in townships, e.g. Columbus N. Sikota from Wattville.<sup>257</sup> While most material was in English, this particular flier was also printed in Afrikaans and isiZulu.<sup>258</sup>

The Indaba Foundation produced more fliers, e.g. *KwaZulu Natal, what is it?*, which told a personal story (thus evoking emotions) by Dawid van Wyk, at the same time giving information on the Indaba and its expected effects on KwaZulu and Natal if implemented.<sup>259</sup> The brochure *You hold the future in your hands* gave brief explanations of the Indaba and focused on prominent supporters backing the Indaba: Oscar Dhlomo, Ian Player (conservationist), Gavin Relly (chairman of Anglo American), and David de Villiers (lawyer).<sup>260</sup> Another flier introduced and explained power-sharing as the Indaba had adapted it,<sup>261</sup> yet another one in poster size gave very colourful illustrated explanations of the Indaba, maybe also designed to be liked (although not fully understood) by children.<sup>262</sup> Images of children from diverse backgrounds were meant to evoke emotions and make the reader think of their children's future (*future* in general was emphasised in the promotional material). The *Indaba information kit*, a 39-page document, sized A4, also looks like it was aimed at children and the youth, as it closely resembles teaching material, even including questions that readers were supposed to answer. It explained the Indaba in detail, giving background information on why it was convened, how it worked, what it proposed and what its effects were expected to be.<sup>263</sup>

Apart from written communication, videos in English and Afrikaans were also produced and distributed via Gallo Africa,<sup>264</sup> and the

257 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba information sheet: constitutional proposals, 21.04.1987. CC box 39.

258 Howard, Pollyanna: Robprint printing Zulu and Afrikaans constitutional proposal leaflets, 16.04.1987. CC KCM01/2/24/6.

259 KZN Indaba Foundation: KwaZulu Natal, what is it? CC KCM01/2/39/1.

260 KZN Indaba Foundation: You hold the future in your hands. CC KCM01/2/36/34.

261 KZN Indaba Foundation: Power-sharing: How the Indaba achieves it. CC box 39.

262 KZN Indaba Foundation: The Indaba vision. CC box 39.

263 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba information kit. CC KC33377/F 320.9684 IND.

264 KZN Indaba Foundation Communications Department: Communications pro-

BBC filmed the Indaba offices.<sup>265</sup> All this material could be picked up at public Indaba meetings or be ordered via mail,<sup>266</sup> but bulk sending via mailing lists to professionals and organisations was also considered.<sup>267</sup> Additionally, subscribed members received the monthly (later bi-monthly) *Indaba News* informing about recent developments on eight to twelve pages.<sup>268</sup> To reach an even greater audience, costly advertisements were placed in newspapers (focusing on Natal) and magazines (e.g. business magazines, Reader's Digest) which showed prominent supporters of the Indaba giving a guarantee for its contents.<sup>269</sup> This advertising campaign especially included the *Ilanga* newspaper which had been bought by Inkatha in 1987 and enabled the Indaba foundation to access mostly urban, Zulu readers.<sup>270</sup> The foundation also relied on Zulu members of staff who were to bring in their experience about a group largely unknown to the white executive (Deborah Posel calls these 'black gurus'<sup>271</sup>). Indaba supporters could also buy t-shirts, hats, bumper stickers, ties, buttons, and Christmas cards to show their endorsement in public.<sup>272</sup>

gramme '89, 1989. CC KCM01/2/25/52; Mountain, A.G., Development & Communication Consultants: Audiovisual programme of the Indaba (to Peter Mansfield), 19.05.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/15; KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Ninth Meeting, 23.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/1.

265 Badcock, Peter: Memo: BBC crew at Indaba office, 08.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/24/19.

266 Hugo, Michi, Secretary, Independent Movement: Request for Indaba information material, 23.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/11; KZN Indaba Foundation: Support postcard (including an order form for Indaba information material), e.g. 10.02.1987. CC boxes 41–43.

267 Howard, Pollyanna: List of services of Core Computers (to J. Wessels, Core Computers), 24.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/9/14.

268 See, e.g., KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 1, 04.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/1.

269 Mansfield, Peter: Endorsement advertising, 17.07.1987. CC KCM01/2/28/11.

270 Gillwald 1988.

271 Posel 2018, 130–132.

272 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba tie and buttons. CC box 73; KZN Indaba Foundation: Sticker "Support the Indaba". CC box 39; Mathew, S. J.: Indaba peaks and stickers (to Frylinck Toyota), 19.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/40; Mathew, S. J.: Indaba peaks and stickers (to Nongoma Garage), 19.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/37; Mvelase, Ellias Phulula: Requesting Indaba news, 12.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/108; Niven, Belinda, Senior Account Executive BatesWells:

A supporter from Soweto, Ellias Phulula Mvelase, wore the promotional material and told the Indaba office:

I here by beg to apply to tell you about my problem. On 6th of November 1987 I was atacked by the two people one of this people was carrying a gun (45 mm) consisting of 1 bullet.

I was report to the police as from now they do nothing about that. As I'm a member of Inkatha and a member of KwaZulu Natal Indaba. I was lived at Siphimfundo High School where I was a student in. I am in the above address I'm work at the contruction. Please send me Indaba News. That is my picture.

Yours faithfully  
Ellias Phulula Mvelase

Not only did the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation place ads in newspapers, the press was also interested in the Indaba and the foundation's work, resulting in regular, usually neutral or positive press coverage.<sup>273</sup> To keep the press informed, the foundation's representatives gave interviews and issued press statements commenting on current developments.<sup>274</sup> Additionally, the Indaba Foundation sought direct contact to journalists and newspapers, offering exclusive stories or commenting on their coverage of the Indaba.<sup>275</sup>

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Design of bumper sticker and christmas card, 13.11.1989. CC KCM01/2/11/15; Niven, Belinda, Senior Account Executive BatesWells: Revised design of bumper sticker, 21.11.1989. CC KCM01/2/11/24; Oakley, Lynn/Dlamini, Tyson: T-shirt sales, 27.10.1987/10.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/25.

273 CC: Indaba papers, boxes 44–49.

274 See, e.g., Hellberg, Jon: Contact to journalists (to Dawid van Wyk, Peter Mansfield, Peter Badcock). CC KCM01/2/21/13; Howard, Pollyanna: Press functions (to Dawid van Wyk, Peter Mansfield), 13.04.1987. CC KCM01/2/24/3.

275 Mohamed, Ayesha: Letter to the editor (of newspaper The Leader), 12.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/42; Hitchens, Peter, Defence and Diplomatic Correspondent, Daily Express: Thanks for meeting (to Jon Hellberg), 06.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/17; Hellberg, Jon/Freedman, J.: Letter to the editor (of Sunday Tribune), 14.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/28; Hellberg, Jon: Indaba information material (to Winnie Graham, The Star), 23.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/55; Hellberg, Jon:



**Figure 27: KwaZulu Natal Indaba supporter  
Ellias Phulula Mvelase, 1988.**

To this end, the Indaba's proposals were supplied to the press repeatedly, backed with (often statistical) information on how popular the proposals were among the people of KwaZulu and Natal.<sup>276</sup> The Indaba Foundation regularly referred to market research that showed high support for the Indaba among the white electorate in Natal and even commissioned its own research of which the results were then pub-

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Indaba's outreach programme (to Rapport, Natal Witness, Daily News, Weekend Argus, Beeld, Sane, Cosmopolitan, Fair Lady), 04.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/7.

276 KZN Indaba Foundation: Press statement: Indaba overview. CC KCM01/2/33/1; KZN Indaba Foundation: The Indaba: a Plan for a Peaceful and Prosperous KwaZulu Natal. CC KCM01/2/25/34; KZN Indaba Foundation: We have a dream. CC KCM01/2/31/2; Mansfield, Peter: Power-sharing. CC KCM01/2/31/4; Mansfield, Peter: The Indaba's constitutional proposals. CC KCM01/2/31/12.

lished by the Indaba Foundation.<sup>277</sup> This market research was in turn used for the publicity campaigns; knowledge about Blacks was limited, so information had to be gathered to adapt the publicity campaign.

The KwaZulu Natal Indaba had already resorted to scientific findings (although to a lesser extent than the Buthelezi Commission) to support its position, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation followed the same strategy. The Indaba Foundation's staff kept their statements and arguments up to date by collecting statistical data (election results, leader popularity, scientific texts, social data, and population censuses).<sup>278</sup> The Indaba Foundation further hired Dr Johan van Zijl, who had worked for the Natal Education Department before, to carry out a study on how to implement the Indaba's educational proposals in KwaZulu and Natal (to work out a precise plan that the government simply would have had to follow).<sup>279</sup> Apart from the aim which the Indaba lined out, van Zijl now drafted a clear-cut scenario, i.e. made the way to the implementation of the educational proposals explicit.

The Indaba Foundation commissioned its own attitude surveys through Markinor and others to find out about the acceptability of the Indaba's proposals and about the public's knowledge of the Indaba. From the results, the foundation's strategy was adapted, e.g. their advertisement campaigns were improved to reach the groups that were

277 Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: Survey shows heavy National Party support for Indaba, 15.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/32/17; Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: New survey shows Indaba has maintained white voter support, 21.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/32/23; Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: Natal's white voters would back Buthelezi in a KwaZulu/Natal provincial government, survey shows, 28.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/32/26; Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: National survey by Mark en Meningsopnames shows majority support for Indaba in all four provinces, 07.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/32/35.

278 KZN Indaba Foundation: Comments on the black township research. CC KCM01/2/18/7; N.N.: Results of the 1981 general election. CC KCM01/2/17/7; N.N.: Statistics of leader popularity. CC KCM01/2/25/28; N.N.: Statistics on expected population composition. CC KCM01/2/17/3; N.N.: Structure of the various population groups in Natal/KwaZulu for 1985. CC KCM01/2/17/8; South African Barometer: Fortnightly Journal of Current Affairs Statistics, 21.04.1989. CC box 39.

279 Mansfield, Peter: Hiring Johan van Zyl [sic] (to Dawid van Wyk), 08.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/51; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba update. CC KCM01/2/13/20, 3.

largely unaware of the Indaba, and the wide support for the Indaba in KwaZulu and Natal was emphasised.<sup>280</sup>

The *Endorsement Campaign* (presenting prominent Indaba supporters to the public) was running in 1987 to advertise the Indaba's proposals. BatesWells, an advertising company, was asked to find out which of the Indaba's prominent supporters and their respective opinions had the highest standing among the public so the Endorsement Campaign could focus on these. It was found that opinions of businessmen and scientists had the highest value among the public.<sup>281</sup> The foundation, therefore, hugely relied on these (perceived) experts on the topic to promote the Indaba.

By the means of these attitude surveys, the Indaba Foundation wanted to demonstrate that the Indaba's proposals enjoyed significant support among the white electorate and among all the other people in KwaZulu and Natal. The South African government, therefore, could be urged to implement them – as the majority of people in KwaZulu and Natal according to these studies wanted them to be implemented – or to hold a referendum on the Indaba proposals. Additional to the experts, a large group of supporters should also apply pressure on politics as we will now see.

A large circle of supporters from South Africa, Europe, and North America was built up by the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation. As mentioned above, the public was approached via articles and advertisements in newspapers and magazines, but also by participation in shows. Contact was kept via personal meetings and an extensive cor-

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280 Culross, Brian R., Senior Client Services Executive, Market Research Africa/Mansfield, Peter: Researching attitudes to the Indaba among black adults: design of questions, 07.01.1988/08.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/28; Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: Survey shows heavy National Party support for Indaba, 15.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/32/17; Hofmeyr, Jan: Proposed questionnaire, 06.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/18/2; KZN Indaba Foundation: Market research on Indaba, 11.05.1987. CC KCM01/2/32/7; Research International: Draft research proposal for: Project Pineapple, 19.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/19/14; Spier, Andre, Executive Director Syncom: Thanks for visit, thoughts on research programme (to Peter Mansfield), 11.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/59.

281 BatesWells: Survey proposal to establish changing attitudes towards the KwaZulu Natal Indaba based on the endorsement campaign, 08.1987. CC KCM01/2/23/7.

respondence between the Indaba offices and supporting individuals, organisations, and companies.<sup>282</sup> As the Indaba Foundation relied on donations, it was vital to keep donors informed and convinced that their donations were achieving something. The following paragraphs are supposed to show how the Indaba Foundation secured continuing support (including donations) by showing some examples of correspondence, but also to give an overview of the people the foundation appealed to.

Companies were the main financial contributors to the Indaba Foundation; Anglo American donated the highest sums.<sup>283</sup> Other major donors were Anglovaal, Tongaat-Hulett, De Beers, First National Bank, and Sun International/Kersaf among many smaller companies donating; in all, the foundation raised several million Rand in donations in 1987.<sup>284</sup> The foundation approached so many companies that these cannot be listed here (and there probably were even more companies whose letters were lost at some point). But in general, it can be said that all different kinds of companies were contacted for support, from multinational giants to family-owned companies.<sup>285</sup> A

282 The main office was in Durban, but branches were, for some time, operated in Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg, and Cape Town; KZN Indaba Foundation: Press release, 17.07.1987. APC PC126/7/4; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba update. CC KCM01/2/13/20, 1; Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: Indaba expands into Transvaal and Cape, 07.07.1988. CC KCM01/2/32/45.

283 Pardoe, G.R., Anglo American Corporation/De Beers Consolidated Mines: Phase two funding: cheque for R700 000 (to R. D. Kemp, Indaba), 11.06.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/23. Anglo American also published a promotional article by Alan Paton in its Optima magazine; Paton 1986.

284 KZN Indaba Fund-Raising Committee: Report to the Executive Committee, 14.09.1987. APC PC142/3/4/1; KZN Indaba Fund-Raising Committee: Report to the Executive Committee, 07.12.1987. APC PC142/3/4/1.

285 Stegmann, J.A., Chairman, Sasol: Thanks for meeting (to R. D. Kemp), 09.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/22; Icely, Nick, Regional Manager Retail, Shell South Africa (Pty) Limited, Oil Division: Thanks for agreeing to address (to Desmond Clarence), 14.05.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3; Hatton, D.A., BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd: Confirmation of appointment with Dawid van Wyk (to Allison Margeson), 06.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/16; Badcock, Peter: Sending a speech by Oscar D. Dhlomo (to J. M. Kahn, Managing Director S. A. Breweries Limited), 17.05.1988. CC KCM01/2/6/3.



special focus when contacting international companies was laid on Europe (especially the United Kingdom) and North America; it is, however, not clear whether the Indaba Foundation actually received any financial support from companies solely based abroad.<sup>286</sup>

The process of establishing contact and maintaining support was as described above. Donors received updates on a regular basis telling them what their donations were used for and why they should continue donating. The main donor, Anglo American, received special attention and regular briefings by van Wyk, the associate director Peter Mansfield, and Dhlomo.<sup>287</sup> In general, the Indaba Foundation did not make their donors public; some companies, however, explicitly demanded that their donations remained secret.<sup>288</sup> Another minor source of income was the sale of Indaba promotional material via supporters and smaller companies.<sup>289</sup>

The Indaba proposals were also promoted among clubs, societies, and cultural organisations. Although some of these sent donations, the main reason was to win supporters who would spread the word and maybe become volunteers for the Indaba Foundation. It seems that for these meetings, a prominent figure without affiliation to a political party was needed and, therefore, Clarence attended most of them. This activity included talks and discussions at schools, with

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286 Campbell, Scott R., Senior Vice President Kellogg's: Thanks for meeting, promise of support, 13.04.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1; Jacobs, Marlene: Notice of tax benefits for awaited support (to Sal Marzullo, Vice President Government Relations, Mobil Oil Corporation), 28.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/92.

287 Dhlomo, O.D.: Update on recent development (to G. W. H. Relly, Chairman Anglo American Corporation of S. A. Ltd), 15.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/55; van Wyk, Dawid: Thanks for reception and support (to G. W. H. Relly, Chairman Anglo American Corporation), 18.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/29; van Wyk, Dawid: Thanks for donation (to M. W. Spicer, Anglo American Corporation), 14.12.1988. CC KCM01/2/8/42.

288 Van Wyk, Dawid: Thanks for donation, assurance of remaining silent about donation (to H. D. MacKenzie, Managing Director SAICCOR), 22.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/127.

289 See, e.g., Oakley, Lynn/Dlamini, Tyson: T-shirt sales, 12.12.1987/25.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/18.

religious organisations, chambers of commerce, sports clubs, and professional associations.<sup>290</sup>

Individuals stood in correspondence with the Indaba Foundation as well and could enroll as supporting members (donations were not compulsory), usually expressing their support, their rejection, or asking questions about the Indaba.<sup>291</sup> Of these individual contacts, however, the international ones seem most interesting. The Indaba Foundation received many letters of support from Western Europe and North America and a delegation of Dhlomo and Peter Hirst also visited the US. They visited various companies but also other contacts in the US, especially Republican politicians, foundations, and institutes.<sup>292</sup>

Many supporting letters were received from the Federal Republic of Germany, and Indaba Foundation officials met Germans at many

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290 Kitching, K. T.: Balgowan meeting at Michaelhouse (to Desmond Clarence), 25.11.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1; Tweedy, T.G., Public Relations Officer, M. L. Sultan Technikon: Forum at the Technikon (to Peter Mansfield), 24.06.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/28; Bawa, Ibrahim Mahomed, Executive Director Islamic Council of South Africa: Promotion among members (to Desmond Clarence), 06.02.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1; Pillay, Harry: Address (to Chairman, South African Hindu Dharma Sabha), 16.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/30; Hobson, K.W., Chief Executive Durban Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce: Thanks for agreeing to address (to Desmond Clarence), 12.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3; Pillay, Harry: Address to Cricket Club (to Hans Maharaj), 20.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/45; Ayers, P.G., South African Institute of Chemical Engineers: After dinner speech (to Desmond Clarence), 24.02.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

291 See, e.g., Spry, E. R. H.: Thanks for membership and promotional material, plea for being men of action, 09.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/5; Arnold, L. M.: Letter concerning "boycott" of conference "Towards Democracy: PMB in a Changing Society", 22.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/45.

292 Dhlomo, O.D./Hirst, Peter: Visit to the USA, 18.01.-02.02.1988. APC PC142/5/9/1; Kemp, R. Dirk: Thanks for meeting, further Indaba information material (to Senator Larry Dixon), 26.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/75; Bureau for Information, The Regional Representative, Durban: Appointment with Mary Alice Ford (Republican Member of the State Legislature of Oregon) (to Desmond Clarence), 30.10.1987. APC PC142/5/8/2; Kemp, Janet: Visit of Senator Robert Dole's aides, 13.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/28/17; Waters, Derri: Information material on Indaba (to Karen Fung, Deputy Curator Africa Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford), 27.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/54.

occasions in South Africa, especially liberal or conservative politicians, scientists, and journalists.<sup>293</sup> Clarence, e.g., met and received a letter from Christoph Graf Dönhoff. He was executive of *Arbeitskreis Christen für Partnerschaft statt Gewalt* (“Work group of Christians for partnership instead of violence”) since 1982, close to the far-right *Deutsch-Südafrikanische Gesellschaft* (“German-South African society”) which connected conservatives, big business, and fascists.<sup>294</sup> Dönhoff had joined the German nazi party’s (NSDAP) foreign organisation in 1935, since 1940 working as colonial referent.<sup>295</sup> Dönhoff thanked Clarence for the meeting and the material on the Indaba and announced that he would write a lauding article about the Indaba for said *Arbeitskreis*.<sup>296</sup> Additionally, Clarence met Austrian Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, a right-wing conservative publicist, monarchist, and a critic of democratic principles with close ties to (neo-)nazis.<sup>297</sup>

Mansfield met, inter alia, Professor Werner Pfeifenberger, a right-wing (some called him a nazi) Austrian political scientist who openly supported the Apartheid regime.<sup>298</sup> A short time before the end

293 Bureau for Information, The Regional Representative, Durban: Appointment with Horst Niemeyer (General Secretary of the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft) on 02.10.1987 (to Desmond Clarence), 17.09.1987. APC PC142/5/8/2; Malherbe, Jessica, Public Relations, Southern Africa Forum: Meeting West German guests Siegfried G. Lang, Ermanno Meichsner, Hubertus Meentzen, 13.02.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3; Niemeyer, Horst: Thanks for meeting (to Desmond Clarence), 16.11.1987. APC PC142/5/8/2; Viljoen, Sandra, Public Relations Officer Southern African Forum: Meeting Günther von Lojewski (to Desmond Clarence), 18.10.1988. APC PC142/5/9/1/2.

294 Peham 1994, 59.

295 Tripp 2015, 148–149.

296 Bureau for Information, The Regional Representative, Durban: Meeting Christoph Graf Dönhoff (to Desmond Clarence), 24.10.1986. APC PC142/5/7/1; Dönhoff, Christoph Graf: Thanks for letter and constitutional proposals (to Desmond Clarence), 25.04.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

297 Bureau for Information, The Regional Representative, Durban: Meeting with Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn [sic] on 16.03.1987 (to Desmond Clarence), 02.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3; Großmann 2014, 526; Holzner/Riccabona 2009; Holzner/Riccabona 2010; Peham 1994, 61.

298 Pfeifenberger, Werner: Interview for German politicians (to Peter Mansfield), 31.05.1989. CC KCM01/2/9/45; Mansfield, Peter: Response to request for interview (to Werner Pfeifenberger), 15.06.1989. CC KCM01/2/9/KCM01/2/9/6;

of the Indaba Foundation's work, Mark Woolley met Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein, member of the Christian Democratic Union but also of the extreme-right *Die Deutschen Konservativen* ("The German Conservatives") and the aforementioned Deutsch-Südafrikanische Gesellschaft.<sup>299</sup> To be fair, it is not known how many details the Indaba Foundation's officials knew about the people they met.

These connections between Germans and South Africans were not new, originating in German-Boer friendship against a common enemy (then the British Empire) and in a number of German settlers. Nazism had been fascinating for some Afrikaners who kept the contacts to Germany after 1945. In the fight for apartheid and against communism, right-wing Germans and South Africans cooperated because they saw the white man as fighting at an outpost for Christianity, against communism, and against Africans who were deemed unable to govern themselves.<sup>300</sup> Although said South Africans who wished to 'save' apartheid did not favour the Indaba, some of their German counterparts stood in correspondence with the Indaba Foundation.

Not only did Indaba Foundation officials meet Germans in South Africa, they also travelled to Germany for conferences.<sup>301</sup> Van Wyk visited Germany in 1988 together with Gavin Woods (the Inkatha Institute's director, see chapter 5.2.4) and a member of the KwaZulu government; the visit was organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. His general impression was that the government officials he met had a "substantial knowledge" of the Indaba.<sup>302</sup> Dhlomo spoke at a conference in Erlangen in 1987 about the Indaba and the media, Mansfield spoke a conference at Otzenhausen in 1989.<sup>303</sup>

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Pfeifer 2001; Der Spiegel 1998.

299 Der Spiegel 1986a; Der Spiegel 1986b; Peham 1994, 59; Wittgenstein, Casimir Prinz: Thanks for meeting (to Mark Woolley), 27.02.1990. CC KCM01/2/12/24.

300 Großmann 2014, 344–365; Peham 1994.

301 The Natal Chamber of Industries also promoted the Indaba in Germany; Natal Chamber of Industries: Die Pflichtgebote für politische Veränderung in Südafrika. Das KwaZulu Natal Indaba, 15.10.1986. issa SA B5.

302 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 21.11.1988. APC PC142/3/5/1.

303 Hellberg, Jon: Oscar D. Dhlomo speaking at a German conference in Erlangen on 05.12.1987, 04.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/24/24; Mansfield, Peter: Travel to Otzenhausen, Germany, and USA (to RENNIES Travel), 25.09.1989. CC

In the UK, the Indaba Foundation's contacts largely were politicians. In 1987, Clarence received a letter from an "Indaba Group formed at Westminster", stating that a significant part of the House of Commons would support the Indaba proposals in the future and that they hoped to invite Clarence to speak to the Foreign Affairs Committee.<sup>304</sup> Another source suggests that the MPs interested in the Indaba were Conservative Party members (Tories).<sup>305</sup> One supporter in his private capacity sent Indaba information material to the UK's prime minister Margaret Thatcher whose private secretary replied that "genuine national dialogue" was what the prime minister wanted for South Africa. She welcomed "all constructive efforts to reach a political solution in South Africa through dialogue, and the Indaba is clearly one such approach."<sup>306</sup>

Contacts in other parts of the world included France, Canada, Sweden, Portugal, and Russia, these mostly were (conservative) politicians and scientists.<sup>307</sup> The foundation's Rosemary Steinfeldt further had contact with Dr Ulrich Schlüer, a Swiss politician and Secretary General of the *Arbeitsgruppe südliches Afrika* ("South African Study Group", official translation). Schlüer told Steinfeldt that his group was publishing a journal that referred to the Indaba on a regular, very positive basis and he offered his assistance in promoting the Indaba

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KCM01/2/10/44.

304 Henderson, B.: Indaba group (to Desmond Clarence), 19.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

305 Steinfeldt, Rosemary: Interest in involvement (to David Eade FR.C.S., Essex, England, Chairman of S. A. Society), 13.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

306 Powell, Charles, Private Secretary of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom: Thanks for Indaba material, 28.07.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/35.

307 Magnusson, Ake, International Council of Swedish Industry: Thanks for Indaba information material (to Dawid van Wyk), 20.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/51; Marchand, Général Régis: Thanks for Indaba information material (to Dawid van Wyk), 16.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/7; Munro, Donald W., Retired MP for Esquimalt-Saanich, Canada: Letter of appreciation, 1.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/1; Mansfield, Peter: Request for support and cooperation (to Luis Manuel Geraldes, Secretario Geral-Adjunto Partido Social Democrata, Portugal), 06.11.1989. CC KCM01/2/11/7; Mansfield, Peter: Sending of Indaba information material (to Lev N. Rytow, Institute for African Studies, Moscow), 06.11.1989. CC KCM01/2/11/5.

in Switzerland.<sup>308</sup> The Arbeitsgruppe was generally rather right-wing and wanted to act against the ‘misinformation’ about South Africa by promoting moderate leaders (which, in their eyes, did not exclude the National Party). As the Arbeitsgruppe also was anti-communist, it saw South Africa as an important factor in guaranteeing a ‘free’ Europe. Schlüer himself seems to have been on the right edge of this organisation, openly supporting the Apartheid regime.<sup>309</sup>

As can be seen, the Indaba Foundation built up a network of influential persons and organisations that it used for successful lobbying (in terms of publicity and donations gathered). But the Indaba Foundation did not stop at this point; possible future leaders and the youth in general were brought in contact by various programmes the foundation organised.

These programmes brought people of different backgrounds together, especially the youth. They were meant for social exchange and acquisition of skills, but also were platforms on which the Indaba was promoted and discussed. On 23 and 24 January 1988, the Indaba Foundation held the *KwaZulu Natal Indaba Conference Weekend – Sponsored by Foschini* at Kearsney College near Durban with students from all backgrounds. Costs were largely covered by Foschini (a clothing retailer) but donations were also received by other companies; this made participation including food and transport free for all students. The programme consisted of speeches by Indaba representatives, each speech followed by group discussions, but also included a fashion show organised by the Indaba Foundation with material by Foschini. During the weekend, the role of the ANC was also discussed by the pupils with many being sympathetic towards Nelson Mandela, but criticism was later voiced for the speakers only presenting the Indaba and Inkatha views.<sup>310</sup>

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308 Steinfeldt, Rosemary/Schlüer, Ulrich: Indaba and the Arbeitsgruppe Südliches Afrika (Zürich), 23.10.1987/05.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/3/14.

309 Kreis 2005, 132–133; Pfister 2000.

310 Gillmer, Glenda: KwaZulu Natal Indaba Conference Weekend – Sponsored by Foschini (to H. A. L. Mathew, Foschini Limited), 07.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/20; Moore, Lynda: Foschini KwaZulu Natal Indaba Conference Weekend: other donations (to L. Mullen, Secretary Foschini Limited), 25.11.1987. CC

As part of the *Youth Focus Programme*, youth conferences of 150 to 230 students were arranged at schools on which politics and the Indaba were discussed accompanied by follow-up weekends on which the participants were brought back together. These conferences were held at Kearsney College on 06 and 07 February 1988, at Michaelhouse Private School from 25 to 27 June 1988, and at Uthongathi College<sup>311</sup> on 20 and 21 August 1988, the expenses largely paid by the Indaba Foundation's donors.<sup>312</sup> The weekend at Kearsney College, e.g., was seen as a success, showing the Indaba 'in action', while the weekend at Uthongathi even was filmed for television.<sup>313</sup> Quite similar to the first weekend in January, the Indaba speakers at Kearsney College (visiting was also Alan Paton) presented and discussed the Indaba, but the students also discussed topics like the AWB, the ANC, education, capitalism, and communism. Criticism arose concerning the elitist image the weekend had and concerning the small number of African students,<sup>314</sup> but the students themselves largely called it a great, open-minded gathering when asked by the press. As a consequence, many participating pupils were convinced of the Indaba after the weekend. The follow-up weekends were held at Spioenkop in May, July, and September.<sup>315</sup>

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KCM01/2/3/71; Mngadi 1988.

311 Uthongathi was a private school and founded in 1987 as one of the first legal, non-racial schools which had been prohibited previously; Kane-Berman 2012.

312 Hellberg, Jon: Press statement: Kearsney College to host Indaba conference, 12.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/32/19; Jewitt, Eve: Youth Focus meeting, 10.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/31/7.

313 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 18.07.1988. APC PC142/3/5/1.

314 During the weekend at Uthongathi college, Afrikaans-speaking students were also largely absent; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 17, 10/11.1988. CC KCM01/2/36/15, 6–7.

315 This assessment was voiced by the Indaba Foundation itself, but it also got a positive reply by Adrian Enthoven, Secretary of the African Affairs Society, Kearsney College; Daily News Reporter 1988; Jewitt, Eve: Booking of schools village at Spioenkop (to Chris Black, Natal Parks Board), 14.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/2; KZN Indaba Foundation Communications Department: Communications workshop, 1988. CC KCM01/2/25/40; Enthoven, Adrian, Secretary of the African Affairs Society, Michaelhouse Private School: Thanks for address (to Peter Mansfield), 07.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/38; Naidoo 1988.

On a smaller scale, the *Unity through Youth* programme brought senior high school students of all backgrounds together for weekend workshops. At these workshops, useful skills (for their educational and work careers) were taught but, according to the Indaba Foundation, the main aim was that the students got to know each other and learned to understand the aspirations of others. The foundation assessed the programme as successful (permanent friendships had been established between students from different backgrounds<sup>316</sup>) and had to introduce waiting lists.<sup>317</sup> Many participants had passed the *English Advancement Programme* before in which students improved their English skills and learned to show confidence when speaking or presenting.<sup>318</sup> This project had been initiated due to perceived difficulties of KwaZulu's and Natal's education systems in which even the English teachers had problems in speaking English according to the Indaba Foundation or, in Peter Mansfield's words, "the relatively blind [were] leading the blind".<sup>319</sup> The programme was designed to be executed by professional white teachers giving the students a total immersion of several days in an English-speaking environment using material supplied by researchers.<sup>320</sup>

The foundation planned another programme to foster mutual understanding, the *Youth Exchange Programme*, in which students from different backgrounds would swap their homes on weekends or during holidays. The *Negotiation Skills Training* was planned to teach

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316 E.g., Dinesh Singh, Headboy of the Sea Cow Lake Secondary School, enjoyed the Indaba in Action weekend at Windy Ridge and, according to his own letter, had found many friends that he wanted to stay in contact with. As requested, Eve Jewitt of the Indaba Foundation sent him the addresses of the other participants; Singh, Dinesh, Headboy Sea Cow Lake Secondary School: Thanks for "Indaba in Action" weekend, enquiry concerning the addresses of other participants (to Eve Jewitt). CC KCM01/2/7/22; Jewitt, Eve: List of people participating in "Indaba in Action" weekend (to Dinesh Singh), 27.07.1988. CC KCM01/2/6/35.

317 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 11.12.1989. APC PC142/3/5/2.

318 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba update. CC KCM01/2/13/20, 3-4.

319 Mansfield, Peter: Project English Uplift (to Peter Hirst), 10.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/73, 1.

320 Ibid; Mansfield, Lyndy: English Communication project, 22.07.1988. CC KCM01/2/30/55.



local leaders negotiation skills focusing on how to settle conflicts by consensus.<sup>321</sup> It could not be determined, however, whether these two were realised, but the latter one received positive responses from potential participants of a broad spectrum including Inkatha, UDF, COSATU, and others. This programme, therefore, would also have been a chance of many people from different backgrounds coming and learning together. For financing the programmes, big business was approached.<sup>322</sup>

It was also considered to include the Indaba proposals in KwaZulu's Ubuntu-Botho syllabus (see chapter 4.1.3) but it was argued that this would have made the Inkatha-Indaba links too strong, giving additional reason for criticism – the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation wanted to be seen as largely independent despite its connections to politics, especially Inkatha, as we will now see.<sup>323</sup>

Inkatha and the KwaZulu government had been one initiator, along with the Natal Provincial Council, of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and played an important role during the negotiations, albeit not a defining one. The KwaZulu government and Inkatha delegations signed the Indaba's report, accepting it as the result of the Indaba negotiations, but it only became official policy on 03 July 1987, about half a year after the proposals had been presented to the South African government. Inkatha then adopted the Indaba proposals "in principle", meaning that their own policy might differ in some respects from the Indaba proposals but that their basics were accepted. The Steering Committee had been informed about this deliberate delay, probably to await the public's reaction and further developments.<sup>324</sup> After the official adoption, Dhlomo promoted the Indaba proposals at many occasions<sup>325</sup> and remained active on the Steering Committee;

321 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba update. CC KCM01/2/13/20, 3–4.

322 Holroyd, Shelley/Mansfield, Peter: Information on Indaba programmes (to D. Naicker, Deloitte, Haskins and Sells), 31.07.1989. CC KCM01/2/10/15.

323 Oakley, Lynn: Report on the Prococ meeting, 20.01.1988. LO.

324 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes of fourth meeting, 13.04.1987. APC PC142/3/4/2; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 4, 07.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/4, 1.

325 See various issues of Indaba news in CC: Indaba papers KCM01/2/36.



Figure 28: Indaba tent at an Inkatha meeting. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.



Figure 29: Indaba shields at an Inkatha meeting. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

after Clarence's resignation as chairman in 1988, he was elected as Clarence's successor and remained the Indaba's chairman until the end of the foundation's operation.<sup>326</sup>

In turn, Indaba officials were present at Inkatha gatherings, e.g. UWUSA conferences or the meetings of the Women's Brigade, where on at least one occasion Perfect Malimela and Dirk Kemp held a speech to promote the Indaba among Inkatha supporters. Indaba promotion was also carried out at Shaka Day and Reed Dance celebrations, but resentment arose when the young women performing the Reed Dance wore Indaba caps, politicising a cultural event (which had not been intended by the Indaba executive); Buthelezi then decided that Indaba promotion was very welcome at political gatherings, but not at cultural ones.<sup>327</sup> Other promotional meetings in KwaZulu were usually organised by members of the KLA, which had accepted the Indaba proposals, at the regional authorities' meetings, and via the KwaZulu Bureau of Communication (usually in isiZulu).<sup>328</sup> For this purpose, a presentation (to be shown from a video tape or from slides) was prepared by the Indaba Foundation and its exact contents were finetuned by Frank Mdlalose.<sup>329</sup> Buthelezi himself kept good relations with the Indaba, for example by inviting many of the Steering Committee's members and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's director

326 KZN Indaba Foundation: Minutes of the first annual general meeting, 05.12.1988. APC PC142/3/5/1; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba re-elects Dhlomo as chairman, 11.09.1989. APC PC126/7/6.

327 Mkhize, Z.J., Secretary, Department of the Chief Minister: Handing out of information about the Indaba (to Peter Mansfield), 14.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/6; Buthelezi, M.G.: Distribution of Indaba material at Inkatha conferences (to Dawid van Wyk), 07.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/2/19; Oakley, Lynn: Reed Ceremony and Shaka's Day celebrations at Stanger (to Peter Mansfield, Dawid van Wyk), 12.10.1987. LO.

328 KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes of Fourth Meeting, 12.10.1987. APC PC142/3/4/2; Mazibuko, Ndongeleni Joshua, Liaison Officer, Umlazi Region, Office of the Chief Minister: Involvement of the Bureau of Communication in the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba campaigns (to Dawid van Wyk), 03.06.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/19; Mdlalose, F.T./van Wyk, Dawid: Indaba to the people/Regional Authorities, 10.06.1987/04.06.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/21.

329 Mdlalose, F.T.: Slide/tape presentation of Indaba (to Peter Mansfield), 11.06.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/22.



Figure 30: Zulu girls wearing Indaba caps at the Reed Dance ceremony, Nongoma 1987. Photographer: Lynn Oakley.

Dawid van Wyk to his prayer breakfasts; the foundation in turn kept him informed with personal meetings.<sup>330</sup>

In April 1988, Buthelezi publicly threatened to withdraw his support from the Indaba, but this was by no means meant to discredit the Indaba or break the cordial ties. Instead, this was done to apply pressure on the South African government: If it showed no willingness to negotiate, Buthelezi and Inkatha would review their stance on negotiations and maybe turn to harsher measures to bring about change.<sup>331</sup> During the Inkatha general conference in July 1988, Inkatha members decided to continue supporting the Indaba and resolved:

We the members of Inkatha have always been encouraged by our President in everything he has done to develop the politics of negotiation. [...] We therefore resolve:  
To continue supporting the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's constitutional proposals in principle because their inherent merit is not changed by the South African Government's rejection of them.

330 Inkatha: Fourteenth KwaZulu Prayer Breakfast: guest list, 13.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3; van Wyk, Dawid: Thanks for prayer breakfast, request for meeting (to M. G. Buthelezi), 23.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/3.

331 Van Wyk, Dawid: Statement on relationship to Inkatha (to N. E. Drew, Managing Director Cookson Chemicals (Pty) Ltd), 07.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/95.

To call on the South African Government to recognise the value of these proposals and begin working with us in their implementation of their elaboration in practice.

To call on all white South Africans with a vote to express themselves clearly in favour of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba during the forthcoming municipal elections.<sup>332</sup>

Inkatha, therefore, continued its support of the Indaba proposals (and of the foundation) through 1988 and beyond; the Inkatha Youth Brigade and UWUSA also supported the Indaba.<sup>333</sup> Additionally, the Inkatha Institute released two of their employees (at different points in time) so they could be employed by the Indaba Foundation: Perfect Malimela and Peter Mansfield.<sup>334</sup> The latter had also been a member of the Progressive Federal Party to which the foundation kept good relations; the PFP had accepted the Indaba's proposals, albeit with reservations. Ray Swart of the PFP remained a Steering Committee Member until the Indaba Foundation ceased its operations.<sup>335</sup> Another liberal party, Denis Worrall's Independent Party, also supported the Indaba.<sup>336</sup> When the PFP, the IP and the National Democratic Movement merged to form the Democratic Party, relations remained good.<sup>337</sup>

Relations to the South African government on the other hand, especially to the Minister of Co-Operation and Development Chris

332 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 18.07.1988. APC PC142/3/5/1, 4–5.

333 The Citizen 1987a; Molefe 1987; Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 22.-23.08.1987. EGM N968.3 INK; Inkatha Youth Brigade: Resolutions of the Annual General Conference, 02./03.07.1988. EGM N968.3 INK.

334 Woods, Gavin: Release from contract (to Perfect Malimela), 21.08.1987. CC KCM01/2/1/52.

335 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 6, 09.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/6, 10; Poovalingam, Pat: Letter to the editor (Natal Mercury), 10.10.1987. APC PC142/5/8/2; Political Staff 1987; van Wyk, Dawid: Indaba involvement in local government (to Ray A. F Swart), 29.03.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/35.

336 Hellberg, Jon: Press statement on support by the Independent Party. CC KCM01/2/33/13; Swart, Jannie, National Organiser Independent Party: Invitation to and programme of first National Congress, 17.08.1988. CC KCM01/2/7/57.

337 Mansfield, Peter: Congratulations on Democratic Party election results (to Wyand Malan, Zach de Beer, Denis Worrall), 12.09.1989. CC KCM01/2/10/37.

Heunis, were mixed. When receiving the Indaba proposals in January 1987, Heunis announced to examine the proposals in detail and report back to the Indaba. Although Indaba officials followed up on this topic in August 1987, no official response was received until at least September 1988, more than a year later.<sup>338</sup> In the meantime, Heunis had stated in a speech in parliament that in principle initiatives like the Indaba were welcomed and acceptable to the government, but timing had not been right to implement the Indaba proposals.<sup>339</sup> This means that Heunis neither rejected nor accepted the Indaba proposals; he rather evaded a clear answer and kept the Indaba officials waiting. National Party members in Natal, including provincial leader and Minister of Home Affairs Stoffel Botha, outright rejected the Indaba proposals at a congress in October 1987, stating that the Indaba proposals would introduce majority rule and would not safeguard minorities.<sup>340</sup> This unwilling (Heunis) and hostile (Botha) reception changed in 1989.

F. W. de Klerk, Heunis, and Botha agreed to meet Dhlomo and the Steering Committee on 12 July 1989 – one month before de Klerk became president – to appoint a ‘joint working committee’ of the South African government and the Indaba to find out about common agreements and differences, showing openness towards a regional solution that would have to be negotiated between the Indaba and the government.<sup>341</sup> Also in 1989, the NP met with Inkatha for negotiations, chaired by Dhlomo and Roelf Meyer, agreeing that Mandela needed to be released, the ANC and other organisations unbanned, and the Group Areas Act to be repealed.<sup>342</sup> Another meeting between Indaba representatives and the Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerit van Niekerk Viljoen, took place on 20 February 1990. According to the Indaba, the meeting was successful, gave reasons for hope, and

338 Dhlomo, O.D.: Negotiations with the government on the Indaba proposals (to Desmond Clarence, Dawid van Wyk, John Kane-Berman), 31.07.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1; Buthelezi, M. G./Dhlomo, O.D./van Wyk, Dawid: Letter to Chris Heunis, 19.09.1988/21.09.1988/17.10.1988. CC KCM01/2/4/27.

339 Heunis, Chris: Speech in Parliament, 11.09.1987. CC KCM01/2/25/4.

340 Woods, Gavin: Attitudes surfaced at the NP congress 10.1987 regarding the Indaba, 30.10.1987. CC KCM01/2/21/5.

341 KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba update. CC KCM01/2/13/20, 2.

342 Giliomee 2013, 302–303; Houldsworth 2016, 205.

further negotiations were planned.<sup>343</sup> The last meeting took place on 21 May 1990, shortly after the *Groote Schuur Minute* had been signed by the government and the ANC, both promising to work towards negotiations. Viljoen told the Indaba delegates that the government would conduct no regional negotiations when national negotiations were held at the same time. He called the Indaba an important experience and its proposals would have to enter the national negotiations but saw no room for further negotiations with the Indaba.<sup>344</sup>

Like the KwaZulu Natal Indaba itself, the Indaba Foundation drew a lot of criticism from both the left and right of the political spectrum for its work in promoting the Indaba proposals. While the political left and more radical liberals largely rejected the Indaba, but further usually ignored it,<sup>345</sup> right-wing organisations conducted a lot of interconnected agitation against the Indaba, mostly through pamphlets and newspaper advertisements that are described in the following paragraphs, but also by bumper stickers just like the Indaba Foundation.<sup>346</sup>

One organisation was founded by Arthur Morris and Rama Reddy for the specific cause of opposing the Indaba: The Natal Anti-Indaba League. NAİL sent many letters to newspaper editors stating their position (which were often printed<sup>347</sup>), but also paid for advertisements in newspapers and gave out press statements.<sup>348</sup> The Stallard Foun-

343 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 12.02.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2; KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 28.02.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2; KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 09.05.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2.

344 KZN Indaba Steering Committee/KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes, 14.05.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2; KZN Indaba Steering Committee/KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes, 11.06.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2.

345 A notable exception of this disregard was the Natal Midlands branch of Black Sash, criticising the Indaba itself for having no democratic legitimacy and its proposals for being undemocratic and perpetuating instability and inequality; Natal Midlands Black Sash: Factsheet on the KwaNatal Indaba, 11.1987. CC KCM01/2/15/15.

346 N.N.: Sticker "Natal says no to the Indaba sell-out!". CC box 37.

347 See, e.g., Morris 1987.

348 Natal Anti-Indaba League/South Africa First Campaign/Civic Action League: Here's why we reject the Indaba (in Sunday Tribune), 11.10.1987. CC box 25; Natal Anti-Indaba League: Statement, 13.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/15/2.

dation, a “pro-apartheid, white supremacist, anticommunist group”<sup>349</sup> founded by CP member Clive Derby-Lewis (who later provided the weapon for Chris Hani’s assassination) supported the Conservative Party’s Natal Anti-Indaba Campaign. This campaign called the Indaba a “brainwashing” campaign by big business that Buthelezi, in turn, would use as a springboard for “Marxist conquest” of South Africa; the CP therefore saw their action as an information campaign to inform the Whites of Natal.<sup>350</sup> Thus, the CP issued a pamphlet explaining how they (mis)understood the Indaba proposals.<sup>351</sup>

The CP used material by the Think Right movement which called the Indaba proposals part of a “leftist blueprint” that would lead to another Rhodesia, a domination by Blacks, and a lowering of the standard of living for Whites; after all, the Indaba proposals were seen as not financially viable.<sup>352</sup> The Patriotic Forum, made up of the CP, the Herstigte Nasionale Party, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, South Africa First Campaign, Civic Action League, and Afrikaner Volkswag, published an Anti-Indaba special in the South African Patriot, supporting Aksie Blank Natal (Action White Natal). Action White Natal, composed of members quite similar to the Patriotic Forum, issued press statements against the Indaba.<sup>353</sup>

The Indaba Foundation reacted by issuing detailed press statements stating the foundation’s view and correcting misrepresentations of the Indaba proposals.<sup>354</sup> Indaba officials were reminded in an internal memo not to suggest any connection of Anti-Indaba agitation to the National Party (although it was possible that connections existed) not to offend the NP.<sup>355</sup>

From the very beginning, the Indaba Foundation’s finances had been an issue. In the timespan from March 1987 to February 1988,

349 Mickolus/Simmons 1997, 370.

350 The Stallard Foundation: Statement, 20.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/15/4.

351 Conservative Party Anti-Indaba Campaign: Statement on Indaba. CC KCM01/2/16/4.

352 Think Right: The Indaba conspiracy. CC KCM01/2/16/35.

353 KZN Indaba Foundation: Right-wing organisations producing Anti-Indaba literature and their respective supporting groups. CC KCM01/2/16/27.

354 KZN Indaba Foundation: Straightening a bent nail. CC KCM01/2/25/49.

355 Mansfield, Peter: Right-wing research, 01.02.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/44.



the foundation spent R4,682,543 and received R4,035,368, amounting to a deficit of R647,178.<sup>356</sup> To change this situation, the Indaba was restructured in the beginning of 1988, becoming a smaller organisation to be more stable in the long run.<sup>357</sup> The foundation's debt was indeed decreased to R256,000 in 1989,<sup>358</sup> but difficulties in the foundation's accounting meant that the financial situation continued to be problematic.<sup>359</sup>

In March 1990, debts had increased to about R850,000, also due to a change in donors' attitudes. Anglo American had donated less while other companies, especially those with many workers organised in COSATU, discontinued their donations due to the Indaba Foundation's links to Inkatha; only donations bound to specific projects were still coming in as before. To cope with this situation, the Steering Committee founded a sub-committee to investigate in the future of the Indaba while Mansfield was granted the competences to cut expenditure.<sup>360</sup>

As the mood in the office was deteriorating due to the coming cuts, Mansfield and the sub-committee hurried to determine which staff members would remain and which would have to leave; this was also meant to show donors that the foundation was indeed keen to put their money to a good use (and not just used it to pay staff they did not need). A core team of four to six was supposed to continue the negotiations with the government while finalising the foundation's business.<sup>361</sup> As the projects were still receiving donations, these were separated from the Indaba Foundation and run as part of the Educa-

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356 KZN Indaba Foundation: Monthly financial statements, 29.02.1988. APC PC142/3/4/3.

357 Mansfield, Peter: Cutting expenditure, going from short-term to medium-term strategy, 20.01.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/33; Mansfield, Peter: Staff changes, 21.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/98; Mansfield, Peter: New meetings due to Indaba's restructuring, 28.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/29/101.

358 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 11.12.1989. APC PC142/3/5/2.

359 Van Wyk, Dawid: Job description for additional staff (to Guy Harris, Pim Goldby Management), 12.04.1988. CC KCM01/2/5/83.

360 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 12.02.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2.

361 KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 28.02.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2.

tion Foundation or of the Independent Project Trust (if they were not concerned with pupil education).<sup>362</sup>

In May 1990, press reports declared the Indaba almost dead, and in the end of May, Mansfield left the Indaba. By now, it was clear that the Indaba Foundation had reached its end. Dhlomo remained chairman until 30 June 1990; from this date, the Indaba offices were closed. To liquidate the remaining debts, Anglo American donated a last time. Thankfully, the Indaba office's documents were given to the Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban, and Clarence gave his material to the Alan Paton Centre, Pietermaritzburg.<sup>363</sup>

The KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation's aim had been to promote the Indaba, make it known to the public, and inject it into the political discourse. This was successfully done by a huge promotional and networking endeavour based on professional marketing strategies – through expert authorities, scientific findings, and mass support – that reached many supporters, especially from a liberal-conservative background, including big business. The foundation also reached out internationally and was successful in establishing international links. Interestingly enough, the Indaba Foundation appealed to some market liberals and Christian conservatives in Europe, but also to far-right politicians, scientists, and publicists.

For the business community, the Indaba Foundation was a message to the South African government, making clear how the community imagined a future South Africa. Market research added to this pressure, but as soon as there was no realistic chance to implement the Indaba proposals, donations consequently ceased. For Inkatha, the Indaba Foundation was an alliance with the business community securing Inkatha's regional power base and maybe acting as a forerunner for national change. Inkatha would without doubt have had a central role in KwaZulu and Natal had the Indaba proposals been

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362 KZN Indaba Finance Committee: Staff decisions (to Executive Committee), 07.05.1990. APC PC142/5/9/2.

363 Ibid; KZN Indaba Steering Committee: Minutes, 09.05.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2; KZN Indaba Steering Committee/KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes, 14.05.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2; KZN Indaba Steering Committee/KZN Indaba Executive Committee: Minutes, 11.06.1990. APC PC142/3/5/2.

implemented; nevertheless, it was a sign of the commitment to peaceful change to its supporters and to Whites, especially the business community, but also liberals who opted for an open society without touching capitalist structures.

The contemporaries accused the Indaba Foundation of being an initiative by big business, trying to push a political system onto the people, and of being an initiative by Inkatha, trying to secure Inkatha's power in KwaZulu and Natal. As could be shown, reality was more complicated. The business community indeed paid for the Indaba Foundation and sent personnel, Inkatha officials indeed influenced and promoted it. Nevertheless, the foundation developed quite a life of its own and found many supporters among what one might call the common people of KwaZulu and Natal. Many Blacks and Whites were supporting the foundation and worked for it, some employed and some as volunteers. The Indaba Foundation was further successful in informing and bringing together pupils of various backgrounds, actually living the anti-segregationist stance the foundation employed. This shows that 'democracy' was indeed more than just a constitution, it had to be lived and responsible citizens educated. By practicing open discussions and mutual understanding with pupils, the foundation tried to counter the popular image of black youth as a 'lost generation', as violent warriors fighting the police and shaping the future.<sup>364</sup>

Nevertheless, it did not reach the left and the far-right of the political spectrum. Neither trade unions, the ANC, the UDF, nor nationalist (white) organisations and parties supported it as the Indaba proposals were a compromise that was too much for the right and not enough for the left. The foundation also failed to convince the National Party and the South African government soon enough, and when the government finally was willing to negotiate in 1989/90, it was too late. National politics had taken a different course and the Indaba Foundation had reached its end; this had come quicker than expected but was fuelled by financial problems and finalised by the government's ultimate rejection.

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364 Everatt 2002.

The South African government, that had rejected the Indaba proposals in 1990 but called it an important experience, then included many aspects of the Indaba's constitutional proposals in the NP proposals for the CODESA negotiations. Quite ironically in the light of the NP's behaviour towards the Buthelezi Commission and the Kwa-Zulu Natal Indaba, the proposals begin with the statement that the NP had "repeatedly committed itself to the creation of a new constitutional dispensation through negotiation". After making out some points of departure that would ensure a liberal, capitalist South Africa, the document states that at regional level further negotiations for different dispensations might take place – exactly what the NP had rejected a year earlier. The NP's proposals only really differed in one point from the Indaba proposals, namely the second chamber of the legislative: instead of groups, it would have been based on regions (but would also have been responsible to protect minority rights).<sup>365</sup>

#### 5.2.4 Organising the Network:

##### *The Inkatha Institute for South Africa*

Throughout the networking activities depicted above, Inkatha was aided by the Inkatha Institute, a think-tank that provided (scientific) input on policy matters and worked as the nexus for cooperation with the science and business communities.

Already in 1973, the then Minister of Education and Culture, J.A.W. Nxumalo, mentioned the possibility of founding an institute for research on the political and social needs of KwaZulu.<sup>366</sup> This idea resurfaced in November 1979, but what the institute's tasks and composition could be, was still vague.<sup>367</sup> Plans became more precise in May 1980, at the same time that the Buthelezi Commission was being

365 National Party 1991.

366 Nxumalo, James Alfred Walter: The education manifesto of KwaZulu, 14.02.1973. DocAfr Acc 23, 2–3.

367 Inkatha: Proposals for the establishment of an Inkatha Development Institute for South Africa (First Draft), 08.11.1979. APC PC126/3/13.

prepared. The commission and the Inkatha Institute shared the same reasoning: to take the initiative for peaceful, democratic change.<sup>368</sup>

The institute was supposed to deliver information on current political and social trends to Inkatha and to propose a response to current problems as well as to support Inkatha when negotiating with the government. It was also meant to conduct research on the problems of black communities and to develop solutions; ways to fulfil this were seen in organising training programmes (especially for Inkatha members) and in fostering economic development through private enterprise. Publicity was to be gained and discourse vitalised by publications of the institute's research and (academic) conferences.<sup>369</sup>

At this stage, several projects were already planned, although probably not in detail. The Inkatha Institute was supposed to help Inkatha in combating youth unemployment by founding a 'Youth Corps' (what then became the *Youth Service Corps*, see chapter 4.2.1); it seems that the Inkatha Institute wrote the YSC's curriculum.<sup>370</sup> The institute further assisted Inkatha when supporting the informal sector of KwaZulu's and Natal's economy through credits and savings associations. Institute officials were also meant to monitor employment and labour conditions so, through cooperation with the employers, these could be improved.<sup>371</sup>

Work of the *Inkatha Institute for South Africa* began from 01 July 1980 in Durban as a tax-exempt company (Section 21 company) with academic and administrative personnel (supposed to be employed on a merit basis without regard of the respective background), supplemented by additional academic staff for specific projects. The Inkatha Institute was led by the President of Inkatha (Buthelezi), the Secretary-General (Dhlomo), another Inkatha member nominated by the president, the institute's director, and a nominee of the director (although in its day-to-day business, the institute worked quite independently from the Inkatha leadership). Liaison committees

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368 Inkatha Institute: A development for progress and peace, 05.1980. ABI.

369 Ibid, 3–5.

370 McCaul, Colleen: Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC 320.9683 MACC, 25–28; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 68.

371 Inkatha Institute: A development for progress and peace, 05.1980. ABI, 5–8.

coordinated cooperation with other bodies, e.g. employers. An initial R12,000 was provided by Inkatha to get the institute running, but it was hoped that, on the long run, financial and academic support<sup>372</sup> would come from all parts of the South African society.<sup>373</sup> As director of the institute, Buthelezi invited Lawrence Schlemmer, who formally accepted on 11 July 1980, stating that he was “honoured to accept” and that this was the “greatest challenge in [his] career”. Schlemmer indeed hoped to achieve something important for Buthelezi: “I sincerely hope that my humble contribution will be appropriate to the promise that your leadership holds for the future of our country”.<sup>374</sup>

In an interview in 1981, Schlemmer argued that, apart from preferring Buthelezi as a sophisticated leader, his motivation to work for the institute was to give science a practical meaning which was, in his eyes, often missing: “Academics should serve as consultants, write articles, do community work – they should become more involved in the market place. This will make their courses relevant and the students more useful persons.”<sup>375</sup> Although he also stated that the institute (and Schlemmer himself as director) would not decide on Inkatha policy, it seems that Schlemmer also contributed to Buthelezi’s speeches with comments and complete paragraphs.<sup>376</sup> The Inkatha Institute wanted to strengthen a positive perspective on Inkatha, countering bad publicity (especially by other researchers) in the press, or as Schlemmer put it in a letter to Oscar Dhlomo in 1983: “At this stage, the way the press is inclined, we simply cannot win at this level. The best strategy is to approach the press with new data and insights, presented as objective research and analysis, without

372 The Inkatha Institute cooperated, e.g., with the Urban Foundation; Fourie, C.: Access to data (to Urban Foundation), 24.06.1985. APC PC126/3/13.

373 Inkatha Institute: A development for progress and peace, 05.1980. ABI, 9–10; Schlemmer, Lawrence: The Buthelezi Commission and the Inkatha Institute (to M.G. Buthelezi), 26.05.1980. APC PC140/2/10/1, 2–3.

374 Schlemmer, Lawrence: Directorship of the Inkatha Institute (to M.G. Buthelezi), 11.07.1980. APC PC126/3/13.

375 Financial Mail 1981.

376 Schlemmer, Lawrence: Notes on speech (to M.G. Buthelezi), 22.12.1982. APC PC126/3/13.

any reference to what other people have said.”<sup>377</sup> What Schlemmer perceived as ‘objective’ science should therefore trump ideology of the left; this strategy of publishing on Inkatha was continued until the end of the Inkatha Institute.<sup>378</sup>

Over the years, the institute commissioned and conducted many research projects of which the reports were published, primarily on the topics of informal settlements and urbanisation, land tenure, regional political structures and initiatives (including a summary of the Buthelezi Commission in isiZulu), and health.<sup>379</sup> Furthermore, the institute also monitored current (political) events. For a few projects, international funding from the Federal Republic of Germany via the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was secured. This offers the opportunity to describe these projects in greater detail including the way they were to be conducted (because the applications are still stored at the Federal Archive in Germany). The question how funding from the FRG was obtained will be covered in chapter 5.4.2 on the cooperation between Inkatha and the KAF.

The first project that the Inkatha Institute applied for was concerned with rural development. The people of KwaZulu’s Msinga district were suffering from overpopulation and soil erosion, making the region hardly arable at all; many inhabitants therefore relied on allocations of migrant labourers: The young men left Msinga while women, children, and the elderly stayed there. Under these circumstances, no economic development was taking place and crime rates were rising. Inkatha, according to the application, wanted to find out how to improve this situation. A possible solution was seen in changing local agriculture to more intense (and more productive), modern ways so the higher per capita income could (slowly) improve the standard of living. To cover the expenditure and to gain the necessary knowledge, the KAF applied, on behalf of the Inkatha Institute, to the

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377 Schlemmer, Lawrence: Letter (to Oscar Dhlomo), 02.11.1983. APC PC126/3/13.

378 See, e.g., Woods, Gavin: *The Politics of Negotiation: an outline of Inkatha’s position*, ca. 1989. HPD AG2838; Woods, Gavin: *A constituent assembly in the South African context – Inkatha Freedom Party thinking*, ca. 1991. HPD AG2838.

379 See publications in APC PC19/0/1.

FRG's minister of economic cooperation.<sup>380</sup> The funding of 25,000 German Marks was granted in 1982, in that year corresponding to about ZAR 11,000.<sup>381</sup>

Together with the organisation *Lawyers for Human Rights* from Durban, the institute analysed the problematic situation in the Msinga district, developed proposals that the local people could implement themselves, and recommended on how all relevant agents could work together and combine their resources. While most players realised that improving the standard of living was important, private companies still needed to be convinced that they would actually profit from improving their workers' lives.<sup>382</sup>

The second Inkatha Institute project that the KAF applied for was concerned with training courses in administration, the project running from 1983 to 1986. Two types of courses were carried out, the first called *Community Organisation and Project Administration Training*, lasting two years and solely meant for Inkatha members. The course tried to teach Inkatha branch leaders how to administer their branch and how to initiate development actions. Among its contents were: introduction to development problems, special problem areas like health, education and housing, administration and leadership of groups, (agricultural) cooperatives, entrepreneurship, accounting, project management, acquisition of funds and cooperation with other organisations and authorities, and conflict resolution.<sup>383</sup>

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380 Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung eines ländlichen Entwicklungsforschungsprogramms des Inkatha-Instituts, Durban/Südafrika (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 13.11.1981. BArch B 213/34213, 12–13.

381 Siebert, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311: Bewilligung der Anträge (an KAS), 31.03.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

382 Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung eines ländlichen Entwicklungsforschungsprogramms des Inkatha-Instituts, Durban/Südafrika (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 13.11.1981. BArch B 213/34213, 13–14; Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit: Projekte der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung der politischen Stiftungen in der Republik Südafrika, 15.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214.

383 Kraft, Lothar: Förderung der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung in Entwicklungsländern, hier Inkatha II (Verwaltungskurse) (an Bundesministerium für wirt-



The other course, *Development Orientated Administration Training*, was open to all regional administration staff and lasted twelve months each.<sup>384</sup> It was supposed to train staff that could fill in vacant administration positions in KwaZulu (about 35% were vacant, according to the application) and combat the consequences of the insufficient Bantu Education system. Many qualified young people left for better-paid jobs on the free market, and KwaZulu's existing training institutions were seen as inadequate. Among the course's topics were: requirements of development, accounting, administration, correspondence, leadership skills, and English as a business language.<sup>385</sup>

To carry this out, a project coordinator, two trainers, and one administrative assistant were employed and scholarships for participants were given out. Additional working material, a car, rent, and salaries for other, called-in experts were also paid for. The Inkatha Institute and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal, Durban (headed by Schlemmer), assisted with their secretariats.<sup>386</sup> In all, the FRG paid 1,340,000 German Marks for this project (about ZAR 1,280,000 in the exchange rate of 1986).<sup>387</sup>

Yet another project funded by the FRG<sup>388</sup> set up a centre for information and advice as part of the Inkatha Institute in Durban. Inkatha members could visit the centre to consult a library (which was also open to the public for reference<sup>389</sup>), get counsel on political questions

schaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 321), 28.04.1983. BArch B 213/34213, 8–9.

384 It should be noted that this meant that most participants were Inkatha members or affiliated with Inkatha.

385 Ibid, 9–11.

386 Ibid, 11–12.

387 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit: Projekte der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung der politischen Stiftungen in der Republik Südafrika, 15.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214.

388 Oscar Dhlomo, in his annual reports, stated that the money was donated by the KAF; see, e.g., Inkatha Institute: Annual report, 1984. APC PC19/10/1; but the KAF had received said money from the German federal government and, thus, from German taxpayers.

389 Shireen Hassim reports that for some years the institute was reluctant to make material accessible for anyone that had not been approved by Inkatha and might use it in a way that was politically undesired by Inkatha. Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, two outspoken Inkatha critics, were aided in their research

and social or economic problems. During the course of the project, counselling was to be standardised. In the past, the institute had not been able to answer all requests by Inkatha members, so demand was already there. The new *Inkatha Resource and Information Centre* was supposed to provide and communicate information about Inkatha, to counsel individuals and groups on legal and labour questions, to solve problems within Inkatha, to produce a journal on socio-economic development, and to develop a manual for Inkatha members when planning and implementing development projects with special respect to international expertise. To this end, a manager and an assistant were employed and monthly publications, offices, and working material were financed.<sup>390</sup> The FRG granted the Inkatha Institute 410,000 German Marks for this project (about ZAR 390,000 in the exchange rate of 1986).<sup>391</sup>

Little is known about many other projects, especially the ones without a surviving scientific report, but the annual reports at least list the active projects and give brief descriptions. The institute cooperated with the Urban Foundation and Durban City Councillor Peter Mansfield, Progressive Federal Party, who later joined the Inkatha Institute and the Indaba Foundation, on a project on informal ('squatter') settlements to improve their conditions. Youth programmes were also a focus; in cooperation with the Youth Brigade, the Inkatha Institute supported the Youth Service Corps' Emandleni-Matlang Youth Camp (see chapter 4.2.1) and it supported the Youth Brigade with expertise on development programmes. Additionally, a public relations programme was running to promote Inkatha; the Canadian government

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by institute without reasons for complaints, however. Hassim, Shireen: *Black Women in Political Organisations: A Case Study of the Inkatha Women's Brigade, 1976 to the Present*, 1990. CC T 968.3 HAS, 10; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 2.

390 Inkatha Institute: Annual report, 1984. APC PC19/10/1; Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung in Entwicklungsländern, hier Inkatha III (Beratungs- und Informationszentrum) (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 321), 28.04.1983. BArch B 213/34213.

391 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit: Projekte der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung der politischen Stiftungen in der Republik Südafrika, 15.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214.

had funded slide-tape shows on health issues that the institute then presented to the public; a mobile film unit was also visiting schools, and the institute trained the KwaZulu Bureau of Communications' staff on filming. Interestingly enough, the institute also conducted research on the people of the Ingwavuma area and their needs and aspirations – an area that was heavily contested in the period from 1982 (see chapter 4.4). The reports also list donors to the institute, among these were: Anglo American Corporation, Harry Oppenheimer, KwaZulu government, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Urban Foundation, other companies, and private persons.<sup>392</sup>

From 1984, the institute was training Inkatha branches in running successful meetings with courses and with a 40-page manual to make Inkatha a better-working organisation: "All organisations, no matter how small or big, have to hold meetings. Successful meetings, at grassroots and right through to the top, are the foundation of any organisation. Successful meetings show the people how serious the office-bearers are about the community and of course the organisation they represent."<sup>393</sup> To this end, the manual urged office bearers to take their duty seriously, involve the community and act according to the community's will. The manual describes the Inkatha branch structure and the roles of office bearers, and then takes the reader through every step of preparing and holding a meeting to creating minutes of the meeting, recommending what to do and what not in a very detailed way for unexperienced organisers.<sup>394</sup>

In the same year, an accompanying manual was produced to make the manual on successful meetings useful for other organisations. As the Inkatha constitution already defined branch structures, deciding on such structures was not explained in the first manual. This accompanying manual then gives detailed information on how an organisation needs to constitute itself, decide on its structures and office

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392 Inkatha Institute: Proposal for a black informal sector support programme; annual report, 06.1983. APC PC126/3/13.

393 Inkatha Institute: Running successful meetings, 1984. APC PC19/10/1, introduction.

394 Ibid.

bearers, work, and report on its work.<sup>395</sup> In 1985, the institute compiled another manual giving more details on the work and structures of an Inkatha branch which the aforementioned manual had only covered briefly.<sup>396</sup>

Apart from these projects, the Inkatha Institute also cooperated with the Inkatha Development Office; they assisted self-help actions and community-based cooperatives and established a marketing network. Furthermore, infrastructure was improved in cooperation with the Inkatha youth.<sup>397</sup>

In 1986, the institute got a new director: Peter Mansfield, who had been a Durban city councillor of the Progressive Federal Party and a consultant to the Urban Foundation (and who later worked for the Indaba Foundation).<sup>398</sup> Walter Felgate, in his TRC testimony, claims that at first, Kobus Bosman had been discussed as Schlemmer's successor. Bosman<sup>399</sup> had strong links to the security apparatus, was "on active call" as an agent, and played a key role in the training of Inkatha men at the Caprivi strip (*Operation Marion*, see chapter 3.3.4), Felgate accounted.<sup>400</sup> In the same year, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was convened which was documented by the institute and also received scientific input from the institute.<sup>401</sup> Also in 1986, the institute's Information

395 Inkatha Institute: How to use this manual for development organisations, 1984. CC F 968.3 INK.

396 Inkatha Institute: Branch. Books and money, 1985. APC PC19/10/1.

397 Langner, E.J.: The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 89; Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, tenth anniversary conference, 28.-30.06.1985. APC PC126/3/17.

398 Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17.

399 It is not clear whether this is the Kobus Bosman that was an MP for the NP in the 1990s and the leader of the Federal Alliance caucus in the Gauteng legislature from 2003; Bentley/Southall 2005, 1; Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 1999.

400 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 38-40; Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 1998.

401 KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 13.11.1985. APC PC140/4/1/1/11; van Dokkum, Neil: Conventions report. A background document for those involved in the proposed KwaZulu Natal Indaba commissioned by Inkatha Institute, 02.1986. APC PC142/1/1/2; KZN Indaba Advisory Committee: Minutes, 05.02.1986. APC PC140/4/1/1/20.

Department was founded which was responsible for three projects (which had existed before):

The FRG-funded training workshops were still running as small, regional events, being conducted by three employees that had been specifically trained beforehand. Until 1987, about 600 Inkatha branch officials had been trained on the topic of 'running successful meetings' and were involved in the workshops' organisation, therefore acquiring organisational skills as well. Both Buthelezi and Dhlomo participated in some of these workshops as well as members of the KLA and of the Youth Brigade.<sup>402</sup> The second project was the production of various manuals on 'running successful meetings', 'branch books and money', and 'organising workshops'; another one on 'branch management' was in production in 1987. Manuals were monitored and revised by the Inkatha leaders. The FRG-funded information office was also running and offering help on virtually any problem to Inkatha members, providing solutions or giving information on other organisations that might help. It published internationally and served as a source of information for scientists. Expertise inside the institute was also passed on to Inkatha youths that were trained at the institute on the matters of negotiation, administration, and scientific research.<sup>403</sup>

The genesis and use of said, very detailed step-by-step manual concerning the organisation of workshops<sup>404</sup> was reviewed internally by institute staff member Hlengiwe Kunene. The institute had made the experience that organising its own workshops, especially in the more distant areas of KwaZulu, was complicated because letters did not always reach their recipients and phones were not available everywhere. In some instances, the organisers even had to travel to the people they wanted to invite. Finding a date suitable for all also proved difficult. As this work bound a lot of the institute's resources, it was decided to involve the target community and especially Inkatha's

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402 E.g. on 20. and 21.04.1985 in Ulundi where more than 550 persons participated (this was before the workshops' size was reduced); Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, tenth anniversary conference, 28.-30.06.1985. APC PC126/3/17, 17.

403 Inkatha Institute: Annual Report, 1987. CC F968.3 INK, 15-17.

404 Inkatha Institute: Organising a workshop, 1986. APC PC19/10/1.

regional structures in the preparations which also helped to teach organisational skills very practically. The Inkatha Institute's staff then wrote a draft manual on how to organise workshops which was in turn reviewed by regional leaders including the Inkatha leadership at several workshops. According to the internal evaluation, the workshops on the various manuals cited above were successful and helped the regional leaders with their own organising work.<sup>405</sup>

In general, the Inkatha Institute's role in South Africa's scientific discourse was growing, according to Dhlomo. He claimed that the Human Sciences Research Council funded some projects of the institute and that many university departments had made requests to the institute. This research had also impacted on local policies, e.g. the Durban Corporation accepted informal settlements as an important part of local economy (through consumption and supply of work-force), therefore eliminating the permanent risk of removal. Another big project, meant to influence official policy, was the creation of an aerial map in 1987 showing the real population distribution in KwaZulu and Natal (i.e. mixed and not seperable), disproving the maps of apartheid planners.<sup>406</sup> This map was updated in 1990.<sup>407</sup>

Other tasks of the institute, at the time, were recordings of television news and the creation of a weekly 'current affairs' video tape delivered to Buthelezi. These video tapes and the library were open to all Inkatha members and scientists. Furthermore, the institute monitored violence against Inkatha members.<sup>408</sup> The institute also was active in charity: It ran the Book & Buck Trust that collected school

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405 Kunene, Hlengiwe: Report on how to organise a workshop, ca. 1987. LO.

406 Fourie, C./Aitken, D./Scogings, D./Hillerman, R.: Preliminary mapping of settlement distribution KwaZulu/Natal, 1987. CC F 333 PRE; Inkatha Institute: Annual Report, 1987. CC F968.3 INK, 17–20; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 8, 11.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/8, 10.

407 George, Mary Frances: Black urbanisation trends in the Durban functional region 1990. Results of aerial reconnaissance survey, April 1990, 1990. APC PC126/3/25.

408 See, e.g., Inkatha Institute: Inkatha Freedom Party leaders assassinated in political violence, 11.1991. HPD AG2838. Walter Felgate claimed in his TRC testimony that the recorded incidents were never verified; Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 43.

books and money from US-American donors; the books were then distributed by KwaZulu's Education Department and the donations were given as scholarships to students.<sup>409</sup> As of 1988, this amounted to 80,000 books and 75 new school libraries, according to Dhlomo.<sup>410</sup>

In 1987, after Mansfield had left for the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation, Gavin Woods was appointed new director. Woods had already been working for the institute before, although originally, coming from a poor white background, he had been an ANC supporter. He later described his time at the institute as isolated and traumatic due to the struggle and propaganda warfare between ANC and Inkatha, but he enjoyed the scientific part and used it to promote his academic career.<sup>411</sup> The Inkatha Institute continued to publish and kept involved with the Indaba Foundation by correspondence;<sup>412</sup> the institute's officials also wrote a paper on the projected costs of the Indaba proposals (if implemented) in 1988, defending the Indaba's cause.<sup>413</sup> Around this time (but maybe also earlier and later), the institute published the Inkatha Year Book<sup>414</sup> and a scientific journal called South African Update.<sup>415</sup> Also during the late 1980s, the Inkatha Institute undertook at least one "discreet survey" (i.e. work and results unknown to the public) on behalf of Inkatha.<sup>416</sup>

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409 Inkatha Institute: Annual Report, 1987. CC F968.3 INK, 20–23.

410 Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's Annual Report, Annual General Conference, 01.-03.07.1988. APC PC126/3/17, 17.

411 Helen Suzman Foundation 30.01.2001.

412 Woods, Gavin: Sending of institute's publication "The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba: Economic Implications" (to Dawid van Wyk), 06.09.1988. CCKCM01/2/7/102; Woods, Gavin: Sending of project motivation "The advantages of federalism: a viable political economy for Natal-KwaZulu" by Charles Ballard (to Dawid van Wyk), 02.11.1988. CC KCM01/2/8/20; Woods 1988.

413 Inkatha Institute: The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba: economic implications, 08.1988. CC KCM01/2/7/54.

414 The Inkatha Institute for South Africa 1989.

415 See, e.g., Inkatha Institute: South African Update Vol. 3 No. 7, 07.1991. APC PC126/3/13; Inkatha Institute: South African Update Vol. 3 No. 8, 08.1991. APC PC126/3/13.

416 Woods, Gavin: UDF's and MDM's attitudes towards the King's Imbizo (to M.G. Buthelezi), 16.11.1989. SAHA AL3456/89 SEC-20.

When scandals erupted in 1991 – the training of Inkatha members on the Caprivi strip by the South African Defence Force (*Operation Marion*) and the funding of Inkatha rallies by the government (*Inkathagate*) – the Inkatha Institute was accused of being the channel of funds from the South African Security Police to Inkatha. The Inkatha Institute was subsequently closed and replaced by the Institute for Federal Democracy (in the same offices) which now claimed to work for all political movements and not only for Inkatha (but even the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s representative admitted that it still worked with Inkatha most of the time<sup>417</sup>). In the process, the institute’s files and library were lost or deliberately hidden as the TRC investigators found out when they wanted to access them. In his TRC testimony, Felgate recommended to search Gavin Woods’ garage to this end.<sup>418</sup> The new institute was headed by Dr Rama Naidu and received about R3,500,000 from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation annually.<sup>419</sup> The institute was renamed the Democracy Development Program which is still housed in the same offices and still headed by Naidu in 2019. The KAF keeps its connections to the DDP to this day through meetings, publications, and through Henning Suhr who is the head of the KAF’s Johannesburg office and board member of the DDP.<sup>420</sup>

In all, the Inkatha Institute was working on several levels. It was networking with scientists and politicians for the benefit of Inkatha and created its own input into the scientific discourse which influenced official policy. It also coordinated programmes that can be categorised as development aid, namely workshops for future leaders, manuals, and other projects meant to improve education for Blacks (showing that ‘development’ also included politics and society in the eyes of the institute). Whether these projects were actually conducted the way they were portrayed to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation

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417 Brandt 1995.

418 Felgate, Walter: Testimony in front of TRC, 07.07.1996. SAHA AL3456, 82–83.

419 Mail & Guardian 1995.

420 <http://ddp.org.za/about-us/our-people>, last access on 30.01.2019; <https://www.kas.de/web/suedafrika/veranstaltungen/detail/-/content/politische-parteien-in-suedafrika4>, last access on 30.01.2019; Dix/Glitz 06.11.2013.



cannot be said with certainty, but it seems likely that in broad terms the agreements were complied with. The institute further had an information centre that published and informed on Inkatha and helped Inkatha members. The institute, therefore, ran several programmes to inform the people, to generate an input into the scientific discourse and to put scientific findings into practice, but also to improve the standard of living through development programmes. Still, this was a means to educate Inkatha's own personnel and to consolidate its party structures, and a means to promote Inkatha and its initiatives among all affected people by making improvements to the standard of living.

Dhlomo argued that the contributions to the scientific discourse, reasoning why apartheid needed to be abolished and what should have replaced it, were part of something bigger: "It is vital that research information and opinions with which Inkatha can identify, are fed into the intellectual arena of the country as another instrument of the liberation struggle."<sup>421</sup> Indeed, the Inkatha Institute supplied the intellectual support that Inkatha needed and that others like the ANC and the NP already had. With this undertaking, the Inkatha Institute for South Africa was part of a global trend of forming market-liberal and/or conservative think-tanks which were meant to influence politics and public opinion.<sup>422</sup>

### **5.3 From Plans to Practice: *The Joint Executive Authority***

The sub-chapters above indicated that not much came of the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba in practical terms because the South African government rejected both and never implemented their demands. There was, however, a regional administrative cooperation between KwaZulu and Natal, as far as the apartheid state allowed, termed the *Joint Executive Authority*.

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421 Inkatha Institute: Annual Report, 1987. CC F968.3 INK, 17.

422 Miller/Dinan 2008, 67–77.

The Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba had recommended a closer cooperation of KwaZulu and Natal, including the possibility of a future merger of the homeland and the province.<sup>423</sup> In 1984, both the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Council (NPC) signed the Ulundi Accord, agreeing to return to closer cooperation of their administrations (leaving the legislatures separate) and declaring their intent to form a federal unit in the more distant future. As a direct consequence, the KwaZulu/Natal Strategic Policy Group and the Natal/KwaZulu Work Group were established that were platforms to discuss policy and practical implementation.<sup>424</sup> The administrative cooperation was then institutionalised through the Joint Executive Authority (JEA) which will be described in this chapter.

After drawing up concrete plans, Dhlomo and Frank Martin, the head of the NPC, asked the South African government's Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis for approval of their plans. Heunis agreed and brought them into parliament for legal approval which was granted. The JEA had been intended to be formed by representatives of the KwaZulu government and of the NPC, but by the time the JEA was opened with a large media event on 03 November 1987, the NPC had been abolished and replaced by an

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423 From 1975 to 1982, the Natal Consultative Committee had existed that brought together representatives from KwaZulu and Natal (including Coloureds and Indians) to coordinate government action, but with significantly fewer powers (often only a platform for the exchange of information) and led by Natal. When the NPC refused to sign the Buthelezi Commission report, KwaZulu ceased its cooperation in the Natal Consultative Committee and it then was disbanded; Africa, Sandra Elizabeth: *The Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu/Natal: Origins, Structure, Functions and Political Significance*, 11.1994. UNISA libr. 352.0684 AFRI, 67–68; Bureau for Information: *KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority*. CC box 39, 5–7.

424 Africa, Sandra Elizabeth: *The Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu/Natal: Origins, Structure, Functions and Political Significance*, 11.1994. UNISA libr. 352.0684 AFRI, 69–74; Bonnini, et al. 1996, 166–167. The Ulundi Accord was a consequence of three workshops organised by the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission and the Stellenbosch University's Institute for Futures Research on the future of KwaZulu and Natal attended by members of the KwaZulu Government and the Natal Executive Committee; Joint Executive Authority: *Media package*, 03.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/22/7; Linscott/Königkrämer 1987.

executive appointed by the president P. W. Botha who was also present at the opening and accompanied by Heunis, Gerrit van Niekerk Viljoen (Minister of Education), and other deputy ministers. KwaZulu was represented by Buthelezi, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and ministers and deputy ministers, and Natal by the province's administrator, Radclyffe Cadman.<sup>425</sup>

In his opening speech, Buthelezi called the JEA a step in the right direction and emphasised the need for peaceful change through mutual understanding:

There is a race against time as violent passion clashes with reason and goodwill. The fate of our country is in the balance and a democratic future can no longer be achieved by one race group alone. It can only be achieved in a sharing of wisdom, and in the tolerance and understanding which each must develop for the other.<sup>426</sup>

The JEA allowed for cooperation of the administrations and for institutionalised deliberations between the two regional bodies which could then plan their actions jointly. This also meant a more efficient planning and exercising of projects concerning infrastructure, public services, and economic development that had in the past been hindered by the fractured nature of the interdependent Natal and KwaZulu. As a possible future development, it was seen possible to also form a joint legislative body if central government approved (Heunis declared that he was open to this).<sup>427</sup>

The JEA was funded by KwaZulu and Natal but made sure not to cause huge costs; apart from secretarial staff, existing public services were used. By law, the JEA was to meet at least six times per year and to be composed of members of the KwaZulu government and the Natal Provincial Executive Committee (NPEC, the successor to the NPC). At any meeting, at least three representatives of each body

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425 Bureau for Information: KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority. CC box 39, 4; Cameron 1987; Inkatha: Year Book, 1987. APC PC126/3/1, 89–90.

426 Bureau for Information: KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority. CC box 39, 13.

427 Inkatha: Year Book, 1987. APC PC126/3/1, 89–90; KZN Indaba Foundation: Indaba news 8, 11.1987. CC KCM01/2/36/8, 1–7.

would have to be present, headed by the JEA's Chief Executive Officer that was elected from these officials (its first CEO was Dhlomo). The JEA members at its inauguration<sup>428</sup> included Zulus, Whites, two Indians and one Coloured, including all major groups in the JEA. It has to be stressed that many of these representatives were not elected but appointed.<sup>429</sup>

The JEA organised much of its work through standing, advisory, and liaison committees on all matters concerning public services, planning, infrastructure, and others. These committees discussed matters in greater detail and then advised the JEA on its decisions that were all based on consensus. Although the JEA was a platform to exchange information and coordinate the work of the KwaZulu government and the NPEC, the JEA did not receive actual powers, although this had been intended in the Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal Act 1986. For example, the JEA was to become responsible for parts of the health services, but legal differences between KwaZulu and Natal (that were not levelled out through the 1986 act) made it impossible to transfer personnel from KwaZulu to Natal or vice versa (thus, only small improvements, like joint and therefore cheaper buying of medicine, could be introduced). In the case of tourism, KwaZulu had the competences for own legislation, but tourism in Natal was controlled by the central government. Even when the JEA made plans that were to be executed by KwaZulu and Natal jointly, missing funds stopped the plans from realisation. In

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428 At its inauguration, the KwaZulu members were Dhlomo, Simon Hulumeni Gumede (KwaZulu Minister of Works, Inkatha Central Committee member and Deputy Secretary-General), Dennis Rheinallt Bhekokwakhe Madide (KwaZulu Minister of the Interior), Mdlalose, E. Stephen C. Sithebe (KwaZulu Minister of Welfare and Pensions); the Natal members were Valentin Albert Volker (NPEC and former MP), A.G. Joosab (businessman and former member of the South African Indian Council's executive), C.J. Pierce (teacher, member of the Labour Party and the Natal Executive Committee, former member of the President's Council), Peter Maxwell Miller (businessman and former Natal Provincial Council member), S. Naidoo (teacher); Bureau for Information: KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority. CC box 39, 18–23; Joint Executive Authority: Media package, 03.11.1987. CC KCM01/2/22/7.

429 Bureau for Information: KwaZulu Natal Joint Executive Authority. CC box 39, 2.

1991, the 1986 act was amended, but the problems mentioned above remained, and although it was deemed possible, no departments under the JEA were created. Works on infrastructure were, however, put under joint authorities (Joint Services Boards) from 01 March 1991, working to improve infrastructure across the boundaries of Natal and KwaZulu.<sup>430</sup>

A notable achievement of the JEA was the unification of KwaZulu's and Natal's ambulance services around Durban from 1992. KwaZulu's ambulances based at Prince Mshiyeni Memorial Hospital, Umlazi, were overtasked and repeatedly stolen and their service, therefore, inadequate. Tasked by the JEA, officials from KwaZulu and Natal analysed the ambulance services and found that Natal's ambulances could also cover KwaZulu's townships around Durban (which they were not allowed to do before) without impairing the service in Natal. KwaZulu's ambulances could then serve a smaller area and would still be working to capacity. It was decided that the joint ambulance service was solely conducted by Natal while KwaZulu paid a fixed sum; some ambulances were moved from Durban to Prince Mshiyeni Memorial Hospital and still operated by Natal personnel which significantly increased the quality of ambulance services for people living in and around Umlazi.<sup>431</sup> While services were indeed improved, this does not seem to have been a rationalisation of services as KwaZulu then paid more for its ambulance services than before (nevertheless, improving healthcare was probably worth the extra expenditure). Even so, this example shows that the creation of the JEA indeed helped to blur the artificial boundaries between KwaZulu and Natal.

In all, it seems that the JEA fell short of what it was intended to become and was not the "first non-racial government in South Africa"<sup>432</sup> (how Buthelezi called it later). Instead of a real joint authority and a forerunner for a joint legislative (i.e. merging KwaZulu and Na-

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430 Africa, Sandra Elizabeth: *The Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu/Natal: Origins, Structure, Functions and Political Significance*, 11.1994. UNISA lib. 352.0684 AFRI, 97–129.

431 Ntsele 1993, 347–357.

432 Buthelezi 25.09.2014.

tal and therefore abolishing the apartheid homeland), it was in many cases merely a forum for exchange of information, discussion, and joint planning. Only in some limited cases, the JEA really acted like an executive and improved services across borders, sometimes with higher costs than before and not through rationalisation. Although established with good intentions, its impact, thus, was quite limited. Additionally, for the time from 1990, it was reported that the JEA played a central role in “brutal politico-military repression”.<sup>433</sup>

While the state, Inkatha, and some liberals (like Indaba staff and supporters that were also present at the JEA’s opening) and academics believed that the JEA might be a good means to achieve closer cooperation and rationalisation, the political left and liberals like the women of Black Sash often rejected the JEA as another apartheid structure (although Farouk Meer, spokesman of the Natal Indian Congress, admitted that it might be a step in the right direction).<sup>434</sup> We have now seen how Buthelezi and Inkatha built up networks inside South Africa to promote their ‘multi-strategy approach’ in the struggle against apartheid and for a new order. At last, we will turn to the networking activities on the international scene.

#### 5.4 Going International: The German Connection

After scrutinising Inkatha’s constructive, internal relations that were crossing boundaries set by the apartheid system, the focus shall now be on international relations. On the international stage, Buthelezi was just as busy networking as he was inside South Africa. This chapter will not (and cannot) trace the abundance of meetings that Buthelezi had outside South Africa but will focus on the connections to the Federal Republic of Germany because they were especially fruitful. Numerous accounts of other meetings in the West and with African leaders can be found in Buthelezi’s biographies<sup>435</sup> and in his

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433 Dominy 2017, 48.

434 Cameron 1987; Ntsele 1993, 128–136; Rohan 1987.

435 Especially Temkin 2003, but also Smith 1988 and Temkin 1976.

published speeches.<sup>436</sup> The Konrad Adenauer Foundation's files are not accessible (yet), so the analysis will draw on a variety of public and some internal sources.

During the 1970s, Buthelezi and Inkatha could appeal to the political left to some extent (although many anti-apartheid movements rejected him from the beginning<sup>437</sup>), but this ceased after the break with the ANC in 1979. For the 1980s, it can in general be observed that Buthelezi met with representatives of the business community, of churches, and of (mostly) conservative governments. Buthelezi and Inkatha enjoyed good relations with most of these which often led to an acceptance of the Inkatha stance on South Africa, but only few relationships led to material support: Apart from the FRG, which will be detailed later, only Sweden sent official 'development aid' as it was called at the time. This was only happening from 1977 to 1980 and was not continued after the ANC-Inkatha break. Thor Sellström reports in his 2002 study that the Swedish government had lost track of the money it had sent and did not know whether it had actually been spent as intended.<sup>438</sup> In the US, Inkatha representatives managed to acquire investments into self-help programmes, and the Inkatha Institute ran the Book & Buck Trust which helped pupils (see chapter 5.2.4).<sup>439</sup>

In Europe, Inkatha was represented by the Information Centre on South Africa in Amsterdam run by Reina Steenwijk which disseminated material on Inkatha among interested parties;<sup>440</sup> Franz Ansprenger called it the "Inkatha advertising agency for Western Europe".<sup>441</sup> The office was reportedly attacked with a bomb by the

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436 Buthelezi 1979b; Buthelezi 1986a.

437 Ansprenger 1999, 9.

438 Sellström 2002, 536–542.

439 Lobbying in the US was undertaken by Inkatha's information representative Dr. Lorna Hahn as well as the American legal counsel for Inkatha Vance Hartke (former senator) and Inkatha's advisor on constitutional affairs Professor Albert Blaustein (of Rutgers University Law School); Langner, E.J.: *The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yesizwe*, 1983. CC T 320.9683 LAN, 90.

440 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 178–179. See, e.g., Griffin/Steenwijk 1987 which is a German translation of an Inkatha pamphlet.

441 "Inkatha-Werbeagentur für Westeuropa" (Ansprenger 1999, 87).

ANC's Benjamin Moloise Commando in 1985.<sup>442</sup> In Germany, it was tried to establish a permanent Inkatha office in 1982 funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), but this was not successful.<sup>443</sup> Inkatha's London office, however, opened on 01 June 1987.<sup>444</sup>

Among European and Northern American academics, Buthelezi's and Inkatha's reputation was mixed; as we have seen in the context of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation, many rather conservative (and some right-wing) scientists and publicists endorsed Buthelezi and his allies. The left of the political spectrum and many liberals, however, largely rejected Inkatha. Support for the ANC and rejection of Inkatha was often without discussion, even in academic circles, as one incident shall exemplify: In October 1986, Lynn Oakley was asked to read a speech by Buthelezi<sup>445</sup> rejecting disinvestment to the University of Hawaii's board of regents which was going to adopt an official stance on sanctions against South Africa. Oakley recalls: "Of course, I was booed the moment I mentioned MGB and called a sell-out. The Chairman of the Board of Regents (who had each received a copy of this statement in a timely manner) cut me off. Didn't want to hear it. The vote was unanimous for disinvestment."<sup>446</sup>

The following chapter will first analyse Buthelezi's and Inkatha's 'official' and openly visible relations to the FRG and the KAF including numerous visits of Inkatha personnel to the FRG and its consequences. Then, the confidential KAF projects and the KAF's role in influencing the government will be in focus. Before closing the chapter, a few remarks on other moral support from Germany will be made.

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442 Cooper, et al. 1986, 22; Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's annual report, Annual General Conference, 04.-06.07.1986. APC PC126/3/17, 6.

443 Maré/Hamilton 1987, 178–179.

444 Dhlomo, O.D.: Secretary-General's Annual Report, Annual General Conference, 03.-05.07.1987. APC PC126/3/17, 2–3.

445 Buthelezi, M.G.: Speech to University of Hawaii's board of regents, 15.10.1986. LO;

446 Oakley, Lynn: E-mail, 13.10.2018.



#### 5.4.1 Buthelezi abroad: Meetings in the Open

On his third ever overseas trip in 1971, Buthelezi (along with Kaiser Matanzima and Lucas Mangope) visited first the United Kingdom where he was received by Prince Philip and also by ANC exiles including Oliver Tambo. All three visitors were willing to discuss the South African situation but refused to join the ANC's position in attacking the government.<sup>447</sup>

From the UK, Buthelezi and Mangope continued to Germany where there was no official reception; it rather seems that they wanted to get to know Germany.<sup>448</sup> Maybe it was from this experience that Buthelezi became interested in Germany:

We found that the recovery of Germany from the bombing she suffered during the last World War were a tribute to German determination and was achieved by sheer hard work. Many of the German Cities were completely or about eighty per cent of a City bombed or seventy per cent and it was just unbelievable to see [the] amazing recovery from such bombing. We were pained [by] the sight of the wall that divides Germany into two States. To me it crystallized quite a common human weakness of creating artificial barriers between people, which human beings seem to be in the habit of doing all the time and throughout generations.<sup>449</sup>

This observed parallel might have sparked the will for future cooperation. Another visit to several European countries including Germany

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447 Buthelezi, M.G.: Report by the Chief Executive Officer [...] to the Zulu Territorial Authority on the activities of the Executive Committee for the period 9th July, 1971 to the 4th January, 1972, 09.-11.02.1972. HPD A1045, 6-7; Temkin 2003, 121-122.

448 Buthelezi, M.G.: Report by the Chief Executive Officer [...] to the Zulu Territorial Authority on the activities of the Executive Committee for the period 9th July, 1971 to the 4th January, 1972, 09.-11.02.1972. HPD A1045, 6-7; Temkin 2003, 121-122.

449 Buthelezi, M.G.: Report by the Chief Executive Officer [...] to the Zulu Territorial Authority on the activities of the Executive Committee for the period 9th July, 1971 to the 4th January, 1972, 09.-11.02.1972. HPD A1045, 5-6.

is recorded for October and November 1974, but there are no sources relating to this trip.<sup>450</sup>

In June 1980, Gibson Thula, at the time Inkatha's urban representative in Johannesburg, visited Germany on invitation by the *Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden* ("Catholic Work Group on Development and Peace", KAEF). He arrived at Berlin-Tegel airport on 07 June 1980 to attend the German Catholic Congress' forum called *Christian Witness in Africa* and the holy mass in Berlin's Olympic stadium. Thula also talked to Dr. Martin Kruse, protestant bishop of Berlin and chairman of the protestant commission for Southern Africa. After meeting journalists on 09 June, Thula continued to Bonn where he was interviewed by *Deutsche Welle*, the FRG's international radio station, on 10 June, followed by numerous talks and lunches with politicians, government officials, and representatives of political foundations including the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.<sup>451</sup> On 14 June, Thula visited an art exhibition by South African artists and (notably) met with members of the anti-apartheid movement in Frankfurt from where he continued to Heidelberg on 15 June to meet political scientist Reinhard Hermle. At last, he went to Freiburg to meet political scientist Theodor Hanf who had recently conducted research in South Africa.<sup>452</sup> After meeting Dr. Albert Schunk of *IG Metall* (metalworkers' union), Thula left for South Africa via Paris on 16 June 1980.<sup>453</sup>

There are hardly any details on the visit apart from a few notes on the 10 June meeting which outline what Thula told the other participants: Blacks demanded democratic change more than ever and they became increasingly angry with the status quo. Thula further stated that the homeland policy made all Blacks foreigners in South Africa

450 Temkin 2003, 162.

451 Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden: Programme for Mr THULA's Visit, 07.-16.06.1980. AEK, DBK, JuPa 1488. On 10 June, KAF representatives Wolfgang Koll and Franz-Xaver Brunnhuber were present; Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden: Informationsgespräch mit Herrn Gibson Thula, 10.06.1980. AEK, DBK, JuPa 1488.

452 Hanf/Weiland/Vierdag 1978.

453 Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden: Programme for Mr THULA's Visit, 07.-16.06.1980. AEK, DBK, JuPa 1488.

so he and Inkatha firmly rejected it.<sup>454</sup> Inkatha, Thula stated, followed a pragmatic approach and considered every peaceful solution.<sup>455</sup> From the schedule, it is obvious that many politicians, government representatives, foundation representatives, clergymen, and the press were keen to meet somebody with inside knowledge of South Africa from the perspective of the oppressed majority. This included conservatives, liberals, and social democrats alike, showing that Inkatha had an at least reasonable reputation among the majority of the political spectrum. This was going to change in later years, as we will see.

Sources for the visits in 1981 and 1982 by Inkatha representatives are sparse. Frank Mdlalose spoke in front of the Hanns Martin Schleyer Foundation<sup>456</sup> in 1981,<sup>457</sup> Buthelezi spoke in front of KAF and church representatives in 1982 when he also met the leader of the opposition, Dr. Helmut Kohl, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.<sup>458</sup> With Kohl, a cooperation agreement was signed, foreshadowing more extensive cooperation when Kohl had become chancellor.<sup>459</sup> Given these circumstances, it seems that

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454 The use of “Schwarze” (Blacks) in this source is misleading in this case because there were no homelands for Coloureds and Asians/Indians.

455 Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden: Notes on talk with G. Thula, 10.06.1980. AEK, DBK, JuPa 1488.

456 The Hanns Martin Schleyer Foundation was founded by the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations and the Federation of German Industries.

457 Buthelezi, M.G.: Opportunities for the young generation to contribute towards evolutionary developments in the Third World: Initiatives illustrated on the model of Natal/South Africa – through Inkatha, Aachen, 25.09.1981. CC KCM43087/301. The speech was delivered by Mdlalose.

458 He was accompanied by Mdlalose, Thula, and Eric Ngubane, his personal assistant; Barthelt, Rainer, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Gespräch mit Buthelezi am 09.06.1983, 27.05.1983. BArch B 213/34214; Buthelezi, M.G.: Development for liberation. Address to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Bonn, 03.1982. CC KCM53988; Buthelezi, M.G.: Messages to the churches in Germany, Bonn, 27.03.1982. CC KCM53988; Buthelezi, M.G.: Entwicklung für Freiheit, Rede vor Mitarbeitern und Gästen der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 29.03.1982. ABI; Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung der Informationsreise der Inkatha-Delegation (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 26.02.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

459 Poppen 2006, 272.

lasting ties could not be established with the political left including the ruling social democrats. Nevertheless, development programmes had been financed by the FRG's government since November 1981 (see chapter 5.2.4 and below).

When Buthelezi had been to Germany in March 1982, the FRG was still ruled by a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), but when he returned in June 1983, Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had taken over in a coalition with the liberals. This would prove to cause a drastic change in Inkatha's relations to the FRG.

Buthelezi was now officially received by the Parliamentary Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Alois Mertes, and the Minister for Economic Cooperation, Dr. Jürgen Warnke. Buthelezi was accompanied by Frank Mdlalose, Oscar Dhlomo, Abbie Mchunu (chairperson of the Women's Brigade), Eric Ngubane (Buthelezi's assistant), and a Mr Mathe (maybe the S.M. Mathe who was later a high-ranking member of the KwaZulu Police). They came to Germany on the invitation of the KAF and it was Dr. Lothar Kraft, director of the KAF's Institute for International Solidarity, who arranged the meeting with Warnke. Accompanying the request to arrange a meeting between Buthelezi and Warnke, a short, benevolent (and selective) summary of Buthelezi and Inkatha was to inform Warnke about his guest. Also included was a copy of the Buthelezi Commission's main report in German translation<sup>460</sup> published by the KAF in 1982 and wrongly called a description of Buthelezi's personal, political aims.<sup>461</sup>

The Ministry for Economic Cooperation then compiled a report on Buthelezi and Inkatha that is much more nuanced than the KAF's description. It describes Buthelezi's position in South African politics, his methods and aims, and the conflict with the ANC rather benevolently. However, the report contains critical passages as well, remarking that Inkatha was only successful in KwaZulu, many members probably only joined out of material coercion (i.e. they were denied

460 Buthelezi 1982.

461 Kraft, Lothar: Terminanfrage für ein Treffen mit Buthelezi (an Jürgen Warnke, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), 13.05.1983. BArch B 213/34214.

social services before they joined), and (notably) that Buthelezi was easily offended and could not cope with criticism. Nevertheless, arguing that Buthelezi was the most important moderate black leader inside South Africa, the report concludes that he and Inkatha were to be supported to counter radicalisation.<sup>462</sup>

Warnke explained his understanding of the FRG's development policy in a KAF publication: The FRG helped poorer countries out of moral commitment as well as political and economic foresight in an interdependent world, just like the United States helped Germany after 1945. Pursuing this aim, the FRG's government intended to involve the private sector. In the receiving country, Warnke expected the best results of the FRG's help for self-help in settings of unbureaucratic and stable countries with a free market that encouraged hard work and efficiency. Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, etc., should not be forced on other countries (Warnke compares this to the colonial 'Am deutschen Wesen mag die Welt genesen') although political dialogue should be sought. Partner organisations, therefore, should be peaceful and guarantee free enterprise and stability (and not necessarily democracy). The term 'development' almost exclusively referred to economic development with a focus on agriculture which was in line with general movements and discourses (see chapter 2.4).<sup>463</sup>

When the meeting was scheduled for 09 June 1983, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation prepared a press release six days in advance, 'predicting' what Warnke and Buthelezi would say. The FRG's government committed itself to democratic, peaceful change and an abolition of apartheid in South Africa for which Buthelezi was presented as the only counterpart. This was explicitly contrasted to violent ANC action, namely bomb attacks. The statement also 'predicted' that Buthelezi would be grateful for German support in his cause.<sup>464</sup>

462 Barthelt, Rainer, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Gespräch mit Buthelezi am 09.06.1983, 27.05.1983. BArch B 213/34214.

463 Warnke 1986.

464 Haas, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Presseerklärung: Südafrikanischer Oppositionspolitiker bei Minister Warnke (Entwurf) (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat

Buthelezi and his entourage stayed in Germany from 05 to 10 June 1983. Unfortunately, there is no surviving schedule, but from the surviving sources it becomes clear that he discussed the South African situation with business representatives (stressing the importance of investments for economic growth and prosperity)<sup>465</sup> and with KAF representatives (stressing the importance of development programmes);<sup>466</sup> he also spoke in front of the German Society for Foreign Policy and journalists.<sup>467</sup> To the latter two, he presented Inkatha's official policy as being in line with the West and the ANC as violent and socialist.

In his aide memoire for the discussion with Mertes, on the other hand, Buthelezi explained his view on South African politics and the new constitution. Explicitly as a preparation for the discussion (of which no records survive), Buthelezi demanded that the West should not only voice opposition to apartheid but should act according to this stance, not in the form of disinvestment but through cooperation with the suppressed Blacks. To this end, the "African National Congress Mission in exile"<sup>468</sup> should no longer be supported because it had gotten out of touch with reality in South Africa, the document claims.<sup>469</sup>

The aide memoire for the discussion with Warnke stresses quite the same as Buthelezi's statement in front of KAF representatives: The West should take its responsibility more seriously, should start to act according to its voiced opposition to apartheid, and should help with development programmes to counter radicalisation and to foster

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02), 03.06.1983. BArch B 213/34214.

465 Buthelezi, M. G.: *The Role of Free Enterprise in Developing South Africa*, Rede vor Wirtschaftsvertretern, Köln, 05.06.1983. ABI.

466 Buthelezi, M. G.: *Eingesperrt bis zur Befreiung*, Vortrag in der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 06.06.1983/24.08.1983. ABI.

467 Buthelezi, M. G.: *Briefings on the South African situation*, Bonner Presseklub, 07.06.1983. ABI; Buthelezi, M. G.: *The Role of the West in the black struggle for liberation in southern Africa*, to the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn, 06.06.1983. DocAfr Acc 8.

468 Buthelezi, M. G.: *Aide memoire for discussion with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Mr Mertes, Bonn, 06.06.1983. DocAfr Acc 8, 6.

469 Ibid.

black faith in mutual understanding.<sup>470</sup> In the discussion with Warnke, Buthelezi also argued that political liberation alone would not suffice but that it had to be accompanied by economic development and a prospering free market. South Africa could only head into a brighter future this way. Warnke replied to Buthelezi's demands that the latest applications for development programmes by the KAF were considered benevolently but also that funding KwaZulu directly was out of question. This visualises international pressure on the FRG: It would have given the homeland system legitimacy which was frowned upon in the eyes of the international community. Closing the discussion, Buthelezi requested the FRG to help in establishing an Inkatha office in Bonn and he invited Warnke to South Africa.<sup>471</sup> Of the next trips to Germany in 1984, hardly any source survive.<sup>472</sup>

Not only did Buthelezi and Inkatha representatives travel to Germany, KAF representatives also visited South Africa on invitation by the South African government. In 1985, Kai-Uwe von Hassel,<sup>473</sup>

470 Buthelezi, M.G.: Aide Memoire for discussion with the Minister of Economic Development, Federal Republic of Germany: "Black South Africa's Share of Economic Development", 09.06.1983. BArch B 213/34214.

471 Haas, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Ergebnisvermerk des Gesprächs mit Buthelezi am 09.06.1983, 13.06.1983. BArch B 213/34214.

472 In January 1984, an Inkatha delegation led by Oscar Dhlomo visited various European countries and met government officials, but there are no surviving records with the exception of a compilation of frequently asked questions and their respective answers. They touch many topics already mentioned above and also Inkatha's view on the violence in KwaZulu and Natal; Information Centre on South Africa: Inkatha delegation in Europe. Report of the trip between January 11th and January 21st, 1984, 02.1984. ABI. Buthelezi himself returned to Germany in October 1984, but not much is known about this visit. He did meet Volkmar Köhler, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation with whom he spoke about development cooperation; Buthelezi, M.G.: Aide memoire for a discussion with the Hon. Dr. Volkmar Köhler MP Undersecretary of State in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, 04.10.1984. issa SA B5; Buthelezi, M.G.: Memorandum for a discussion with Mr. Horst Teltschik, Foreign Affairs Analyst of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 05.10.1984. issa SA B5.

473 Former Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, former FRG's Minister of Defence and Minister for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims, and

board member of the KAF, and Andreas Breitsprecher, the KAF's press secretary, travelled to South Africa where they met a variety of officials and politicians. Among these were members of the South African government and the state's departments, of Inkatha and its associates (e.g. Lawrence Schlemmer and Peter Mansfield), academics, the KAF representative in Durban Gerd Dieter Bossen, businessmen, but also representatives of the South African Defence Force and the South African Police. In all, this was a rather conservative and sometimes liberal selection of actors that were close to the state or involved with it.<sup>474</sup>

Although they did not speak to any ANC or UDF members (which they state explicitly), their report contains a lengthy statement on both organisations confirming every fear of a communist revolution that a European conservative might have had. However, they stated, ANC and UDF did not have the support of the majority which was itself split along ethnic lines (which they call "tribal"); von Hassel and Breitsprecher denied any black solidarity and explained that the USSR controlled the ANC and the ANC controlled the UDF. After explaining their view on the causes of violence and riots – which were usually organised for the media, they claimed – they discussed obstacles for reform. Almost everybody they talked to agreed on the necessity for reforms and the government had already made steps in the right direction, they thought. They also had a very positive impression of the KAF projects in South Africa and of Buthelezi, who was to be supported in any case.<sup>475</sup>

The next thoroughly documented visit by Buthelezi was in February 1986 and the schedule was very similar to the one before.<sup>476</sup> He

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former President of the Bundestag.

474 Hassel, Kai-Uwe von, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Vorstandsmitglied: Bericht über die Dienstreise in die Republik Südafrika 20.-30.11.1986, 12.1985. BArch B 213/30371, 2–5.

475 Ibid.

476 Buthelezi usually also met with parliamentarians, especially from the Foreign Affairs Committee; see, e.g., Holtz, Uwe: Einladung zu Buthelezis Vortrag, 30.01.1986. issa SA B5; Buthelezi, M.G.: Memorandum for discussion at a meeting with members of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, 19.02.1986. issa SA B5.



met business representatives, the press, KAF representatives, conservative and liberal parliamentarians, clergymen, and of course members of the government: Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Economic Cooperation Warnke and Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl. It was also planned to meet President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, but this meeting did not take place.<sup>477</sup> As before, the visit was prepared with reports on Buthelezi (including his personality) and Inkatha by the Foreign Office but also by the German consulate general in Cape Town and the German embassy in Pretoria. The reports are still rather benevolent and see Inkatha as the only opportunity for peaceful change, but they also mention violent action by Inkatha and the authoritarian one-party state of KwaZulu.<sup>478</sup> In his speeches and comments, Buthelezi spoke about the same topics as before with one notable addition: In a speech on the role of donor agencies, Buthelezi criticised that many donors only supported projects that were approved by the ANC, and by doing so, supported violent action by a Marxist organisation. While foreign aid and investments were crucial, Buthelezi requested that these should be spread evenly across the oppressed majority in South Africa. Everything else would have led to more violence and, ultimately, a Marxist revolution.<sup>479</sup>

When Buthelezi was in Germany, the Green Party questioned the government about its motivation to meet Buthelezi, whether the government knew about the violence in KwaZulu and Natal, how much money the government was spending on development programmes related to Inkatha in South Africa, and why the government had no

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477 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Programm für Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, 17.-22.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Weizsäcker, Richard von: Brief an Buthelezi (Absage des Termins), 20.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

478 Deutsches Generalkonsulat Kapstadt: Lebenslauf und Persönlichkeitsbild Buthelezi (an Auswärtiges Amt), 31.01.1986. BArch B 213/34214; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Sachstand: Buthelezi, 07.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Sachstand: Inkatha, 07.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Sachstand: Südafrika, 12.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Deutsche Botschaft Pretoria: Buthelezi's Haltung in der innenpolitischen Diskussion der letzten Tage, 17.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

479 Buthelezi, M. G.: The role of donor agencies in South Africa, Bonn, 20.02.1986. HPD A1045.

plans of meeting ANC leader Oliver Tambo or SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma (as the latter had recently been to Germany).<sup>480</sup>

The government declared that by meeting Buthelezi, it wanted to support peaceful change; to this end, the government stated, it kept in touch with all relevant groups inside South Africa. The reply further called the violence a consequence of apartheid and racial discrimination and rejected blaming Inkatha alone for it. Notably, the opposition had not asked for this, just for a general attribution of an active role in the violence. Replying to the question why there had been no meeting with Nujoma, the government stated that he had not asked for one. Regarding finances, the government referred to already given information elsewhere but also stated that no development projects for KwaZulu were planned.<sup>481</sup> We will see below that several projects, however, actually benefitted KwaZulu and Inkatha.

The first member of the government that Buthelezi met during this trip was Genscher, but only a press release relating to this meeting survives, mentioning that the two had met and talked about sanctions.<sup>482</sup> Directly afterwards, Buthelezi met Kohl.

The meeting was arranged by the KAF that also paid for the visit.<sup>483</sup> For the preparation of the talk, the Chancellery requested material from the Foreign Office which, in turn, prepared what Kohl should say and ask. It was recommended to explain the FRG's stance on South Africa, stressing the importance of non-violent democratic change and the FRG's policy of critical dialogue with the South African government; the FRG was not going to proscribe a solution as this would have to emerge from dialogue within South Africa. Kohl should then continue to discuss current political developments in South Africa with Buthelezi and declare his support for Buthelezi and Inkatha,

480 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 10/5066 – Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Frau Eid und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN, 20.02.1986. BT 10/5066.

481 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 10/5066 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Frau Eid und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN, 26.03.1986. BT 10/5066.

482 Pressereferat des Auswärtigen Amtes: Pressemitteilung, 18.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

483 Schloz, Rudolf, Bundeskanzleramt: Vermerk: Anregung der KAS zu einem Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit Prinz Buthelezi, 12.11.1985. BArch B 213/30371.

although material support and official recognition were impossible because the FRG only recognised states and no organisations.<sup>484</sup>

Buthelezi also prepared the meeting with a written memorandum highlighting non-violence, free enterprise, and Western democracy and explaining the power imbalance and recent political developments in South Africa. Closing the memorandum, Buthelezi asked Kohl to assess whether Inkatha might be worthy of support.<sup>485</sup> According to the press release and an internal note, the discussion went as prepared.<sup>486</sup>

The preparations for the meeting with Warnke went the same way, although this time, it was not a formal discussion but a dinner. A benevolent information sheet about Buthelezi and his policies (partly based on KAF information) was prepared and a speech praising Buthelezi written. During the dinner, Warnke and Buthelezi were meant to discuss the South African situation and questions were prepared for Warnke (that were basically the same questions Kohl had already asked). Of course, Buthelezi also had a memorandum adapted to his counterpart. It stressed the importance of economic growth and development for peaceful change. During the dinner, Warnke also assured Buthelezi that the development programmes would continue to be funded by the FRG.<sup>487</sup> Indeed, a few days later, Warnkes ministry resumed working on the pending applications (see below).

484 Ueberschaer, Hans-Christian, Bundeskanzleramt, Referat 213: Anforderung von Gesprächsunterlagen (an Konrad von Schubert, Auswärtiges Amt), 15.01.1986. BArch B 213/30371; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Gesprächsführungsvorschlag für das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit Buthelezi, 07.02.1986. BArch B 213/30371.

485 Steenwijk, Reina R./Buthelezi, M.G.: Informationspaket: Memorandum zur Präsentation während eines Treffens mit dem Kanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Herrn Dr. H. Kohl, 02.1986. BArch B 213/34214.

486 Ost, Friedhelm, Staatssekretär, Sprecher der Bundesregierung: Pressemitteilung, 18.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214; Ost, Friedhelm, Staatssekretär, Sprecher der Bundesregierung: Pressemitteilung, 18.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Ueberschaer, Hans-Christian, Bundeskanzleramt, Referat 213: Vermerk über das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit Buthelezi am 18.02.1986, 20.02.1986. BArch B 213/30371.

487 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit: Termin mit Buthelezi: Informationsvorlage, Gesprächsvorlage, Rede, 31.01.1986. BArch B 213/34214;

The meeting with von Weizsäcker was arranged by the KAF, but to which extent the President was informed about Buthelezi and Inkatha through the KAF or the government is not known.<sup>488</sup> Letters from various Green and Social Democrat MPs to the President emphasised Inkatha's role in the violent clashes of KwaZulu and Natal and denied Buthelezi the role of a genuine black leader; von Weizsäcker, consequently, was urged not to meet Buthelezi.<sup>489</sup>

For the discussion, von Weizsäcker received a shortened version of the document that had been prepared for Kohl, containing the FRG's official policy and possible questions.<sup>490</sup> The day before von Weizsäcker received this document, however, he had already cancelled the meeting with the following statement in a letter to Buthelezi:

I should like you to know how very sorry I am that it will not be possible for me to see you while you are in Bonn. I had been looking forward to meeting you again and getting from you first-hand information about the situation in South Africa as well as your assessment of future developments. However, after three strenuous state visits to South and South East Asia from which I have just returned I will not be able to resume my official duties until next week. I am sure you will appreciate this situation.

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Barthelt, Rainer, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Vorlage zur Vorbereitung des Gesprächs (an Jürgen Warnke, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), 17.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214; Buthelezi, M. G.: Memorandum for Presentation to Dr. G. Warnke, Minister for Economic Co-Operation, Federal Republic of Germany, 20.02.1986. BArch B 213/34214; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Besuch von Buthelezi in Bonn, hier: Gespräch mit BM am 18. Februar 1986, 18.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

488 Heck, Bruno: Termin mit Buthelezi (an Richard von Weizsäcker), 20.12.1985. BArch B 122/37180; Weizsäcker, Richard von: Termin mit Buthelezi (an Bruno Heck, Vorsitzenden der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), 10.01.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

489 Eid, Uschi/Borgmann, Annemarie/Hönes, Hannegret/Volmer, Ludger/Vogel, Axel/Senfft, Hans Werner: Brief an den Bundespräsidenten, 10.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

490 Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Gesprächsführungsvorschlag, 21.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

I was deeply impressed by your commitment to peaceful change in South Africa. You can be assured of our sympathy and our unequivocal support for a policy leading to a just society and the elimination of racial discrimination.<sup>491</sup>

Notably, differing from Kohl and Warnke, he did not express support for Buthelezi and Inkatha but only for said aims that Inkatha officially pursued. It can only be speculated whether von Weizsäcker in fact did not want to meet Buthelezi, possibly also due to the voiced criticism. One remark by von Weizsäcker made ten months later in November 1986 supports this assumption. In a document of the Foreign Office informing the reader on recent political developments in South Africa, one unknown government official added a hand-written note criticising that the Foreign Office ignored or marginalised Buthelezi. The President answered in another hand-written note in his green ink: “He is not very important anyway”.<sup>492</sup>

Following Buthelezi’s repeated plea for more support, also directly as development aid for KwaZulu, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation discussed the matter. The ministry’s Dr. Rainer Barthelt argued that this should be granted not only for humanitarian reasons but also to give Buthelezi visible proof that his politics were successful. A strong Buthelezi and a strong Inkatha would work as a counterweight against radical forces that were willing to risk the country’s economy for political liberation which would, in turn, lead to more radicalisation (also among right-wing Whites). The FRG should now seize the opportunity of declining violence to push for reforms with a strong Buthelezi against the South African government. Empowering Blacks in the economy would further weaken apartheid. While some departments in the ministry had doubts, this was not the reason why development aid was not granted.<sup>493</sup>

491 Weizsäcker, Richard von: Brief an Buthelezi (Absage des Termins), 20.02.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

492 “Er ist halt auch nicht sehr wichtig”; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Sachstand Südafrika, 10.1986. BArch B 122/37180, 1.

493 Barthelt, Rainer, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Hilfsersuchen des Chefministers von KwaZulu, M. G. Buthelezi (an Jür-

Under the given circumstances, the government itself could not grant this direct form of development aid because such cooperation was only possible with developing countries – and South Africa was not classified as one. Giving funds from this dedicated part of the national budget was impossible. Other institutions could, however, apply for funding as described above. To this end, the ministry decided to approach the KAF and private agencies, although funding would not be possible in 1986 anymore. Warnke agreed to this procedure as he also wanted to support Buthelezi; apart from the KAF, the *Welthungerhilfe* (“World Hunger Aid”)<sup>494</sup> and the Hanns Seidel Foundation were possible partners.<sup>495</sup>

Previous to the next visit in November 1986, the Greens again questioned the government about its relationship to Inkatha, adding statements about Inkatha stabilising apartheid, Impis threatening the opposition, and UWUSA splitting the opposition. The Greens questioned whether observations by the Foreign Office’s person in charge for Africa, Hans Günter Sulimma,<sup>496</sup> that Buthelezi should not be pre-

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gen Warnke, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), 27.02.1986. BACh B 213/34214.

494 In 1982, Buthelezi and the Welthungerhilfe had established friendly contacts, but this did not result in any cooperation; Deutsche Welthungerhilfe: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe zu Südafrika, 14.04.1982. issa SA B5; Deutsche Welthungerhilfe: Presseerklärung: DWHH und Buthelezi, 14.08.1986. issa SA F2.

495 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 324: Entscheidung kann nicht akzeptiert werden, 28.02.1986. BACh B 213/34214; Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 122: Südafrika ist kein Entwicklungsland, 03.03.1986. BACh B 213/34214; Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Unterabteilungsleiter 11/Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Unterabteilungsleiter 32: KAS soll als erstes angesprochen werden, 11./13.03.1986. BACh B 213/34214; Barthelt, Rainer, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Hilferesuchen des Chefministers von KwaZulu, M. G. Buthelezi, hier Entscheidung des Bundesministers vom 25.03.1986 (an Referate 322, 324), 02.04.1986. BACh B 213/34214.

496 Genscher nominated Sulimma to replace German ambassador Lahusen in South Africa which was met with fierce resistance by Franz Josef Strauß, leader of the Christian Social Union and declared friend of the Afrikaners. Because of Sulimma’s critical stance on Buthelezi and Inkatha, Strauss called Sulimma an amateur/dilettante (“Dilettant”). The decision who would replace Lahusen was

ferred over other black leaders actually influenced the government's policy.<sup>497</sup> The 'reply' by the government just referred to their earlier answers.<sup>498</sup> This reflects an increasing split in the FRG's policy on South Africa: The Foreign Office, led by Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the liberal FDP, was more critical of Buthelezi and of the apartheid regime, with Genscher stating that apartheid could not be reformed and that cooperation with Buthelezi was wrong. Chancellor Kohl of the conservative Christian Democratic Union and Minister for Economic Cooperation Warnke of the conservative Christian Social Union, however, lauded Buthelezi and allowed hardly any criticism. Even if they acknowledged Inkatha's involvement in the violence, the violence was attributed to other factors.<sup>499</sup> Only in the beginning of the 1990s, the government would begin to acknowledge that Inkatha shared the responsibility for violence but still insisted that Inkatha's opponents and apartheid were also to blame (which the opposition did not deny).<sup>500</sup> Then, the government officially tried to influence Buthelezi and Inkatha to behave more peacefully while material support for Inkatha-related programmes continued to flow.<sup>501</sup>

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up to chancellor Kohl. Strauss managed to prevent Sulimma from becoming ambassador; instead, Immo Stabreit was sent to Pretoria who was friendlier towards both Buthelezi and P. W. Botha; *Der Spiegel* 1986c; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 1986.

497 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 10/5914 – Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Frau Borgmann, Frau Eid und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN, 07.08.1986. BT 10/5914.

498 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 10/6148 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Frau Borgmann, Frau Eid und der Fraktion DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 10/5914, 13.10.1986. BT 10/6148.

499 Also see Ropp 1991, 300; Wenzel 1994, 81–82.

500 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 11/7815 – Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 3. September 1990 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 07.09.1990. BT 11/7815, 41; Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 12/862 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Günter Verheugen [et al.], Drucksache 12/308, 24.06.1991. BT 12/862, 6.

501 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 12/1142 – Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 9. September 1991 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 13.09.1991. BT 12/1142, 8; Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 12/3312 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Gerd

The document containing von Weizsäcker's note "He is not very important anyway" as cited above came into being as preparation for Buthelezi's next visit, taking place in November 1986. Discussions with von Weizsäcker and Warnke were prepared along the same lines as depicted above and they repeated the same arguments. As usual, Buthelezi also prepared a memorandum repeating his viewpoint, thanking the FRG for support and attacking the ANC.<sup>502</sup> During this stay, the KAF organised a conference named *Demokratie und Freiheit für die ganze Welt* ("Democracy and Freedom for the whole World") to which Buthelezi was invited as a speaker among with Kohl, Weizsäcker, Genscher, and others.<sup>503</sup> Buthelezi spoke about the violence in South Africa, of peaceful change, and of the role of the West.<sup>504</sup> The KwaZulu Natal Indaba was also discussed at this meeting, based on a translation of the Bill of Rights supplied by the KAF.<sup>505</sup> Especially the Greens in cooperation with others protested this conference, stating that Inkatha was a violent organisation supporting the apartheid regime, murdering its opponents and therefore doing quite the opposite of liberating South Africa. The KAF, therefore, would support "Buthelezi and his hit squads with millions – partly from

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Poppe, Konrad Weiß (Berlin) und der Gruppe BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 12/3033. BT 12/3312, 10–11.

- 502 Bundesregierung der BRD: Gesprächsführungsvorschlag (an Richard von Weizsäcker, Bundespräsident der BRD), 30.10.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Bartelt, Rainer; Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 115: Gesprächsführungsvorschlag (an Jürgen Warnke, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), 03.11.1986. BArch B 213/34214; Buthelezi, M.G.: Anmerkungen zu einem Treffen mit dem Präsidenten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Herrn Dr. R. von Weizsäcker von Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Hauptminister KwaZulus, Präsident der Inkatha-Bewegung und Vorsitzender der südafrikanischen Schwarzen Allianz, 04.11.1986. BArch B 122/37180.
- 503 CDU-Pressestelle: Internationale Tagung zu Fragen der Menschenrechte am Montag, den 3. November, im Konrad-Adenauer-Haus, 30.10.1986. issa SA B5.
- 504 Buthelezi, M.G.: Democracy and freedom for the whole word – human rights, democracy and development in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 03.11.1986. issa SA B5.
- 505 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Bill of Rights für KWAZULU NATAL / Republik Südafrika [translation] (presented at conference on 03.11.1986), 10.07.1986. issa SA B5.



German tax money”. The Greens further accused the KAF of supporting Costa Rican Contras. The KAF, in return, filed an injunction suit against the Greens to prohibit such statements.<sup>506</sup>

The charge was supplied to the Landgericht (regional court) Bonn, directed at Claudia Roth and Franz Stänner, both members of the Greens. The injunction suit was meant to prohibit further statements of the KAF allegedly supporting Buthelezi and his “hit squads” with millions of German Marks as well as Costa Rican Contras. Violation of the prohibition (if the court agreed) was requested to be fined with 500,000 German Marks or up to two years of imprisonment. Roth and Stänner were named as press spokespersons of the Greens and in this function responsible for the Green’s public statements as cited above. The charge further explained what the KAF was legally allowed to do and what not, and what it actually did in connection with Inkatha and with Costa Rica. To prove their point, various KAF officials were requested to be heard by the court.<sup>507</sup>

The Greens and their lawyer replied to the court that Roth and Stänner were not the authors of the press release making said statements about the KAF. Instead, the whole Green parliamentary group were the authors; Roth and Stänner were just distributing the release. The Greens repeated their claims about Inkatha and requested for an interesting group of witnesses to be heard: theologian Theobald Kneifel who had for twelve years worked at a missionary school in Pietmaritzburg, former (‘defected’) Inkatha Secretary-General Sibusiso Bengu, prominent legal scholar Nicholas Haysom (at the time working at Wits), prominent sociologist Fatima Meer (University of Natal), and an anonymous witness. They were to provide detailed accounts of Inkatha’s involvement in violence and how the KAF projects benefitted Inkatha. The Greens and their lawyer further cited freedom of speech as legitimising such criticism and showed that many of their

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506 Evangelischer Pressedienst: Kohl fordert Einsatz für Freiheit und Menschenrechte, 04.11.1986. KAF 2/201/24-0; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Einladung zur Tagung “Demokratie und Freiheit für die ganze Welt. Menschenrechte – Demokratie – Entwicklung”, 03.11.1986. BArch B 122/37180; Die Grünen im Bundestag: Pressemitteilung Nr. 33/87, 20.01.1987. KAF

507 KAF lawyers: Klage, 10.11.1986. issa SA F2.

statements were cited from journals. The same strategy was followed for the case of the Costa Rican Contras. Notably, the Greens also requested to hear KAF officials as their witnesses.<sup>508</sup>

The KAF replied that the press release would have needed to name explicit authors by law, but as no authors were mentioned, the press spokespersons were to be held responsible. The KAF further insisted that it did not cooperate with Inkatha, thus all the claims about Inkatha's infliction in violence were meaningless. Regarding the financing of Contras in Costa Rica, the KAF had to admit that the accounting had been tampered with.<sup>509</sup>

The KAF denied funding Inkatha at all,<sup>510</sup> which is true from a legal perspective as the Inkatha Institute was the official partner. Nevertheless, this heavily benefitted Inkatha – which was the KAF's intention. The applications analysed below state this *very clearly*: Inkatha was to be supported with these projects.

Buthelezi's last visit to Germany of which sources could be found/ accessed was in October 1987, this time invited by Siemens and the *Hessischer Kreis*. Again, he met Kohl and Genscher. It can be assumed that the meetings were prepared as usual but hardly any records of the meetings survive. Buthelezi urged Kohl to apply diplomatic pressure on P. W. Botha to accept the KwaZulu Natal Indaba. Kohl and Genscher both stressed that they would support any moves for peaceful change.<sup>511</sup> According to a newspaper report, Buthelezi primarily met business representatives to promote investments.<sup>512</sup>

508 Greens' lawyer: Klageerwiderung, 15.01.1987. issa SA F2.

509 KAF lawyers: Entgegnung auf Klageerwiderung, 10.03.1987. issa SA F2.

510 Rediske 1987.

511 Deutsche Presse-Agentur: Buthelezi auch bei Genscher, 16.10.1987. issa SA B5; Mercury Reporter 1987.

512 taz 1987; Bundeskanzleramt: Vermerk über den Termin des Bundeskanzlers mit Buthelezi am 15.10.1987, 16.09.1987. BArch B 213/30372; Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 320: Gesprächsführungsvorschlag für das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit Buthelezi am 15.10.1987, 06.10.1987. BArch B 213/30372; von Leuckart, Bundeskanzleramt, Abteilungsleiter 2: Presseerklärung zum Gespräch mit Buthelezi am 15.10.1987, 14.10.1987. BArch B 213/30372; Ost, Friedhelm, Staatssekretär, Sprecher der Bundesregierung: Pressemitteilung: Kohl empfing Buthelezi, 15.10.1987. BArch B 122/37180.

In 1989, Dhlomo returned to Germany on the KAF's invitation to meet members of the government, the ruling parties, KAF representatives, and the press.<sup>513</sup> When the first democratic elections were approaching, the schedule of such trips changed: Now, the (unnamed) representatives of Inkatha and other parties including the ANC were meant to learn about German institutions and procedures additionally to meetings with politicians.<sup>514</sup>

#### 5.4.2 Undercover from the German Public: KAF Lobbying for Inkatha

As we have seen above, Buthelezi enjoyed cordial relations to the KAF and, subsequently, to the FRG's government; how the relations between Buthelezi and the KAF emerged in the beginning could not be reconstructed. The sources found during research support the following picture: While the open and loud support for Buthelezi and Inkatha by the KAF only started in the mid-1980s, the KAF applied for development programmes that were close to Inkatha as early as 1981. Inkatha was never supported directly, but the projects were run by the legally separate Inkatha Institute under Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer (and his successors) or by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal, under Schlemmer.<sup>515</sup> It can reasonably be argued, however, that at least the projects run by the Inkatha Institute were commonly understood as belonging to Inkatha due to close cooperation between the two and the composition of the institute's leadership (see chapter 5.2.4). Another project was run by the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), a capitalist

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513 Kaiser, Hans: Einladung zum Pressegespräch, 03.11.1989. KAF 2/201/24-0.

514 Priess, Frank: Presseinformation: Südafrikanische Politiker in Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin und Erfurt, 08.09.1993. KAF 2/201/24-0.

515 On this project, see Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung eines Forschungsprogramms des Centre of Applied Social Sciences der Universität Natal/Südafrika (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 13.11.1981. BArch B 213/34213.

union of African businesspeople.<sup>516</sup> This sub-chapter will trace how Buthelezi and the KAF managed to secure funding from the FRG for the projects run by the Inkatha Institute (the details on the projects themselves can be found in chapter 5.2.4). Afterwards, the KAF's ideological support by promoting Inkatha will be analysed.

In general, the KAF's viewpoint was quite in line with Warnke's as described above, pursuing free enterprise and stability. But the KAF added important aspects that its projects were meant to strive for: democracy, human rights, and a social market economy.<sup>517</sup> To this end, independent partners that were tolerant and open for dialogue in 'developing countries', as it was termed, were sought – because socialist and/or one-party states could hardly fit these criteria from the FRG's perspective. Differing from Warnke, 'development' not only meant economic development but also (political) education and human rights.<sup>518</sup>

Dr. Lothar Kraft, head of the KAF's Institute for International Solidarity, applied to the Ministry of Economic Development for a research programme into rural development; its aim was to find out how to improve rural living conditions in the Msinga district. To fund this project, 25,000 German Marks were requested. The application explained the KAF's view on South African politics: The homeland system had failed and the homelands were not economically viable; Botha's regime would only grant (minor) improvements to urban Blacks. The KAF wanted to help improving the living conditions of the oppressed majority but neither wanted to cooperate with the apartheid state nor with violent organisations. Thus, it was argued, cooperation was only possible with organisations that were legal, nonviolent,

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516 On this project, see Erl, Willi: Antrag auf Förderung gesellschaftspolitischer Aufgaben der Entwicklungsförderung, hier NAFCOO-Südafrika/Unternehmerförderung (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 04.12.1981. BArch B 213/34213.

517 The commitment to human rights had been binding for the FRG's political foundations in their development work since 1971; Thesing 1997, 175.

518 Krieger 1995; Thesing 1997.

and yet still independent of the apartheid state – ruling out ANC, PAC, and the Black Consciousness Movement as well.<sup>519</sup>

The application (which also included a statement of costs) named the Inkatha Institute as the suitable partner in its subject and one part explicitly introduced the institute, at least according to its headline. The relevant paragraphs, however, do not begin with the institute but with Inkatha itself. Buthelezi and Inkatha were described as powerful, nonviolent, and an important force in the struggle against apartheid. Peaceful democratisation, therefore, could only be achieved with Inkatha on board. The application then characterised the Inkatha Institute explicitly as a body that supported Inkatha in formulating its policy on a scientific basis, but also as a centre for education.<sup>520</sup> If the Inkatha Institute really was completely separate from Inkatha (as the ruling party of a homeland institution could not be supported), one would expect the application to be structured differently. The summary then indeed named Inkatha as the organisation that was to be supported.<sup>521</sup> It seems that naming the Inkatha Institute as partner was just for administrative reasons; in fact, Inkatha was the organisation being supported through the institute.

For the operation of the KAF projects in South Africa, the KAF applied for the funding of a KAF representative who was to support the partners in South Africa. The application lists Inkatha as a partner, not the Inkatha Institute. The designated KAF representative was judge Gerd Dieter Bossen who was also instructed to gather information about South and Southern Africa from his base in Durban.<sup>522</sup>

The Ministry for Economic Cooperation treated the application as confidential and examined it internally.<sup>523</sup> The examiners were

519 Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung eines ländlichen Entwicklungsforschungsprogramms des Inkatha-Instituts, Durban/Südafrika (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 13.11.1981. BArch B 213/34213.

520 Ibid, 7–11.

521 Ibid, 15.

522 Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung von Entwicklungsländern durch Maßnahmen der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung, hier Personaleinsatz Südafrika (KAS-Beauftragter) (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311), 14.01.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

523 Hinrichs, Referat 311, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit:

aware that other governments and the ANC and PAC would probably criticise the FRG for cooperating with Inkatha because many argued that it was stabilising the homeland system through governing Kwa-Zulu. But the ministry preferred making its own decisions and not following outside pressure, it was stated, when they had deemed a project useful. So the ministry recommended to accept the KAF's applications, including the funding of Buthelezi's 1982 visit.<sup>524</sup> The final decision was up to the Minister for Economic Cooperation, Rainer Offergeld (Social Democratic Party), who agreed to the funding (without involving himself any further).<sup>525</sup>

In 1983, after the change in the FRG's government, Kraft applied for two further projects on behalf of the Inkatha Institute, one concerned with training courses in administration and one with setting up a *Resource and Information Centre* based at the Inkatha Institute. The argument for both projects is very similar to what has been described above and, again, the documents state explicitly that Inkatha, not the Inkatha Institute, was to be supported. Even more, the training courses were meant to be for Inkatha personnel only.<sup>526</sup>

Both projects were accepted and, differing from the 1981/82 case, the process took little more than three months and not four-and-a-half months.<sup>527</sup> Also, in this case, there is no documented internal

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Weiterleitung des Antrags der KAS vom 13.11.1981 (Inkatha Institute) (an Referat 115, 312, Forschungsbeauftragter), 14.01.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

524 Kalf, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311: Beabsichtigte gesellschaftspolitische Zusammenarbeit der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) mit Partnern in der Republik Südafrika (RSA) (an Rainer Offergeld, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit), 12.03.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

525 Siebert, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311: Bewilligung der Anträge (an KAS), 31.03.1982. BArch B 213/34213.

526 Kraft, Lothar: Antrag auf Förderung der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung in Entwicklungsländern, hier Inkatha III (Beratungs- und Informationszentrum) (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 321), 28.04.1983. BArch B 213/34213; Kraft, Lothar: Förderung der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung in Entwicklungsländern, hier Inkatha II (Verwaltungskurse) (an Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 321), 28.04.1983. BArch B 213/34213.

527 Kalf, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311:

discussion. This gives reason to assume that obtaining funds from the new, conservative Minister for Economic Cooperation Jürgen Warnke was easier. While criticism of Inkatha had at least been discussed within the ministry under Social Democratic leadership, the process had now become very smooth, probably due to better relations and a greater ideological proximity which will be discussed later.

The two projects that had been started in 1983 were still running in 1986 (but starting others failed in 1986 as noted above); the Resource and Information Centre's funding was reviewed in 1989 and, again, granted. It was only in 1992 that the project was discontinued at about the time when the Inkatha Institute was closed. Until then, various workshops, conferences, and training programmes had been run by the Resource and Information Centre in cooperation with the KAF. In the timespan from 1985 to 1992, 3,127,000 German Marks were transferred from the FRG to the Inkatha Institute for the projects mentioned in this sub-chapter. From 1993, the KAF supported the Democracy Development Program that succeeded the Inkatha Institute and was (officially) open for all; in 1993 alone, the DDP received 1,330,000 German Marks from the FRG.<sup>528</sup>

Aside from mediating between the FRG's government and Inkatha, the KAF also threw in its weight to defend Buthelezi personally and Inkatha as a whole in public, especially in the FRG in the beginning

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Bewilligung Inkatha II (Verwaltungsausbildungsprogramme) (an Institut für Internationale Solidarität, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), 03.08.1983. BArch B 213/34213; Kalf, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Referat 311: Bewilligung Inkatha III (Beratungs- und Informationszentrum) (an Institut für Internationale Solidarität der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), 03.08.1983. BArch B 213/34213.

528 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 12/3312 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Gerd Poppe, Konrad Weiß (Berlin) und der Gruppe BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 12/3033. BT 12/3312; Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/2521 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Christa Luft, Dr. Gregor Gysi und der Gruppe der PDS, Drucksache 13/2336. BT 13/2521; Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/2522 – Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Uschi Eid und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 13/2397, Verwendung von Entwicklungshilfegeldern für Südafrika. BT 13/2522.

1990s. Already during the 1980s, however, the KAF informed interested readers about South Africa and Inkatha (from the KAF's point of view, of course) in its own publications to 'correct' the image of Buthelezi and Inkatha, claiming that the KAF publications were objective and most others were not. One document from 1985 by the KAF's South African representative, Gerd Dieter Bossen, asked whether the "undifferentiated criticism and partisanship [of the West] indeed is in the interest of the South African people – black, brown, or white – and in the West's own interest."<sup>529</sup> While it is questionable whether the West should pursue its own interests at all when supporting oppressed people, this shows how much South Africa and Inkatha were seen as instruments in the Cold War. The existing free enterprise system and, to a large extent, the distribution of wealth were to be protected and South Africa should not be lost to the Soviet Union's sphere. Also, one could accuse the KAF of the same partisanship, just the other way around.

The document further tells the story of recent boycotts and riots in which Inkatha appears as an almost non-violent force of law and order. The riots had been instigated by the ANC and the UDF, the document tells, and then had gotten out of control so that Blacks attacked Blacks and Inkatha was threatened. After a week of hesitation, the Inkatha leadership decided to defend itself, step in, and restore order. Except for three minor incidents, Inkatha's actions had been entirely peaceful, the document claims, and the aggression could only be found on the side of ANC and UDF. Inkatha, Bossen concluded, was the only option for peaceful change.<sup>530</sup> This appears to be either a miracle, given the chaotic circumstances, or a one-sided narrative. As we have seen in chapter 3.1, things just were not that simple.

Bossen repeated his view in later documents, describing how ANC and UDF wanted to conquer territory by any means and, on their way, destroyed anything that was in the way, both politically

529 "[...] ob undifferenzierte Kritik- und Parteinahme tatsächlich im Interesse der Bevölkerung Südafrikas – der schwarzen wie der braunen und weissen – und nicht zuletzt auch in seinem eigenen Interesse ist." Bossen, Gerd Dieter: Südafrika: Inkatha – zwischen Unwissen und bewußter Entstellung. ABI, 3.

530 Ibid.



and economically. Of course, it is a valid argument that destruction hit the oppressed majority hardest, but Bossen did not ask whether people were maybe willing to make sacrifices for the sake of political liberation – instead of enduring more years under apartheid. Bossen also dismisses that ANC and UDF might have had good reason to see Inkatha as a part of the system from *their* point of view.<sup>531</sup> Claiming to be objective, it seems that Bossen's assessment is rather subjective, which is of course natural if one is personally involved.<sup>532</sup>

During this time, the KAF established very good personal, lasting connections to Buthelezi and Inkatha through Bossen;<sup>533</sup> Buthelezi liked Bossen and his work so much that Bossen was declared an honorary Zulu.<sup>534</sup> In 1987, the new KAF representative Günther Karcher was also introduced to the chairman of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, Noel Desmond Clarence,<sup>535</sup> but the KAF played no important role in this respect. It did, however, advertise the Indaba in its publications.<sup>536</sup>

While the KAF was rather discrete in public about its support for Inkatha during the 1980s, maybe because of the confidentiality of the running programmes, this changed in July 1991, at a time when even conservative German media could no longer deny that Inkatha played an active role in the violence.<sup>537</sup> After the Inkathagate scandal had erupted (see chapter 3.3.4), the German anti-apartheid movement made the funding of Inkatha-related organisations public in July 1991. Although Josef Thesing, head of the KAF's International Institute, confirmed the funding of projects run by the Inkatha Institute, he did not comment on the amount of money transferred from

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531 Bossen, Gerd Dieter: Kurzdarstellung der politischen Lage in der Republik Südafrika und der Position Inkathas, 29.01.1986. ABI.

532 This should not imply that total objectivity is possible, and I am fully aware that my own worldviews are shaping this text. This needs, however, to be reflected at least.

533 E.g., Bossen was invited to Buthelezi's prayer breakfast (Inkatha: Fourteenth KwaZulu Prayer Breakfast: guest list, 13.03.1987. APC PC142/5/8/3).

534 Schmüdderich 1987.

535 Kane-Berman, John: Introducing Günther L. Karcher (to Desmond Clarence), 08.05.1987. APC PC142/5/8/1.

536 Karcher 1988.

537 Tillmanns 2016, 48–58.

the FRG's government via the KAF to the institute and stressed that the Inkatha Institute was legally independent. Thesing stated that no projects would be cancelled "just because somebody did some crazy things." Further, Buthelezi would be told "that of course you cannot do such things at all".<sup>538</sup>

Karcher confirmed two weeks later in August 1991 that the cooperation would continue, admitting that the institute was Inkatha's think tank and that its personnel had significant overlapping with Inkatha. It was now known to the public how much money was being transferred, that the institute had very close links to Inkatha, and that the intention of its foundation explicitly was to support Inkatha, e.g. in formulation of policy. Karcher emphasised that the KAF would now try to strengthen democratic thinking and action within Inkatha even more than before.<sup>539</sup> Cooperating with Inkatha, however, was portrayed as a bare necessity as there were no other organisations with which the KAF could have worked.<sup>540</sup> That this partnership was more than a marriage of convenience has become obvious in the paragraphs above. A year later, when the KAF was still being criticised for supporting the Inkatha Institute, KAF's Silke Krieger explained that the KAF had "very exact control" over the flow of funds and could guarantee that they were being spent as intended.<sup>541</sup>

In the beginning 1990s, when it became clear that apartheid would end and the CODESA and, later, MPNF discussions were under way, the KAF participated in the discourse on the new order and supported Inkatha's insistence on a federal order. The KAF organised various conferences and workshops that helped formulating a clearer policy on a scientific basis. It has to be noted that ANC members also par-

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538 "[...] nur weil jemand dort einige verrückte Dinge getan hat."; "daß man sowas selbstverständlich überhaupt nicht machen kann". Müller-Gerbes 1991. Also see Bundespresseamt: Adenauer-Stiftung dementiert Hilfe für Inkatha, 29.07.1991. KAF 2/201/24-0.

539 Hanf, Theodor/Hofmeier, Rolf/Mair, Stefan: Evaluierung der Aktivitäten der politischen Stiftungen in der Republik Südafrika, 04.1995. issa, 52.

540 Brandt 1991. Also see Gottwald 1991.

541 "sehr exakte Kontrolle"; Deutscher Depeschendienst: Adenauer-Stiftung unterstützt angeblich Inkatha-Partei, 14.07.1992. KAF 2/201/24-0.

ticipated here and could now take part in some of the projects run by the KAF and its partners.<sup>542</sup>

Even in 1995, four years after the Inkathagate scandal and after about ten years of intense violence in KwaZulu-Natal in which Inkatha was not just a victim, the KAF still stood by the side of Inkatha. The Inkatha Institute no longer existed and the Democracy Development Program (called ‘Institute for Federal Democracy’ for a short time) was now being supported, but even the KAF representative in Durban, Johannes Stoll, admitted that said institute mainly worked with Inkatha. Stoll justified the KAF’s support for an institute close to Inkatha – which was involved in so many violent incidents – with the following remarkable statement: “The barrier keeping people from killing [each other] is very low here [...]. This is a part of black culture”. Furthermore, Stoll added, the ANC had also killed hundreds of people<sup>543</sup> – as if one wrong cancelled out the other. The *Mail & Guardian* suspected in 1995 that the money actually was being diverted and used for paramilitary training of Inkatha supporters.<sup>544</sup> It is not known whether these claims are substantial.

During the first years of the South African democracy, a permanent constitution still needed to be drafted and negotiated. To assist Inkatha with pushing for a viable federal constitution and with writing the constitution of KwaZulu-Natal, the KAF brought in international experts on constitutional law and held several workshops on the matter, quite like it had done in the beginning of the 1990s. Ironically, though, one such expert<sup>545</sup> complained that Inkatha was throwing out all proposals by experts. During these years, Kohl still received Buthelezi, but Kohl had not backed the negotiation and election boycotts and urged Buthelezi to participate.<sup>546</sup>

542 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 1991; Priess, Frank: Zur Meldung von ddp vom 14.7.1992 zur Arbeit der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Südafrika erklärt der Pressesprecher der KAS, Frank Priess (14.07.1992). KAF 2/201/24-0; Arbeitsbereich Internationale Zusammenarbeit 1993.

543 “Die Schwelle zum Töten ist hier einfach sehr niedrig [...]. Das ist ein Teil schwarzer Kultur”. Brandt 1995.

544 *Mail & Guardian* 1995.

545 Ulrich Karpen, legal scholar and member of the Christian Democratic Union.

546 Brandt 1995; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 1996; Poppen 2006, 286–289.

Looking back on the KAF-Inkatha cooperation, KAF's Silke Krieger recalled in 1995 that the decision to support Inkatha had at first been uncontroversial and that nobody could have foreseen the violent conflict between Inkatha and the ANC (throughout which the support continued). The KAF reacted to this by organising meetings between Inkatha and ANC representatives to discuss peaceful solutions. Krieger admits that this was also due to the (strategic) interests of the FRG and Europe in the South African developments.<sup>547</sup> Frank Spengler, KAF representative in South Africa from 1991 to 1996, briefly recalled in 2002 that the KAF's work was centred around political education and transformation and, Spengler concluded, this work was successful and the KAF played an important role.<sup>548</sup> The KAF's Michael Lange even went so far as to state: "Without our financial support, it can be safely assumed that Buthelezi would have had to close down his activities."<sup>549</sup>

Spengler reviewed in 2006: "We knew that *Inkatha* was not free from violence [...], in its rivalry with ANC both sides used violence. [...] [I]n our contacts with leading personalities of the *Inkatha* movement, we always tried to have a tempering effect on their self-conduct."<sup>550</sup> This differs from the official KAF stance that violence was a result of the apartheid system and at least acknowledges that Inkatha played an active role in the violent clashes in KwaZulu and Natal. However, it is questionable how successful the KAF's interventions had been.

A more detailed review is contained in a KAF publication from 2007. It states that the KAF activities in South Africa started in 1982 and were soon centred around Inkatha (although, as we recall, this was legally not the case). What has already become obvious from the above paragraphs is confirmed by an explicit statement: "The decision to cooperate with the IFP was made on ideological and programmatic grounds. The IFP shares the foundation's Christian-hu-

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547 Krieger 1995.

548 Spengler 2002.

549 Poppen 2006, 268–269.

550 Ibid, 265. Original emphasis.

manist values.”<sup>551</sup> Termed like this, Inkatha neither was the lesser of two evils nor the only option but actually the preferred option; the KAF wanted to promote its values with the help of a like-minded partner. The document then focuses on the beginning of the 1990s, describing the IFP’s and the KAF’s involvement in the making of the new constitution(s) and claiming that today’s South African constitution was shaped by the IFP’s goals. More interesting, however, is what this document does not mention, e.g. how many times Buthelezi and Inkatha walked out of the CODESA and MPNF negotiations and how they forced concessions into the interim constitution. For the sake of political education open for all, the Democracy Development Program had been founded in 1993, the document continues. What it does not mention is why the DDP came into being after the Inkathagate scandal when the Inkatha Institute, its predecessor, was closed. Closing the paragraphs on South Africa, the document contains a vote of thanks to the KAF by Buthelezi.<sup>552</sup>

The KAF continues supporting the DDP to this day (2019), inter alia through Henning Suhr, board member of the DDP and head of the KAF’s Johannesburg office, and keeps reporting on the IFP,<sup>553</sup> but there are no mentions of any material support given to IFP-related programmes since the middle of the 1990s.<sup>554</sup>

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551 “Die Entscheidung für eine Zusammenarbeit mit IFP war jedoch vor allem inhaltlich und programmatisch begründet. IFP teilt die christlich-humanistischen Grundwerte der Stiftung.” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2007, 11.

552 Ibid. A publication from 2010, however, acknowledges the role of the Inkatha Institute by quoting Buthelezi on the KAF’s role during the 1980s; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2010, 30.

553 Dix/Glitz 06.11.2013; Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2014; Wahlers 06.11.2013; <http://ddp.org.za/about-us/our-people>, last access on 30.01.2019.

554 Thesing 1997, 176–186.

### 5.4.3 German Conservatives and Evangelicals

Buthelezi and Inkatha had good connections to some evangelical-fundamentalist<sup>555</sup> groups in Germany. This support remained largely on an ideological level, promoting Buthelezi and Inkatha in Germany. From all the available sources, it seems that this cooperation only took place during the 1980s.

Two pronouncedly evangelical institutions undertook to inform the German public about their one-sided perception of Buthelezi and Inkatha, namely the *Informationsdienst der Evangelischen Allianz* (“Information Service of the Evangelical Alliance”, idea), a news agency, and the *Offensive junger Christen* (“Offensive of young Christians”,<sup>556</sup> OjC), an evangelical movement.

The OjC proposed nominating Buthelezi for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1981 on which idea reported.<sup>557</sup> Astonishingly enough, the German Bundestag followed this request unanimously with votes from all parliamentary groups including the Greens that became very critical of Buthelezi in later years.<sup>558</sup>

During the 1980s, both idea and the OjC in its journal continued to publish on Buthelezi and Inkatha, repeating Buthelezi’s own statements,<sup>559</sup> presenting him and Inkatha as peaceful, as true representatives of all Zulus, as the only means for a non-violent transi-

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555 In the following paragraphs, these movements will be referred to simply as ‘evangelicals’ for the sake of readability as opposed to ‘protestants’ for members of the mainstream Evangelical Church in Germany. The latter had quite good relations to Buthelezi in the beginning of the 1980s, but this deteriorated due to the violence in KwaZulu and Natal. See, e.g., Hild, Helmut: Rede des Vorsitzenden des Rates der EKD [...] aus Anlaß des Besuches des Ministerräsidenten [sic] von Kwa Zulu [sic], Gatsha Buthelezi [idea-Dokumentation], 27.03.1982. issa SA B5.

556 Their official translation was ‘Reichenberg Fellowship’, named after Reichenberg castle where their headquarters were located.

557 Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: OJC schlägt Buthelezi als Friedensnobelpreisträger vor, 01.06.1981. issa SA B5.

558 Kols 1987.

559 Some speeches were translated as a whole; Buthelezi 1987; Buthelezi 1990.

tion to democracy, and stressing Buthelezi's Christian convictions.<sup>560</sup> When Buthelezi was criticised in public, idea did not publish this but it did publish Buthelezi's dementi.<sup>561</sup> Indeed, they put the blame for the violence in South Africa solely on the ANC and its allies.<sup>562</sup> This followed the obvious aim of convincing the Evangelical Church in Germany and the general public to support Buthelezi and Inkatha.<sup>563</sup>

In 1982, the Gütersloher Verlagshaus (publishing house) Gerd Mohn, a Protestant Christian publisher, produced a selection of translated speeches by Buthelezi. The volume was edited by Horst-Klaus Hofmann, leader of the OjC,<sup>564</sup> who wrote on the back of the book that these speeches were the key to understanding Buthelezi's political work. The volume is further dedicated to the MPs who proposed nominating Buthelezi for the Nobel Peace Prize. The copy that I bought at second hand further contains a sticker designating the copy as a present by the OjC. According to Inkatha's former secretary-general Sibusiso Bengu, the OjC collected money for Inkatha in the FRG.<sup>565</sup>

The OjC published on Buthelezi and Inkatha in its journal *Offensive* and welcomed him at Reichenberg castle. Articles on Buthelezi were generally positive and portrayed his view, or in one case,

560 Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Einer der bemerkenswertesten schwarzen Politiker Südafrikas in der Bundesrepublik. Gatsha Buthelezi trifft mit dem Rat der EKD zusammen, 25.03.1982. issa SA B5; Martin, Werner: Kommentar – Der Friedensprediger aus Südafrika. Ministerpräsident Gatsha Buthelezi in Deutschland, in: Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz, 29.03.1982. issa SA B5.

561 Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Buthelezi dementiert: Südafrikanische Kirchenkonferenz wurde nicht "verscheucht", 29.11.1983. issa SA B5.

562 Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Kirchen verantwortlich für das Blutbad in Südafrika, 18.07.1986. issa SA B5; Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Schwarzer Anti-Apartheid-Führer: Der ANC will keine Verhandlungen, 05.01.1987. issa SA B5.

563 Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Inkatha-Chef Buthelezi kritisiert deutsche Kirchen, 07.05.1987. issa SA B5; Informationsdienst der evangelischen Allianz: Buthelezi warnt Kirchen vor Unterstützung von Gewalt in Südafrika, 13.07.1987. issa SA B5.

564 Tripp 2015, 193.

565 Entwicklungspolitische Korrespondenz 1986, 54.

published a long article by Lawrence Schlemmer translated to German.<sup>566</sup> Nevertheless, an article by journalist Ulrich Kienzle was published in *Offensive* in 1982 that weighed both criticism and support, calling Buthelezi “a man full of contradictions who tried squaring the circle politically.”<sup>567</sup>

Part of the OjC was and still is the *Institut für Jugend und Gesellschaft* (“Institute for Youth and Society”) which sees itself as a research institution and has in recent years made headlines with ‘gay conversion therapies’.<sup>568</sup> Said institute sent Professor Henning Günther (philosopher and educationalist) and Helmut Bechheim (lawyer and political scientist) to South Africa to travel and to meet Buthelezi. Günther and Bechheim later published a very benevolent book on Buthelezi and Inkatha, calling Buthelezi a “hope for reconciliation [... and] a role model”.<sup>569</sup> In 1984, Horst-Klaus Hofmann and Hermann Klenk donated to the Inkatha Scholarship Fund in their functions as chairman and vice-chairman of the Institut für Jugend und Gesellschaft, Dhlomo reported.<sup>570</sup>

There were, however, a lot of other activists and activist groups in the FRG that did not favour Buthelezi and Inkatha. The World Council of Churches, e.g., directed funds to the German Anti-apartheid

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566 *Offensive junger Christen: Offensive* 83, 4+5: Gewaltfrei gegen Gewalt, 05.1983. issa SA B5; see also *Offensive junger Christen: Offensive* 82, 3, including: Horst-Klaus Hofmann: Schwarzer Ministerpräsident sucht in Europa Wasser und Brot für Millionen Südafrikaner, 05.-06.1982. issa SA B5; *Offensive junger Christen: Offensive* 86, 3, including: Horst-Klaus Hofmann: M. G. Buthelezi und Inkatha im Kreuzfeuer. Friedlicher Wandel trotz Straßenkampf und ‘Krieg der Köpfe’?, 05.-06.1986. issa SA B5.

567 “Ein Mann voller Widersprüche, der politisch die Quadratur des Kreises versucht.” *Offensive junger Christen: Offensive* 82, 2, including: Ulrich Kienzle: Drahtseilakt im Zululand. Gathsa [sic] Buthelezis “kooperativer Widerstand”, 03.-04.1982. issa SA B5, 52.

568 Langer/Spiegel Online 05.12.2012.

569 “Hoffnung für eine Versöhnung [... und] ein Vorbild”; Günther/Bechheim 1981, back.

570 Dhlomo, O.D.: Tenth Annual General Conference, Secretary General’s annual report, 22.-24.06.1984. CC KCM98/3/53, 9.



movement which outright rejected Inkatha, mainly for its role in the violence and its stance on sanctions.<sup>571</sup>

After 1994, interest in Buthelezi and Inkatha dwindled among the German public and among Christian groupings. The only recent mention that could be found was on the website of the catholic radio station Domradio based in Cologne where an article was published for Buthelezi's 90<sup>th</sup> birthday, but compared with the 1980s and 1990s, this article is remarkably balanced and yet critical.<sup>572</sup>

## 5.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has shown the various attempts at networking by Buthelezi and Inkatha, some more fruitful than others. Buthelezi had started joining forces with other reformist political movements in the South African Black Alliance in the late 1970s to apply pressure on the South African government and convince it of reforms (differing from the reforms that the government itself was devising). SABA was meant to be inclusive, reaching out to all Blacks that preferred openly visible, non-violent resistance. It surely was no coincidence that SABA was founded a few months after Biko's death and the banning of the Black Consciousness Movement; Buthelezi tried to inherit a movement to which relations had been mixed.<sup>573</sup>

This coalition, however, did not succeed in pushing for reforms and splintered when one of its members decided to participate in the tricameral parliament. Buthelezi had turned to other allies well before that split, namely to the scientific community of Natal which had had strong liberal currents for decades.<sup>574</sup> At a time when many

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571 World Council of Churches 1980; Anti-Apartheid-Bewegung 1990; Zwick 1987; Bacia/Leidig 2008, 275–276.

572 Schönherr 27.08.2018.

573 See, e.g., a booklet that was edited by Biko and contained a text by Buthelezi: Biko 1972. Translated to German: Biko 1977.

574 For liberal academics, see Guest 2015; Guest 2017; for the Liberal Party's Natal wing, see Vigne 1997; for the importance of Biko and Turner for the University of Natal, see Macqueen 2018.

others were also looking for a new constitution,<sup>575</sup> Buthelezi turned to Natal's academics to devise a new constitution on a scientific, empirical basis. At the time, thus, many different futures were competing for realisation and the South African government had to choose which one to realise under pressure and with support by the ones who had imagined the respective future. Contingency, therefore, is not only an analytical category by the historian looking back, but it was observed by the contemporaries: The future seemed uncertain and it was not clear where South Africa's path would lead to – this opened up possibilities to influence the development of South Africa and the contemporaries wanted to seize the opportunity to do so. This is what we have called management of contingency, making productive use of uncertainty.

The Buthelezi Commission's approach of realising the desired future was through plans that were scientifically proven to be adequate. Concrete plans were made for a rather near and predictable future on legal and administrative matters, leaving the distant future vague. The proposals that were eventually agreed on would only have caused slow and limited change to appease Whites' political and material interests but at the same time to gain at least some improvements for Blacks. Choosing a near future and slow change, this not only managed but also reduced contingency for the contemporaries if realised, preventing rapid change and limiting the possibilities of future events.

Buthelezi and the commissioners believed to be doing something radically new, or at least they told the public so. The size of the commission and its empirical basis surely made it stand out, but especially from a praxeological perspective, the notion of being entirely new has to be limited. The Buthelezi Commission worked like many other commissions and group research projects: Experts gathered in plenary sessions, split up into expert groups where they discussed their specific topics on a scientific basis and maybe conducted additional research, and then reported back to the plenary sessions. The empirical foundation made it possible to imagine future(s) in detail. The Bu-

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575 Commissions/reports by Lombard, Quail, Schlebusch, Du Preez, and a few years earlier SPRO-CAS, to name only the most important ones.

thelezi Commission's proposals, on the other hand, were not radically different from previous proposals in the discourse on a new constitutional order. While the commissioners intended to break structures and routines, they were actually confined to these. The similarities to other commissions and reports are not surprising given the fact that the commissioners analysed them and invited some scientists who had served on earlier commissions. Even more, Buthelezi and Schlemmer – the latter prepared and organised the commission – had both been part of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS)<sup>576</sup> and surely their experiences influenced the Buthelezi Commission. In 1974, Buthelezi and Harry Schwarz of the United Party signed the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith, striving for a committee that was to devise a new federal constitution and for improvements in education and development, quite similar to what was to come.<sup>577</sup>

The commission's report, though, was not accepted by the South African government and not even by the New Republic Party which was governing Natal, leading to a deterioration in relations between KwaZulu and Natal that would take years to heal. As Buthelezi's alliance with liberal scientists had not induced change, he turned to yet another ally that had already played a (minor) role in the Buthelezi Commission: big business. Looking at structures, personnel, and contents, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba was a sequel to the Buthelezi Commission with a different arrangement of roles. While scientists and politicians still participated, it largely was big business that bargained for a constitutional proposal. This was not about scientific justification, although scientists managed to stop proposals that they deemed inadequate, but about what all could agree on and could be 'sold' to the public through the authority of the participating experts. Again, the focus was on the near future that was imagined as peaceful and capitalist, protecting individuals and groups (attempting to fulfil two demands at once). As change would inevitably be slow, contingency was again reduced, primarily for Whites and for everybody who had

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576 Randall 1973, 113–116.

577 Karis/Gerhart 1997, 262.

something (material) to lose. The delegates almost reached a consensus, only thwarted by Afrikaner participants who were close to the Broederbond and the NP. Ironically, one can say that the NP in effect prevented consensus and then complained that no consensus had been reached.

Contemporaries accused the Indaba's delegates of just repeating what Buthelezi demanded, but as we have seen, the Indaba proposals were culturally more conservative and economically more liberal than everything Buthelezi and Inkatha ever demanded at the time. Its participants evoked the 'spirit' of the Indaba, meaning that people from different backgrounds finally started talking to each other, and turned the Indaba into a long-running advertising campaign for its proposals. But the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation, funded by big business, not only promoted a start into a different future in the forms of the Indaba proposals, it also maintained an international network that applied pressure on the South African government together with the business community. It also carried the 'spirit' of the Indaba forward by bringing young people together for conference weekends to discuss political events and to overcome the barriers of apartheid. Education programmes further helped underprivileged students. Thus, one can say, the Indaba Foundation lived the society it wanted to create. In the end, the South African government finally agreed to find a way of implementing the Indaba proposals, but it was too late since the national developments of 1990 had taken a different course.

Throughout the 1980s, Buthelezi and Inkatha had stayed in touch with the Progressive Federal Party which also had sent delegates to the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba. Informal contacts had been established in 1976 and a common steering committee was established in 1980 to coordinate joint action.<sup>578</sup> Relations were not free from conflict, however; especially the increasing violence in KwaZulu and Natal harmed them.<sup>579</sup> After the Prohibition of Political Interference Act<sup>580</sup> was repealed in 1985, there even were talks of an

578 Ibid, 269; Gordon 1981, 50; Maré/Hamilton 1987, 172.

579 Cooper, et al. 1986, 311–312.

580 This act had prohibited parties from recruiting supporters of different groups as defined by apartheid and led, inter alia, to the dissolution of the Liberal Party.

official alliance between the PFP and Inkatha with the PFP suggesting that Inkatha members should join the PFP.<sup>581</sup>

Behind all this, as a nexus for this network of politicians, scientists, and business representatives, stood the Inkatha Institute that organised the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba. It also helped Inkatha on policy matters as the intellectual support it needed to compete with the ANC and the NP; after all, as Oscar Dhlomo put it, the South African government should be presented alternatives to its policies or, to put it bluntly, to be told what to do.<sup>582</sup> The institute also acquired funds for scientific projects, education, and self-help programmes that helped the people at grassroots level. To Inkatha supporters (who were the main beneficiaries), this showed that Buthelezi's and Inkatha's strategy of working within the system achieved material improvements. The scientific endeavours of the Buthelezi Commission, the Inkatha Institute, of Schlemmer's Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, and the Indaba Foundation's opinion surveys were part of a general tendency during the 1980s of collecting data, or how Ari Sitas called it, "Durban's positivist heaven".<sup>583</sup>

Some improvements were also realised by the Joint Executive Authority, the only practical result of the many proposals of cooperation, but this was very limited. Nevertheless, like all the networking activities, it fostered mutual understanding of people divided by apartheid and applied internal pressure on the South African government. This networking activity, however, created new contingencies: For once, it showed that change was thinkable and possible, also in a peaceful way, opening up new possibilities for action directed at the future. Furthermore, nobody could actually know what would come of the proposals if implemented. Resistance to Inkatha and this network, also in the form of violent action, made political structures even more fragile.

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Inkatha, however, officially was not a party but a cultural movement; this way, it could also accept other Africans amongst its members.

581 Weekend Argus Correspondent 1985.

582 Cooper, et al. 1989, 667.

583 Sitas 1986, 93.

Most of these activities seem to have ceased in the beginning of the 1990s when the fight for territory was dominating KwaZulu and Natal. Nevertheless, Inkatha still proposed new constitutions with the help of the KAF.<sup>584</sup>

The last sub-chapter has shown the proximity of the KAF and Inkatha. Although through the 1980s it had often been claimed that Inkatha was the *only* option (hardly imaginable in such a diverse country) and supporting it was a bare necessity, the two organisations actually were a lot closer. What the cited KAF document from 2007 revealed to the public – namely that the support for Inkatha was based on ideological and programmatic proximity – had already become obvious through the KAF's applications for development programmes. But as they were treated confidentially and remained inaccessible for 30 years, the political opposition could only make educated guesses about the real motivation behind this cooperation. The claim that Inkatha's development into a partly violent organisation could not be foreseen in the beginning of the 1980s from a European perspective surely has some validity, but as we have seen earlier, there had been indications of such tendencies that demanded a serious reflection on this matter.

Throughout the 1980s, the KAF was regularly challenged by accusations of supporting a violent organisation which it denied. This was done by bringing forth arguments that violence was originating from the violent apartheid system and that they were not supporting Inkatha but the legally separate Inkatha Institute. In times of increasing pressure and an abundance of reports on violent actions committed by Inkatha members, the KAF retreated from this position and argued that it was working to pacify and democratise Inkatha. Frank Spengler reviewed this as having been successful. In my opinion, however, it is questionable how successful these efforts have been during the roughly 15 years of KAF-Inkatha cooperation because, to put it bluntly, violence and autocratic behaviour rather got worse than better. One has to concede, at least, that the KAF was very persevering in this matter.

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584 Haas/Zulu 1994, 434.

All three sides involved in this cooperation – KAF, the FRG's government, and Inkatha – pursued their strategic interests. The German side, KAF and government alike, intended to keep communism and the influence of the Soviet Union at bay in South Africa in the context of the Cold War. Furthermore, they wanted to safeguard free enterprise in South Africa because of German investments and business interests;<sup>585</sup> keeping the supply of raw material flowing was also important for the German industry. The FRG additionally wanted to gain and keep a reputation as a mediator in conflict. One aspect has to be added in regard to Franz Josef Strauß<sup>586</sup> (whose party friend Warnke controlled the relevant ministry) who was a declared friend of the Afrikaners and feared for their survival in a majority system, especially so in respect to the Afrikaners of German descent. This, however, led to a confrontation with the liberal Genscher who deemed democratisation as more important.<sup>587</sup> Both the FRG's government and the KAF followed this line although differing nuances were possible as we have seen: Warnke mostly understood development as economic development so Africans would see the West as a helping hand, while the KAF also intended to educate Africans on the benefits of free enterprise and the KAF's understanding of democracy.<sup>588</sup> It also seems that the government made (somewhat) more realistic assessments of Buthelezi and Inkatha than the KAF did. It should not be forgotten, of course, that the KAF was generally close to the CDU and that the German chancellor himself, Helmut Kohl, was a KAF board member.<sup>589</sup>

For Buthelezi and Inkatha, the connection to Germany offered several benefits. On the one hand, Buthelezi could present himself as an important and respected leader and statesman, being received

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585 South Africa was the third-biggest export market for the FRG where industrial giants benefitted from cheap labour.

586 Strauß also visited Buthelezi in Ulundi (Buthelezi, M. G.: A Few Remarks on the Occasion of a Visit to Ulundi by Dr. Franz-Josef Strauss, 25.01.1987/1988? EGM N968.300994 BUT.

587 Poppen 2006, 252–254.

588 Kraft/Krieger/Deussen 1982; Thesing/Krieger/Jung 1991; Thesing 1996.

589 Poppen 2006, 263.

by even the chancellor and the president who declared their moral support.<sup>590</sup> This form, however, was not unique to the FRG as many (conservative) governments offered him warm welcomes; the numerous photos of Buthelezi and international heads of states were even presented to visitors at his office.<sup>591</sup> The financial support for self-help and education programmes run by the Inkatha Institute further showed that his strategy was working: Operating within the system actually allowed him to achieve improvements for ‘his’ people and showed that change could be achieved without violence.

To this end, Buthelezi adapted his speeches and memoranda to his counterpart. Buthelezi and his advisors were fully aware who should be approached for what, including not only the different government members but also business and church representatives. Buthelezi wanted to convince the business community of investments, the KAF and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation of more development programmes, and the Foreign Office and the Chancellor of becoming active and turning against the ANC. To this end, Buthelezi applied a method that was common during the 1980s in South Africa especially among reformers: He claimed to work without ideology and based on common sense: “In this camp there is a recognition that ideologies are luxuries we just cannot afford. Dire necessity dictates that the free enterprise system be unshackled from its apartheid shackles [ . . . A] multi-party democracy in which politics and economics are synthesised is prescribed by the need for economic development”.<sup>592</sup> This also demands involvement of the business community and depoliticises the causes of poverty to some extent (naming a lack of economic development instead of apartheid and exploitation as reasons). Even if one supported segregation in cultural terms, it was possible to agree to Buthelezi’s stance. In other contexts, however, Buthelezi

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590 Buthelezi made this explicit when he returned to South Africa (Deutsche Botschaft Pretoria: Reaktionen Buthelezis nach Rückkehr (an Auswärtiges Amt)), 26.02.1986. BArch B 213/30371).

591 de Kock 1986, 38.

592 Buthelezi, M.G.: A few remarks on the occasion of a meeting with the press, commerce and industry under the chairmanship of Mr. Robert von Lucius of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt, 17.02.1986. HPD A1045, 2.



spoke about apartheid a lot more critically, but he surely was careful with conservative Whites.

He convinced the KAF and the FRG's conservative government that he was one of the most important black leaders, but he even convinced the more critical von Weizsäcker of being the legitimate leader of all Zulus.<sup>593</sup> The CDU's Secretary-General Heiner Geißler was also very convinced, stating that Buthelezi should become president.<sup>594</sup> Due to his convincing appearances and the ideological proximity, several development programmes especially for rural regions (where Inkatha's power base lay) were granted that benefitted Inkatha (which the FRG's government admitted although direct support was not granted<sup>595</sup>). In the beginning of the 1990s, however, Kohl no longer backed Buthelezi unconditionally, urging him to participate in the negotiations and elections, so this time, Buthelezi returned with empty hands from Germany. Nevertheless, the KAF and the FRG continued their material support for a few years and the KAF remained in touch with Buthelezi and Inkatha well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

All actors in this sub-chapter realised that possibilities for intended change had arisen. The KAF and the FRG's government especially wanted to involve themselves to advocate the interests of the West – they realised that the chance of changing South Africa in their interests came with the risk of losing it to the Soviet bloc. Therefore, their actions were directed at the future they imagined: a federal, democratic, capitalist South Africa with a welfare state – to some extent based on Germany. While others opted for a revolution, they attempted to realise their goals in small steps, i.e. through gradual improvements in politics and the economy.

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593 Weizsäcker, Richard von: Brief an Albrecht Dihle, 05.03.1986. BArch B 122/37180.

594 Schmüdderich 1987.

595 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 11/4545 – Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 8. Mai 1989 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 12.05.1989. BT 11/4545, 4–5.



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## 6. Conclusion

In the beginning of this thesis, I outlined the general question that emanated from the Research Training Group which I was part of. Applied to my topic, I asked whether and how Buthelezi, other Inkatha leaders and members, and their allies perceived contingency, how they reacted to it, and how they managed contingency in a constructive way – as action directed at the future (“Zukunftshandeln”).

We have seen multiple, explicit examples of Buthelezi and his contemporaries perceiving contingency. They witnessed already during the 1970s that the apartheid state was not as strong as it had been before, especially during the Durban strikes, the Soweto riots, and in its inability to make the homeland system work. Buthelezi and his allies realised that the apartheid of old style could not be continued and something new would take its place. To avoid things turning worse from their point of view – destruction, anarchy, a communist revolution, a civil war – they took the initiative to spearhead change from within and from above. Because a political alliance alone (the South African Black Alliance) and statements together with other homeland leaders had not worked, they turned to the scientific and the business community to apply pressure on the government with better arguments than before.

In the case of the Buthelezi Commission, the arguments were based on scientific findings that also played a role in the KwaZulu Natal Indaba which was, however, more a product of a consensus or compromise between representatives from many groups and organisations led by the business community. In the first case, Buthelezi and his allies could ‘prove’ scientifically that the government’s policy was wrong while they could point to the (seemingly) only possible consensus from inside the country that would not overthrow the state in the second case.

In the Joint Executive Authority, KwaZulu and Natal attempted to show the government that cooperation between Blacks and Whites could work and would actually improve the situation for all concerned people. The FRG also lobbied for Buthelezi and Inkatha among the common people through development projects and among

representatives of the South African government. Nevertheless, the South African government under P.W. Botha never took Inkatha's side in these matters. It was only under F.W. de Klerk that the government actually moved closer to Buthelezi and his demands when future developments had become increasingly uncertain, but once the national negotiations had started, this was aborted, and it seems that Buthelezi and Inkatha had run out of ideas for further initiatives. Once the *Inkathagate* scandal and the training of Inkatha fighters at the Caprivi strip (*Operation Marion*) had become public, a real alliance between the government and Inkatha had become impossible, even though parts of the security apparatus still cooperated with Inkatha fighters against the ANC alliance.

Simultaneously, Buthelezi and Inkatha were working inside KwaZulu under the keyword *development* which had become more important than ever in turbulent times when order needed to be restored. In their multi-strategy approach for liberation, development was to liberate Blacks on all fields. In education and culture, Zulus were on one hand urged to 'return' to traditional values (including the respect for traditional leaders) as means against a changing society through migrant labour and urbanisation and as means for nation-building. On the other hand, vocational training was to empower Zulus to become skilled labourers and/or successful entrepreneurs to earn their share in the capitalist economy. Not only was this meant to lead to a higher standard of living, it was also a measure of safeguarding the capitalist economy itself against a socialist revolution. If more people profited from the economic status quo, more people would defend it. Additionally, the economic development of KwaZulu was heavily subsidised by the KwaZulu government through the KDC/KFC, creating new jobs for Zulus but also offering safer conditions to the allies in the business community. While Buthelezi and Inkatha managed contingency, it was to be reduced for the business community to promote investments.

It has often been said that Inkatha and the ANC followed the same aim, namely the abolishment of apartheid. While this is certainly true, they differed on the question what was to be *instead of* apartheid. The ANC wanted – at least officially – to overthrow the apartheid state and create a new state and a new society based on revolutionary

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ideals. Buthelezi and Inkatha, however, wanted to abolish apartheid, but they did not want to abolish the state. They envisioned a capitalist economy, a society with respect for conservative values and authorities, and power-sharing mechanisms that would reform the state from within through compromise. While the ANC fought against the state and ultimately negotiated a settlement, Buthelezi and Inkatha wanted to skip fighting and start the negotiations right away.

To realise their envisioned future (and to avert other futures), they formed alliances, commissioned research, negotiated, and enacted the kind of development leading to the realisation of their desired future inside KwaZulu – at least as far as possible. Limited funding severely inhibited the KwaZulu government's plans for development of both the economy and the society, even though additional funds were acquired from the business community that in return got more badly needed skilled labourers and a safer environment. The FRG participated in these endeavours on behalf of the German economy out of the same economic interests that would have been infringed by a socialist revolution.

The ugly side of history should not be forgotten. The change of the 1980s and the uncertainty that came along with it allowed violence in the fight for territory, but also for resources, to spread. These fights created new contingencies that had to be coped with and led to an increasing level of uncertainty and anxiety about the future. Inkatha reacted to the increasing activities of the ANC alliance with countermeasures that led to a spiral of violence in which no side remained innocent – apart from the numerous civilians, of course, who were not spared. These fights can also be understood as action directed at the future, but in a destructive way: They were meant to prevent the other side from realising their envisioned future.

I conclude that Buthelezi and his allies indeed perceived the contingency of the 1980s and managed it as far as they could. They entered a vicious cycle of violence, often colluding with the state. This, combined with Buthelezi and Inkatha governing the homeland of KwaZulu, led to a wide perception of them as government stooges, even more so in the late 1980s and beginning 1990s when collaboration was obvious. Because of what we have seen in this thesis, I argue

that Buthelezi was by no means a government stooge and clearly followed his own agenda of development and reform. He was, however, open for compromise and pragmatically took what he could get from the state, even from its security apparatus.

Buthelezi's open criticism and his plans differing from government policy had earned him a reasonable reputation during the 1970s under John Vorster as an inconvenient homeland leader (which he remained to be during the 1980s, as we have seen) and a member of the liberation struggle. After the break with the ANC, his aspirations of becoming a nationwide black leader were curbed and he turned to his constituency in KwaZulu and to all Zulus, where possible. But his other policies focusing on development and negotiation had been in place during the 1970s and remained so during the 1980s with only minor alterations.

This posed a problem to Buthelezi when P. W. Botha came to power who introduced reform apartheid. Botha cooperated with experts and with the business community to improve the living conditions of Blacks through development. This, coupled with cautionary measures of power-sharing, was meant to pacify Blacks and to put the apartheid state on a broader supportive basis. This was *practically* the same as Buthelezi did, albeit with differing intentions. Buthelezi and Botha were seen *doing* the same thing, thus Buthelezi was no longer seen as a real alternative to the apartheid government by many, no matter how often he challenged the government to introduce further reforms and release Nelson Mandela. Inside KwaZulu, Buthelezi and Inkatha could to some extent deliver improvements to their constituency, but not in the rest of the country where Inkatha support dwindled. But even inside KwaZulu, the police could be seen upholding the same law and order as the South African Police did. After all, Buthelezi and Botha were both working through the state's institutions.

We have seen examples of Inkatha members joining out of a desire for peace and order and out of economic incentives that no other organisation could provide in KwaZulu. Although Buthelezi repeatedly invoked a unified Zulu nation around himself and the king, many monarchists actually resented Buthelezi's rule and opted for a stronger, executive king. In this light, it is likely that a relevant number

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of Inkatha supporters joined Inkatha as long as they profited from it and not on ideological grounds. This also explains the demise of Inkatha after 1994 when others, especially the ANC-led central state and from 2004 the ANC-led province of KwaZulu-Natal, could be approached for material support and for law and order.

This has already brought up the praxeological approach of this thesis. We have seen that many people and groups demanded democratisation and power-sharing which often sounded quite similar – even P. W. Botha spoke of introducing power-sharing through the tricameral parliament and other measures. In a broad outline, the plans of the apartheid government and the demands made by the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (both became Inkatha policy) did not differ radically (and the government even copied large parts of the Indaba proposals for their CODESA submission). Although their intentions differed, Buthelezi and Botha demanded quite similar reforms and could be seen doing the same things, but no huge improvements were delivered because Buthelezi could not introduce them and Botha only paid lip service. Also from a praxeological perspective, one has to realise that Buthelezi's demands for democratisation and Inkatha's increasingly autocratic and undemocratic behaviour were incongruent – for many contemporaries, Inkatha was an oppressor like the apartheid government was.

One can break it down to one question: If these leaders, their organisations, and their allies were doing what they had always been doing and what the others were doing, where should change have come from? It seems logical that many contemporaries turned to other leaders that were behaving differently and also offered a completely different ideology.

Although development was fostered in many respects as a means for liberation, this was hardly enough. Buthelezi's and Inkatha's multi-strategy approach to liberation from apartheid on the path to their envisioned future was consistent in itself and genuinely pursued – and violently defended. Of course, Buthelezi would have been a national leader in his envisioned future. In the end, the apartheid state under Botha had in *practice* moved so close to Buthelezi that others took the lead in the liberation struggle.





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## 7. Abbreviations

ANC	– African National Congress
AZASO	– Azanian Students' Organisation
BCM	– Black Consciousness Movement
CED	– Corporation for Economic Development
CODESA	– Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	– Congress of South African Trade Unions
FOSATU	– Federation of South African Trade Unions
FRG	– Federal Republic of Germany
IFP	– Inkatha Freedom Party
IWB	– Inkatha Women's Brigade
IYB	– Inkatha Youth Brigade
JEA	– Joint Executive Authority
KAF	– Konrad Adenauer Foundation
KDC	– KwaZulu Development Corporation
KFC	– KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation
KLA	– KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
KTT	– KwaZulu Training Trust
KZN	– KwaZulu-Natal
LP	– Labour Party
MPNF	– Multi-Party Negotiation Forum
NP	– National Party
NPC	– Natal Provincial Council
NPEC	– Natal Provincial Executive Committee
NRP	– New Republic Party
PAC	– Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
PFP	– Progressive Federal Party
RP	– Reform Party
SADF	– South African Defence Force
SAP	– South African Police
UDF	– United Democratic Front
YSC	– Youth Service Corps



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## 10. Literature

The differentiation between literature and sources provided difficult and needs a few explaining words. Much of the literature on Buthelezi, Inkatha, and especially on the violence in KwaZulu and Natal was written by political and social scientists in the period that this thesis covers. They are treated as sources in the analysis above and therefore not listed here but in the following chapter. Later literature by political and social scientists, when they were mostly working historically, is listed here, however, together with accounts by historians – with the exception of those texts that are treated as sources in the context of the KwaZulu Monuments Council and of the defamations by *Ilanga* newspaper. On rare occasions, some authors appear in both lists, here with their texts after 1994 and below with their texts before 1994 for the sake of coherency.

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- Amafa / Heritage KwaZulu Natali, Pietermaritzburg (*Amafa*)
- Archive for Contemporary Affairs, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein (*ARCA*)<sup>1</sup>
- Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, University of Freiburg, Freiburg i.Br. (*ABI*)
- Bundestag, Web Archive (<http://pdok.bundestag.de>; *BT*)
- Campbell Collections, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (*CC*)
- Cecil Renaud (Main) Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg (*CR*)
- Documentation Centre for African Studies, University of South Africa, Pretoria (*DocAfr*)
- Durban Archives Repository (*DAR*)
- EG Malherbe Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (including Special Collections) (*EGM*)
- Federal Archive, Koblenz (Bundesarchiv Koblenz; *BArch*)
- Historical Archive of the Archdiocese of Cologne (Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln, Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax; *AEK, DBK, JuPa*)
- Historical Papers Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (*HPD*)
- Informationsstelle südliches Afrika, Bonn (*issa*)
- Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Press and Media Archive (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Presse- und Medienarchiv; *KAF*)
- Law Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg (*LL*)

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<sup>1</sup> I did not visit this archive in person because the document in question was missing. My thanks go to Adam Houldsworth for providing me with a copy of said document.

- Life Sciences Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg (*LSL*)
- Main Library, University of South Africa, Pretoria (including Compactus Government Publications and Compactus Periodicals) (*UNISA Libr*)
- National Library of South Africa, Pretoria (*NLSA*)
- Private Collection of Lynn Oakley (*LO*)
- South African History Archive, Johannesburg (*SAHA*)

Sources from these archives and libraries are not listed here due to their sheer number; detailed information is instead given when they are cited.

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### 13. Annexure: Biographic Notes

**Clarence**, Noel Desmond: Clarence was born in 1921 in Pietermaritzburg, educated at Merchiston Preparatory School and Maritzburg College. After his first degree (Bachelor of Science) from UNISA, he served in the Special Signals Services in WW2 from 1941 to 1945. He then returned to academic education, receiving a University Education Diploma and a Master of Science from the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, in 1947, a further Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts from Cambridge University in 1949 and a PhD from the University of Natal in 1955. He joined the Department of Physics in 1949 where he became lecturer in Experimental Physics and in professor of Physics (specialising on lightning, atmospheric, radio propagation, and magnetospheric and space physics) in Durban and later Head of Department until 1977. He was vice-principal of the Durban campus from 1974 to 1977 until he became vice-chancellor and principal of the University of Natal from which he retired in 1984.<sup>1</sup>

After his retirement, he was chairman of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba (including the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation) from 1986 to 1988. He furthermore became chairman of the council of Mangosuthu Technikon and also served on the council of the University of Zululand. The South African Marine Biological Research Association elected him as president and he advised the Magnetic Observatory in Hermanus.<sup>2</sup>

It seems that he was not only a distinguished researcher but also a respected teacher and leader caring for students and colleagues. He accepted the challenges of change and set the University of Natal on a successful course of growth and expertise. In his private life, he was a happy husband and father of three children. He enjoyed woodworking, growing vegetables hydroponically and also being a do-it-yourself homeowner. Clarence died in 1995.<sup>3</sup>

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1 Clarence, N. D.: CV. APC PC142/8/12/2; Guest 2017, 45, 404; Walker 1995, 84.

2 Clarence, N. D.: CV. APC PC142/8/12/2; Walker 1995, 84–85.

3 Ibid, 85–86.

**Dhlomo**, Oscar Dumisani: Dhlomo was born on 28 December 1943 in Umbumbulu near Durban where he attended school and matriculated from Amanzimtoti College (formerly called Adams College) in 1962. He then attended the University of Zululand, earning his Bachelor's degree in 1965 in history and social anthropology and a diploma in university education in 1967. During this time, he became active in students' politics. Afterwards, he taught history to pupils at Menzi High School, Umlazi, and to local teachers while obtaining a degree in history himself (in 1970). In 1973, he received a Bachelor of Education degree in history and became headmaster of KwaShaka High School, Umlazi. He then became lecturer in didactics (specialising on history) in 1974, receiving his Master of Education in 1975. In 1977, he received a British Council Scholarship and the Ernest Oppenheimer University Travelling Fellowship, allowing him to visit the UK, the USA, and some African countries for his degree as Doctor of Education which he finished in 1980 at UNISA. Also in 1977, he became active in politics, becoming elected to the KLA as member for Umbumbulu wanting to support Buthelezi in his struggle against homeland independence, becoming Minister of Education & Culture as well as Secretary-General of Inkatha in 1978, succeeding Prof S.M. Bhengu. Dhlomo was active as vice-president of the KwaZulu Monuments Council and as chairman of the board of directors of the KwaZulu Training Trust. As Minister of Education & Culture, Dhlomo was responsible for the introduction of the Inkatha Syllabus (and the school subject called Inkatha), later called Ubuntu-Botho (officially translated as 'Good Citizenship'). He represented Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government on the Buthelezi Commission, serving on the Central Working Group and the Education Working Group; also for the Buthelezi Commission, he wrote papers and supplied data from the KwaZulu Government. He later represented the KwaZulu Government at the KwaZulu Natal Indaba and became chairman of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba Foundation in 1988 after the resignation of Noel Desmond Clarence, in this capacity also negotiating with the South African Government. He also was vice-chairman of the Joint Executive Authority.<sup>4</sup>

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4 Dr Oscar Dhlomo Foundation 2017; Gastrow 1987, 71–74; Joyce 1999, 72;

Apart from his work in education and politics, Dhlomo also was a businessman, being Managing Director of Manda-Matla, the company that brought the Ilanga newspaper under Inkatha control. He further founded an investment company (OD Investments) and served on the boards of Rembrandt, Standard Bank, Shell, Anglovaal and the Development Bank of South Africa.<sup>5</sup>

Dhlomo resigned from all offices in politics on 31 May 1990, officially to have more time for his family and his business activities, but rumour had it that this was the result of a struggle between Buthelezi and Dhlomo. Through the JEA, Dhlomo had shifted competences away from the KLA, which supposedly enraged Buthelezi who then wanted Dhlomo to leave. Dhlomo, on the other hand, supposedly saw no future for himself as an Inkatha member in a democratic South Africa. After his retirement from politics, Dhlomo founded the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and remained active as a businessman, among his recreational activities were spending time with his wife, children and grandchildren, listening to classical music, reading, playing and watching football/soccer, being a supporter of Manchester United. Dhlomo died on 29 August 2008.<sup>6</sup>

**Felgate**, Walter Sidney: Felgate was born in Pretoria in 1930, was educated at Pretoria Boys High School, finishing in 1949, and received a degree in Social Anthropology in 1959. In the following years, Felgate conducted research for the Institute for Social Research in Tongaland and for the University of Lourenco Marques in Southern Mozambique. After his return, he lectured at Rhodes University for three years and then conducted research for the Chamber of Mines for another three years. When he became African Affairs Adviser for Rio Tinto in the 1970s, he got in closer touch with Beyers Naudé and Buthelezi. When acting as a lay preacher already in the 1950s, Felgate began questioning Apartheid and joined the Liberal Party. During the

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Masemola 2008.

5 Dr Oscar Dhlomo Foundation 2017; Gastrow 1987, 71–74; Joyce 1999, 72; Masemola 2008.

6 Cape Times 1990; City Press 1990; Dr Oscar Dhlomo Foundation 2017; Gastrow 1987, 71–74; Joyce 1999, 72; Masemola 2008.

1970s, Felgate was associated to the Black People's Convention and the African National Congress before parting with Tambo after the 1979/80 ANC-Inkatha split. He had become speech-writer and advisor for Buthelezi in the mid-1970s and remained on Buthelezi's side after the split, although Felgate broke ties with Inkatha for a while in 1980/81 due to Buthelezi becoming increasingly autocratic, as Felgate later stated. In 1981, he returned to Inkatha, persuaded by Dhlo-mo. After party legislation was changed in 1990, Felgate was the first White to join the Inkatha Freedom Party and soon became member of the Central and Executive Committees. During the CODESA talks, Felgate was the chief negotiator for the IFP until the IFP abandoned the negotiations. In 1994, Felgate became a member of the National Assembly for the IFP until 1997/1998 when he joined the ANC and later became a member of KwaZulu-Natal's provincial legislature. Felgate was known as a tough negotiator, productive advisor and writer, and sometimes referred to as *Rumpelstiltskin* (Rumpelstilzchen) due to his stern, sober character.<sup>7</sup>

In an interview in 1996, Felgate stated that his motivation to become involved in politics stemmed from personal observations of the cruel Apartheid system and an affinity to the workers on his parents' farm and to rural Africans in general. When his white church congregation became increasingly politicised, he left for an Indian community and joined the Liberal Party to oppose the Apartheid system.<sup>8</sup>

Felgate's critics accused him of being responsible for Buthelezi's tough line on negotiations, boycotting the Multi-Party Negotiation Process and not wanting to participate in the 1994 elections – therefore making Felgate responsible for at least some of the bloodshed that occurred during these years. Allegations were even made of a collusion with right-wing intelligence agents.<sup>9</sup> After leaving the IFP, Felgate spoke in front of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, accusing Buthelezi of cooperating with the Bureau of State Security, receiving monthly briefings of BOSS and supporting the Operation

7 Carlin 1993; Frost 1996, 58–62; Helen Suzman Foundation 1998; Joyce 1999, 88; O'Malley Archive ca. 2018.

8 Frost 1996, 58–62.

9 Carlin 1993; Frost 1996, 60.



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Marion at the Caprivi Strip (see chapter 3.3.4).<sup>10</sup> Felgate died on 03 January 2008.<sup>11</sup>

**Heunis, Jan Christiaan “Chris”:** Born on 20 April 1929 in Uniondale, he matriculated from Outeniqua High School, George, in 1943 and studied Law at the University of Stellenbosch, receiving his LL.B. in 1948. At Stellenbosch, he was active in students’ politics as the chairman of Stellenbosch’s National Party Youth Branch. From 1951 he practised as an attorney, became the NP’s district leader and was elected to George’s town council. He then was elected to the Cape Provincial Council in 1959, becoming its vice-chairman in 1965. In 1970, he was elected as a Member of Parliament for False Bay, holding various ministerial offices from 1972. The Commission for Investigation into the Constitution was devising a new constitution (the tricameral parliament) for South Africa that Heunis, being the commission’s deputy chairman from 1979, had a huge influence on. Accordingly, he was appointed Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning in 1982, being given a large authority on the structure of government on national, provincial, and municipal level as well as on economic, scientific and physical planning. In this function as Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, being part of the NP’s reformist wing, Heunis played a key role in reshaping provincial politics (including the abolition of the Provincial Councils and the introduction of the Regional Service Councils) and was the contact person for delegates of the Buthelezi Commission (from 1982) and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba. He succeeded P. W. Botha as the leader of the NP in the Cape and was a candidate for becoming his successor as president, but lost against F. W. de Klerk and then retired from politics and working as a lawyer. Heunis died in 2006.<sup>12</sup>

**Koornhof, Pieter Gerhardus Jacobus “Piet”:** Born on 02 August 1925 at Leeudoornstad, he was educated at Sentraal High School, Bloemfontein, where he met his future wife Lulu. At Stellenbosch Univer-

10 South African Press Association 27.11.1998.

11 Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 2008.

12 Gastrow 1987, 116–118; Joyce 1999, 115; Mail & Guardian 2006.

sity, Koornhof studied Theology and then went to Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar where he had close ties to a Pakistani and a West African. There he received a PhD in Social Anthropology with a study on 'The Drift from the Reserves among the South African Bantu' – a study which, in opposition to National Party politics, accepted black urbanisation. He applied at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, where it was feared he would be too left-wing for Rhodes University. Instead, he became researcher in Verwoerd's Bantu Affairs Department in 1953. He was also active as general/chief secretary of the Broederbond and in the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge. Koornhof was elected to parliament in 1964 and was appointed deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, National Education and Immigration, being promoted to Minister of Sport and Recreation, Mines and Immigration in 1972. As a minister, Koornhof – an apartheid opponent – played a very contradictory role. On one hand, he relaxed apartheid regulations in sport, allowing more mixed teams and competitions, and after becoming Minister of Plural Relations and Development in 1978 spoke out against passes for Blacks and declared Apartheid dead when speaking to the Washington Press Association. He also accepted the fact that many Blacks were permanently residing outside the Homelands and promised to improve the situation in the townships and let the township residents handle their own affairs which clearly contradicted apartheid policy. On the other hand, he introduced the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons bill which increased arrests due to pass law violations drastically. He became chairman of the President's Council in 1984 and South African ambassador to the USA in 1987 until he retired in 1991. Notably, he was the only member of the old apartheid regime that wanted to testify in front of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and admitted personal guilt; in 2001, he joined the ANC.<sup>13</sup>

In his private life, Koornhof married Lulu Steyn in 1951 and had two sons. In 1992, Koornhof separated from his wife and moved in

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13 Hammond-Tooke 1997, 116–117; Marx 2007, 83; Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 2007; Telegraph 2007.

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with his lover Marcelle Adams, a Coloured woman 44 years younger who had been his secretary in the USA. Adams and Koornhof had mutual twins; on his relationship with Adams, Koornhof stated: “My relationship with Marcelle is really the answer to apartheid, an answer by deed. I can honestly say I have risen above colour.” In 2004, Marcelle left for another man, a German stunt pilot, and Koornhof returned to Lulu who had never agreed to a divorce. Koornhof died on 12 November 2007, receiving condolences from various parts of the political spectrum including the ANC (for which Koornhof’s son Gerhard is an MP), the Afrikanerbond, and the United Democratic Movement. His son Johan stated that his father had a strong commitment to Christianity and to do something good for all people but also to the Afrikaners, his ‘volk’, which led to his contradictions and being limited by the political system of the time.<sup>14</sup>

**Mansfield, Peter:** Trained at Michaelhouse, he studied at the University of Natal and at Boston University. He then became a reporter for Daily News and joined the Progressive Party before becoming co-owner of Merit Selection, an employment agency (the only black employment agency run by Whites in Durban). He began his public career as a Durban city councillor for the Progressive Federal Party, became director of the Inkatha Institute in 1986 and joined the Kwa-Zulu Natal Indaba Foundation in 1987 as associate director. He was promoted director in 1989 and remained until the foundation’s end in 1990. After that, he conducted a study on the Indaba proposals’ role in the national negotiations in 1991, financed by the Human Sciences Research Council and supervised by Professors Simon Bekker and Mervyn Frost at the University of Natal.<sup>15</sup> Then he became Durban City Council’s Image Management Committee’s chairman, leaving politics in 1995 to run consulting and internet businesses.<sup>16</sup>

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14 Staff Reporter, Mail & Guardian 2007; Telegraph 2007.

15 Mansfield, Peter: The Indaba’s constitutional proposals revisited. EGM N 342 MAN.

16 <https://www.linkedin.com/in/petermansfield1/>, last access on 20.03.2018.

**Mdlalose**, Frank Themba: He was born on 29 November 1931 in Nquthu, KwaZulu, where he grew up and visited primary school. He matriculated from St Francis High School, Mariannhill, in 1949 and studied from 1950 to 1952 at the University of Fort Hare where he was rewarded a B.Sc. (and a University Education Diploma in 1953). At Fort Hare, he met Buthelezi and got in touch with the ANC Youth League and Z.K. Matthews at the recommendation of Buthelezi (according to Mdlalose himself) and through his own brother Edward Mdlalose. He then became involved in politics and served as the chairman of the Victoria East branch of the ANCYL as well as on Fort Hare's Students' Representative Council (in 1952 and 1953). On 26 June 1953, Mdlalose participated with other students in the Defiance Campaign by sitting on 'whites only' benches after curfew in the town of Alice. Afterwards, Mdlalose went to University of Natal to study medicine which he finished in 1958 with a PhD. In Durban, he kept involved in ANC politics, regarding himself as part of the ANC's conservative wing (he rejected parts of the Freedom Charter as socialist while he preferred nationalist tendencies). After his internship at King Edward VIII hospital, Durban, Mdlalose ran a private practice in Atteridgeville, Transvaal, from 1960 to 1962, then he worked in Steadville Township, Ladysmith from 1962 to 1970 and then at Madadeni where he kept contact with Buthelezi. Mdlalose was present at Inkatha's revival at Melmoth in 1975 and succeeded A.H. Zulu as its chairmain in 1976. In 1978, Mdlalose was elected to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and was then appointed Minister of the Interior; from 1983 he was Minister of Health and Welfare (from 1986 shared with E.S.C. Sithebe). In 1990, he became national chairman of the IFP. During the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, he was the leader of the Inkatha delegation. During the national negotiations prior to the election of 1994, he was one of KwaZulu's main negotiators. After the election, Mdlalose was premier of KwaZulu-Natal from 1994 to his resignation in 1996 – it was rumoured that he had been forced to resign due to differences between him and Buthelezi. When the National Freedom Party broke away from the IFP in 2011, Mdlalose made headlines again by claiming that Buthelezi "had shamed him more than once, and kicked him out of the party chairmanship and

premiership’ and that the IFP ‘‘had not been committed to a peaceful resolution between itself and the ANC’’.<sup>17</sup> South Africa’s ambassador to Egypt from 1998 to 2005. In his private life, he is married to Eunice Nokuthula Sikhosana since 1956 with whom he has three sons and two daughters; he further enjoys tennis and boxing, but is also committed to child welfare.<sup>18</sup>

**Nattrass, Jill:** Born in 1934, Nattrass was an accountant and an economist by training (she graduated from the University of Natal in 1954) and joined the University of Natal’s Economic Research Unit in 1965 where she became professor and director of the Development Studies Unit in 1981. In the area of Development Studies, she was an industrious and renowned researcher and carried her expertise into numerous committees, especially into the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba. This way, academic knowledge was to be applied and have a practical use. She further had the reputation of being a committed teacher and caring colleague. Nattrass died of a heart attack, as a consequence of a car crash, on 22 December 1987, aged 53.<sup>19</sup>

**Schlemmer, Lawrence:** He was born on 11 September 1936 in Pretoria into an Afrikaans- and English-speaking family, the family name originating from a Jewish German emigrant. Since his childhood, Schlemmer seems to have been fascinated by the underprivileged side of society and crime. When he went to the University of Pretoria, he wanted to study Criminology, but in 1960 became a social worker dealing with the poorest and the excluded. He then turned to Sociology and became a lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand before joining the University of Natal, Durban campus, in 1972 as professor and head of the Centre of Applied Social Sciences<sup>20</sup> (which produced

17 Da Costa/SAPA 31.01.2011.

18 Gastrow 1987, 180–182; Joyce 1999, 173; Mthembu/Eveleth 1997; Mdlalose 2006.

19 Natal Witness 1987; The Citizen 1987b; Daily News Pietermaritzburg Bureau 1987.

20 Johnson calls it the Centre for Social and Development Studies, but all sources

the Indicator magazine). He became known as an industrious scientist relying on a wide knowledge, but also as a liberal opponent of apartheid and any sort of racism. He also had contacts to left-wing or Marxist academics and was part of prominent philosopher Rick Turner's house community (which also included Gerhard Maré); Turner was shot in their house in 1978 with Schlemmer present according to R. W. Johnson. Schlemmer got in touch with Buthelezi around 1980 and agreed to become head of the newly founded Inkatha Institute in 1981 (which included acting as secretary for the Buthelezi Commission) and joined the KwaZulu Development Corporation's board of directors,<sup>21</sup> but this created pressure by the ANC and students on the Durban campus. After both his office and his flat were burned down on the same day, Schlemmer and his wife Monica gave up Durban and the Inkatha Institute in 1986 and moved to Johannesburg where Schlemmer became head of the Centre for Policy Studies. In 1990, Schlemmer left to become vice-president of the Human Sciences Research Council, controlled by the Broederbond, but soon after, due to pressure from the ANC, was without a job. He then created the independent survey firm Markdata in 1996 and continued working until his death due to cancer in 2011. In his private life, Schlemmer had a passion for old cars, dogs, and cigarettes.<sup>22</sup>

His achievements over the years included "Dean of the Social Sciences at Natal, a professor at Wits, Strategy Director of the Urban Foundation, Founder member of the Academy of Science of South Africa, Vice President of the Institute of Race Relations, President of the SA Political Studies Association, Research Associate of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute (Germany), President of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, and the author or co-author of 300 publications and 15 books".<sup>23</sup>

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clearly state the above.

21 KwaZulu Development Corporation: Annual Report, 1982. UNISA lib. 338.9684005 KWAZ, 13.

22 Johnson 2011; Johnson 2012; Platter 1983; see also <http://whoswho.co.za/lawrence-schlemmer-1757>, last access on 14.03.2018.

23 Johnson 2011.

**Schreiner**, George Deneys Lyndall: Born in Johannesburg in 1923, his father was Oliver Schreiner, a chief justice who challenged apartheid legislation, and his grandfather was William Philipp (W.P.) Schreiner, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and later defender of King Dinuzulu. His great-aunt, Olive Schreiner, author of *The Story of an African Farm* and early feminist, also contributed to G.D.L. Schreiner growing up with a strong sense of commitment to justice. Schreiner left school with his matric in 1939 and studied at the University of the Witwatersrand, finishing in 1942 (BSc) and then joined the army. After the war, he studied at Cambridge University, finishing his PhD in Inorganic Chemistry in 1951 or 1952. Schreiner, his wife Else (née Kops) and their first child moved to the USA in 1952 where Schreiner was a visiting professor at Pennsylvania State College, but in 1953 they returned to South Africa. Schreiner immediately involved himself in politics, being a founder member of the anti-apartheid, mixed-race Liberal Party in 1953. In 1959, he was appointed professor of Inorganic Chemistry at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, and promoted the teaching of science. He also involved himself in liberal politics: He was among the organisers of the Natal Convention of 17 to 19 April 1961, a meeting of hundreds of dissenters, predominantly liberals, calling for a national convention and an end to Apartheid.<sup>24</sup> He was promoted to vice principal of the Pietermaritzburg Campus in 1976 where he organised the conference on ‘Constitutional Models and Constitutional Change in South Africa’ (mentioned in the chapter on the Buthelezi Commission). He worked on transforming the University of Natal into a multi-racial university for all South Africans to abolish racism and apartheid in the university’s sphere as far as possible. He later became chairman of the Buthelezi Commission, but broke with Buthelezi in 1983 (however, he participated in the preparations for the KwaZulu Natal Indaba in 1986). Schreiner retired in 1987, leaving behind a modernised and multi-racial campus. In his private life, he enjoyed debating, drama, arts, wood-carving, and sports and kept good contact with his colleagues and students. Schreiner died in 2008.<sup>25</sup>

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24 Vigne 1997, 145–146.

25 Chetty/Merrett 2014, 17; Dominy 2017, 45–46; Gardner 2008.

**Thula, Gibson:** Born in Pinetown, Natal, in 1934, he was trained as a teacher at St Francis College and taught from 1955 to 1957. He then went to Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work and practiced as a social worker 1960–1965. After working in private business marketing 1965–1975, he became the KwaZulu Government's Principal Urban Representative in Johannesburg. He further was for some time chairman of Inkatha's Publicity, Strategy, Elections, and Projects Committees.<sup>26</sup> He was part of the Buthelezi Commission's Constitutional and Legal Working Group.

**Vilakazi, Absolom Lawrence:** Vilakazi was born in Natal in 1917 where he went to mission schools and later received his PhD in Anthropology from the University of Natal in 1960 for a work on Zulu religion and its transformation during the colonial era. Afterwards, he became associate professor at the Hartford Seminary Foundation. From 1962, he was active for the UN as Senior Social Affairs Officer for the Economic Commission for Africa and was also consulted by the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the World Council of Churches. He was professor of Anthropology at the American University, Washington DC, and president of the African Studies Association. After his retirement, Vilakazi returned to South Africa as director of research at the University of Zululand and as a member of the Anglo American Corporation's board of directors. He further was active in development matters and acquired funds rural development programmes. In his private life, he was married to Beatrice Vilakazi with whom he had five children. Vilakazi died on 29 June 1993.<sup>27</sup> On the Buthelezi Commission, he was chairman of the Social Services Working Group and an official representative of KwaZulu.

**Webb, Colin de Berri:** He was born on 24 October 1930 in Pretoria and enrolled at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1948, where received his BA (Honours), and then went to Clare College, Cam-

26 Hirson 1979, 245; Munger 1980, 10; Katholischer Arbeitskreis Entwicklung und Frieden: CV Gibson Thula, 1980. AEK, DBK, JuPa 1488.

27 Anthropology Today 1994, 20.



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bridge, earning his MA. In 1957, he became a temporary lecturer at the University of Natal, Durban, in history, and moved to the Pietermaritzburg campus in 1962 where he remained, from 1971 as associate professor, until 1976 when he was appointed King George V Professor of History at the University of Cape Town. He returned in 1984 to Durban as vice-principal of the Durban campus and left this post in 1988 to become vice-principal of the Pietermaritzburg campus, succeeding G. D. L. Schreiner, where he dedicated himself to continued innovation and initiated the founding of the Alan Paton Centre. He was a renowned teacher and scholar, famous for editing the James Stuart Archive together with John Wright and famous for his humour and oratory skill, but also a dedicated administrator. Besides his interests in history and education, he was also a liberal politician for the Progressive Federal Party for some time and was part of the Buthelezi Commission's Education Working Group and of the KwaZulu Natal Indaba's Advisory and Education Committees. Webb was married to Fleur (née Gower) and had two sons, Jonathan and Nicholas. He died on 22 March 1992 aged 61 due to cancer; soon afterwards, the Old Main Hall on the Pietermaritzburg campus, that was renovated under his auspices, was named Colin Webb Hall in his honours.<sup>28</sup>

**Zulu**, Alpheus Hamilton: Born on 29 June 1905 in Nquthu, KwaZulu, he started teacher training in 1921 and qualified at St Chad's College, Ladysmith, in 1924. He then became principal of the Umlazi primary school until 1926 when he moved to Umlazi intermediate school; during this time, he promoted his studies and got a Junior Certificate. From 1931, he was head teacher of Umlazi Combined School. He matriculated in 1936 and enrolled at the University of Fort Hare in 1935 in Social Anthropology; he received his B.A. in 1938. In 1939, he turned his career around and enrolled at St Peter's Anglican Theological College in Johannesburg. Although Anglican, he joined the Interdenominational African Ministers' Association of South Africa as he did not regard denominations as important. From 1942 he was a member of the ANC and worked as a priest, becoming Bishop of

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28 Irvine 1992; Laband/Gardner 1992.

Zululand in the 1960s. On the international arena, he was renowned and became one of the presidents of the World Council of Churches at its 1968 meeting but resigned in 1975 because the WCC had begun to support liberation movements from 1971,<sup>29</sup> therefore (in his eyes) supporting violence, and he did not want the church to become a political instrument. Around the same time after retiring from being bishop in 1975, he broke with the ANC and, as a pragmatic decision, decided to be active for Inkatha as the speaker of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, as Inkatha chairman (in 1975), and the chairman of the board of directors of the KwaZulu Development Corporation (from 1981, although he had been on the board before). This earned him a lot of criticism among his friends and other Zulus. In his private life, he enjoyed music and had six daughters and one son with his first wife Miriam Adelaide Magwa (married since 03 January 1929). He married Lillian Mkhize on 23 February 1985 and died on 29 February 1988.<sup>30</sup>

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29 Macqueen 2018, 165–171.

30 Burnett 1988; Macqueen 2005; Marawa 1999.

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Nicole Wiederroth

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
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Bianca Walther ist Konferenzdolmetscherin und Historikerin mit Schwerpunkt Geschlechtergeschichte des europäischen Bürgertums im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Sie promoviert über weibliche Lebensgemeinschaften in der Alten Frauenbewegung und lebt in Berlin.



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