

**C55**



UDF

Row "C 55"

Interview with ~~T. M. Lekota~~?

Q Is UDF beginning to focus on rural areas?

A We have taken a decision to intensify our organization in rural areas in the period after the election.

Q Are there many rural organizations affiliated to UDF?

A It is true to say that we have strong support in the rural areas, <sup>tw</sup> a large part which still has to be converted into formal organization. But if you go into areas like N. Cape we already have organizations like the Huhudi Civic Association which is affiliated to UDF.

Q But Huhudi is a township?

A In a sense it is, but in a sense it is really in-between. We have these townships like Onverwacht which are neither rural nor are they <sup>real</sup> towns. ~~urban~~

In the Border areas, based the Mgwali Residents Association which is based in a rural freehold area, is affiliated to UDF.

Q In the past, it seems that rural resistance has been around issues like removals and betterment planning, which immediately affect people's economic position. Is it possible to translate this local resistance around immediate issues into long-term ~~the~~ political organization?

A These communities are organising around immediate issues, but these organizations have the potential to carry the struggle far beyond the immediate short term issues. As the bantustan policy matures, the question of additional land for African people is going to become a daily issue. The process of consolidation and the fact that <sup>only</sup> 13% of the land has been set aside for African people, has meant that this small area is literally overflowing. We can't see <sup>how</sup> that the government can calm this situation. These pressures, like the overcrowding in areas like QwaQwa, for instance, are generating so much unhappiness that it is inevitable that organization around these areas will take place. ~~These communities~~

Q If you look at communities that are moved, you find that once the removal takes place, organization breaks down. Can this be countered?



K I think there are many ways to counter this. If you take the removal of the Magopa ~~xx~~ <sup>people</sup> ~~removed~~ for instance, the lack of amenities like water supply ~~for instance~~ <sup>in the place where they are moved +</sup> are issues around which people can be organised and around which resistance can continue to be generated. We must have the foresight to realise, that once the removal is over, this is not the end of the struggle. The failure is in the follow-up. I think we should be wherever the people are moved to.

Q Do you think that the only reason why people, like those from Magopa, become disorganised, when moved, is because there are no ~~ixi~~ ~~structures~~ to channel their dissatisfaction?

Well, the removal of Magopa had a dynamic of its own. There were some sharp tensions within the community. There were some people who were prepared to settle at Pechsdraai and who were prepared to follow the schemes of apartheid. There were others who were more resolute, who would not co-operate and those people moved to Bethanie.

Some people carried on, some became disillusioned in that they saw the efforts of a lifetime disappear over night. The type of ~~ixi~~ disorganization that exists, must be understood by the fact that it has only been a short time since the community has been moved and that the community is recovering from this disruption.

However it is true to ~~xxx~~ say that in Magopa we did not find the solid type of local organization of the Mgwali Residents Association, for instance.

The Magopa ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup> seemed to have come together because of the removal. It seems that no one was interfering with them before the removal as they owned ~~ixi~~ the land. In other words the people were not confronting the types of issues which face the people of Soweto and around which organization can take place - high rents for instance. When the people of Magopa were moved <sup>they face problems of a different nature</sup> it meant that new forms of organization had to take place. While before the people of Magopa were organizing as landowners, now they must organise as tenants or as landless ~~people~~ <sup>people</sup>.



a In Soweto, day to day, the people are facing local authority and the state and are ~~forced~~ <sup>forced</sup> to make demands around <sup>issues like</sup> the rent issue which you mentioned. But ~~the people of rural people are unlikely~~ <sup>are subject to</sup> ~~even to see the agents of Pretoria~~. What power do these people have to organise themselves?

X This is true of these areas, people do not have immediate provocation by the state. This makes for difficult organization. But people still have to pay tax. And if we look back across this century we see the struggles that were waged around hut tax for instance. If we look at Bophuthuswena we see donkeys are being killed because it is said that the people have more donkeys than they need- there is immense potential for organization around issues like these. For instance the question of the amount of land allocated to people must have potential for organization. And of course the question of political rights, the fact that rural people are restricted to certain parts of the country, unemployment in these areas, & the need for people to challenge influx control by moving to urban areas where there are jobs.

People are going from the Ciskei to the Western Cape for instance and then being taken back to the Ciskei. We must not forget that these people are members of unions in the towns and that through this their political consciousness is raised and this leads them to have a critical look at the circumstances in which they have left their children and their wives in the rural areas.

All this is petrol which generates heat and must generate action through organization.

Q Is it possible to organise in areas where chiefs and tribal authorities exist?

In most cases the chiefs are paid by the state. Therefore it is most likely that they will align themselves with the state. However the institution of chiefs is dying. As the pressures of the capitalist economy penetrate even those rural areas, more and more people are making a break with the tribal ties of loyalty to the chief who are being seen to be serving not the community but themselves.



What we are going to see is the building of new leaders, not on the basis of old traditions. It will be a slow and painful process.

Q But doesn't the type of control that chiefs have over rural areas prevent organization?

A That may be so in some areas. I have my doubts though, to what extent the chief can prevent people from having meetings if the majority of the people want to attend. This problem when it arises will be surmountable, depending on the strength or weakness of resistance within communities. It is an issue to be considered but I think each situation has its own dynamic. That has been our experience.

Q What are the difficulties for UDF of organising in rural areas?

A The main difficulty is one of resources. These communities are located far from cities. Secondly most of the men in these communities are staying in the cities where they work - so it is a destabilised community. Magopa is a good example. Many of the able-bodied men were working in Johannesburg. Those left behind were old <sup>or people</sup> and children. And even when men could go back they were only there for a day or two.

All the government did, was to wait for their time <sup>at home</sup> to expire and then ~~go back~~ <sup>go ~~back~~ with removal programme</sup>. The other problem is that those men who do remain are probably the people in the employ of the state of the chief - and therefore the balance of men is kept on the side of the chief. It makes it possible for the chiefs for a considerable period of the year to have the area under their own control.

A further problem of rural areas is that they are out of public attention. They are not immediately accessible to the outside world.

In the isolation and desolation of the rural areas, ~~unwanted~~ <sup>people can be kept out</sup> the chiefs and the state can terrorise communities into submission. These are real problems.

Q UDF seems to have ~~been~~ merely been responding to crises in rural areas, like the removal of the Magopa people. Is it likely that UDF will set up alternative structures in rural areas, before crises take place?

We are now contemplating that if we have the resources we will employ rural organisers who will set up structures, monitor what is going on and <sup>send</sup> ~~send~~ information to these communities. It is



only through structures that resistance can become active.

Q Will UDF attempt to organise in the rural areas of the so-called independent bantustans.

A These are parts of South Africa and we will organise in these areas as much as in the rest of South Africa. In some of the bantustans we have a very strong following, like in the Ciskei for instance.

A few weeks ago a few members of the Bophuthuswana assembly raised a storm in which they attacked <sup>one of our speakers</sup> me for having addressed a meeting in the bantustan, saying that <sup>he</sup> had come to initiate a battle against apartheid when in fact apartheid was dead in Bophuthuswana. We will continue to move in and organise in areas like Mabopane <sup>by the way</sup> because the condition of the people there makes it imperative that we do so. We not only intend to organise in the homeland, it is our obligation. Those bantustans are a part of apartheid. Part of the strategy to destroy apartheid is to destroy the bantustans as well.

Q Do you think that ~~KwaZulu~~ <sup>KwaZulu</sup> has more active role in removals is a result of the emergence of the UDF?

A I don't think that Inkatha is even ~~genuinely~~ genuinely taking up the issue of removals. I think that they are moving in there because they are seeing that we are making ground. Their strategy is simply to try and undermine our campaign. We know that people like Mkalose <sup>is</sup> travelling in Northern Natal, going to hospitals and talking to groups of nurses, telling them about the UDF, warning them not to sign the million signature campaign; saying that through this they will become members of the ANC. Inkatha has been around for a long time if they really had the interests of the people they would have started a long time ago.

Q Inkatha has control over rural areas in Natal through chiefs and Inkatha leadership, even if they do not have popular support. Do you think it is possible for UDF to organise in these places.

A We would not say that Inkatha has a lot of support in rural areas. We would say that many of these people have been harassed into taking Inkatha membership.

But I am sure that the members of Inkatha do not know what Inkatha is doing. All they have been told is that Inkatha is fighting for freedom.

Put into  
3rd  
Nelson



Because the UDF has a message for every single person, even in areas where Inkatha has been before us, we will be able to provide a message that is meaningful. There is no way of stopping the masses.

① → Relative roles of women - against  
tribally based people

② → What does it mean for women  
of absence of new means for  
organization of women



112

R5200


Car hire R21.00 p.d. x 14 = R294.0

R29.40 gst

petrol = 90

Insurance R70

P.I. 17c P.K.



CAR HIRE = R21.00 per day  
X 14 days

- Add G.S.T.

R294.00

29.40

R323.40

- Add Petrol Before After -

90.00

R413.40

- Add Insurance

70.00

R483.40

- Add Personal Insurance

36.60

R520.00

53.20  
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29.40

Has - this hall is the embryo of a South Africa we would like to have. A South Africa devoid of



Float = R200.00

<u>EXPENSES.</u>	<u>FOR.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
12.85	Petrol	(02.08.84)
25.20	"	(03.08.84)
10.40	"	(04.08.84)
30.00	"	<u>(06.08.84)</u>
<u>78.45</u>		

Bal 121.55

AVAIL. <sup>74.63</sup> 84-83-10.00

OUTST. (26.72) +1000.  
46.72



MISC — Acc. CONT.

INCOME

EXPENDITURE

184/07	R250.00. (Expenditure account already submitted to treasurer)		Statement submitted to treasurer and before financial reports presented to C.C.
44/07	R200.00. (fuel)	44/07/01	R31,46 (Patrol - receipt details) 44/07/01
	R200.00. 01/3. - 31.46	68/26/01/01/3	R31.46.
1/02. Balance	R168.54.		

*Neilsen*



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