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Integration and demobilization are 2 sides of the same coin.

steps:

- ① Make an audit (independent) of what is there.
- ② What do we need? (political decision).
- ③ Where is the money going to come from (SADF budget is not enough).
- ④ Who wants and can (requirements!) be integrated.  
→ further training will be needed.

The process will be finalized after elections

demobilization:

Those who do not want to be integrated or do not meet the requirements need a programme, linked to civilian development schemes. International assistance should be sought.

TEC should coordinate training etc. of the various armed forces at this stage.

→ Calvin Khan:

We should look at how we want to control the armed forces during transition. The ruling classes usually control armed forces.

We can have formal democracy, but the ruling class will still control armed force (e.g. Chile). It is therefore essential that control of armed forces reflects the democratic process, legitimacy is key. MK can bring that.

Council of defense (under TEC) will initiate the process. The present SADF wants to absorb MK. But that is not integration.



The debate around integration will be political for a long time.  
Integration is only first step towards total restructuring.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

New threat analysis is needed beforehand.

Demobilization is essential to remain control (employment etc).

→ Laurie Nathan:

Integration is

- ① need for new defence force.
- ② need for new defence policy.
- ③ need for disarmament

ad ①: new symbols, doctrine, culture etc.

It needs to be different in order to get legitimacy. None of the present armies are set up to serve democracy.

ad ②: primary role: to defend against external aggression.

Not: to offend internally (as the practice is now).

civilian control should be key

ad ③: possession of arms creates a culture of violence.

\* There is now realistic external threat.

\* resources will be limited: priorities should be set by new government.  
defence is not priority.

Integration is not a mechanical process. It needs to be planned carefully.

→ Joblyn: Why do we need an army at all?

Joblyn: armed forces are there to defend peace. Africa has soft borders, there is intense violence in the region. The world is not peaceful.

We are close to the point where you can not spend less on defence.

Laurie: There is no external threat, but there is a need for policing

But we as people and countries are not ready to do without army. So the fact is that we will have an army.



(2)

Jalil: Requirements:

We should not just get people in the army that say they are in a defence force.

- What is MK? What is SADF? → define that.
- requirements have to change but they still have to be there (eg. age, physical health, educational criteria, psychological testing etc).

Calvin: Issue is important when it comes to marginalising people. Are standards important? SADF claims exclusive professionalism. Those things need to be fundamentally changed.

haurie: Are we going to exclude people that have committed abuses of human rights?

If you do not do that: Bad for the credibility. There is no guarantee that somebody would not do that again.

If you do that: You need to investigate 2 decades, you would touch the question of responsibility of crimes under duty.

Besides it would create tension in terms of "nation building" you could select some notorious cases, though.

No one dares to predict how big a new SADF would be.



# NEW PEACE MOVEMENT

Mandy explained that the ECC has no position on this - it will disband when apartheid conscription goes. Because of its specificity it wouldn't be a good starting point. She proposed that we commence the workshop by brainstorming ① The problems ② Existing orgs/initiatives ③ Proposals to fill whatever gaps are identified (it was agreed).

- ① PROBLEMS: Aggressive culture; assumption that violence can resolve disputes; arms trade; nuclear weapons; PTSD; privatised military elements; weapons economy; secrecy; militarisation of children/youth; problems of "lost generation"; myth of "defence/security"; crime; security mania; machismo; domestic violence; continued destabilisation; military land ownership; conscription/objection; arrogance of "security forces"; right wing.
- ② ORGS/INITIATIVES: POWA; FAMILY LIFE; BLACK Sash; MOPM; IFOR; Local orgs eg Eldorado Centre for Peace; National Peace Accord/Secretariat; MRG; ELA; ERJ; Peace Action; NIM; IBE; LHR; LRC; Koeberg Alert; Church-related (Diakonia etc) ANC marshalling structures; COSG, CAS; Centre for Study of Violence & Reconciliation; Quakers.
- ③ GAPS: No debate on nature of security; Lack of public awareness of militarisation; Research/investig. journalism; ~~conv~~ quality of policing; no monitoring of army; network between orgs; make link! unequal distr. of wealth;

We then examined Rob's proposal. We agreed that there is a gap, Rob pointed out that most of ② weren't represented here, so it wouldn't be appropriate to initiate a structure. It was suggested that Rob's list is too specific; Janneke suggested immediate steps re. Angola. Douglas said there needs some structure. Mandy agreed that consultation would have to focus on specifics; Rob said the list should be a starting point; Laura seconded. Michael seconded Janneke; Laura suggested ECC take up Angola; Doug said it's no longer capable; Mandy called for specific <sup>suggestions for</sup> steering com. Douglas said we can't have another white-dominated initiative.

Mandy summarised: initiative must be consultative; Angola to be urgent; S.C. to be composed of people from plenary. Local meetings to be convened; Angola initiative to be parallel though linked.



Given history, possible to make it.

ANGOLA

D. Torr

Jeremy Cronin: Chair.

Joe Harbon: Author of Who Calls the Shots. + article in W.I.P about  
The World Bank

Albie Sachs.

Joe Harbon: It's recognising regions out of there - that there are lessons  
in history that we can look back on.

The S.A.D. F has learnt well from the regions (of Southern Africa) +  
the 3rd force etc.

Elective in Angola - can't be transposed direct into S.A. but there  
are some lessons.

I was part of 35 election observers. - based in OAMBU - RUNITA

A spirit of reconciliation was est on the ground + really believing  
+ voting for democracy.

Not the voters who determine it

2 day period, one vote for president + one for parliament

prep. rep.

prior registration - photo id cards - national basis you could  
vote where you like.

high illiteracy

18 candidates - president

> relatively high no of spoilt ballot.

22 parties

Votes were secretive no one allowed in the booths to assist despite  
possibility of spoilt ballots - This gave security to pl who believed

Registration 90% + 90% turn out of those registered.

2 committees on election process:

1. Monitors from ~~all~~ parties at the ballot  
station - after not local pl.  
+ this was checked on misconduct by  
party monitors.  
+ then international monitors.



International pl - see then more a threat of an outside record.

There was discussion between polling monitors.

2. In Angola whole <sup>election</sup> process transparent - 3 nights sleeping in the ballot boxes from the beginning until the end of the poll.  
- makes people very much a part of the process.

PL who ~~was~~ involved in the polling process

3 UNITA got  $\frac{1}{3}$  of votes & had the process been allowed to continue UNITA would have had a forceful opposition had they chosen that route.

What went wrong (1) Not the voters who determined the outcome of the election it was the military people

(1) Go back to their Peace Accord - the U.N. where to be monitors  
↓ the 2 sides would move into a single area <sup>assembly points</sup> & a new army would be created. UNITA didn't go to assembly point & started stockpiling arms.

UNITA didn't allow MPHA into KUANDA KUBANG.

Role of U.N + Margaret Anstey:

Anstey made a choice to say we can either blow the whistle or go ahead with the election.

Every body presumed UNITA would win. Why didn't they win?

(1) UNITHA - ran a divisive campaign.

(2) MPHA - ran a campaign of reconciliation.

Anstey argued - let election go ahead coz they going to win the election anyway & so the problem was the watch dog of the U.N. didn't bark.

As the demobilisation stopped the MPHA stopped & put their men into a very effective riot carroll. As late as 2-3 days before election UNITHA still passing out arms.

So when the outcome not as expected the military moved in. UNITA turned things into Somalia.

What happened afterwards: After election the outcome could be enforced but. PPK visited & said don't accept the outcome - so did



the U.S. UNITA's long term backers encouraged them to go back to the bush.

If the military is not disarmed, the historic backers come into play & this then makes enforcing the election impossible. So prior to elections we need to disarm as many pt as possible.

Albie Sachs : As a result of the diaspora - the exiles have a strong regional understanding.

Part of understanding of the elections can be understood in 2 theories.

(1) ~~weak~~ <sup>lack</sup> on the part of the pt for peace.

(2) extreme instability on the other.

The cold war played a devastating effect causing a civil war of unmanageable proportions to become an international battle field.

ZAIRE was one of the players & it is still there.

Our situation in S.A. is very different.

Something else happened - how is it that UNITA which had so little to offer the pt could even get  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the vote. We need to look at the failures of the M.P.L.A & this self examination is NB for us as well.

1. sheer inexperience in gov (even colonised gov underdoped).
2. Factionalism & lack of UNITY in MPLA which came about for different reasons had disastrous consequences. Open factionalism was very damaging.
  - a lot of the best intellectuals lost, power struggles destroyed integrity.
  - UNITY not as blind obedience, but ~~an~~ openness is very NB, don't homogenise, currents need to be recognised & dealt with.

FRELIMO was more successful but at quite a heavy price -

3. Role of civil society - it was almost destroyed, - ~~movement~~ <sup>economically & socially</sup>.
  - mistake was destroying existing things that might have worked but because they were seen as counter-revolutionary & so they were undermined.
  - without the revolution being able to deliver the goods immediately this meant the state / military played a very NB role which was able to undermine the election outcome.



Why did NAMIBIA has successful elections partly because so many nations + internal groupings had a stake in what was happening.

In S.A. the major contending pol. parties having been working together for a longer period of time + this is not a winner takes all system.

Agreed on certain constitutional + structural policies in advance.

A govt of National Unity means whatever the consequence of elections the diffnt pol. parties will still have a say <sup>with certain guarantees</sup> + privileges.

This means in S.A. the run up to the election will not be as fierce as in S.A. as Angola. i.e. pl struggling for the outcome.

The capacity of the military acting on its own - however can be very destructive so we need to find pol mechanisms which will find means of changing this structure.

How can you have peoples rights without thinking that if you est peoples govt you will solve all the problems of the pl.

### OPEN SESSION

① What was the essence of some of the Angolan P. Accord?  
In Angola + Mozambique there was a call for total demobilisation of both sides + creation of a national army by the time of election. This was partially created which meant that there were 3 armies instead of 2 in Angola.

② Can the problem be solved in Angola? What price is the ANC prepared to pay for regionalisation?

The S.A. govt interest in the region is not cold war related - argument that a black govt leads to chaos. This is still on the Agenda for the NATS so multiparty democracy doesn't work + so its in their interests to continue to destabilise. The 3rd Force is critically NB coz you must be able to say black pl cannot govern the township.

No hope for a settlement in Angola now - there need in S.A. to be a looking beyond the elections. What place for Buthezi in the new system - we need to think what happens to the losers.

The Peace Committees have not been able to control peace in the townships. What is civil society going to be able to do about military take over.



③ What regional vision. Albie - as S.S. looking at this situation then. The new S.A. will be so concerned. Its own problem won't be able to help materially. What can we offer?

1. End to destabilisation
2. Normalisation of relationships at every level
3. Est. good neighbourliness
4. Est. regional framework for socio/economic/cultural purposes

Joe: We all talk about Angola. but there have been other successful regional elections. MALAWI, LESOTHO, ZIMBABWE, ~~BOZOTANA~~ <sup>ZAMBIA</sup>. Angola needs to be what we don't want to happen.

1. What was the role of UN ~~FA~~, the independent monitors & the political monitors.
2. How are we going to disarm people before the elections.
3. What provisions was made for misconduct.

1. Angola didn't have a neutral national force which was pibly a mistake - Only had international monitors & party monitors. The response to the disarming - the SADF has to be disarmed, as have to be all other sides. So some mechanism has to be devised to do this. <sup>unlike Albie</sup> I'm pessimistic about elections in April. In S.A. there are too many guns.

There needs to be a major voter education both nationally & also by pol parties - so you need to know what the ballot paper looks like months before.

Albie: If the ANC loses its because of fraud is not a helpful way of thinking - There is no connection between illiteracy & stupidity. In terms of disarming - there is the pblm of whites having private arms.

Battle for the regions also needs to be debated. Constitutional debate & struggle has been over this. Many NB political debate.



Finally: What should we do about ANGOA?

<sup>comment</sup> We have been remarkably placid about this massive war, what are we going to do about the continuing privatised SADF + the govt. continuing regional destabilisation.

There needs to be a campaign of solidarity support for Angola.

No aeroplane can fly to Angola & back without it being traced or radar by SADF, this <sup>flight</sup> record needs to be made available to the transitional executive & this information can then be accessed - the repetition of the process can then be stopped.

Albie: There can be no no-go areas in the election process.

Needs to be a peaceful election committee.

We need to get from the agreement in principle down to the actualization.

As far as ~~the~~ ANGOA there is a lack of transparency

We need to have more campaigning around for freedom + Peace for the Angolan govt.



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## Police as Peacekeepers

3 inputs

### Colonel Alq Dyke (SAP)

1994/1995 - parallel law laws XVI + storming of Bastille to S.A. situation

today

- far reaching effects on SAP.
- SAP at present is not ethnically based + does not rep broader Comm
- Police does not have capacity to execute policy of new gov
- How are we going to change the SAP.
- Must not try to do this by alienating it from Soc.
- SAP is not a rock of granite and is not as inflexible as most people think. Members come from the community. Come from all aspects of Soc
- Come to serve comm
- 1/2 is 25/6 or younger.
- is not as parbal as many think.
- must to make it acceptable to all former community relations dept
- want to be accountable to community.
- 'The People's Police Force' is what they want to become
- ~~exp~~ expect mutual accountability.
- need to change attitudes of all policemen officers + attitude of society.
- First step change syllabus of training programme - much emphasis on community relations.
- top down approach of training police force of a whole.
- Command Structure is being changed so no branch is dominated by a certain race, colour gender.
- Change must not be only cosmetic.
- must remember to have time to retrain personnell.
- not all existing ~~new~~ people are happy to change. - those who are not willing to change must be got rid of.
- police officers moved to grass roots level.



Police seen as reps of the gut 2.

- Police + community must join hands.
- Crime line has been introduced
- Fire arm ~~meat~~ unit.
- Onbi-vehicle high-jacking units
- Crime forums
- crime-buster camps.
- also set up a joint-operational communication centre
- if violence breaks out can use this to address problems immediately.

Gerald Williamson (Eldorado Park Centre for Peace Action)

- Small project that will lead the way for SA.
- UNISA psycho unit + community rel.
- Community safety unit linked to socio-eco relations.
- see solution as reconstructing rel b/w police + comm.
- Community policing → adhere to what comm wants in terms of its own needs.
- want to promote a culture of peace at all level - schools etc.
- 40 page charter set up by police + community of what each expects of each other.
- comm decides<sup>d</sup> what safety was to them + how it should be carried out. Consultation was slow.
- Comm came up with good ideas. Also looked at psychological well being. Ledged at security system at Disney world.
- Site similar to JHB - rich tourists, ignorant tourists etc.
- unschool culture of violence.
- design cubicles so that people are not in contact with others.
- meet constantly along the way and watched (every donald duck + mickey mouse is a police officer)
- People see the SAP as a 'hammer + nail' rel. each crime seen like this.



committees to review criminals if judiciary is needed that is the next step. All the criteria for this is in the document.

- We do need the SAP. They are rotten but they can be worked with and transformed.
- biggest problem is that the whole police force must be changed

Alfred Woodington - COSATU rep.

Transformation of police force how can this take place?

They are workers need to be protected as such. However are not doing a good job. Must follow peace accord recommendations.

- community relations org must not be talk shops.
- Vanicee squad disbanded + people sent to diff units but they are still there + action is not transparent.
- Action should be taken at very first point + be transparent.
- Training methods must change from military style to community
- Independence of political influence - independent think<sup>ers</sup> must obviously be politically aware.
- must understand supremacy of community as opp to gov.
- Crime - respect for police must be reinstated
- purge of security forces + element within in the police force.
- massacres in Sebokeng are not being dealt with appropriately.
- community must be involved in crime prevention - not enough police to watch every house etc
- cause of problem must be addressed. socio-economic problems - need holistic approach to crime prevention.
- Alexandra - Wius comm, Eldorado Park, kangaroo courts (sophisticated) will take pressure off police.
- idea of SDU should not be totally discarded. Operating in other areas as neighbourhood watches.
- = Peace corp - much debate around this - dulp programmes? security matters?
- need to deal with dulpm measures. ; accountability of police.



2 structures in place on an ad-hoc basis

Joint operations + communic centre } Sub-committee <sup>established</sup> ~~meeting~~  
SAP - comm relations } problems with action

Joint operations centre are working together but police still have to carry out rules of superiors SAP - SADR problems in terms of operations.

### Questions

is there effort on command structures to admit that things have been done + things must change?

• Police executes laws of the land ∴ police did not act incorrectly <sup>Dyre</sup> but politicians did.

response: what about extra-legal activity pointed out by Goldstone etc ... space must be cleared. so psycho space for peace will be created.

• challenge police's action at world trade centre if police must admit <sup>Dyre</sup> to atrocities each one must be mentioned. The police force as a whole ~~must~~ can not apologise

• bad elements must be purged but we must not generalise + <sup>Williamson</sup> turn 'good apples bad'

ISU in Durban causes violence - has there been a programme for retraining?

• ISU was set up to act independantly did not work this way. <sup>Dyre</sup> Problem - police remain too long in this unit + dupl tunnel vision working on a way to solve the problem. want to change structure of units. Any change cannot ~~be~~ <sup>happen</sup> overnight.

• Communities are divided + police are from these ranks. Corruption <sup>Williamson</sup> + mismanagement. Suggestions must come out of comm. SAP 'we' must work together. Can people come up with good suggestions. - need to deprogramme people on apartheid policy. 80% of officer core are white - buying seeds is not an excuse there are competent people who could be moved up.



• people need experience to move up - ~~General~~ this boss is bl general

Dyke Collaboration Down AWRB + ISU at World Trade Centre

Woodington new legislation on camouflage uniforms

Dyke - weapons in hospital reported nothing is done but in individual homes police search with many casspirs etc.

Police should not work partially should respond to all reports.

Dyke Should use crime stop number. Takes many people to raid a hostel.

Change from State being major clients to community being major client.

- decisions come to with the community ~~allow police to~~ empower police to carry out <sup>action + get</sup> ~~what is possible~~ community assistance.

Woodington • Police lack the political will to take effective action re AWRB traditional weapons etc.

Dyke People re AWRB incidents + sebokeng have been taken to court.

- why aren't local police officers in Tlokoza, Sebokeng etc investigating crimes - they are only used as translators. Outsiders (whites) investigate

- telephones must work in police stations

- people being taken out of the community by the police should be noted in local station.

- professionalism in police stations.

- Police must be recognised + ~~seen~~ credible perhaps they can work with POPCEU

- 33% of police officers are involved in admin these must be pulled out and put on the beat.

- don't only have internal investigations

- SAP must push for a peace-keeping force to be put in place to relieve police so that they can go out into the community and be visible.

- District arresting office should be implemented in the short term, all arrested people can be noted in one place so that whereabouts are known.

Williamson • must think about what the community can do to make the job easier. + change the police.



- need to show community small gains to prevent disillusionment.
- Crimes committed by police what action is taken these people are not removed but are promoted.
- need to encourage people to come forward but these people must be assisted.
- We should not generalise in terms of police force.
- Restructuring must ~~be~~ not be done behind closed doors must be done with community.



SAP RECOMMENDATIONS  
any effort to admit that things have been wrong.

if wrong not SAP but the govt  
he executes duty as laid down.  
in order to clear state & regain credibility

Police as a force must be kept but those who  
have acted unlawfully must be acted against.

I.S.U. retaining?

Unit within police force, in order to act independently  
Police remain in unit too long develop tunnel vision  
have a programme to change them.

Joint change should be looked at together

DE PROGRAMMING. officer corps 80% white.

uniforms AWB & security now similar, also MK  
new legislation: camouflage unlawful

SEARCHES.

Lack political will  
wants to know what restructuring is taking place -  
can't say.

LOCAL POLICE <sup>be used to</sup> ~~should~~ investigate rather than outsiders.

TELEPHONES to work always.

Different units e.g. crime etc report to local police  
station that they have taken some one

COMPLAINTS. should be more professional.

POPCRU to be recognised

RESTRUCTURE

33% of SAP administrative staff - unnecessary should be  
in the field. 46 generals.

INVESTIGATIONS include people from communities  
SAP to push for peace keeping force to ~~include~~ <sup>release the SAT</sup>

DISTRICT OFFICE to have names from all areas



Suggestion - imp for ecc to hold more workshops - eg in townships

Workshop  
17-7-93

## Intervening to Prevent Violence

Venitia Govender + Sally Seaby (IBI)

Sally Seaby

BACKGROUND

- Violence described as "black on black violence", "tribal conflict" etc - we need to move away from this perception
- Historically, there was only one Xhosa / Zulu clash - in 1800s
- Prior to outbreak of violence in 1990, people of different ethnic groups lived together quite OK - need to question therefore the perception of this whole thing as an historically based ethnic war
- → coincided with Inkatha moving out of cultural organisation role + ~~becoming~~ becoming a political party - aggressive recruitment campaign, Buthelegi's push to become a major political player
- violence rises + falls according to what's happening in the country politically
- July / August 1990 - characterised by massive "uiphi attacks" - have become more sophisticated - train attacks, "drive-by" shootings, firearms instead of trad. weapons designed to instil terror.

ANC's perception →

①



Inkatha's perception - Violence stemmed from ANC's campaign to make Sebokeng a no-go area + ANC call to disband Kwa Zulu police + reintegrate homeland

THIRD FORCE - attackers not speaking (don't speak local language?)  
- whites seen at site of massacres - involved (cf. Boipatong)

SAP involvement - fundamentally a failure to investigate, a failure to respond when called - cf. destruction of evidence relating to Boipatong - SAP only has one way of investigating - forcing people (through torture etc) into giving confessions.

\* No single one fact which can be blamed for the violence - combination of factors

- \* coincided with ANC's suspension of armed struggle
  - \* IFP recruitment of councillors
  - \* conditions in single-sex hostels + squatter camps
  - \* unequal distribution of resources
- residents of hostels see end of apartheid as end of migrant labour + hostels - destruction of their lifestyles rather than "freedom at last" - reason to resist + inhibit change.



**Collection Number: AG1977**

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**PUBLISHER:**

*Publisher:- Historical Papers Research Archive*

*Location:- Johannesburg*

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