

17

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
1. MEMORANDUM OF EVIDENCE	1
2. APPENDICES	
(a) Notes on Systems of Government in Countries with Heterogeneous Populations	18
(b) Extract from Findings of Institute Council, January 1949 (RR 34A/49)	21
(c) The Coloured Franchise (RR 6/51)	22
3. PAMPHLETS (enclosed)	
(a) <u>White Civilization</u> , by E.E. Harris	
(b) <u>The Cape Coloured Franchise</u> , by L.M. Thompson	
(c) <u>..... go forward in faith</u> , by Quintin Whyte	
(d) <u>Democracy in Multi-Racial Societies</u> , by L.M. Thompson	
(e) <u>The Political Status of Non-Europeans in Southern Africa</u> , by Muriel Horrell	

SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (INC.)
SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VIR RASSEVERHOUDINGS (INGELYF)

Evidence presented to the Commission to enquire into the subject
matter of the Separate Representation of Voters Act Validation
and Amendment Bill

THE INSTITUTE

The South African Institute of Race Relations was established 25 years ago to work for peace, goodwill and practical co-operation between the various sections of the population. It has not been connected with any political party since its inception nor has it been tied to any party-political doctrine. Its work has been based upon belief in the fundamental principles of christian living and the values inherent in Western Civilization. Its methods have been research and investigation, the objective analysis of facts so obtained, and recommendations based on such analysis.

The Institute is dependent upon voluntary public subscriptions for its support. Its membership, of over 3,700, is composed of all racial groups and it has affiliated to it municipalities, churches, missions, universities, welfare and a variety of other organisations. While paying special attention to under-privileged and culturally backward groups, it has sought the welfare of all groups, for it believes that their inter-dependence in South Africa is such that the welfare and progress of the Non-European is essential to the progress and prosperity of all South Africans.

THE INSTITUTE'S ATTITUDE TO THE BILL

The Institute's conviction is that in any democratic state the conferment of the franchise can be determined only by the capability of the person to exercise that right. Such capability is in no way affected by the colour of his skin. The denial of the right to properly qualified persons (or its curtailment) simply on the ground of their colour is therefore undemocratic and unjustifiable. The Institute believes that this follows logically from the acceptance of the values and principles of Western democracy. The

/ curtailment of rights

curtailment of rights is particularly unjustified in the case of the Cape Coloured people who do not differ in tradition, language, culture or interest from Europeans who have full franchise rights. It considers that to place the Cape Coloured people on a separate voters' roll and give them communal representation in the form suggested in the Bill would result in a serious deprivation of political rights based not on incapacity to exercise them but merely on grounds of colour.

The Institute submits that the proper function of a Member of Parliament is to represent, to the best of his ability, national rather than sectional interests and that the consideration of policy should have as its primary objective the interests of the population as a whole. Such interests consist in the moral, political, and economic development of the individual as a member of the state and these interests are not made less important by membership of any particular colour group.

The Institute considers that differences of approach and action on the part of Members of Parliament should be concerned with matters of principle or opinion, cultural, moral, or economic and that the more such concern is submerged by subordination to sectional interests, whether of class or religion, of language or race, the less useful and effective for the common good Parliament will become. The circumstances that in the public life of this, as of many other countries, sectional interests play an active and disruptive part, is no justification for extending the process by creating additional sectional representation. The course of wisdom and statesmanship would be to strive for the subordination of sectional claims to the collective interests of the whole body politic and to legislate for the good of the people as a whole rather than for the real or supposed interests of any particular group or groups. The Institute believes that the interests, present and future, of Europeans as well as Non-Europeans demand this conception of government and policy.

In a multi-racial country, demarcation by racial groups is of all forms of particularism the least desirable, and indeed, the most dangerous, as

/ likely to

likely to foster and intensify antagonisms of a kind which history has shown to be peculiarly harmful.

The separation of voters into constituencies on the basis of any other than territorial division is, unless in exceptional circumstances, unsound and undemocratic political practice. Political opinion is organised in parties on a national basis and any grouping which is not national in its scope will either fail to fit into any party system and so become ineffectual, or it will be the source of new parties which are not national in their purview and will create fissures in the body politic. A legislature split up into sectional groups (more especially if they are based on racial differences) cannot represent a unified national interest, would have nothing to hold it together, and is therefore liable to give rise to a dictatorial and irresponsible executive.

Representation by territorial constituencies, on the other hand, tends to counteract any such development because a large variety of interests is present in every locality, if widely enough demarcated. In each locality, there is, with varying exceptions and in differing degrees, a cross-section of society, and the total pattern of the nation is made up of the mutually complementary variations in the different constituencies. Representation should therefore always be on a territorial system, with local constituencies; and only in the most exceptional circumstances, and only as a supplementation of the territorial system, should there be any departure from this principle. The Institute maintains that no such exceptional circumstances exist in the case of the Cape Coloured people.

The Institute is of the opinion that the Cape Coloured people have absorbed Western ideas to the extent that they must be held to qualify for acceptance into the democratic state. They know no other language than Afrikaans and, to a lesser extent, English. Their culture is that of the Europeans of this country, as are their institutions. Hence, the Institute is at a loss to conceive on what grounds, other than grounds of racial prejudice and pride (which are inconsistent with the acceptance by Europeans

/ of christian democratic principles)

of christian democratic principles) the political segregation of the Cape Coloured people can be based. The Cape Coloured people have made undeniable progress educationally and economically and in the fields of religion, culture, and democratic responsibility and by doing so have established their right to the maintenance of the political position which they have enjoyed for a century. The Institute is not aware of any convincing evidence that their participation in the common roll has been abused by them or has had any detrimental effect on the well-being of the state. In the absence of adequate evidence to the contrary, the Institute is not prepared to consider allegations of political corruption and, even if such corruption should be established, the Institute does not consider it any justification for the deprivation of common rights, for such corruption implies a similar degree of corruption in the European candidates. And, surely, if corruption is held to make the Cape Coloured unfit to exercise the franchise on the common roll, it must equally unfit them to vote on a communal register. In the latter case, indeed, their unfitness in these terms would be a greater danger if they voted as a solid racial group than if their influence were dispersed over a number of predominantly European constituencies.

It should not be overlooked that a small compact body of even four representatives of the Cape Coloured people, elected by the Cape Coloured people to represent Cape Coloured interests, might well be in a position to play a decisive rôle in Parliament if the balance of power among European members depended upon a narrow majority. The very undesirable result would be that a racially sectional group of a few members, representing a small minority of the whole people, with a provoked sectional consciousness, could determine the course of policy in matters of the gravest import to the nation.

The alternative position which the Institute regards as no less undesirable is one in which a racially sectional group would find itself permanently in a small minority in Parliament, in which case its power to further the interests of the Cape Coloured people would prove futile. The existence of such a group in Parliament would mean that other members of

/ Parliament

Parliament would throw the entire burden of representing Coloured interests upon it but, as a small minority, it would be unable to affect legislative or administrative action to any significant degree. This is what has occurred since the Cape Africans were placed upon a separate roll. The three native representatives have come to be regarded as the protectors of African interests and other members of Parliament have tended to divest themselves of responsibility.

It seems hardly necessary to add that, should the establishment of a communal register for the Coloured people be combined with a limitation of the right of their elected representatives to vote in Parliament upon all issues, that would be a form of disfranchisement which they have done nothing to deserve and which they could not but resent very bitterly.

After 100 years of the exercise of normal democratic rights there can be no doubt that the Cape Coloured people are, and have been, considered to be adequately qualified to exercise the franchise on the common roll. In fact, the Institute goes further and suggests that the maintenance of civilized principles in South Africa demands the extension of the Cape Coloured franchise to the Northern Provinces, on the same basis as in the Cape Province and the enfranchisement of Cape Coloured women.

The Institute therefore is completely opposed to any measure which would transfer Coloured voters from the common roll to a communal register. It would oppose such a transfer no less strongly if the Coloured franchise were to be widened by the inclusion of women and extended to Provinces to which at present it is not applicable. Nor would the objections of the Institute be removed by an increase in the number of communally elected representatives, nor yet if Sections 26(d) and 44(c) of the South Africa Act were to be amended so as to enable Coloured persons to sit and vote in either or both of the Houses of the Union Parliament. Even in the unlikely event that the Coloured community were, by means of a referendum, to express itself as agreeable to transfer to a communal register on defined conditions the Institute would still deprecate such a change as undesirable in the interests

/ of the country

of the country as a whole. In fact, the majority of the Coloured community is known to be resolutely opposed to the suggested transfer, and the Institute expresses the earnest hope that the Commission, in its deliberations, will give due weight to the importance of considering not only the interests but also the feelings and susceptibilities of the people whom its recommendations will affect. The Institute is concerned to promote inter-racial harmony and good understanding, and is firmly persuaded that nothing but evil to the future of South Africa could result from the exacerbation of inter-racial tensions.

CIVILIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

In support of its attitude to the Bill, as expressed in the previous paragraphs, the Institute puts forward the following considerations: -

Civilization means a moral and political order evolved for the common good and is such that each member of society has the opportunity for the fullest development of his capacities and personality. In a christian country such civilization will be informed and permeated by the principles of christian living, namely, the brotherhood of man in its christian interpretation, the value of the individual and his potentialities, and the equality of the value of each man's personality, however different his functions and capabilities in society may be.

Democracy involves the acceptance of the recognition of personal responsibility, the indispensability of discussion and consultation as a means of reaching decisions as opposed to the acceptance of the word of authority, the equality of educational, moral and economic opportunity to all, and the acceptance of the impartial application of law. (c.f. Harris, White Civilization, attached).

The Institute believes that the maintenance and progress of "white" civilization in South Africa requires the recognition of these and other implicit values and it was in this belief that its Council passed the following resolution in 1950:-

"The Institute is convinced that the aim of statesmanship

/ in the Union

in the Union should be to find the basis for the development in all sections of a common attitude towards the ideals of Western Civilization expressed in a common loyalty to the state and in a standard of public and private life consonant with those ideals. For this reason the Council believes that the goal of racial policy should be attainment in due course of common citizenship by individuals of all races.

While adopting common citizenship as the goal of racial policy, the Council recognises that this cannot be reached at once because of the differences in conviction already mentioned and because of the wide range of differences in adjustment to Western Civilization, and that it is necessary in consequence to consider what attitude should be adopted towards measures which fall short of the goal. It believes that any measure which will take the Union along the road to the goal of common citizenship should be supported, and any measure that takes the Union in a different direction must be opposed. The Council must, therefore, express its emphatic dissent from any measure which withdraws the common franchise from those who now possess it

The acceptance of the description of civilization and democracy given above implies that the civilization which it is wished to preserve, and which is the product of many races, does not depend upon skin colour. It is civilized standards which must be maintained and there is no reason to believe that the acceptance of acculturated Non-Europeans into Western Civilization in any way constitutes a danger to it. The Institute further considers that the preservation of that civilization lies in the progressive improvement of educational and other living standards among the undeveloped section of our population with concurrent extension of civil and political rights with such safeguards as may be necessary to ensure that Western standards are preserved. The contrary policy, of which the Bill under consideration is an example and which involves the limitation of participation in the Western way of life

/ and a curtailment

and a curtailment of established civilized rights, does not safeguard, but rather menaces, the preservation of Western Civilization in South Africa.

The Institute realises that the situation in South Africa has certain distinctive features. South Africa has achieved sovereign independent status in the twentieth century; it has a large permanently settled and culturally advanced white minority; its "colonial" or undeveloped peoples are within its own boundaries. The Institute, however, considers that it is the bounden duty of the white ruling group in South Africa to extend christian and democratic values as rapidly as possible to such dependent peoples.

Democracy depends upon mutual trust and mutual responsibility as between citizens of the same state. It is the part of statesmanship in any democratic state to foster common interests and minimise differences. Recent application of democratic principles in other countries have had this objective in view and the Institute considers that common interests as South Africans are a greater bond for the greater good of South Africa than apparent sectional colour interests. The acceptance by the minority of majority decisions is an essential democratic convention but such acceptance depends on majority moderation and minority restraint for its effective working. The Institute considers that the Bill under consideration fails to display moderation and that a minority group elected on a communal basis, such as that suggested, would be under no moral or democratic obligation to accept majority decisions or to act with restraint. Indeed, the Institute is of the opinion that the Cape Coloured voters would tend to elect extreme representatives.

That such a tendency is possible has already been illustrated by the way the African communal vote has been exercised since 1936. The recent selection of communist candidates by African voters significantly shows the political influences to which African voters became subject under the system of a separate communal roll. By contrast, the Cape Coloured voters have shown no such tendencies. A danger of this nature is inherent in the system of communal representation for the Cape Coloured, a system to be introduced against the will of the majority of the Cape Coloured voters. By fomenting

/ their feelings

their feelings of grievance and resentment at political discrimination this tendency will undoubtedly be accelerated. The rigid representation which is suggested and which bears no relation to the increase of the Cape Coloured population or the increase in the number of qualified Cape Coloured voters will drive the Cape Coloured to continual agitation and unrest which will harden and antagonise European opinion. The institution of such a communal franchise will in no wise reduce the causes of European fear.

The safety of South Africa in war and its prosperity and, indeed its safety in time of peace, depend upon harmonious race relations. A communal franchise discriminatingly enforced to ensure white domination will make for racial antagonism, hinder peaceful progress for all in all spheres, material and spiritual, and lead to insecurity in times of war and give rise to internal dangers. South Africa cannot ignore or remain immune from developments in the world, -- in the rest of Africa, in the Soviet Union and in the East. Such developments must be taken into account if the good of the state is to be preserved.

HISTORY OF THE CAPE FRANCHISE

The Institute wishes to emphasise that the principles and view which it has put forward underlay the constitutional development of the Cape and that experience there bears out its contentions. The Cape Coloured Commission of 1937, after an examination of the history of the political position of the Cape Coloured, recommended that the franchise privilege held by the Coloured peoples in the Cape Province should be extended to include the Coloured people resident in the other three provinces who hold the necessary qualifications.

The following is a summary of the history of the Cape Coloured franchise and the Institute draws particular attention to the fact that the Native Affairs Commission of 1903-05 suggested a communal franchise for Africans but not for the Cape Coloured and that the Cape representatives at the National Convention were so fully in favour of their own common roll that they did not raise the question of a communal franchise at all. It was not until 1930 that the Cape Coloured were first differentiated against, and

/ since that time

since that time the power of the Cape Coloured voters has been diminished by successive enactments.

BEFORE UNION

Before 1836, elected representatives of the people played no part in the government of the Cape, but in that year, with Municipal Ordinance No. 9 of 1836, provision was made for the election of Municipal Boards on the basis of a franchise which did not make distinctions on grounds of colour: all men could vote and stand for election provided they were in possession of the necessary property qualification. In 1846, consequent on Lord Durham's Report (1839) on Canada, the principle of representative institutions for the Cape was accepted, provided there was no political discrimination against the Cape Coloured. The 1853 Constitution for the Cape entitled a man to register as a voter and to stand for election to the House of Assembly if he earned £50 p.a., or if he earned £25 p.a. and was supplied with board and lodging, or if he occupied a house and land with a combined value of £25. If he wished to stand for the Upper House, he could do so if he owned immoveable property worth £2,000 clear of mortgage, or moveable and immoveable property together worth £4,000 clear of debts. These rights were given to European and Non-European alike; it was a common roll franchise.

The incorporation of British Kaffraria in 1865 and of the Transkeian Territories between 1872 and 1894 induced a change in attitude, for the Africans so incorporated were relatively primitive. So the Parliamentary Regulations Act of 1887 stiffened registration regulations and declared that a share held in tribal lands did not entitle an African to a vote. In 1892, the Franchise and Ballot Act raised the economic qualifications for the vote and introduced an educational test; a man had to earn £50 a year or occupy a house and land together worth £75 and he had to be able to sign his name and write his address and occupation. This did not raise a racial or colour bar, for it applied to all races. Both Africans and Cape Coloured could qualify for the vote on these terms. This position endured in the Cape till 1910.

/ In the northern territories

In the northern territories, namely the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Natal, the position was otherwise. In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State the franchise was open to all European men, irrespective of education or property qualifications, and closed to all Non-Europeans including the Cape Coloured. This was in pursuance of the policy that there was to be no equality either in church or in state between European and Non-European. This was the position at the time of Union.

In Natal, the Royal Charter of 1856 laid down only age (21 years) and economic qualifications for the franchise. In 1865, however, Law No. 11 of 1865 was specially introduced to disfranchise Africans who, though possessing the necessary property qualification for the franchise, were subject to the special Code of Native Law. The Franchise Amendment Law of 1883 maintained this exclusion but nothing in the law affected Cape Coloured or those Africans who were not subject to the special Code of Native Law. In 1896, Indians were excluded but nothing in these laws affected the Cape Coloured people or those Africans who were not under the Code of Native Law. There were only 186 Non-European voters in Natal at the time of Union (1910).

THE UNION

The Native Affairs Commission of 1903-05, as has already been mentioned, first formally recommended the idea of a communal franchise but this suggestion was made only in connection with Africans, not the Cape Coloured. It was apparently considered that the adoption of such a communal system would make it possible for some form of communal representation to be given to Africans in the other colonies as well as the Cape. The former Colonies were averse to a Native franchise, even on these terms, and the Cape representatives at the National Convention were so firmly in favour of their own common roll that they did not raise the matter of a communal franchise at all. Merriman in evidence before the Commission said that the Cape franchise worked well, and that a communal franchise was undesirable, that it would not "keep the natives out of politics", that it would make the party struggle for native votes more acute, that such votes might constitute the balance of power in the House or

/ might give rise to

might give rise to an "Irish party" in the House (i.e., an extreme group outside party alignments which could, in certain circumstances, hold the balance of power).

It is only in recent years that the Cape Coloured vote has been challenged. It was taken so much for granted at the time of Union that only the Native franchise was referred to when discussing safeguards. Similarly, in the debates of the Cape Parliament on the draft constitution during the special session of 1909, the emphasis was entirely on whether or not the Native vote was adequately protected.

At the time of Union the position was that,

- (a) The Cape Coloured people in the Cape were fully enfranchised, and enjoyed full political rights with Europeans;
- (b) In Natal, there was no constitutional discrimination between Coloured and White persons;
- (c) In the Transvaal and O.F.S., the Coloured people were granted no franchise rights at all.

The effect of Union was that the customary franchise in the Cape was maintained but the right to elect Non-Europeans to Parliament was eliminated. In Natal the position of the Cape Coloured remained as before but no further applications for registration from Asiatics and Africans would be entertained. The political colour bar in the Transvaal and Free State was maintained. The existing franchise rights of Cape Non-Europeans were safeguarded by the entrenched clauses.

SINCE UNION

Since Union there has been a relative diminution of the Cape Coloured vote. The Women's Enfranchisement Act of 1930 halved the importance of the Cape Coloured vote for it enfranchised European women but not Cape Coloured women. The Franchise Laws Amendment Act No. 41 of 1931 abolished the existing property qualification for Europeans and extended the franchise to every white person over 21 years of age. The Electoral Consolidation Act of 1946 made it possible to challenge Non-Europeans on the Provisional Voters List to

/ appear in person

appear in person or by proxy to establish their qualifications at a Magistrate's Court under pain of being struck off the List. The Electoral Laws Amendment Act No. 50 of 1948 made it obligatory on Cape Coloured men applying for registration to fill in their application forms before a magistrate, police officer or electoral officer. Act 40 of 1945 had already made provision for the preparation of separate rolls for each electoral division for white men, white women, and Non-Europeans respectively, for compulsory registration of European voters and compulsory notification of changes of address: no such provision applied to Cape Coloured voters. The threat of ultimate absolute diminution of the Cape Coloured voters' power is contained in the form of the Separate Representation of Voters Bill.

OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE

In further elaboration of its thesis that the communal representation suggested for the Cape Coloured people must be emphatically rejected, the Institute wishes to draw attention to the experience of other multi-racial and multi-religious countries where communal representation has been rejected. From the material at the Institute's disposal it is evident,

- (a) that the object of the constitutional experimentation which is going on in various parts of the world is to enlarge the participation of all members of the state in the political affairs of the country, not to limit or diminish such participation, as is the intention of the Bill under review; and
- (b) that general experience seems to confirm that communal franchise is, on the whole, not a success and is not advantageous to the countries concerned.

The Institute draws particular attention to the experience of Ceylon and to the suggestions put forward for Tanganyika (also see other material enclosed).

In Ceylon where full self-government is envisaged though not yet attained, the aim has been the formation of a unitary state, despite contrasting religious and racial differences in the population. There, under the latest constitution (1950), the 95 members of the House of Representatives are

/ elected

elected on a universal adult suffrage. Electoral divisions are based on population and the area of the provinces. The latter factor is introduced on account of the need to give adequate representation to such minorities as the Tamils without bringing in a system of separate electoral rolls. There is also a proviso that lays down that if in any province there is a substantial concentration of persons united by a community of interests, whether social, religious or otherwise, but differing in one or some of these respects from the inhabitants of the area, that Province may be so delimited into constituencies as to render possible the representation of that interest. Such provisions modify the strict application of the "one man one vote" principle.

Ceylon is of particular interest because initially the communal system was introduced to meet the expected sectional minority interests of Ceylon Tamil, Indian Tamil, Muslim, Coloured and European groups. The Sinhalese are in a numerical majority as the following table shows:-

Racial Group

Eurasians	6,000
Burgers and Eurasians	48,000
Sinhalese	5,236,000
Ceylon Tamils	831,000
Indian Tamils	885,000
Ceylon Moors	423,000
Indian Moors	40,000
Malays	25,000
Veddas	3,000
Others	47,000

The Donoughmore Report (1928), dealing with the operation of the communal system in Ceylon, stated, "Communal representation was devised with a view to assisting the development of democratic institutions in countries with different races and religions and in the hope of eliminating the clash of these varying interests during elections. It was expected to provide peacefully an effective legislative assembly which would give a fair representation of the different elements in the population and would also promote unity. Unfortunately, the experiment has not given the desired results, but has had, if anything, the opposite effect. The representatives of the various communities do not trust

/ one another

one another, and communal representation has not helped to develop a uniting bond or link. The minority communities are fearful that any preponderance of governmental power held by another community will eventually be used against them. Communal representation in Ceylon has no great antiquity to commend it, and its introduction into the constitution with good intention has had unfortunate results." The Donoughmore Commission recommended territorial representation and on that recommendation the constitution of Ceylon was based until 1950.

The 1945 Soulbury Commission, after an examination of the working of the constitution over the previous 15 years, recommended the scheme at present in operation. In arriving at its recommendations it remarks, -- "There is, it is true, abundant evidence to show that the hopes of the Donoughmore Commission that communal tension would eventually disappear as a result of territorial representation, have so far not been realised. For instance, no Sinhalese has any prospect of election in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where the Ceylon Tamils predominate The electors undoubtedly tend to vote on racial and, to some extent, religious grounds." But the report later goes on, -- "We therefore reject any proposal calculated to reinforce the communal basis of election, and we prefer to develop the territorial method. We think, however, that there is force in the contention of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress that territorial representation under present conditions tends to become simply numerical representation, and it seems to us that to that extent, and in the light of results, the recommendations of the Donoughmore Commission have pressed too hardly upon the minorities".

Of particular interest is the new approach to racial problems contained in the Report published by ^{the} Tanganyika Government and the British Colonial Office in April 1953. Tanganyika is a dependent territory, has an African population of seven million, an Asian community of 60,000, and a white settler community of 20,000. Under the proposals now being considered, the introduction of a common roll with a limited franchise for all voters is suggested. The franchise would be based on an educational qualification (a knowledge of English

/ being required)

being required) to ensure that all the electors were of about the same educational standard and capable of grasping general political issues in the same way, and through the same media of political communication. Under these proposals, each of the groups would be entitled to seven representatives in the Legislative Council but the Government would still maintain an official majority. As an experiment, each constituency in the larger urban areas would elect one European, one Asian, and one African. Candidates would have to be accredited members of the appropriate race, each backed by a strong list of nominators from his own racial group. Electors would vote in the usual way, but each voter would have three votes. They could use only one vote and cast it for a candidate of their own race; they could use all three votes but cast them all for different candidates of one race; or they could cast a vote for three candidates, one from each race. This would mean that members of the three groups would all have a share in deciding who should be the representatives of each constituency. It should be noted in relation to Tanganyika that the proposals are a step towards democratic self-government.

In drawing attention to these, and to other constitutional developments, the Institute wishes to emphasise that the trends in the world today are towards a full application of the common franchise, not towards communalism. The Institute is not aware of any examples of a change from the common roll to the communal franchise. On the contrary, the communal franchise is regarded as a transition stage on the road to self-government and especially appropriate to the needs of undeveloped peoples who have no experience of democratic procedures. This, most emphatically, the Coloured people are not. The Institute condemns the Bill under consideration as retrogressive.

RECOMMENDATION THAT A COMMISSION BE APPOINTED

While the Institute has directed its attention particularly towards the Cape Coloured franchise, it is naturally concerned with the repercussions of the implementation of the Separate Representation of Voters Act on other Non-European groups. While it realises that the political representation of all Non-Europeans is outside the terms of reference of the Commission, it

/ would, nevertheless,

would, nevertheless, respectfully suggest that the Commission recommend the setting up of a Commission to study constitutional developments in other multi-racial countries and to travel to such other relevant countries to examine the functioning of such constitutions in situ.

C O N C L U S I O N

In conclusion, the Institute is of the opinion that unless the present status of the Cape Coloured people is maintained, racial friction will increase over the next few years, and the highly undesirable position be reached that European and Non-European blocs will face each other in bitter and mutually destructive animosity.

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NOTES ON SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN
OTHER COUNTRIES WITH HETEROGENEOUS POPULATIONS

Countries where the principle of the common roll is accepted

In several countries with heterogeneous populations there is full adult suffrage, with all voters listed on a common roll. The United States is a notable example. In Israel, in spite of the tension there has been between Jews and Arabs, the latter have been enfranchised on the same basis as the Jews, Christians and Druzes. The population of Jamaica consists (1951 estimates) of 966,000 Africans, 227,000 of mixed descent, 21,000 East Indians, 14,000 Europeans and 9,000 others: in elections for the lower house (House of Representatives) all vote on a common roll. Adult suffrage has recently been introduced in Burma.

There are other countries in which the aim is an eventual common roll of voters but, for various reasons, this has not yet been fully achieved. In India, for example, where certain fundamental rights are entrenched in the constitution, it has been considered necessary to arrange that, for a period of ten years, certain seats in the House of the People shall be reserved for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in proportion to their numbers. Further, ten of the total of 489 members are nominated to represent such areas as Kashmir, the tribal areas of Assam, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, where it has not been feasible to hold elections.

In other territories where certain population groups, or portions of these, are less experienced than the rest in the ways of Western democracy, modifications of the common roll are at present employed. In the Gold Coast, while all adults get the vote, direct elections have been so far held in urban areas only: in rural areas they take place through electoral colleges. In French African territories, Europeans and those Africans who have been granted French citizenship vote on one roll and African local citizens who can produce proof of identity vote on another; but both groups vote for members of the same legislative body, and may elect members of any racial group. Full

Maoris of New Zealand are registered on a separate roll and elect four Maoris to the House of Representatives; half Maoris can register on the Maori roll or the general roll, entirely at their option, and all who are less than half Maori vote on the common roll with the Whites. Further, Maoris can stand for Parliament in common roll constituencies: Sir James Carroll, a Maori who has been Acting Prime Minister, represented a predominantly White constituency. The population of New Zealand is composed as follows:

Population 1952

White and Mixed	1,865,442
Full-blooded Maoris	119,288

Certain other countries require members of groups so far inexperienced in Western democratic government to qualify for the franchise. This applies in French African territories, where, to obtain the vote, Africans must be able to establish their identity by being in possession of labour cards or certain licences. It applies, too, in the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mocambique: here decision as to the fitness of an African for assimilated status, and the franchise on the common roll which is consequent on this, rests with the local administrator. A common voters' roll with a qualified franchise, the same for all racial groups, has been adopted in Southern Rhodesia, where the franchise qualification includes residential and literacy requirements together with an income qualification of £240 per annum or a property qualification of £500.

Ceylon is of particular interest in that, as a result of the Donoughmore recommendations of 1928, the system of communal representation was replaced by common roll elections based on adult suffrage. Difficulties arose, however, over representation of minorities; and to safeguard the interests of minority groups such as Tamils, Moors and Malays, the constitution of 1947 provided for the Delimitation Commissions to take into account the racial and religious as well as the territorial distribution of the population.

Other systems of representation

In certain British African territories, for example, Kenya, Uganda,

/ Northern Rhodesia,

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