



Being on the Point of quitting this Place, it has occurred to me that it cannot be useless, and possibly may lead to a beneficial Purpose, that I should reduce to some Order as to bring into one point of view, the various Memorandums I have occasionally made upon the Subject of defence, and particularly with respect to the Works which have been constructed by my direction, — The reason I mean to present to my Successor not as pretending arrogantly to mark out a Line for him to pursue, but merely for the purpose of giving him that Information, which I conceive to be the duty of every Officer to furnish to those who follow him in a Command, but which it is their province to apply according to their own Judgement.

Exclusive of Table Bay, there are

are three other Points which appear to be the only ones open to the attempt of an Enemy as to landing, and I shall begin with these because any Operations which commence at any of them, must all ultimately terminate at the Town which therefore naturally prevents itself as the conclusion of what I shall have occasion to offer.

These three Points are Saldanha, Table, and Houti bays. Table Bay I shall include as a part of Table Bay, because a landing there must be effected from Ships lying in that Bay.

Saldanha is not a dangerous Point, the Bay is excellent and totally without defence, there is therefore nothing to prevent an Enemy from taking possession of it, and he might even post himself in it, in such a manner as to bid defiance to any Attack from the Sea— but in attempting to carry on Operations from thence against the Cape Town he would meet with insuperable Difficulties— the distance is from 75 to 80 Miles. the Road in most part sandy and heavy— Water in Summer extremely scarce and the Habitations very thinly scattered

scattered— with every assistance he  
 will derive from the most willing co-  
 operation of the Country, and unmo-  
 lested by us, He would find it almost  
 impracticable to bring here the im-  
 mense and slow necessary to over-  
 come the slightest degree of resistance  
 which would oblige him to raise a  
 Battery, while his Men just come off  
 a long voyage, would be little capa-  
 ble of encountering the fatigue of  
 a March of such a length thro' such  
 a Country— We must however sup-  
 pose the attempt. I have hitherto  
 thought it sufficient to watch the Bay  
 and have the Road lined by regular  
 Stages, so as to give the earliest Infor-  
 mation of the coming on of any fleet.  
 This can be conveyed to us in from  
 12 to 14 Hours. My Object then is  
 to drive off all the cattle of the Coun-  
 try and for this purpose it will be  
 proper as soon as the Cavalry is in  
 order to have a post of 20 or 30 Men  
 somewhere on the shores of the Bay,  
 to be at hand to begin with those  
 Farms which might otherwise be  
 within the reach of the Enemy  
 before

11  
before the Cavalry from the top  
could arrive. There are not above  
half a dozen Farms within twenty  
Miles, so that the Business would  
be easily and speedily effected, and  
may be accomplished by the Men  
above abovementioned without any  
further help, provided the charge  
of it be committed to an Officer who  
is well acquainted with all the farms  
thruout. This alone is sufficient  
to prevent his advancing into the  
Country. It would however be pro-  
per and necessary to push up a  
strong body perhaps the whole of  
the Cavalry to cover the Country &  
to cut off all communication between  
the Enemy and the Inhabitants.  
With two Regiments of Cavalry  
this will be easily effected; the ne-  
cessity of supporting them with  
Infantry must depend upon the  
Strength of the Enemy and the Cir-  
cumstances of the Moment. It  
must be done with caution—The best  
Infantry cannot return under a  
four Days March, while a few  
Men will bring a Fleet into this  
Bay from Salasubá in six Hours.

and if a Landing is effected before they return your Infantry would be cut off.

with respect to the Inhabitants they are timid and not likely to attempt any thing serious by themselves particularly against Cavalry which they are in great dread, they must however be strictly watched, and it should be remembered that treachery will tempt even "pious" Lanimity ..

The Cattle and Horses of the Country being carefully secured, I consider any attempt to march towards the Cape Town to be utterly impracticable, but little as I think an attack on the Cape Town from Saldanha bay is to be apprehended, I however consider it as a point of great importance in another view. An Enemy may from thence endeavour to throw a small body of Men into the Interior of the Country to raise the Inhabitants and to prevent their supplying Cape Town with Provisions, Every Endeavour must be used to prevent the Success of such a measure, and as the Country is for a vast extent  
one

one immense Plain in which Cavalry can act in every line and in every direction, I think it will not be difficult to cut up any detachment which may hazard the attempt. The same Step of drawing the Country will in this Instance be of the most essential consequence. Without Cattle the progress of an Enemy must be slow and attended with every inconvenience and he must necessarily be unaccompanied by Artillery. —

False Bay is of more consequence. It is the general Opinion of the Officers of the Navy, that during the Winter Months, viz from May to August, no Fleet will venture to lie in False Bay more particularly if deprived of the benefit of <sup>the</sup> harbours in which Ships usually anchor, and which is all under our Guns; during the above mentioned Period therefore it appears that False bay must be looked up to as the most probable point of attack.

During the Months alluded to the Weather is boisterous and stormy and False bay will not admit

admit of any Flatachony except in  
that part of it which is called Semens  
Bay — Single Ships may indeed an-  
chor for a Night or two, but even such  
would be in great danger if they had  
not the Harbour of Semens Bay in  
which to take Shelter, in case of its  
coming to blow from the Southward  
which it frequently does with great  
Violence, but it is certain that no  
fleet especially if encumbered with  
Transports will venture the Experi-  
ment. It has therefore appeared to  
me that if we can prevent the Enemy  
from making use of the anchorage  
of Semens Bay, he must very soon a-  
bandon his attempt from that quar-  
ter —

To effect this I think nothing  
more necessary than to secure the  
battery at the South Point in such  
a manner that the Enemy cannot  
help himself of it in that Space  
of Time beyond which he will not  
venture to lie in the open exposed  
Road of False Bay, because I lay it  
down as an Axiom "That no Ship  
can lie at anchor under the fire of even  
a single Gun" and he therefore  
cannot



round anchor in Simons bay while we remain in possession of South battery, the guns of which command every yard of it.

The Tower which I have constructed in the rear of the battery is with this view. It appears to me that it cannot be taken by any other means than by erecting batteries for the purpose of battering it down and the walls being six feet thick even that will not be accomplished in a short time. But every impediment must be thrown in his way before he is in a situation to erect a Battery against the Tower. The landing places are difficult Kalk's bay is the best - this we have abatised and have placed two guns in such a situation that they cannot be affected by any fire of small vessels or Gun boats from which they are covered by an Emplacement. A slight breast work has likewise been thrown up to furnish a fire of Musquetry on the Abatis, at which the Men

a. A Proportion of Provision and other necessaries should be sent on to the Tower

need

1  
need not show themselves till such  
time as the near approach of the En-  
emy's boats would render it dan-  
gerous for their Objects to fire.

As the Bay is small and boats  
to bring any Number of Men must  
be very much crowded and of course  
must suffer severely from the fire  
of the Guns, I consider this point  
to be tolerably secure.

The Shore of Vie-Hoske bay is  
seldom accessible from the great Surf  
which usually breaks upon it, it is  
however sometimes and two eighteen  
Pounders have been placed so as to  
flank it without being themselves  
liable, <sup>to be opposed</sup> by any Ships or Gun boats—  
but the opposite or West end is the  
easiest of access and it was my in-  
tention before the return of the Sea-  
son to place two smaller Guns on  
that Side. 6

6 This has not been done

6  
This bay is pretty similar  
ly situated to Vie-hoske bay, it is  
however considerably smaller and  
not near so liable to an inconvenient  
Surf. This is the most practicable  
Landing on the coast, and is defen-  
ded by two eight pounders placed  
on the same principle as the two  
heavy

heavy guns in Vis-à-vis bay.

There is another landing near the North battery which is under its guns. Two very small bays to the south of the Tower have been abandoned and are each defended by a gun, but they will require that both abatis and the parapets before the guns should be repaired before the season sets in the sand being blown away from the latter and some small beaches being in the former.

Notwithstanding these precautions and tho' I am clear that every possible exertion should be made to prevent it, yet I think a determined Enemy will land; the accessible part of the coast being too extensive to be guarded effectually — but I do not think by any means that his object will be therefore attained — hemmed in by the Post at Muisenberg; harassed every moment as he ought to be by the light Infantry and Hottentots from the surrounding Hills — with a communication with his Ships upon which he

can never depend for two Minutes to-  
 gether I think he will be extremely  
 puzzled how to proceed to make him-  
 self Master of the South battery with-  
 out which I suspect his Ships can-  
 not enter Amoy bay and will not  
 dare remain in false bay — The ut-  
 most care must be taken that all Guns  
 be effectually spiked when they are  
 abandoned for which purpose the  
 commanding Officer of Artillery  
 has had orders to fabricate a num-  
 ber of Spikes of a proper construction  
 and every Non commissioned Officer  
 should constantly have four or five  
 in a leathern case made on purpose.  
 During the Months alluded to of May  
 June July & August the Post of  
 Marsemburg becomes of infinite  
 importance. It is in itself exceeding  
 strong and may be long defend-  
 ed. It may be affirmed as a cer-  
 tainty that no landing can be  
 effected behind it; the Surf is  
 generally so violent that no  
 Boat with Troops will venture to  
 approach the Shore. I am sure  
 I am within bounds when I say  
 that

that the contrary does not occur  
 six times in a year, and then the  
 extraordinary tranquillity of the  
 Water does not last above an hour  
 or two till the turn of the tides  
 We have built a number of Fleets  
 on the Heights at Muisenberg  
 calculated to secure them and  
 flank the approach. Some-  
 thing further may be done to  
 the main Work — in particu-  
 lar the Battery of two twenties  
 four pounders towards the  
 Sea should be altered. The pre-  
 sent construction is bad as a Ship  
 may easily be out of the range of  
 the embrasures and do all the Mis-  
 chief which a Ship in that Si-  
 tuation is intended to do, by en-  
 velading the Lion, or taking it  
 in Reverse, while it is attack'd  
 in front. —

It was my intention to  
 put them on traversing carriages  
 having the Truck in front, &  
 to place them, one at the angle  
 where they now are, and the other  
 at the angle of the Orpalement  
 on the right of the road, so that

(This is now doing)

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they both might fire in every direc-  
tion towards the Sea and along the  
Road.

A perfect knowledge of the Works  
on the right of the passage of Muisemborg  
will be found to be indispensably neces-  
sary in the Officer who is likely to be  
entrusted with the defence of that line.  
Without the help of the plan it is not  
easy to describe it and I found it  
difficult to make myself Master  
of it. The Sandy Valley which ter-  
minates in the Shore of Vis-hook Bay  
intersects the Country from Sea to Sea  
and if an Enemy notwithstanding  
every Effort to prevent him should  
land in Simons Town in fact and  
should commence his Operations from  
thence as we did, the line of rocky  
heights on this Side the Valley may  
be taken up as the first line of de-  
fence upon a thorough Examination  
it will be found to be strong.

From the Valley above mention-  
ed there are three passages into the  
plain towards the Cape, Muisemborg  
is the first, a path which leads down  
the precipice behind Vompans's House

is

as the next; and another Path  
 leading by Lind Neck into Thote  
 bay is the third; — The two last are  
 scarcely practicable were for Infan-  
 try; but to guard against every  
 possible event it were much to be  
 wished and would certainly be  
 proper in the System which  
 may in future be adopted for  
 the defence of this Settlement, to  
 be executed in the leisure of Peace,  
 that the important pass of  
 Muisenberg should be defended  
 by a small fort calculated equal-  
 ly against an attack from either  
 side, at present if by any means  
 a body of Men was to penetrate by  
 either of the other Passes which  
 I have mentioned, difficult as  
 they are — or should by a fortu-  
 nate concurrence of circumstances  
 as to Wind and Water be able to  
 land on the beach to the North-  
 ward of Muisenberg — that  
 Post would be turned and must  
 be abandoned — whereas if it  
 were secured on both Sides the  
 Enemy having penetrated by

any other means would be of no consequence while the only Road by which he could bring Cannon or Provisions, remained barred to him.

From this short description it will be obvious that a strong Corps must be kept in the Mountains to the right of Muisenberg; and the Pass by Nord Hoek must also be carefully guarded, because it affords a Route by which to advance small Bodies of light Troops to act on the Enemy's flank, and on his communication while he is carrying on his Operations against Muisenberg.

On the whole I consider our Situation <sup>to be extremely strong</sup> towards False-bay for in the first place I look upon it to be very difficult for an Enemy to possess himself of the Anchorage of Simons bay - and without it I deem it to be impossible that he should venture to remain in False bay - and in the next place admitting he should have the good fortune to succeed in possessing himself of Simons bay, I think that the ground to be defended from there is so strong that he will find it still



Still more difficult to advance from it while the barrens of the country thereabouts will ensure to us that he will not be able to procure any Refreshment to recover his Men from the Fatigues of a long Voyage which he will probably have undergone to arrive at this Place.

Before I quit this place it may be proper to remark, that there is a bay towards the Cape in Kala bay, at which an Enemy may land, but it is in a barren Desert which will afford him no real Article of Necessity or Comfort. The landing Place is at the distance of 14 or 15 Miles from Semow Thoon and is cut off from it by a ridge of rocky Heights in which are only two narrow Passes extremely difficult and admitting at most of four Men abreast. This Route is not dangerous, it ought nevertheless to be watched.

The Country on this Side of Meuvemberg coming towards Weyberg should be known and thoroughly studied - There are three Paths by which an Enemy

The first by the beach following it for a considerable distance, till all the Lagoons are passed - from thence there are several Roads, which lead across the Common - This Way is extremely circuitous and bad.

The next is by the Road which leads on the left of the Lagoons towards Constatitia, and

The third by the direct and straight Road to Weynberg. - The Care will of course have been taken to prevent his acquiring any Cattle or Horses, the Artillery which he will have been able to bring with him will be few and his Progress will be slow - British Sailors alone can drag Guns in the Way we did when we advanced on that Road - I conceive that with such a powerful Corps of Cavalry as we possess - With a command of Resources to draw any Number of Guns and with a peculiar acquaintance with the Ground an Action may here be hazarded against almost any Superiority of Numbers and with a fair prospect of success. The Ground is in many parts (particularly in the

the direct route to Wigniberg) very favourable to Cavalry, and Guns may be advanced in almost every direction under cover of the Marshes to act on the Enemy's Flanks. These Marshes form the principal Feature in the Country and ought to be well known. One Range of them runs from the head of the Lagoon by Chateau's House (Berg-bleet) towards Constantin, sending off two or three branches to the left towards the Mountain, at the foot of which stands Roujocain's House. This Marsh is mostly impassable, except where the roads intersect it, and in Winter time even they are sometimes very difficult.

The other Range of Marsh runs from the deep River at the Foot of Wigniberg Hill with a westerly course till it expands into several small Lakes or Lagoons among the Sand Hills. This Marsh is very difficult and scarcely passable except just at the small Stream or deep River. The Distance between the two is somewhere much

above a mile. The direct Road to Weyberg runs in this Space, in the latter part, thro' a fine Plain, favourable to Cavalry — Weyberg itself is a favourable Post for a small Corps to receive any other Body, who might be forced to retreat upon it — but is no Post at all with a View of covering the Town, as in the first place it is too extensive for any body of Troops which will probably be employed there, to be able to stretch sufficiently to the right to the Mountain, and in the next place it can always be turned by its left, either by passing the Marsh of the deep River in some of the places where it is passable though with difficulty — or by the beach, from whence there are several Roads which lead across the Common to the Town.

It must be observed that the Lagoons into which the Deep River expands do not reach to the beach.

Stout Bay does not appear to be a dangerous point of attack — it will not hold above four or five Ships with safety and with a southerly

smoothly would it would be difficult for them to get out again, should they find it necessary to do so. — As there is but one farm in the Valley it would be easily known and the Country is very defensible from thence towards the Town.

The Principle upon which the Defense of this Bay has been taken up is similar to that which has been adopted with respect to Somers Bay, viz that no Ship can lie at anchor under the fire of any Battery however small — We have here a battery of five eighteen pounders and a Howitzer which command very much of the bay. what seemed necessary therefore to be done, was to secure this battery in such a manner, that an Enemy could not become Master of it by a sudden Landing of a number of Men — for this purpose a stone Block House or fortified Barnack has been erected, which is thought to be impregnable unless attacked with Cannon, and to land and bring Cannon to bear upon it will require more time

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than Ships will venture to be under  
the fire of the Gun — besides Can-  
non can only bear on it from one  
Point towards which an Angle of the  
Building is presented so that the  
Shot would strike the Wall obliquely;  
it would therefore be sometime be-  
fore the Effect was considerable —  
The Block House has a Tank for  
Water and should always be sup-  
plied with a Months provision  
besides the daily consumption.

The Path which I have for-  
merly mentioned as leading over  
Nord-Moek into the bay, goes from  
the Block House and in the event  
of an Enemy landing at Simons  
Town would become of importance.  
A path also leads from Houte bay  
to Kampi's bay which the difficulty  
ought to be well known and careful-  
ly watched.

Whilst I am upon the Sub-  
ject of Houte bay it may not be  
improper to notice that altho' it  
appears to me to be too inconsid-  
erable to hold any thing like the  
Number of Ships which would be  
necessary in order to commence a  
serious

serious Attack from thence—Yet  
 in case of an Enemy's being in false  
 bay or. Master of Simon's Town,  
 a Detachment might be made from  
 their Fleet to land a body of troops  
 at Hout Bay with the view of  
 marching rapidly from thence  
 to turn the Post at Mousenberg  
 and oblige us to evacuate it. This  
 would however be a desperate at-  
 tempt and such as I think no  
 prudent Enemy would undertake  
 especially when he finds his Sup-  
 ply could not be there, a Te-  
 heat would therefore be imprac-  
 ticable, the transporting of Guns  
 would probably be equally so; &  
 the March at least the ten Miles.  
 The possibility however of such  
 an Event shews the expediency  
 of guarding against it, and  
 points out still more evidently  
 the propriety of having an in-  
 closed Work defensible every Way  
 at the important Place of—  
 Mousenberg

Another Bath from Hout's  
 Bay should be attended to, it

leads along the coast to Kamfir Bay, is extremely difficult and is intersected with deep and strong Rarivus: it appears to be practicable only for Men on foot, but it should be however, as circumstances may arise to matter of consequence — at every place it should be guarded —

There is likewise a small bay which affords a landing under what is called the false Liver head — the Hill which shows like a Sugar Loaf in the Valley of White Bay — It does seem however to be of consequence as there is no anchorage near.

Before I quit the Subject of the different Landings and come to that of Table Bay, I must take notice of Gordon's bay, which is in False bay, opposite to Simon's bay, and at the foot of the Mountains that separate this part of the Country from that which is usually called Over-borg. This bay is not well <sup>known</sup> altho some of our small Ships have visited it, it appears to me however to be a very bad one particularly in that Season of the Year in which False-bay is frequented, as it is entirely open



open to the North West Winds,  
which then blow with great Violence

I am very clear that no  
fleet of any considerable Number  
of Ships will hazard the anchoring  
there nor will a serious attack be  
even attempted from thence. The  
distance from Stellenbosch is  
from 12 to 14 Miles, and from  
Taverner's Bay about thirty. In  
case of an Enemy being... in Table  
Bay it would however be proper to  
watch this part, as it would fur-  
nish an access to a plentiful  
Country where a considerable  
Number of Cattle and Horses  
would fall into their hands  
immediately. —

I now come to Table Bay  
and the immediate defence of the  
Taverner's Bay. It is from the former alone  
that I think an Attack can be  
made with any prospect of Success,  
and it is at the latter that all at-  
tempts must ultimately termi-  
nate. During the Months of May  
June, July, & August as I have  
already observed the Weather is  
usually boisterous, and the pre-  
vailing Winds which frequently  
blow with great Violence are from

the North West.

The general Opinion of the Officers of Navy, is that no Fleet can anchor in this Bay during these Months, and that an Attack must therefore during that Period commence from false Bay. Altho' I am very much of this Opinion myself, yet I have never supposed it to lead me to strengthen the Defences of False Bay, or as to hazard those of this Town - The Corps at Weynberg was always at hand to return in two Hours time and a disposition for the purpose was given to all the Officers commanding at the different Posts. So that the instant the Troops at Weynberg were called to the Town, they were replaced from those at Muisinsberg & these again <sup>by</sup> a lesser Number from Somers Town, all which could be executed at a Moments Notice by a Signal from the Devils Hill; and these Precautions have appeared to me the more necessary because I have frequently seen a Series of fogs weather in the Winter of several days together, during which a Fleet might have anchored here with the greatest Safety. In

In what I shall have occasion further to say, I beg it may be always remembered that I mean only to avail myself of the usual <sup>books</sup> Memorandums and different <sup>books</sup> Sketch which I have occasionally committed to Paper, in order to lay down a connected Series of Information to offer to my Successor in which I shall doubtless be frequently to observe upon my own intentions & ideas, but that it is by no means my Object to enter into the Minute of detail which would only be necessary were I drawing up an Instruction for others, which I am far from having the presumption to think myself entitled to do on this occasion.

A Fleet may anchor in almost every part of the bay, certainly without Gunshot of any one of our Batteries — The best and most probable place is within Olsen Island, towards the eastern Shore. In this Point he will suffer little difficulty, tho' it is an Object to oblige him to do it as far off as possible.

Off Queen Point he may anchor  
 very near and where at present no Gun  
 can reach him. It has long been my  
 intention to remove the Battery at  
 Grote Mouille from its present po-  
 sition where it appears to be useless  
 with respect to preventing a landing  
 and where it could be very soon over-  
 run by a large Ship, which could come  
 within 300 Yds of it.

I meant to withdraw it &  
 put the six and thirty Rowers in  
 such a Situation as to have a conse-  
 derable Range towards Robben Island  
 and towards the eastern Shore with  
 the sole View of keeping Ships as  
 far off as possible - but in order to  
 place them to the best advantage it  
 would be necessary to know, how  
 near to the Point at which they now  
 are towards Kamp's Bay, Ships  
 can anchor with safety. This In-  
 formation which can only be obtain-  
 ed by sounding the Admiral has  
 promised to procure for me

It may be proper here to  
 observe that Ships of the line and  
 Frigates can anchor at the following  
 distances

distances from the under men-  
tioned objects.

	Length of the Lines	Fathoms
Off Green Point	500 yds	400
— Grote Meulle	300	200
— the same Battery	400	300
— Amsterdam	700	—
— Salthem Lane	N 1300	600
Elizabeth bat. } and Fort Knack }	1700	900
From Fort Knack } to Salt River }	1600	800

This information was furnished  
by Commodore Blacket, who  
had the Coast sounded for the  
purpose at my desire

With regard to landing  
and beginning at Green Point,  
premising, that from thence to  
Kamp's bay which I shall after-  
wards consider, the Coast is to-  
tally inaccessible except at the  
very considerable inlet of Klein  
Meulle where two boats at most  
can land and which may easily  
be destroyed by putting two or  
three more Anchors in it.

Grote Meulle Bay is  
accessible only at high Water: &  
is very small — from thence to  
the Amsterdam Battery there  
is no landing — Between the

Amsterdam and Rogge Bay batteries there are many Rocks and the landing would be difficult at any other moment than a short <sup>space</sup> before and after high Water, when the Rocks are covered.

From the Rogge Bay battery to the Castle and from thence along the Sea line as far as the Salt River, the Beach is very fine except a few Rocks which run out between the Rogge bay battery and the Castle and which contract the landing in Rogge bay.

From the Mouth of the Salt River to the part of the Shore opposite to the House called Jan Bisjes Knaal, the landing is also good and Frigates can come near enough to cover it.

From Jan Bisjes Knaal, for about two Miles the Surf is generally high, but a landing nevertheless may frequently be made good there, but beyond this round as far as Vis-bay which is under Blaan Berg the Surf is nearly constant and so high as to render all landing impracticable. In all this Space, the only part which

is not under our Guns, and which is practicable for Boats is that between the Mouth of the Salt River and the Shore opposite to Jan Pieters Kraal and here it is that I think the landing will be made, nor does it appear possible to prevent it, for the extent of the beach is so considerable that it is not practicable to guard it while the distance from the Town is so great, that you cannot hazard that body of Troops there, which would leave the Town open to the Enemy, as they might not be able to return in time to prevent his possessing himself of important Points.

As to the landing place between the Amsterdam Battery and the Mouth of the Salt River I can hardly think they will ever be attempted. The Body of the Fleet must always lie at so great a distance that a long time must elapse before the first disembarkation can be supported by a second; and I can scarcely imagine that a sufficient Number of Men could be landed at once to be able to

withstand a vigorous attack of all that could be collected for the purpose - beside this a landing must take place under Ground which could not well be affected by any Ships which would attempt to cover the Operations, whilst the irregular disposition of the Range of batteries must concentrate a fire upon them which must go near to destroy them. The apprehension which is so generally entertained of the Effect of Red Hot Shot must also be taken into the Account as I am very clear that it would weigh very much in the consideration which the Enemy would give to the undertaking - Notwithstanding all this as it is possible an enterprising Enemy may attempt, and not impossible that he may succeed in it, it is highly expedient that it should be guarded against

It has always been my view in the first instance, to secure the Summit of the lower part of the Lion's Pump, which is immediately over the Amsterdam Battery, but



but it can only be done by Magony  
 and I have never yet been able to  
 command a sufficient Number of  
 Masons from what I have conce-  
 dered as still more necessary Work—  
 I propose a tower with Walls three  
 feet thick which is fully sufficient—  
 a sufficiency of Artillery should  
 then be placed under the command  
 of the Tower, to bear upon every  
 Spot of the low land, particularly  
 on the two sandy Heights behind  
 the Charriere and by the Magazine,  
 as also on the Amsterdam Battery  
 I would then propose a Line from  
 the Rogge bay battery, to the Quarry  
 over the burying Ground— Two  
 Redoubts would be sufficient one  
 close to the Rogge bay battery and  
 the other about half Way to the  
 Quarry— I would likewise I think  
 be proper to secure the Amsterdam  
 battery which in its present State  
 can only be done by a Wall, across  
 the Gorges of the two bastions—  
 the Palliades which have lately  
 been put on the inside of the Wall  
 will add much to the proposed  
 line of defence.

Supposing this Side of the Town in this state of defence, let us see what an Enemy would gain, or in what Situation he would be if he were fortunate enough to land, notwithstanding that he must do it, under the fire of some of the Batteries.

This Landing may be effected without the proposed Linc — or without it:

In the first place he will find himself on a barren plain subject to a commanding fire wherever he places himself — Without Water — and with a precarious communication with his Shipping, which must at any rate be carried on under our fire — as I take it for granted that all the Guns will be carefully spiked and effectually spiked on abandoning them, he will not be able to use them, which at any rate it would be extremely difficult for him to do, on account of their being all heavy Guns — not easily moved on the Sand under the fire of the Hill. His only Resource seems then to be, to assault the Redoubt which must be strengthened so as to render that attempt fruitless.

The Amsterdam Battery must be also defended — but in case it should at last be carried every Gun on the Hill must be brought to bear upon it so as to drive the Enemy out again, or at least to prevent his making use of the Guns which would entirely command the Lines — Under these circumstances it may be laid down

as an Oxium that of the Line can  
be pursued twenty four Hours  
the Enemy must run back.

This seems to be the proper  
Place to consider Kiampi's bay, be-  
cause a Landing if there effected,  
leads ultimately to the same  
Points as any other Landing would  
which takes place without the line,  
proposed to be drawn between the  
Rogger bay Battery and the Quarry

Kiampi's bay is but seldom  
accessible, the Surf is generally  
very high, however it is sometimes  
smooth enough to admit of Boats  
coming on shore. A new disposition  
has been made for the Batteries  
those which it is intended to begin  
immediately.

The two eighteen Pounders  
to remain in the same Place  
but to be mounted on traversing  
Carriages — And another battery  
of smaller Guns to be erected on  
a Point where it will flank the  
whole of the beach and to be covered  
towards the Sea by an Entrenchment  
The battery will be so situated

that even after the Enemy is landed he cannot reach it but either by marching along the beach directly in front of the Guns or by a circuitous March of some length — so that the Retreat of the Men being secure they may remain at their Guns long enough to destroy every boat which comes on shore. —

These batteries are nearly finished

The anchorage here is so dangerous and difficult that I conceive nothing can ever be attempted but by way of diversion, and the Enemy when landed can only march to Green Point, where he will be exactly in the Situation I have been describing, as what he would be in, if he landed any where beyond the Rogge bay battery, — or he must attempt the Pass between the Lion's Head and the Table Hill which would be equally open to him in the other case. This Pass I look upon as not to be feared if defended with our six little frigates but it must at all times be an Object of Attention.

An Enemy may attempt to land within the proposed line that is between Rogge bay, and the

and the Castle. — This will indeed be difficult as it must be under the fire of both. — We will however suppose the attempt to be successful. In this case three Objects presents themselves to him. The first and most important is to carry the Castle by Storm, but undefensible as it undoubtedly is with respect to a regular attack, I however consider it as a Work not to be carried by Assault in face of the Garrison, which should be in it, and the body of troops which must be without it. — This is however an Object which should at all times be attended to. — The Castle should never for a moment be left without a strong Garrison and its defences against Assault should be repaired and augmented the first leisure Moment that occurs. A precaution which appears to me to be proper with this View and which I have meant to execute is to cover the cover the Sally Port, thro' the Envelope into the main Ditch on the East Side, by

a small loop-holed work of Masonry well covered from the adjacent bank. This would not only secure an additional communication with the Interior of the Castle but would also furnish the Means of making strong Sorties on the flank of the Enemy employed in the attack of the front towards the Town which would probably be his Object of Assault.

The second Object which presents itself to the consideration of an Enemy landed on the Town would be to make himself Master of the Ground towards Green Point, and commence his Operations from thence.

In this case, the Redoubts proposed to be constructed between the Rogge bay battery and the Quarry will scarcely be defensible, as they will be entirely commanded from the Windows and tops of the Houses near them. The possession of the Top of the Hill will however give so decided a command over the whole Plain that while it is retained, I do not see how an Enemy can exist there, besides which his

Communications

communication with his Ships  
 must be so precarious, both on  
 account of the Nature of the Coast  
 and its being all within reach  
 of the Castle Guns, that I do not  
 think he can promise himself  
 much Success from an Attack  
 carried on from these Posts. It  
 appears then that in the Event  
 of forcing a Landing between  
 the Castle and the Rogge bay bat-  
 tery, the third and only remain-  
 ing Object which he can have in  
 View is that which is most like-  
 ly to be attended with Advantage  
 to him, and that would be to push  
 immediately for the Heights above  
 Gordon's battery, and from thence  
 to sweep them entirely to the Shoul-  
 der of the Devils Hill by attack-  
 ing all the post in the rear. If  
 he should succeed it is certain that  
 the Lines must be abandoned,  
 and our Defence being then con-  
 fined to the Castle could not con-  
 tinue eight and forty Hours.  
 This must therefore be guarded  
 against - The Ground by which

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he must make his attack on the Heights  
is naturally strong and two or three  
Batteries would render it exceedingly  
so, while the Guns and Mortars of  
the Castle would flank the Assault-  
ants with great Effect. but above all  
a very small Work on the Top of the  
Hill close under the precipice would  
tend most effectually to secure it.  
Reinforcements from the Lines must  
at any Rate be sent up and every ex-  
ertion made to prevent his Success  
on a point which would be decisive

As to a Landing between  
the Castle and Fort Knoch, I have  
not an Idea I confess, that it can be  
attempted, the Enemy would find  
himself in a plain subject to such  
a Fire crossed in every direction  
from the Castle from the Lines and  
from the Heights, that he could not  
exist a moment. He must assault  
the Castle which I have said al-  
ready I consider as impracticable  
or he must attack the Redoubts of the  
Lines which will even if successful  
lead to nothing more than would  
be attained from his attacking them  
from without, where he would not  
be



be exposed to the previous fire which he must sustain in this case, by the fire of the Castle and the Heights, neither can he bring a single Gun to assist in the attack— In short I look upon a Landing in this Part to be as much out of the Question, that if we had sufficient time I should be strongly tempted to destroy the Line at present existing along the Sea Shore as it affords a very favourable cover for attacking the Castle, should the Enemy at any time become Master of Fort Knock.

The Beach between Fort Knock and the Salt River is equally disadvantageous for a Landing, especially since that by the erection of the Tower in the Year of the Old Redoubt, that Battery is effectually secured. The Enemy would be confined in a very narrow Space subject to such a powerful fire in all directions, that it would not be possible for him long to sustain it.

The best and most secure Landing as has been already

observed which you cannot prevent, and which is that most likely to take place is on Spawden Island between the Mouth of Salt River and that Part of the Coast opposite to Jan Bijes Kraal, The extent is about two Miles - The Beach very fine - the Surf less violent than in any other Part, and Frigates can with safety approach sufficiently near to cover the Landing - How he may disembark at his leisure and in order to pursue the Thread of our Observations on the immediate Defence of the Works, we will suppose him set down before the Lines resuming for a few Considerations what might be done to oppose his Approach to them.

In order to save time the Lines have been repaired nearly upon the plan on which we found them; but the Knock is defective in every Shape with acute Angles - without flank and with a bad ditch. The Holland's Redoubt is better - indeed as a square Redoubt is respectable - the Object has been to put all the Redoubts on a State capable of resisting any  
Attack

Attack by a Coup de Main, while the different positions on the heights furnish such a flank and command the approach so effectually as to render a regular attack by Trenches and Batteries if not impossible at least extremely difficult. The Tower at the old Citadel, Craig's Tower, is eight feet thick except that side towards Fort Knock which is no thicker than was indispensable and can of course be laid open by the Guns of the Fort. The two six pounders are intended to play in reverse on any body of Troops attempting the Line particularly Fort Knock by Assault. The Magazine is bomb proof, and there is a cistern of water, although it would not be easy <sup>for an Enemy</sup> to cut off the communication between Fort Knock & the Tower, it is however intended to have every thing within itself, and certainly furnishes an excellent flank to the Line on that side.

It is now furnished with every necessary.

On the right the principal and most important point is the

new Redoubt and battery of 6 twenty four  
 Pounders on the height immediately  
 was the termination of the lines which  
 I have named the York Redoubt and  
 battery, — these Guns have a most ef-  
 fectual command particularly on  
 the Ground immediately under them  
 in front of the Berghers Redoubt —  
 Indeed this point may be termed the  
 Key of the position as upon it entire-  
 ly depends the possession of the Lines.  
 We have done what we could to se-  
 cure it. The construction <sup>of a ditch</sup> was im-  
 practicable, and we have stretched  
 it the only way that appeared to be  
 feasible, without affording the Enemy  
 too much cover — The first position  
 about which we are beginning to work  
 is another point of great the most of  
 equal consequence. It has a very fine  
 command and would produce a great  
 Effect in the Event of the Enemy attempt-  
 ing the Attack by Approach and  
 batteries.

This Work — called the Piece of  
 Water's Redoubt is now executing

To secure these two Points  
 it is necessary to propose the whole  
 Range of Heights as far as the  
 Shoulder of the Devils Hill and too  
 much

much cannot be done to strength-  
 en and secure that Point particu-  
 larly the Summit where we  
 have constructed a sort of Te-  
 doubt or block House of dry Sta-  
 mpy — this was done in a hur-  
 ry and is by no means sufficient  
 something should be done effec-  
 tually to secure the whole of that  
 Flat — either a Tower or a good  
 Stone block House — but at any  
 rate capable of containing pro-  
 visions and Ammunition as  
 well as every necessary for its  
 own service and that of all  
 the Works and posts about there.  
 This is a most essential Object  
 The Fleches in front of it com-  
 mand the approach to the Te-  
 doubt below, which is on the  
 most accessible Part — I am  
 convinced that if time would  
 permit the construction, that  
 two or three Towers would be  
 well bestowed in these Parts  
 for this Shoulder to the Devil's  
 Hill is the Key to the Key and  
 should be maintained at every  
 risk — the moment you lose it  
 you lose also the first position,

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and even the Tiedoubt on the right of  
the Loris becomes precarious, altho'  
a new position may be taken up  
and ought to be prepared ready to be  
occupied as the principal post of  
all the Heights.

This position is formed of  
the two first ledges of Heights from  
the Town - The Front covered by  
the Ravine which is in front of the  
Tiedoubt and 5 Gun Battery, running  
up the Hill to the Precipice is exceed-  
ingly strong and commands every  
thing before it. The Rear I have al-  
ready <sup>made</sup> is one of the principal Objects  
which the Enemy would probably  
have in view in the event of his land-  
ing in the town with the intention  
of possessing himself of the Heights  
by attacking our Posts in the Rear -  
this also by the help of a few Fleets  
might be rendered strong - This  
Position secures the Loris, for should  
we retain it an Enemy could hardly  
remain in them nor could he attack  
the Castle any otherwise than by  
the beach under cover of the Sea  
line which affords him great Ad-  
vantage. He however he can only

advance by a head unsupported  
He might be frequently annoyed  
and a good defence might be made.

It would be a great advantage  
if this position and indeed all  
the range of Heights were ready  
prepared. A good Magazine of  
Ammunition should be construct  
In Stores should be erect and  
Provisions carried there - above  
all some Tanks for retaining  
the Water in the Gullies should  
be formed - but such are the  
uncommon difficulties attending  
all Works here that it is still far  
to look forward to the time when  
these can be undertaken. As  
a temporary expedient towards  
the defence of these parts I have  
formed a small park of four  
six pounders ready to be carried  
to any point where they may  
be required.

With such powerful &  
commanding Tanks as these  
Heights afford, while we can  
keep possession of them, and no-  
thing should be left unattempted  
to do so, I consider an Attack  
by approaches and batteries to

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be subject to every disadvantage & I should hope, would fail.

The next Object is therefore to see that the Lines are in that State to afford an equally reasonable Hope of being able to withstand an Assault.

The Redoubts are certainly now in a very respectable State of defence, tho' their plan is such as not to furnish any flank to each other yet as their Profile is high and their Situation good it is to be hoped that well manned they would be out of danger. It will be easily seen that it is intended to occupy them alone and not the intermediate Lines which must be considered only merely as a Line of communication — The termination on the right at first Sight will appear extremely unfavourable — upon a nearer examination it will be found to be less so than upon a hasty Survey would be supposed. His out indeed to be maintained for an Instant if the Enemy is supposed to be in possession of the rising Ground in front of it, but while York Redoubt and Battery remain sure that



appears to be impossible — and as  
 to open Attack — particularly in  
 the night time — the roughness  
 of the ground together with the  
 steep and deep gullies or water  
 courses which intersect it would  
 render such extremely difficult  
 indeed — besides these impedim-  
 ents a position has been acco-  
 modated for two field pieces on  
 the right and the commanding  
 Officer of artillery has Barris  
 ready prepared to set fire to Murricks  
 House at moments warning —  
 A reserve should also be always  
 placed with field pieces on the  
 flight where the French began  
 a Line — with these precautions  
 it will be found on Examination  
 that this part is in no contemptible  
 state of defence but the Grounds  
 in the rear of it should be well  
 known and studied — One of the  
 water courses in the front has  
 been improved and something  
 further remains still to be done  
 to complete this end of the Line

to Garden backen

Fort Knuck appears to me  
 to be more open to attack — the  
 very broad River is a defect

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and should be remedied - The ditch  
should be completed and palisaded  
A Quantity of Albates Wood has been  
collected to lay in the Space between  
the left face of the Fort and the Sea  
and this should if possible be con-  
tinued from thence to the end of the  
small inundation which has been  
formed in the front of it, but the  
most effectual way of putting this  
vulnerable point out of all danger  
of being carried by Assault would be  
to surround the Fort towards Craig  
Tower and the right face with a good  
covered Way and Glacis.

I have mentioned that  
a Reserve should be on the Height  
where the french lines are begun.  
If time and means permit this  
is an admirable Situation for a  
large Work well furnished with  
Artillery. It commands the entire  
Plain and even the Lines them-  
selves and would greatly tend to  
secure the Castle, but the summit  
of the Hill close under the prospect  
must be secured at the same time.

With respect to the imme-  
diate Defence of the Works about the  
Town

Then it remains only that I should observe that the Table Hill is certainly impassable for any Body of Troops, there is but one Path that ever I heard of by which it is possible to come down from the Summit, and this is too steep and too rugged for any Body of Men to attempt. It would nevertheless be right to have a small Party on the Top to look out.

There is a path which goes over the Valley between the Table Hill and the Devils Hill it comes down on the other Side in a rugged Gully over Pondebetch; it is to the full as bad as that which leads up Table Hill but would equally deserve some Attention: The Devils Hill itself is held to be inaccessible.

I have thus given my Idea as to the Lines and other Works upon which the Defence of the Town depends—The Question of the propriety of expending ourselves within these Works from the first, or of buying the Count of a battle, will demand very

more consideration and must on a  
 great measure depend upon the cir-  
 cumstances of the Moment - the  
 Strength of the Enemy - the Nature  
 and State of his Troops - the Place  
 of his Landing - our own Strength  
 - all of these must be maturely weigh-  
 ed - It is certain that when we  
 first came here I considered the  
 Position of the Lines as so extreme-  
 ly bad and the Castle as so totally  
 defenceless that I viewed a success-  
 ful Battle as our only Resource -  
 nor was it till some time after that  
 a more minute Examination and  
 Study of the Ground gave me a  
 more favourable Idea of the whole  
 - Our Strength of Cavalry is a cir-  
 cumstance which argues much in  
 Favour of coming to action with  
 an Enemy who cannot possibly have  
 any, and should he commence his  
 Operations from Simons Town &  
 force the Pass of Meisenberg, the  
 Ground from thence to the Town  
 is so favourable particularly for  
 Cavalry

Cavalry that much might be risk-  
 ed - but should the Enemy land  
 upon Pardon Island, it would  
 be more difficult to bring him  
 to action as he will be covered  
 by a River over which there are  
 only two or three fords - The  
 Salt River and its Fords should  
 be well reconnoitered and thorough-  
 ly known by the Commander in  
 Chief - no description can convey  
 an adequate Idea to him - very  
 great Use may be made of it -  
 tho' much will depend upon the  
 Season of the Year - according  
 to which it varies considerably -  
 Shallow in almost its whole ex-  
 tent, it is nevertheless passable  
 in but very few Places, from  
 Mud and shifting quick-  
 sands. At the Mouth it is  
 frequently fordable at low Wa-  
 ter, particularly in the Summer  
 - I hardly think however that  
 an Enemy will ever venture  
 to pass there, for the same rea-  
 son that I do not think that  
 he will attempt a Landing on

this side of it - He would be confin'd  
up in a very narrow strip of land  
exposed to the heavy fire of Craig's  
Battary in the direct front of which  
he must move. It would however be  
essential to secure this front by  
throwing logs, fuel and other in-  
ferments in the ford.

The next ford is below the  
Gallows near where the Salt River and  
deep River join. This is a good ford  
almost dry at low water, but some-  
times deep in the winter. It would  
be a very essential Point to destroy  
this ford the Instant an Enemy makes  
his Appearance - I have frequent-  
ly had it in contemplation to do so  
at present, but have been deterred by  
the consideration of the inconvenience  
which it might occasion, which I  
think it can hardly happen but  
that we shall have sufficient time  
to do it after the Arrival of our  
Army - It will require only the cast-  
ing it with a few ditches - the most  
Place at which the River is passable  
is

is about a Mile up at what is called the wide Mouth - there is then one other Pass on this side of Red Valley.

To shew the consequence of defending these fords, at least as long as possible, it is sufficient to observe that the River being salt the Enemy cannot obtain a drop of Water on Raardon Island of which he will not probably have been aware, and must therefore suffer much - The two first fords, viz that at the Mouth and that near the Gallows ought to be effectually destroyed, otherwise it would be dangerous to attempt defending the others, because if the Enemy succeeded in forcing either of these, he would be between the Lines and the Troops stationed for the Defence of them, besides which it is an essential and important advantage to increase the length of his communication with his Shipping

This however depends much upon the State of the River at the tides

in a Country in which it will at any  
 rate be difficult, and by which the  
 better Opportunity will be afforded  
 to our Cavalry to act upon it. — On  
 the whole much tax may be made  
 of the Salt Water — but caution must  
 be used and every thing will depend  
 upon a thorough Knowledge of it.

The Cavalry have been sta-  
 tioned with the View of cutting off  
 the Enemy's communication with  
 the Country and acting in his Rear  
 while he is occupied in the attack of  
 the Lines — I must however repeat  
 once more; because I conceive it to  
 be of the very greatest Importance  
 that their first Attention must be to  
 drive away or kill all the Cattle  
 and Horses within the Enemy's reach  
 — The commanding Officer must  
 have the most precise and positive  
 injunctions on this head — When  
 this is effectually accomplished, he  
 must employ himself as above  
 mentioned — Parties must be kept  
 constantly close to the Enemy —



continual attacks and alarms  
 must be made — Every detach-  
 ment must be constantly joined  
 by whatever can be collected. If  
 too strong to be attacked it  
 must be surrounded and har-  
 rassed by every possible means —  
 His Movements must be rendered  
 as slow as possible from the ne-  
 cessity of keeping in constant  
 order, and ready to resist a  
 Charge which must at least be  
 ready to take place on the  
 slightest opening.

With a small brigade  
 of very light Artillery, every thing  
 may be attempted by a bold and  
 well led Cavalry against an En-  
 emy who can have none of either

The communication be-  
 tween his Boats and his Camp  
 must be constantly watched &  
 no opportunity let slip, by  
 which it can be interrupted;  
 In short activity and Spirit in  
 the Cavalry may save the  
 Colony.

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**DOCUMENT: A memorandum (56 leaves) on the defence of the Cape prepared by Craig for his successor, Lord Macartney.**

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